

The Diplomacy
of
ZHOU ENLAI



Ronald C. Keith

THE DIPLOMACY OF ZHOU ENLAI

Also by Ronald C. Keith

ENERGY, SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EAST ASIA (editor)

The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai

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
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For Rita, Molly and Nan



With the song of the Great River in my heart, I turn to the East
I'll deeply penetrate the various sciences to save my unhappy
country

For years I'll face the wall like an aspiring Buddha
And I'll break the wall to free the sightless dragon therein
I'll even tread on the East Sea to achieve this great ambition
Or I will die an hero's death in the attempt.*

* As a young student activist of 19, Zhou Enlai wrote this poem just before leaving China for Japan in September, 1917. The developing May Fourth Movement's enthusiasm for foreign learning and especially for 'Mr Science' and the student sense of urgency and dedication to save the country are evident in the classical allusions. The latter are freely translated by the author to convey the tone and sense of the poem. The original calligraphy is housed at the Museum of Chinese History, Beijing.

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The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in the winter of 1985 helped organise, under difficult circumstances, a regime of interviews with foreign policy practitioners and Zhou Enlai's contemporaries. It is certainly not the author's wish to impute any specific interpretation in the present volume to the Academy; however, the interviews were very helpful in establishing policy detail.

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Please note that the *pinyin* system of romanisation is herein considered to be authoritative.

RONALD C. KEITH

List of Abbreviations

BR	<i>Beijing Review</i>
CB	US, Consulate General, Hong Kong, <i>Current Background</i>
CCAS	Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars
CCDC	Columbia University, <i>Contemporary China Documents Collection</i>
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CCPCC	Chinese Communist Party Central Committee
CMEA	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CPPCC	Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CPV	Chinese People's Volunteers
CQ	<i>China Quarterly</i>
DQGJ	<i>Dangqiande guoji xingshi 1973.8–1974.5</i> (The current international situation 1973.8–1974.5) (Hong Kong: Sanlianshudian, 1974)
DOCEX	Declassified Documents Reference System
FRUS 1949	US, Department of State, <i>Foreign Relations of the United States</i> (Washington, DC: GPO, 1974)
FRUS 1951	US, Department of State, <i>Foreign Relations of the United States</i> , vol. VII, Part 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1983)
FRUS 52–4	US, Department of State, <i>Foreign Relations of the United States</i> , vol. XVI, The Geneva Conference (Washington, DC: GPO, 1981)
FRUS 55–7	US, Department of State, <i>Foreign Relations of the United States</i> , vol. III, China (Washington, DC: GPO, 1986)
GMD	Guomindang (Kuomintang)
JPRS	US, National Technical Information Service, <i>Joint Publications Research Service</i>
LDC	Less Developed Country
NCNA	New China News Agency
NPC	National People's Congress
OIR	US, Department of State, Office of Intelligence and Research

PLA	People's Liberation Army
PR	<i>Peking Review</i>
PRC	People's Republic of China
RMRB	<i>Renmin ribao</i> , (People's daily), Beijing
SCMM	US, Consulate General, Hong Kong, <i>Survey of China Mainland Magazines</i>
SCMP	US, Consulate General, Hong Kong, <i>Survey of China Mainland Press</i>
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation
SWDXP	<i>Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping 1975–1984</i> (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984)
SWM III, IV	<i>Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung</i> , vols. III, IV (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967, 1969)
SWM, V	<i>Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung</i> , vol. V (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977)
SWZEL, I	<i>Selected Works of Zhou Enlai</i> vol. 1 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1981)
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
ZELWJ	<i>Zhou Enlai tongzhi lu Ou wenji</i> (The European correspondence of comrade Zhou Enlai) (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 1979)
ZELXJ, II, HK	<i>Zhou Enlai xuanji</i> (Selected works of Zhou Enlai), vol. II (Hong Kong: Yishantushu gongsi, 1976)
ZHWGJ, 49–50	<i>Zhonghua renmin gongheguo dui wai guanxi wenjianji</i> (Collected documents on the foreign affairs of the People's Republic of China), vol. 1, 1949–50 (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1957)
ZHWGJ, 51–3	<i>Zhonghua renmin gongheguo dui wai guanxi wenjianji</i> (Collected documents on the foreign affairs of the People's Republic of China), vol. 2, 1951–3 (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1958)
ZHWGJ, 54–5	<i>Zhonghua renmin gongheguo dui wai guanxi wenjianji, 1954–1955</i> , vol. 3 (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1958)
ZHWGJ, 56–7	<i>Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wai guanxi wenjianji, 1956–1957</i> , vol. 4 (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1958)

ZHWGJ, 58 *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo dui wai guanxi wenjianji*, 1958, vol. 5 (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1959)

ZHWGJ, 59 *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wai guanxi wenjianji*, 1959, vol. 6 (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1961)

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Introduction: ‘Rational’ Diplomacy in the Service of Revolution

The practice of diplomacy is often identified historically with the chancelleries of Europe; however, one of this century’s greatest diplomats emerged in the tumultuous context of revolutionary upheaval in China. Zhou Enlai’s diplomacy was obviously borne of China’s specific domestic and international circumstances, but it has assumed an international significance in its own right. As a Chinese student in Europe, Zhou became very conscious of the European practice of diplomacy, and in his adult years, as Premier and Foreign Minister, he had to contend personally with the consequences of the extension of the European state system to most of Africa and Asia.

Zhou only prized the principles and language of European diplomacy in so far as these formally espoused national self-determination, reciprocity and equality in the relations between states. As a committed revolutionary and Chinese nationalist, he was frequently at odds with the hierarchical international order which was sustained in European diplomacy, particularly as the latter reinforced the pattern of inequality and dependence of colonialism. Zhou readily understood the dimensions of power, but he was keenly interested in the use of power to achieve principle.

Zhou’s view of international relations was pointedly Marxist-Leninist. That ‘revolution is not a dinner party’ is self-evident, but did the Chinese revolutionary experience, as it was understood by Zhou, preclude the ‘rational’ practice of diplomacy? Ultimately, Zhou Enlai was a diplomat *for* revolution, and yet he achieved international recognition as the consummate diplomat.

As China’s Foreign Minister from 1949 to February 1958, and as Premier of the State Council from 1949 until his death on 8 January 1976, Zhou exercised a powerful and formative influence over the conduct of diplomacy and the formulation and execution of foreign policy. His leadership encompassed the development of distinctively Chinese ‘people’s diplomacy’ and strategy for foreign aid. Zhou’s ‘rational’ diplomacy adroitly circumvented US containment in the

seemingly intractable circumstances of the Cold War. His extraordinary acumen and political resilience was later tested to the limits of human endurance in the brutal circumstances of the Cultural Revolution; and yet Zhou, in the early 1970s, oversaw the fundamental reshaping and extension of China's international political alignments, and he established the foundations for the contemporary 'open door policy'.

The narrative of Zhou's diplomacy, therefore, reads as one of the most fascinating chapters of modern diplomatic history, but the scholarly research of his career has been both controversial and difficult. With few exceptions, Chinese accounts have yet to move beyond valedictory recollections of Zhou as a 'revolutionary martyr' to analyse the principles and practices of his diplomacy.¹ Domestic political considerations, particularly the all too ready identification of biography with 'personality cult', have constrained the Chinese study of Zhou.

There are several Western biographies, but these often treat Zhou's diplomacy and foreign policy as incidental to the analysis of the underlying psychological factors which are thought to explain his complex political personality.² In his biography John Roots notes that during the Cold War the Western press was intrigued by Zhou as a 'man of mystery' who was variously described as the 'Gentleman Hatchet Man', 'The Elastic Bolshevik', 'The Rubber Communist', and 'The Chinese Sphinx'.³

Even in death the mystery of Zhou Enlai still piques the curiosity of those observers who would seek an explanation of his 'pragmatism' in the psychoanalysis of his character. In his recent biography of Zhou, Dick Wilson seeks an explanation for Zhou's 'volatile blend of idealism and practicality' in the elusive complexity of his feelings and motivations.⁴ Wilson draws the interesting conclusion that Zhou projected himself 'differently to different civilizations'.⁵ The fact that foreigners of different cultures so readily saw in the character and behaviour of Zhou confirmation of the values, which they, themselves, held dear, points to Zhou's extraordinary success as a diplomat.

Zhou's ability to achieve compromise in the difficult context of conflicting principles might also be cast in light of the Confucian tradition of the 'golden mean' (*zhongyong*). Some foreign admirers, particularly the French, commented on his personal graces as the modern equivalent to the Confucian scholarly gentleman, the *junzi*. Certainly, Nehru, in the 1950s, was confident that the time-honoured

traditions of ancient Chinese civilization would eventually reassert themselves in Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy. Even surviving Chinese contemporaries, who worked with Zhou in foreign affairs, have emphasised the relevance of Chinese classical thought and strategy to his diplomacy.

Zhou's own attitude towards the Confucian past was necessarily complex. In the early 1940s he reviled Chiang Kai-shek's feigned 'virtue of sincerity', and he viewed Chiang's 'holding fast to the mean' as an especially hypocritical reflection of 'the traditional all-pervasive ideology of the exploiting class'.⁶ In his April 1949 talks with 'democratic personages', however, he conceded that the Chinese Communist Party's 'own analytical tradition' required the study of the positive attributes of the Confucian past.⁷ The alleged élitism of the Confucian past conflicted with the Party's mass line, but Confucianism, even according to contemporary CCP analysis, may have a bearing on modern Chinese political leadership and diplomacy.

The apocryphal sage king, Shun, for example, delighted in questioning others and in studying the resulting conflict of opinions so as to lay hold of the two extremes in order to determine the 'mean' in government policy. 'The Doctrine of the Mean' recommended the cultivation of a 'friendly harmony without being weak', and this appears as relevant to modern diplomacy. However, this 'mean' is at odds with the Party's modern notion of dialectics. The latter encompasses both the clash and unity of opposites in all political phenomena, and this is the exclusive philosophical base for the flexible application of principle in the context of complex political realities. Such flexibility is distinguished from 'vulgar evolutionism' by the application of 'seeking the truth from the facts' in the study of 'objective' reality.

There is the more practical issue of whether Zhou adopted a 'pragmatic' balance of power in his foreign policy. Kissinger believed that Zhou had an intuitive grasp of the classical European balance of power. Some observers have traced the modern practice of this balance to classical Chinese strategic practice.⁸ The influence of Chinese classical thought and strategy in the making of Zhou's diplomacy cannot be discounted, but neither should the thrust of contemporary Chinese analysis be discounted. The latter describes the 'factual and realistic' aspects of Zhou's 'diplomatic style' as 'proletarian revolutionary'.⁹ Deng Xiaoping, in his eulogy of 15 January 1976, did not believe that he was being controversial when

he attested: 'Internationally, Comrade Zhou Enlai resolutely implemented Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in foreign affairs and upheld proletarian internationalism.'¹⁰

The study of Zhou's Chinese personality is a useful reference point, but Zhou's 'diplomacy' evolved out of the entwining of modern Chinese nationalism and socialism. If Zhou was indeed a 'realist' in international affairs, it was in large part because he was a Chinese Marxist-Leninist, and the comprehensive explanation of his diplomacy includes reference to Chinese Marxist-Leninist categories of thought. Concepts such as 'workstyle' (*gongzuo zuofeng*), 'strategies and policies' (*fangzhen zhengce*), were explicit in the general development of Zhou's ideas on principles of leadership and related policy and method concerning the observation of reality and the solution of both domestic and international problems. The focus on these particular concepts allows for a close examination of the relation between diplomacy and the general political principles and practices of Chinese Communism.

'Workstyle' has its conceptual origins in 'the Marxist-Leninist working method of the mass line'.¹¹ Ideally, it encompasses rigorous standards of self-discipline, informed tactical responses to 'objective' political reality, collective and democratic consultation in policy development and personal study and inductive investigation, based on the epistemology of 'seeking the truth from the facts' (*shishi qiu shi*). The 'hallmark' of the mass line has been described in terms of 'its balance of situational flexibility within the limits of firm operational principles'.¹²

Fangzhen, or 'strategies', and *zhengce*, 'policies', are so closely related that these two two-character compounds are interchangeable in every day usage. Together the four characters have been translated as 'policy guideline'.¹³ Franz Schurmann suggests a distinction between *zhengce*, as 'specific policy', and *fangzhen*, as 'general policy'.¹⁴ The *Cihai* (Shanghai, 1979), perhaps more clearly distinguishes between *fangzhen* as a theoretical conception of leadership, related to 'guiding leadership' or *zhidao*, and *zhengce*, implying a set of operational principles, or a 'standard for taking action' (*xingdong zhunze*), as for example is implied in 'diplomatic norms' (*waijiao zhunze*).¹⁵

Even though Zhou is widely admired in the West as the consummate diplomat, it cannot be assumed that his definition of 'diplomacy' was exactly the same as that which is formally offered in Western international relations texts. The late Professor Hedley Bull

provided one such definition as follows: 'The conduct of relations between states and other entities with standing in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means'.¹⁶ Zhou did, indeed, presume the need for continuous peaceful negotiations between states, but he regarded 'diplomacy' as 'the continuation of war by other means'.¹⁷ Zhou once lectured a group of green, but attentive foreign service officials on a distinction between 'two kinds of war'. 'Diplomacy', he concluded, falls within the 'war of words' as opposed to the 'war of swords'.

Zhou ultimately sought the transformation of world politics. He viewed 'diplomacy' as a highly politicised process which was neither limited to 'entities with standing in world politics', nor 'official agents'. Throughout the struggle to resist US containment, and to gain wider international recognition, Zhou was ever mindful of the power of international public opinion. The origins of his 'people's diplomacy' (*renmin waijiao*) can be found in the public opinion exercises of united front politics during the late 1930s and early-to-mid-1940s.

For Zhou, propaganda was a natural and legitimate part of the diplomatic process. In one of his earliest instructions regarding 'workstyle', he urged his Wuhan subordinates to practice '*wuqin*', meaning 'get busy with the five things'. His would be-diplomats were to get busy with their eyes in reading Mao's writings and the Party's directives. They were to exercise their ears in collecting opinions in different quarters as to the war and the Guomindang. They were instructed to use their tongues in disseminating Party policies. In using their hands, they were to demonstrate 'self-reliance' in personally handling their diplomatic responsibilities, and similarly, in using their legs they were to go out and make contacts rather than waiting for someone to come knocking at the door.¹⁸ '*Wuqin*' was to be applied towards 'uniting with all the forces that can be united with' (*tuanjie keyi tuanjiede liliang*).

Zhou's prodigious talent for achieving compromise under seemingly tortuous and intractable political circumstances is legendary, and many observers in the West have viewed his diplomacy in terms of 'pragmatism'. A few Taiwan-based scholars have negatively likened his constant compromising to the bobbing up and down of a Chinese leaded doll (*budao weng*).¹⁹ Also, the bear-baiting Albanian leader, Enver Hoxha, once complained bitterly of Zhou's 'vacillating pragmatism' which, he alleged, played right into the hands of US imperialism.²⁰ Zhou regretted Hoxha's failure to appreciate Lenin's

statement: 'There are compromises and compromises'.²¹ Zhou felt that Hoxha and dogmatic ideologues like him did not really understand Lenin's genius at Brest-Litovsk.

The formal source of Zhou's 'realism' lies in Mao's dialectical theory of contradictions and praxis. In a not altogether friendly defence of Zhou during the Cultural Revolution, Mao openly discussed Red Guard suspicions of Zhou's apparent 'habit of combining and compromising'.²² But Zhou's 'workstyle' was always scrupulously rationalised in terms of Mao's own theory of contradictions requiring 'seeking the truth from the facts'. Zhou was personally at ease with Mao's emphasis on the 'unity of theory and practice'. In diplomacy and foreign policy, as well as in all spheres of political activity, his 'strategies and policies' were devised with explicit reference to such unity, which achieved its greatest recognition in the pre-1949 theories of domestic and international politics of united front.

In the West, 'pragmatism' in foreign affairs seems to imply an ability to cope with the underlying power dynamic which originates in the security dilemma of states and the inequalities of an hierarchical structure of international politics. 'Pragmatism' in this sense has never been formally endorsed in the Chinese Communist context.

In Party history, Zhou's name was seldom linked to 'pragmatism' (*shiyongzhuyi*). The latter was understood in terms of the 'bourgeois' liberalism of John Dewey and Hu Shi, which opposed scientific, critical method to ideology. However, Zhou's enemies did attempt to identify his 'realism' with 'empiricism' (*jingyanzhuyi*), connoting a politically regressive over-emphasis on facts at the expense of making revolution. The so-called anti-Party Trotskyites, who in the late 1930s opposed Mao's policy of united front, attacked the development of 'empiricism' in Party affairs. In the rectification movement of 1941, both Mao and Zhou reacted with a counter-emphasis on 'dogmatism', which connoted the misinformed, subjective superimposition of bookish theory on the complex plane of 'objective' reality.

'Empiricism' was later featured in the accusations against Zhou during the Cultural Revolution, and even in the last year of his life when he was subject to innuendo likening him to 'The Big Confucian' and 'The Premier',²³ Zhou was accused of a subterfuge to stall the momentum of the revolutionary forces, and he was cast in the historical role of the 'reactionary' minister, Sima Guang, who so invidiously opposed one of Chinese history's greatest reformers, Wang Anshi.²⁴

Early in 1975 when Zhou was deathly ill, his relentless antagonists targeted ‘empiricism’ as ‘the main danger’. Their cleverness was personally repudiated by Chairman Mao. As was the case during the Party’s formative rectification of the early 1940s, Mao claimed that opposition to ‘revisionism’ at home and abroad must always encompass opposition to both ‘empiricism’ and ‘dogmatism’. Zhou’s wilful opponents were dismissed as amateur dialecticians, who needed tutoring in the basics of Marxism-Leninism. Mao sternly rebuked them saying: ‘You don’t just mention one half and let the other go’.²⁵

The formal difference between ‘empiricism’, and the Party’s ‘correct’ epistemology of ‘seeking the truth from the facts’ was lost in the violent ideological extremism of the Cultural Revolution of 1966–8. Zhou was only gradually able to reinstate the routine reference to ‘seeking the truth from the facts’ in Chinese politics after September 1968.

The following analysis of the origins and policy implications of Zhou’s ‘realism’ assumes the continuing importance of the rational dimensions of the Party’s own analytical traditions. Hedley Bull’s discussion of ‘diplomacy’ asks whether there is not an opposition between revolutionary justice and rational diplomacy;²⁶ however, in the case of Zhou Enlai, the question might be rephrased. Was Zhou Enlai, as both a Party ‘realist’ and ‘proletarian revolutionary’, capable of practicing ‘rational diplomacy’?

Zhou, for all of his realism, may have in fact been a better Communist than even Mao²⁷; however, Western analysis has more often assumed the contrary, casting Zhou as the ‘moderate’ who was not truly in sympathy with Mao’s radical view of world politics. The latter assumption fails to explain the significant co-operation between Zhou and Mao in the orchestration of Sino-American *rapprochement*. Soong Ching Ling’s assessment of Zhou as ‘a complete proletarian revolutionary’, on the other hand, insists on the genuine co-operation between Zhou and Mao in the line of ‘broadening to the utmost extent’ China’s relations with the rest of the world.²⁸

The implications of Mao’s assumed radicalism and Zhou’s moderation has been discussed in the ‘revisionist’ writings of Noam Chomsky. Chomsky alleges that American scholars failed to offer a ‘serious explanation’ as to why ‘the picture of an expansionist, irrational, xenophobic Peking’ should no longer be appropriate in the light of Nixon’s ‘journey for peace’. Chomsky adds that the Western

press tended to ignore the fact that the Sino-American *rapprochement* received the blessing of Chairman Mao, the radical leader most responsible for the Cultural Revolutions. Chomsky concludes: 'The Western press generally assumed that "moderates" led by Zhou Enlai, brought China in out of the cold'.²⁹

The understanding of what so many observers in the West have come to regard as Zhou's 'pragmatism' is, therefore, critical to the contemporary analysis of the undercurrents of realism in post-1949 Chinese foreign policy. The assumption that Zhou's diplomacy succeeded despite Mao's ideology should be tested in the light of the wealth of Chinese documentation suggesting that Zhou's 'strategies and policies' were consistently shaped within the reference points of Mao's own ideology – an ideology which has been formally recognised in China as the collective wisdom of an entire generation of revolutionary leaders including Zhou Enlai himself.

Much of the thinking which sustained the post-1949 development of Zhou's 'workstyle' and 'strategies and policies' originated with the Party's formal conceptualisation of shifting political alignments within the pre-1949 united front struggle for national survival. In fact, in the 1930s and 1940s 'diplomacy' was handled by Party organisation, and according to Zhou the dissemination of Mao's writings on the War of Resistance and its international implications was a major objective of such 'diplomacy'.³⁰ After 1949, Mao's spontaneous ruminations on the politics of the pre-1949 united front were progressively incorporated into a formal ideological canon, which provided the 'rational' basis for the new regime's diplomacy.

Western international relations theory has highlighted the Marxist-Leninist treatment of foreign affairs as the extension of domestic politics as an 'irrational' basis for the conduct of diplomacy and determination of foreign policy. Kenneth Waltz's classic on the images of international relations, for example, focused attention on the Marxist view of war as the external manifestation of domestic class struggle. Citing Charles Beard's conclusion that foreign policy is 'the inescapable phase' of domestic policy, Waltz concluded that modern Marxism in particular had achieved the greatest reduction of foreign policy in favour of domestic politics.³¹

'Realism' in Western theory, has often presumed that the international relations of states, as a political system, operates in compliance to system-specific rules which transcend the particularistic assumptions of domestic politics. Waltz's analysis attempted to describe foreign policy in terms of the complex interrelationships of conflicting

individual actions, domestic politics, and the systemic features of the international system of state relations; however, his assumption to the effect that socialist states are, in particular, capable of ignoring their own stake in the system to further domestic political objectives is controversial.

Alternatively, it might be noted that the general theory of Marxism-Leninism stresses both the explicit and implicit linkages between international and domestic political, economic and social developments. Already in the 1920s such analysis assumed the international development towards world war, and the strategic conceptualisation of international problems influenced the tactical understanding of discrete national conditions. In the elaboration of his own 'strategies and policies', Zhou Enlai personally excelled in this kind of analysis.

The Chinese used their own terms of reference, but they were, nevertheless, keenly interested in making realistic assessments of international politics. This was readily seen as a matter of survival. While the Chinese ideological conception of international relations was indeed self-consciously related to the analysis of the totality of domestic social, economic and political forces of states, one does not, therefore, conclude that either the Chinese leaders, or Zhou Enlai, were incapable of making informed judgements as to the extent of China's national power in comparison to that of other states. Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, in their several case studies of Chinese crisis behaviour, conclude that China's international behaviour is indeed derivative of domestic political perspective, but they suggest that what is important is *how* the Chinese make their decisions and calculations in relation to domestic priorities.³² As China's 'socialist idealism' is inevitably domestic, so is China's 'socialist realism'.

The following chapters together will focus on the chronological study of the schematic framework within which Zhou developed his 'workstyle' and 'strategies and policies' so as to achieve a realistic and successful diplomacy. Despite the vicissitudes of domestic leadership upheavals, Zhou persisted in the attempt to achieve a rationally calculated understanding of national and international policy.

In the end, his diplomacy and policy triumphed over US containment. In the context of improved Sino-American relations and deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations, Zhou evolved a policy which was informed by the Chinese understanding of China's own domestic experience of multiple 'imperialisms'. This policy was rooted in an

ideological understanding of ‘independence and self-reliance’ in international relations,³³ and it was on this basis that Zhou conceived his famous ‘five principles of peaceful coexistence’ as standards of international behaviour and as a strategy for resisting neocolonialism and imperialism. In fact, China’s contemporary ‘independent foreign policy’ has its foundation in Zhou Enlai’s ‘workstyle’ and ‘strategies and policies’.

Diplomats, down through time, have always had to confront the complexity of seemingly intractable political contradictions, and diplomacy has ideally required, in response, an informed view of one’s own national interest as well as that one’s friends and adversaries alike. Zhou believed in diplomacy, but he believed that it is an explicitly political process. He would have agreed with Cardinal Richelieu and François de Callières that diplomacy requires ceaseless negotiation ‘even in those [places] from which no present fruits are reaped’.³⁴

Zhou, himself, attained the epitome of ‘diplomacy’ described by the eminent diplomatist, Sir Ernest Satow, as ‘the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between governments’.³⁵ Zhou, however, was not an exponent of *Louisquatorzien* diplomacy. His diplomatic and ideological world was self-consciously shaped by the quest for independence in the twentieth century context of decolonisation.

Did Zhou’s diplomacy encompass the ‘pragmatic’ discovery of, and the maximisation of the mutually perceived coincidence of the national interests of states? Kissinger was emphatic on the need for ‘pragmatism’ to achieve such a desired coincidence. He cautioned President Nixon to proceed ‘not on the basis of ideology, but on the assessment of mutual interest’.³⁶ Kissinger thought that Zhou shared his own diplomatic precepts in the negotiation of the Shanghai Communique, and he described their close working relationship as follows:

Of course, Chou and I used each other; that is on one level the purpose of diplomacy. But another of its purposes is to bring about a compatibility of aims; only the amateur or the insecure thinks he can permanently outmanoeuvre his opposite number. In foreign policy one must never forget that one deals in recurring cycles . . . with the same people; trickery sacrifices structure to temporary benefit. Reliability is the cement of international order even among opponents; pettiness is the foe of permanence. This Chou

En-lai grasped, and it enabled us to achieve not identical aims but comparable analyses of what was needed to use the international equilibrium to our mutual benefit at this particular moment in history.³⁷

Zhou's shrewd flexibility in negotiations does not establish his personal commitment to Henry Kissinger's 'the international equilibrium'. If Zhou, as a 'diplomat' in the service of the Chinese revolution, believed that tactical flexibility was necessary to the attainment of strategic purpose, or 'firm principle', this was the essential lesson of the revolutionary experience, itself. The pre-1949 survival of the revolution was consciously predicated in the 'unity of theory and practice' which militated against the extremes of 'dogmatism' and 'empiricism'. Zhou did not struggle for 'international equilibrium' between the US and USSR.

The contemporary dimensions of Chinese foreign policy, including Third World multilateralism, the simultaneous co-operation and struggle with the superpowers and the furtherance of multipolarity, as opposed to bipolarity, were anticipated in the 'strategies and policies' which made up the style and substance of Zhou Enlai's diplomacy.³⁸

1 The Making of the Diplomat in Revolution, 1919–49

In defining ‘diplomacy’, the late Hedley Bull once noted that it cannot be successfully practiced in the context of any universalist claim to justice.¹ As revolution so clearly embraces the latter, it does pose a conceptual dilemma in terms of the practice of diplomacy in an international environment commonly characterised by the realities of hierarchical ordering of power and the enduring competition between nation-states. Hedley Bull’s notation is not at all that extraordinary, for ‘revolution’, as it is predicated in massive social change and the ideological conceptualisation of the remaking of society, has often been contrasted with rational, legal routine.

Zhou Enlai, however, practiced diplomacy in the service of revolution. The making of Zhou Enlai as a diplomat raises several related questions. How did Zhou personally investigate the realities of international relations? What were the conceptual origins of his famous ‘realism’? How did he conceptualise the institutional features of international politics? These questions require a chronological analysis of the stages in Zhou’s developing realism with reference to his travels, personal political career and intellectual maturation, and his developing perception of interrelated changes in contemporary Chinese society and world politics.

Zhou became acquainted with Marxism in Japan; however, in Europe, in the early 1920s, he developed a sophisticated grasp of Leninism which explicitly rejected the alleged temporising of European social democracy to highlight the critical revolutionary role of the proletariat. His view of international relations originated in basic Leninist assumptions regarding foreign policy and diplomacy as the extension of domestic class contradictions.

Zhou agreed with Lenin on the need to put down ‘infantile disorder on the left’, and he highly valued Lenin’s common sense at Brest-Litovsk. In the early 1920s Zhou forwarded to China a serialised reportage covering social and political crisis in Europe, the domestic and international implications of the Versailles settlement,

the failings of the League of Nations, as an alleged extension of the balance of power, China's status with respect to competing European hegemonisms and the underlying trend towards world war in the Pacific. As a senior Party organiser at the centre of the Chinese Communist movement in Europe, Zhou earned the respect of the Comintern.

On his return to China in 1924, Zhou had to cope with the complex exigencies of the first united front. Zhou assumed many of the burdens of the early Comintern-CCP relationship. He demonstrated his negotiating skills in the frequently attempted reconciliations of rival factions within the CCP as well as between the CCP and the factions of the Guomindang. In the 1930s, Zhou progressively tempered his European assumptions regarding the role of the proletariat in China. Against 'infantile disorder on the left' he defended the utility of 'diplomatic method' (*waijiao shouduan*) as a means of discriminating between, and extracting concessions from, competing imperialist powers in order to secure Chinese Communist bases in the hinterland.

In the Xi'an Incident of December 1936, his personal diplomacy achieved a new pinnacle of revolutionary realism. This realism was formalised in the rectification of the Party in the early 1940s, which described 'workstyle' largely in terms of 'seeking the truth from the facts'. Zhou also worked closely with Mao in the day-to-day evolution of united front 'dual tactics'. Under Mao's influence he became a committed Chinese Marxist-Leninist, and it is herein that one may find the most important intellectual component of Zhou's realism in foreign affairs.

Zhou had by then moved considerably beyond the theoretically abstract limitations of the 'Internationalist' faction in the Party to participate in the 'sinification of Marxism-Leninism'. There was no question of abandoning the basic ideological objectives of the revolution in favour of a numbing daily praxis. In the sharp focus on the unity of theory and practice, Chinese praxis, itself, became seminally ideological. Zhou and Mao together attacked 'dogmatism' in the Party and moved beyond the 'leftist infantile disorder' of the early 1930s to achieve a new understanding of domestic and international politics in terms of a specifically Chinese theory of contradictions. Their emphasis on praxis focused the Party on the importance of Chinese 'independence and self-reliance'. They welcomed what Soviet aid was available, but their primary concern was the organisation of a self-reliant revolutionary movement which drew on domestic resources.

Zhou's workstyle and analytical approach startled the members of the US Dixie Mission in Yan'an. In contrast to the Guomindang, the CCP had apparently achieved a remarkably realistic understanding of Chinese political, economic, military and social conditions. In fact, it was an important part of Zhou's 'diplomacy' to persuade the Americans that this was indeed the case. John Service was so impressed with Communist analytical capabilities that he loosely compared their approach to the rigorous techniques of Western social science. Service, at least, was convinced that the CCP leaders were realists because they were Chinese. In other words, they viewed reality from an informed Chinese perspective – a point which CCP propaganda constantly reiterated in its denunciation of the shallow dependency of the Guomindang on external aid and circumstances.

In several years of negotiation at Chongqing, Zhou was outstanding. His diplomacy targeted the Americans. It sought to establish itself as the genuine alternative to official diplomacy of the Guomindang. Zhou and Mao astutely dealt with the frustrating conditions of 'fight, fight, talk, talk' consistently applying their strategy of 'dual tactics' which always sought to win over the 'middle forces' in the political struggle to isolate the diehards of the Guomindang.

The following discussion highlights the stages of development in Zhou's realism in pre-1949 foreign affairs. The origins of Zhou's realism are primarily located within the ideological parameters of Chinese Marxism-Leninism. This discussion is inclusive of the developing coincidence of views between Mao and Zhou which became the basis of a lifetime political partnership. Zhou did not achieve a realistic assessment of national interest on the basis of an evasion of the ideological requisites of Mao's view of the revolution. On the contrary, the sources of his realism lie for the most part in the Party's ideological emphasis on revolutionary praxis, and his personal work-style was informed by the Yan'an tradition of 'seeking the truth from the facts'.

ZHOU'S EUROPEAN TUITION, 1920–24

By the time that Zhou boarded the good ship, *Porthos*, at Shanghai on 7 November 1920 for the long journey to Marseilles via the Suez Canal, he was already a jail-hardened student activist who had taken a leading role in the May Fourth Movement against 'warlordism' and 'imperialism'.

As an editor of the *Tianjin Student Union Bulletin*, Zhou's articles

appeared under the assumed name of Fei Fei. Zhou was interested in the May Fourth focus on free marriage and the traditional family system, but he was especially keen to write about the foreign exploitation of cheap Chinese labour in the Japanese cotton mills and British textile factories of Shanghai.²

Like many student nationalists of the time, he looked abroad for an explanation of China's desperate condition of internal collapse and humiliating foreign occupation. As a novice to the study of Marxism, he was eager to discover in this theory an explanation of China's national crisis as it related to Lenin's theory of imperialism. Unlike Mao, who was a self-confessed 'graduate of the university of the green woods', Zhou had his revolutionary tuition in the cafés, streets and factories of London, Paris and Berlin.

During the first two years of his stay in Europe he was intermittently quartered in Paris at the Hotel Godfrey near Place d'Italie. Zhou had been commissioned by a Tianjin Catholic newspaper, *Yishibao* (To benefit the world) to do a serialised reportage on social welfare issues and the workers' movement in Europe.

The recent publication of *Lu Ou tongxin* (Correspondence from Comrade Zhou Enlai in Europe), and *Zhou Enlai tongzhi lu Ou wenji* (The European Correspondence of Zhou Enlai), have made available some 56 items from the Tianjin *Yishibao* as well as another 11 items from the *Jueyou* (Awakening letter-box), a supplement carried in the Tianjin paper, *Xinminyibao* (The new people's will). These items provide Zhou's explanations of the comparative and related development of contemporary Europe and China, and they offer a running commentary on the dynamics of European foreign policy and diplomacy as these apparently originated in domestic social and economic crisis. Zhou set out for the readership back home the underlying causes of the European crisis and its influence on China's position in world affairs.

Zhou's Paris correspondence highlighted the behind-the-scenes wheeling and dealing in the Sino-French loan negotiations. Zhou editorialised on the hidden Sino-French agenda to prop up the failing Sino-French Enterprise Bank and to finance arms shipments to warlord factions in China.³ He charged that the secrecy of the loan negotiation was yet another example of the violation of the 'era of democracy'. The Wilsonian promise of 'open covenants' had yet to become manifest.

Zhou placed the loan issue in the larger context of the post-war international economic order, warning his readers that French vindic-

tiveness in relation to German war indemnities would produce serious international contradictions. Zhou was personally struck by the social and economic devastation of the First World War, and he linked the vicious cycle of military expenditures of the war to the harsh post-war policies of reparations. He believed that the logic of the war still persisted into peace time, and he castigated international finance for its cynical bankrolling of foreign wars.⁴

Zhou predicted that the reparations issue would generate a serious backlash in Germany. He also rejected contemporary commentary on the irresponsibility of debtor nations, arguing that there was no point in the creditor nations upbraiding the poorer borrowing nations such as China, Turkey, and Egypt, for their misuse of foreign funding for military purposes, as the creditor nations were, themselves, the source of post-war competitive imperialisms.⁵ The latter was having serious consequences for European society, and Zhou suspected that the creditor criticisms of the debtor states were part of a hidden agenda to promote the foreign management of the debtor states' finances. Zhou predicted that post-war militarism and reparations would engender greater unemployment, the disruption of commerce, currency speculation, raw materials shortages, production disincentives and 'anger and contention between peoples'.

Zhou wrote of a dangerous tautology lurking in the minds of Europe's statesmen. Reparations were rationalised as an answer to chronic shortages of capital in the post-war period. Zhou phrased the argument by powerful victors of the war as follows: 'The many needs of my country all stem from the injury done by the defeated countries'.⁶ He concluded that reparations furthered the process of post-war militarisation, thus the victors argued: 'In order to protect ourselves from enemy reprisals and to secure the payments of our indemnities, we have to have a strong military. . .'.⁷ Zhou indignantly charged that through reparations the 'capitalists' were 'taking the food from the mouths of the people'.

Zhou applied Lenin's theory of imperialism to conclude that the European competition for monopoly positions in the colonial world would become more intense, and he correlated international militarisation and debt with specific reference to the negotiating position of China in relation to Japan. In September 1921, Zhou reported on the discussions of the Anglo-Japanese alliance at the British Imperial Conference in London. Zhou lamented that China is the country with the greatest interest in the situation, and yet China ' . . . painfully pays for every one of these treaties of alliance'.⁸ He predicted that

the Conference settlement would not prevent the coming conflict in the Pacific. He was appalled by the lack of effective response in Chinese diplomacy. Zhou observed that Japan claimed non-involvement in European affairs only to insure Japan's involvement in subsequent disagreements between Britain, France and Italy, and he warned that Japan, in assuming the role of disinterested 'mediator', was seizing the initiative in explaining East Asian affairs to the Europeans.⁹

Zhou's analysis of the Washington Conference likewise focused on the reality of an intractable conflict of interests between the great powers in the Pacific, and, despite the agreements on the limitation of naval forces, he believed that Japan only feigned interest in 'equal influence' in the Pacific. Zhou summed up the period from the end of the First World War to the Washington Conference as 'the frantic struggle to restore the balance of power'.¹⁰

In an unrelated comment on post-war nationalism, Zhou claimed that the victorious allies had raised the slogan of 'people's self-determination' only to honour it in the breach. Half of Silesia, for example, reverted to Poland, despite the fact that Germany had won the referendum.¹¹ Zhou conceded the complexity of European national boundaries when he agreed that even self-protection could easily lead to encroachment on other people's rights to self-determination.

Zhou was hostile to the blusterings of German imperialism which had so recently insulted Chinese sovereignty in Shandong, but he was sympathetic to the German post-war predicament. As a Marxist-Leninist 'realist', he feared 'infantile disorder on the left' in Germany, and speculated that any Communist attempt to seize power in Germany would precipitate an invasion by the League of Nations.¹² He was aware of the general paranoia which greeted the Bolshevik revolution in Europe, and he argued that it would be necessary to avoid extremist tactics in Germany where the majority of the population was to be encouraged in their support for a republican form of government.

This realism should be placed in the context of Zhou's admiration for Lenin. Zhou identified with Leninist argument against social democracy, but he agreed with Lenin on the need to undermine 'Leftists' who refused to take advantage of the contradictions existing between the imperialist powers. As far as Zhou was concerned, Lenin had been absolutely right both in signing the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and in his diplomatic overtures to England and Germany.

This was in fact a case of ‘uniting a high degree of flexibility with a high degree of principle’ – a unity which was to become Zhou’s own life-long credo in foreign affairs.

Zhou was not sanguine about the prospects for revolution in Europe given the raise of right-wing forces, the treachery of social democracy, and the middle class’s increasing involvement with imperialism.¹³ He was heartened by the ‘ambition’ of the Russian proletariat, and at the same time frustrated by the Chinese people’s lack of ambition. He complained in a Party magazine, *Xiaonian* (*La Jeunesse*) of the general lack of Chinese awareness as to the special role of the proletariat in modern social development. Even so, he refused to accept the gainsaying attitude of Chinese liberal intellectuals who stressed that China’s condition was so hopelessly backward as to necessitate ‘some type of mechanical transition’ under which capitalism and foreign investment would be allowed to develop unchecked in the Chinese economy.¹⁴

Zhou agreed that the proletariat was desperately weak, but he would not dispense with the role of the proletariat in modern Chinese history. Zhou could not understand why knowledgeable people in China were so uninterested in workers’ issues.¹⁵ The relation between industry and agriculture was not generally appreciated, and Zhou concluded: ‘Famine in our country partly originates with the weather and partly from the inability of the people to promote their own development. This means there is no escape from drought. Once it comes, we can only sit and wait for death’.¹⁶

Despite this dilemma, Zhou took a hard line on concessions to capitalism in China. He accepted the rationale for Lenin’s New Economic Policy, but then he argued that the expansion of enterprise in China through foreign investment and the borrowing of foreign capital was unacceptable. He favoured a moratorium on the development of foreign religious and educational agencies. He devoutly wished for the elimination of private capital and urged the proletariat to eschew the ostensible benefits which the outside world of capital so tantalisingly proffered.¹⁷ Even in these early years, Zhou was thinking in terms of national independence and self-reliance.

In Europe Zhou discovered his own political identity as a Marxist-Leninist. He not only gained invaluable organisational experience, but he honed his analytical skills. In his analytical correlations of domestic and international politics, he wanted to peel away the surface rationalisations of European governments to get at the underlying confluence of social and economic forces influencing

European society. Zhou was no starry-eyed dreamer; he was a Leninist realist who rejected 'infantile disorder on the left'.

ZHOU AND 'INFANTILE DISORDER ON THE LEFT' IN CHINA, 1924-35.

Zhou revealed some remarkable insights into European politics and foreign affairs; however, his view of China from Europe was inevitably somewhat abstract. At the age of 26 he returned to China as a senior Communist leader, who enjoyed the respect of the Comintern; however, he returned home to find a much more complicated political situation than was suggested in his European readings of Marx on labour and capital.

Zhou immediately plunged into the complicated politics of the first united front. Zhou was in Shanghai for last minute negotiations with Wang Jingwei over the means for strengthening the Communist relationship with the Guomindang 'Left' when Chiang Kai-shek suddenly struck with brute force on 12 April 1927, massacring Communists in Shanghai, Hangzhou, Nanjing and Ningbo. At the Fifth National Congress of the CCP in May 1927, Zhou emerged as a senior Party leader with a position in the Politbureau. He was the only senior leader to serve continuously in the Politbureau from 1927 through 1949. The Guomindang 'Left' pre-emptively expelled the Communists from its ranks in mid-July.

The failure of the first united front was the subject of stormy debates within the CCP and the Communist International. In the summer of 1928 a new CCP Politbureau was hand-picked by Stalin and his latest ally, Bukharin. Apparently, Stalin selected three 'left' candidates, including Zhou Enlai, while Bukharin named three 'right' candidates. Subsequent Party history in China, however, was characterised by extreme infighting over revolutionary strategy.¹⁸

On his return from Moscow in August 1930, Zhou assumed a leading role in organising the Party's assessment of the failures of the so-called 'Li Lisan line' which had overemphasised the role of the proletariat and the creation of urban-based Party power on the mistaken assumption of nationwide support for the CCP. At the third plenary session of the Sixth Central Committee, Zhou delivered his famous 'Shaoshan' report which dealt with Li in unexpectedly moderate terms. Zhou, as one of the original three 'left' appointees of

Stalin may not have wanted to go all the way in discrediting a second member of the original group for fear of losing the political initiative to the right-wing forces of He Mengxiung. Zhou's report is well known for its discussion of Li's strategy; however, in the report he commented extensively on international relations.

Zhou's outline consciously conformed to the theoretical parameters set forth in reports by Stalin and Molotov to the Sixteenth Congress of the Comintern.¹⁹ The depressed international circumstances of the time were described in terms of the economic crisis in the US. The trend towards world war was confirmed in the military competitions of the great powers, particularly the intensified competitions between the defeated and victorious powers of the First World War. The sharper contradictions between imperial centres and colonies was thought to have strengthened national resistance in India, South America, Vietnam and China.

Zhou disavowed Bukharin. His theses with respect to 'there is organised capitalism', 'India is in decolonisation' and 'The US is an exception' were, according to Zhou, calculated to distract from the building of a positive international correlation of forces against imperialism. This erroneous line was, thus, an example of 'liquidationism', *quxiao zhuyi*.²⁰ Bukharin was perhaps guilty of a capitalist as opposed to a socialist realism.

Zhou reviewed the Chinese context of the ever-widening political economic crisis of the war-lord wars, and their destructive effects on agricultural production, industrial development, communications and domestic commerce, reiterating that the unevenness of revolutionary development in China was a function of the local character of imperialist activity. The revolutionary situation was cast in terms of the competitions between imperialisms within China, which precluded any one imperialism from gaining an absolute position of dominance.

Zhou specifically asked how Chinese Communism could negotiate with these local imperialisms inasmuch as there was no 'third road' between revolution of the CCP soviets and the counter-revolution of the warlord regimes. Insisting that no compromise could be justified at the level of strategic principle, he still warned against 'infantile disorder on the left' (*zuopai youzhibing*), which had ignored the possibilities of 'diplomatic methods' (*waijiao shouduan*).²¹ Zhou wanted to employ these methods towards the removal of foreign military forces from the soviet areas and to obtain foreign recognition

of the laws of the soviet governments. Predictably, Zhou cited Lenin contending that signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk saved the weakly defended Bolshevik regime from certain collapse. Zhou affirmed: 'Every Party member should know this'.²²

In early January 1931, the Politbureau engaged in a more vitriolic exposure of the Li Lisan line as a substantive failure of principle. Zhou, himself, made an appropriate 'self-criticism' of his leadership at the earlier third plenum, but he retained his Politbureau position; and he insisted on the importance of independent analysis. The criticism of Li, in his outspoken view, was '... not just to repeat the line of the Communist International'.²³

In 1931, Zhou's worst European premonitions actually came true as Japan attempted to upset the balance of power between the several European imperialisms within China. Regardless of Zhou's stated concern about 'infantile disorder on the left', the Party generally failed to take advantage of the contradictions between competing imperialisms within China and failed to broaden its political basis of support through a united front against Japanese invasion in the early to mid-1930s. During this period Zhou and Mao quarrelled over military strategy. Mao even lost control over the Red Army to Zhou. Zhou later blamed the failure to support the Fukien people's government on the Comintern's bad advice.²⁴ Also, the Comintern had burdened the Chinese Communists with its reluctance to acknowledge significant distinctions between the several imperialisms within China.

In the small town of Zunyi, the fleeing Red Army paused on 5 January 1935 to take stock of the military failures which had led to the collapse of the Soviet regimes in central China. Zhou shouldered the blame for 'forward and offensive line' (*jingong luxian*) in the Party's military strategy, and Mao became Chairman of the powerful Revolutionary Military Committee. Zhou accepted the position of Vice-Chairman of the same committee. Zhou's orthodox Marxism-Leninism made room for Mao's down-to-earth interpretation of China's 'objective' conditions. He had, himself, progressively left behind a Soviet-inspired view of the trajectory of the Chinese revolution. At this point, Zhou may not have been prepared to openly defy the Comintern, but the experience of significant military failure acted as a form of political baptism reinforcing the importance of analytical independence in the assessment of China's own specific domestic and international predicament.

THE ADVENT OF UNITED FRONT DIPLOMACY IN 1936.

In what was surely the supreme act of political realism, Zhou met and negotiated with Chiang Kai-shek in Xi'an in December 1936. Chiang owed the Party 'a blood debt as high as a mountain', but Zhou and Mao accepted a 'strategy of peaceful settlement of the Xi'an incident' (*heping jiejue Xi'an shijiande fangzhen*). The Soviets pressed for Chiang's release, but the CCP reached its own decision on the basis of a different assessment of the emerging political alignments at Xi'an.²⁵ Putting aside his own feelings, Zhou massaged the ego of Chiang Kai-shek. He even assured Chiang that he would personally see to the security and comfort of his son, Jingguo, who was then training in Moscow.²⁶

The incident was, itself, an act of united front diplomacy whereby the CCP sought to isolate the hardline pro-Japanese element within the Guomindang government and to consolidate existing links with patriotic elements of the North-eastern armies of Zhang Xueliang and the 17th Route Army of Yang Hucheng. The 'infantile disorder on the left' which had earlier resulted in vacillating support of the Fukien people's government had been discredited. The CCP no longer had to labour under the Comintern's injunctions against 'united front from above' as the Seventh Congress of the Comintern had endorsed the international united front against fascism in the summer of 1935.

Negotiation with Chiang was premised in the assumption that the Chinese revolution would come to power 'on the vehicle of the anti-Japanese movement', which Chiang was organisationally incapable of controlling to his own political advantage. According to Zhou, the 'peaceful settlement' ended 'the policy of concession in external affairs' and promised a 'realignment of class forces' favouring the Chinese revolution.²⁷ The 'left wing' of the bourgeois camp, with the North-west at its centre, was consolidated against the pro-Japanese faction within the Guomindang and as a result more 'middle-of-the-roaders' were brought over to the united front against Japan. The effectiveness of the strategy was borne out in the swiftness of the Japanese invasion of North China on 7 July 1937.

In the post-Xi'an negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek, Zhou established the International Propaganda Bureau in Wuhan, which became the earliest Communist foreign affairs agency. The Bureau promoted international interest in the CCP's policy of united front.

One of its primary responsibilities was the translation and dissemination of Mao's writings on that subject. The desire to cultivate favourable international opinion was reflected in Zhou's own heavy schedule of meetings with Western journalists and celebrities.

Wang Bingnan has described Zhou's leadership of the Bureau. Zhou emphasised 'independence and self-reliance' in foreign affairs and urged his Wuhan subordinates to break the Guomindang's monopoly over foreign affairs. Zhou kept the possible co-ordination with the British and Americans against the Japanese under active consideration, and he hoped that the Xi'an Incident would result in the ending of the Guomindang's policy of concession in external affairs. Zhou told the comrades in Wuhan: 'In triumphing over [the Japanese] it is important that we depend upon our own force, but we must also make good use of foreign help. A policy of relying exclusively on ourselves can only serve the enemy'.²⁸ Zhou and his organisers worked to develop independent contacts with embassies and correspondents so as to establish a diplomatic alternative to Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist government. 'Diplomacy', especially as it addressed US public opinion, incorporated the 'policy of propagandising our Party' (*xuanchuan wodangde zhengce*).²⁹ The latter was the precursor to Zhou's post-1949 'people's diplomacy'.

THE CHONGQING 'STRATEGIES AND POLICIES'

In December 1938 Zhou arrived in Chongqing, where, with the exception of a six-month stint in Moscow, he was to spend a large part of the next seven and half years in extremely difficult and dangerous negotiations with the Guomindang. In this period, Zhou adapted united front 'strategies and policies', emphasising a duality of struggle and co-operation, to the exigencies of the negotiating table.

He honed his famous 'workstyle', stressing firm ideological commitment, and the realistic measure of, and adaptation to, 'objective' political realities. Looking outwards from inside the complicated web of shifting united front alignments, Zhou and Mao together moved beyond the 'infantile disorder' of the 1930s to understand both domestic and international politics in terms of a specifically Chinese theory of contradictions.

The self-conscious ideological emphasis in this period on the 'sinification of Marxism-Leninism', (*Zhongguohuade Makesi-Lieneringzhuyi*),

related to a commitment to realism in domestic and international policies. Mao Zedong opposed ‘concrete Marxism’ to ‘dogmatism’, stating as follows: ‘What we call concrete Marxism is Marxism that has taken on concrete form, that is Marxism, applied to the concrete struggle in the concrete conditions prevailing in China. . . .’³⁰ This ‘concrete’ Marxism represented a Chinese realism which was to become seminal to the diplomacy of Zhou Enlai.

Strategy, as it was discovered in praxis through ‘seeking the truth from the facts’, was predicated in the duality of political co-operation and struggle within a united front. Within the latter, configurations of power were typically trilateral as opposed to bilateral. Strategy called for the winning over of the ‘middle forces’ in any given political equation counterposing two opposing ideological camps. This notion later gave rise in the mid-1950s to Zhou’s 1950s emphasis on the ‘five principles of peaceful coexistence’ as a strategic means of joining the forces of socialism and neutralism against the ‘war policy’ of the US.

Zhou was in Moscow at the time of Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and a major confrontation between Soviet and Japanese forces along the Manchurian border with Outer Mongolia. Zhou then found it personally necessary to defend the CCP’s changing course of revolution in North China before the Comintern. Apparently, ‘leading comrades’ were worried that Mao and Zhou had become ‘too far separated from the working class’.³¹

Meanwhile, in China, Mao attempted the difficult explanation of CCP support for the Pact, claiming that Stalin’s policy had countered the Chamberlain-Daladier strategy to precipitate war between Germany and the Soviet Union. Mao upbraided ‘muddled’ Party members for thinking that ‘. . . on the whole the Anglo-Franco-Polish side has after all slightly progressive character’.³² The Western failure to support the Soviet Union, he claimed, meant that any past distinction between the democratic and fascist states had become less than politically meaningful. The Pact temporarily limited the CCP’s own ability to distinguish between imperialisms, and there was a resultant loss of opportunity to exploit ‘middle forces’.

In this period the Party launched a significant internal movement for rectification. Mao moved directly against Stalin’s former protégés in the ‘Internationalist faction’ within the Party to further his views concerning the importance of Chinese praxis. Zhou returned from Moscow in March 1940 to again take up his negotiating responsibilities in Chongqing. He wholeheartedly endorsed the growing emphasis in Yan’an on ‘self-reliance’. Zhou disparaged Chiang Kai-shek for

his dependency on forces outside China to solve his domestic political and military problems for him. Chiang ultimately relied on 'foreign countries joining in the war'. Chiang was utterly lacking in 'self-reliance'. In his approach to the Japanese invasion, Chiang was the 'blindman' groping for fish.

The concept of 'self-reliance' was quite complex in its related domestic and international implications. In the first place, it conveyed the primary ideological content of the CCP's mass movement. It projected a new domestic politics rooted in a new national consciousness, which in the rhetoric of the time saw the Chinese standing up to throw off the yoke of slavery.

'Self-reliance' is, in Chinese, *ziligengsheng*. It consists of two two-character compounds, the former meaning 'self-standing' and the latter meaning 'changing one's life'. Zhou's propaganda contrasted 'standing on one's own to change to a new life' with the obsequious dependency of the national government on outside forces to defeat the Japanese. This view had more than propaganda significance, for it seems that Zhou's strategy at the Chongqing negotiations was largely derived from his assumption that the Guomindang leaders would never adopt more than a 'passive strategy', whereby for immediate political or military reasons they would only nominally support the War of Resistance.

Zhou's own chronology of the stages of the Chongqing negotiations as the 'couple of threes', i.e., 'three anti-Communist onslaughts' and 'three rounds of negotiations', features the lack of self-reliance on the Guomindang side and the related lack of commitment to the united front negotiations.³³ The latter were profoundly affected by the ebb and flow of the military struggles of the time, but the primary purpose in CCP participation in the negotiations was twofold, namely, to gather support from domestic 'middle forces' so as to isolate the Guomindang's right wing and to gain domestic legal status and international credibility.

Mao Zedong stressed that the 'concessions' made in the light of the 'identity in united front between unity and self-reliance' could well be positive rather than negative factors within the 'zigzag' course of the revolution.³⁴

Since February 1941 the alleged 'dogmatists' of the Internationalist faction, led by Wang Ming, came under increasing attack for their overreliance on Soviet and Comintern leadership, and their counter-productive strategy for domestic revolution. Zhou joined Mao in the attack, while easily fending off counter-accusations of 'empiricism'.

Zhou fully identified with themes of ‘sinification’ and ‘independence and self-reliance’. Zhou, like Mao, welcomed the dissolution of the Comintern, simply stating: ‘. . . the Chinese Communist Party will solve the problems of the Chinese revolution still more independently and with an even greater sense of responsibility.’³⁵

Over the course of the ‘rectification’, Zhou formalised his own ‘workstyle’. In this respect there is little difference in what is expected in diplomatic as opposed to government work in general. While involved in the Chongqing negotiations, Zhou penned his ‘Guidelines for Myself’ in the form of seven principles.³⁶

Zhou stressed diligent study and the ‘grasping of essentials’. One might see Zhou as the classical scholar admonishing his disciples to distinguish between *ben*, the essential, and *mo*, or that which is secondary; however, his discussion originates in the Marxist-Leninist dialectical consideration of ‘objective reality’ as part of the ever changing plane of contradiction and synthesis. In accordance with reoccurring mass-line themes, he laid particular stress on the importance of an inductive style of observation which combined work and study ‘according to time, place, and circumstance’. Zhou had always self-consciously adjusted his own conduct in relation to the specific circumstances of any given political and social context. In his encounters with particular groups and publics, he related to the specific features of his audience. He had remarkable powers of adaptation, not only in terms of differences within society, but also in relation to foreigners. Zhou projected himself ‘differently to different civilisations’, making his foreign guests extremely comfortable in his presence.³⁷

Reaffirming his own dedication to ideological principle, Zhou underscored the importance of gaining self-knowledge of one’s own strengths and weaknesses. This was to stand him in good stead in terms of his later negotiations with the great powers. Zhou also endorsed ‘collective life’, personal fitness, and self-improvement, and these emphases were very much in line with Mao’s writings on the subject. His didactic stress on ideological principle was explicit within his definition of workstyle emphasising realism and flexibility in response to objective conditions through a self-disciplined and specifically Chinese praxis.

Zhou’s diplomacy gained the attention of the Americans and, in June 1944, US Vice-President Wallace prevailed over the objections of Chiang Kai-shek to insist that the Generalissimo approve the dispatch of the US Army Observer Section to Yan’an. As the Mission

was supposedly to operate in a 'rebel' area, it was dubbed the 'Dixie Mission'. The domestic and international implications of the Mission were not lost on Mao and Zhou. A Party directive of 18 August 1944 described the significance of the Mission in terms of 'the beginning of our participation in the unified international anti-fascist front and the start of our diplomatic work'.³⁸

John Service, who went to Yan'an with the first section of the Mission, has extensively detailed the encounter. He was already critical of Chiang Kai-shek's 'rash' foreign policy, particularly for its alienation of the Soviet Union and the 'tactics of bargaining, bluff and blackmail' which were beginning to antagonise the US government.³⁹

Service reported on the Chinese Communist leadership in terms of their 'realism and practicality' – characteristics, which he believed, originated with their 'constant self-examination and self-criticism'. At times he thought these leaders were unresponsive to suggestions coming from outside the Party, but they did insist on serious debate within the Party. Service concluded: 'This consideration of policies is based on an objective and scientific attitude'.⁴⁰ In fact, he suggested that such 'consideration' would compare favourably with the requirements of Western social science. Service was impressed with the way in which they consciously sought the 'truth from the facts', declaring the Communist leaders not only to be more modern in their thinking than Chiang Kai-shek, but also more realistic in their understanding of China's political and social conditions.

Zhou Enlai wanted to establish the CCP's separate identity in foreign affairs, and he wanted a more direct relation with Washington. The development of a positive attitude in Washington would give CCP negotiators some leverage in their discussion of coalition government with the Guomindang. The success of CCP diplomacy and propaganda was partly reflected in the personal bitterness of Chiang, who complained about 'the babel of foreign criticism of our military and political affairs'.⁴¹

The two sides were unable to reach any substantive agreement prior to the closing of the Second World War in the Pacific, and what Zhou called the 'fifth stage' of the negotiating process started up in the late summer of 1945.⁴² This stage, he believed, was qualitatively different from past stages in that the new set of negotiations were public. They involved 'democratic personages' from other political parties, and they involved the US as 'mediator'. The ensuing talks were painfully protracted and complex.

The new format offered a greater opportunity for public cultivation of the ‘middle forces’ as both sides manoeuvred to make the other side politically responsible for continued fighting. While the two antagonists rushed to take military and political advantage of the Japanese surrender in the different parts of the country, they were locked into a negotiating dynamic. Both wanted American support, and both wanted the propaganda advantage *vis-à-vis* domestic and international political opinion. The Communist side was handicapped in that US mediation assumed that the Soviet Union would honour its treaty commitments to Chiang Kai-shek and that Stalin would not, therefore, directly intervene in any civil war.⁴³

The CCP leadership had cultivated the Americans with interesting suggestions concerning potential American economic involvement in China. Service had reported that the CCP leaders should be understood as Chinese realists, who were not prepared to dogmatically apply Soviet models in China, but who recognised that the US was ‘the strongest power in the Pacific area’.⁴⁴ Not only Chinese diplomacy stressed that the US was in a position to assist in the economic recovery of China, but even Stalin emphasised the point to Truman’s envoy, Harry Hopkins.⁴⁵ Service may have exaggerated the degree to which the CCP was willing to welcome American foreign investment.

On 10 January 1946, on the same day as Zhou sent a top secret transmission to Chongqing suggesting that he and Mao could make an informal visit to Roosevelt in Washington, DC, Mao was making the following argument at a Party conference:

We cannot imitate the Kuomintang [Guomindang], which does not lift a finger itself, but depends on foreigners even for such necessities as cotton cloth. We stand for self-reliance. We hope for foreign aid but cannot be dependent on it; we depend on our own efforts, on the creative power of the whole army and entire people.⁴⁶

The winning over of the ‘middle forces’ was the central task of Zhou’s diplomacy and propaganda. A dual strategy, encompassing ‘independence and unity’, was necessary to relate to the dual character of this element, which from the CCP’s point of view could be either ambivalent and wavering, or progressive.⁴⁷ Zhou’s tactical flexibility and ideological firmness was known to his opponents at the negotiating table. One senior Guomindang negotiator grudgingly described his negotiating skills as follows:

He shifts his line so subtly that it often escapes your notice. Of course he makes compromises, but only minimal and nominal compromises at the very last moment just to keep the negotiations going. When you study his statements afterwards, you realize that he hasn't made any substantial concession on any important issue at all.⁴⁸

Zhou's continuing emphasis on 'independence and self-reliance' meant that he was not prepared to see China depend upon the US, nor was he prepared to allow the unstructured penetration of the Chinese economy by American capital. He referred to Mao on this point:

Comrade Mao Zedong has pointed out the need to maintain our independence and initiative within the united front. Independence and initiative mean the independence of the proletariat, which has its own policy and ideology. It allies itself with others, but it is not assimilated by others. Wherever there are distinctions, there is struggle.⁴⁹

Making these 'distinctions' was integral to Zhou's realism in both domestic and international politics. Like Mao, he argued that the Party had to recognise that there were more than one imperialism in world affairs, just as internally there were different cliques within both the landlord and bourgeois classes. Complex 'distinctions' were necessary in light of the fact that '... the enemy camp keeps changing.'

Zhou lost faith in US mediation due to the unabated shipment of military supplies to the Guomindang; however, he and Mao strung out the negotiations so as to gain domestic political advantage. Some in the Party feared the possibility of US intervention on the side of the Guomindang in open civil war. Zhou had insisted that Mao go in person to negotiate in Chongqing, for not to do so would have further enhanced the prestige which the Guomindang had already acquired with the Japanese surrender.⁵⁰ Zhou's diplomacy played for time so as to discredit the Guomindang and to co-opt the 'middle forces'. Mao and Zhou were even prepared to concede eight of the 'liberated areas' in central China so as to extend the negotiating process. Mao explained: 'Sometimes going to negotiations is "tit-for-tat"'; and sometimes not going to negotiations is also "tit-for-tat"'.⁵¹

Zhou persuaded the Party to accept a national military reorganisation which would have left the CCP with 10 divisions and the

Guomindang with 50. Zhou thought that the American proposal to equip the 60 divisions of a new national army was a ploy to gain greater political control over Chinese affairs, but he believed that the central element in the negotiation was the recognition of local governments which, under CCP control, would rely on their own 'people's armed forces' rather than the national divisions for protection.⁵²

A refusal to negotiate would have alienated the 'middle forces'. Zhou, himself, recorded Marshall's aggravated comments to Ye Jianying to the effect that General Zhou had not been negotiating '... for the sake of negotiation, but for propaganda purposes instead'. Zhou acknowledged Marshall as 'partly correct' indicating that negotiation was 'a means of educating the "people" on the point that the Guomindang fully intended to go to war'.⁵³ The two parties could not agree on the critical details of organising a coalition government, and Zhou was right in his assumption that Chiang really wanted to exercise his military option.

In 1947 Chiang's armies attacked the Yan'an, forcing the Politbureau to seek temporary refuge in northern Shaanxi. At that time the Party's Central Foreign Affairs Bureau (*zhongyang waishizu*) was established, but Zhou and Mao were much too heavily involved in military affairs to devote attention to its operations until the Central Committee apparatus was re-established at a stable location at Xibaipo in May 1948.

Zhou then discounted the US ability to influence the course of the war. He repeated Mao's point that the US would not be able to use an atomic bomb to deal with a peasant war, and he noted that the US had already expended great efforts in equipping 45 divisions for Chiang, and had provided US\$ 4 billion in aid. Zhou concluded: 'How much more can the United States offer? US imperialists may be rich and prodigal but many countries have asked the United States for money.' Zhou also concluded that the most troops that the US could spare for a conflict would be about 200 000 troops, given the international commitments of the US government. He asked rhetorically: 'What are 200 000 men to China?'⁵⁴

In the April 1949 context of last minute negotiations with the supplicant Nanjing delegation which had hoped to sign a peace instrument, Zhou spelled out the general direction of Communist foreign policy. Zhou indicated that there would be no compromise of China's 'independence and self-reliance', but he also stated: 'We are willing to co-operate with all countries that treat us as equals.'⁵⁵ China would welcome foreign aid, but only on the basis of an

acceptance of China's national equality. And Zhou promised: 'As for the future, after peace has been achieved, we'll manage things practically and realistically.'⁵⁶ As for issues of diplomatic recognition, Zhou was not going to press for it and thus forego the principle of equality by making concessions for the sake of quick recognition.

2 Establishing the Foreign Ministry in the Cold War

In a commemorative article on Zhou Enlai's work in foreign affairs, the Theoretical Study Group of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted the following: 'He trained a revolutionary diplomatic contingent. He created and developed a proletarian style of diplomacy for New China.'¹ In fact Zhou, himself, described the building process of the early 1950s in terms of 'building a new kitchen' (*ling qi luzao*).²

On the morning of 30 September 1949, Zhou arrived in the offices of the Central Foreign Affairs Bureau to announce to his would-be diplomats that from then on they would handle foreign affairs in an official capacity. Zhou stressed that New China's diplomacy would encompass the revolutionary principles of 'independence and self-reliance'. New China was to have a new type of government, namely, 'new democracy', and a new style of diplomacy. Under a regime of 'concrete Marxism' it would not be possible to follow precedents established by capitalism. China's long and anguished experience of imperialism and feudalism had resulted in a clear rejection of the 'servile diplomacy' of the former 'Nationalist' government. Even Soviet experience, while helpful, would not be exactly appropriate to the 'concrete Marxism' of New China. Zhou's remarks caused great excitement at the Central Foreign Affairs Bureau.³

The Chinese had 'to sweep [their] house clean and prepare invitations for guests', but the establishment of diplomatic relations was not to be dependent on concessions to 'imperialism'. Zhou announced that all diplomatic and consular missions of foreign governments (with the exception of those of the socialist governments) would no longer enjoy diplomatic status. These governments would have to extend recognition on the basis of the equality of the new government, and Zhou insisted that such negotiations would not proceed unless the governments involved severed their relations with the Nationalists on Taiwan. Under these circumstances, the US insistence on an acknowledgement of Nationalist financial and treaty obligations, and a guarantee that the regime would not enter into a formal alliance with the USSR, was viewed as a totally unacceptable challenge to the sovereignty of the new Chinese state.

BUILDING A 'NEW KITCHEN' AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

The 'building of a new kitchen' required the establishment of administrative and personnel structures. In calling up personnel, Zhou relied on those who had been involved in the CCP's unofficial diplomacy of the 1930s and 1940s. Even as an 'illegal' party the CCP had had to practice diplomacy in establishing an internationally recognisable alternative to the official diplomacy of the Nationalist government, thus Zhou was able call up former CCP united front workers, military officers and journalists.

Under the 'second politbureau' at Wuhan, Zhou had started to recruit unofficial diplomats who diligently applied his 'wuqin' work-style in establishing contacts with foreign journalists and officials. The International Propaganda Bureau in the Wuhan party offices was the first Communist foreign affairs organisation.⁴ It liaised with the personnel of the General Office of the Eighth Route Army, which had an International Information Section.

A larger group was later established at Chongqing. During the early years of the Chongqing negotiations, satellite missions were established in Guilin and in Hong Kong, but these were closed down as a result of the New Fourth Army Incident of January 1941. In November 1947 all of the CCP negotiators and support staff were hurriedly recalled from Chongqing, Shanghai and Nanjing. The Central Foreign Affairs Bureau was only established on a regular basis after the CCP Central Committee (CCPCC) established itself in Xibaipo in May 1948.

The career pattern of Wang Bingnan, whose writings on Zhou Enlai are a more important source on his diplomacy, is somewhat typical of the senior-level personnel of the new Ministry.⁵ Like Zhou Enlai, Wang had studied in Europe, and he was later involved in the 1936 negotiations with Zhang Xueliang. Wang headed the Committee for Guidance of the Mass Movement in the North-west. After 1938 he acted as the head of the foreign affairs section of the Liaison Office of the Eighth Route Army in Chongqing. During the Chongqing negotiations he acted as deputy secretary of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the CCP Delegation in Nanjing. Wang became deputy director of the Central Foreign Affairs Bureau, established in 1947. In October 1949 he assumed the directorship of the General Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The personalities associated with the Marshall Mission 'group'

contributed more personnel to the new Ministry than any other 'clustering' of CCP personalities who had worked in an unofficial diplomatic capacity before 1949.⁶ The personnel of the new Ministry were not necessarily overtaxed in the early 1950s as China had diplomatic relations with relatively few countries. The process of diplomatic recognition was quite slow in the face of US containment of 'Red China'.

On 30 September 1950 Zhou reported on China's international status, naming the following 17 countries in order of the date of the mutual establishment of diplomatic relations, the USSR, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Korea, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Mongolia, East Germany, Albania, Burma, India, Vietnam, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and Indonesia. Great Britain, Norway, the Netherlands and Finland were still in the process of negotiation at the time of this reporting. Zhou ignored Yugoslavia which had formally offered to establish relations in a Belgrade communication of 5 October.⁷

Under the provisional organic state laws of October 1949, the Foreign Ministry occupied an unique position in the new government as it was the only ministry not subject to one of the three top-level general offices of the Government Administration Council. Zhou's position in foreign affairs was pivotal as he was Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The best personnel were initially kept in Beijing, so as to organisationally reinforce the new Ministry; however, in the following decade many of the directors and deputy directors of departments served abroad in senior ambassadorial postings. Not surprisingly the 'foreign affairs system' (*waishi xitong*) showed some Soviet influence. The foreign language, publications and distribution bureau, was, for example, made responsible to the 'dual leadership' (*shuangchong lingdao*) of the CCPCC Propaganda Bureau and the Ministry of Culture. The establishment of the Bureau of Ceremonies within the Central People's Government Council, on the other hand, was consistent with Chinese tradition.

The early Bolsheviks had promoted popular diplomacy in the context of the First World War. The Chinese, however, had developed their own brand of popular diplomacy in the international politics of united front. Even after 1949 this notion of people-to-people contact remained important as a means of influencing international opinion and the policy of foreign governments. The new national administrative structure, therefore, included a commission for the establishment of cultural relations with foreign countries

and the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries. There was frequent exchange of personnel between these agencies and the Foreign Ministry. The structure and senior-level personnel of the Ministry at October 1950 are outlined in the listing below. Those agencies, which in 'people's diplomacy' acted as appendages of the Ministry, enjoyed significant state support. American Cold War interpretation viewed their existence as just further confirmation of 'Peiping's' disinterest in conventional diplomacy.

The breakdown of the Ministry, in the accompanying chart, indicates a high degree of concurrent office-holding within the same 'system', and this was not extraordinary given the general lack of experienced personnel at the senior levels of the new national administration. Departmental lines were drawn along both geographical and functional lines (see Table 2.1).

As is typical of socialist international relations, the Ministry operated with exclusive reference to state-to-state relations, while the Central Committee's International Liaison Department handled Party relations.⁸

'SELF-RELIANCE' AND SINO-US, SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

The Common Programme of October 1949 formalised an already existing foreign policy orientation favouring a wide pattern of diplomatic exchange, and subsequent to Zhou's October request for international recognition, based on reciprocity and equality, he cabled his request for United Nations Security Council representation on 15 November 1949 and General Assembly membership on 8 January 1950.

The US government barred the PRC from taking up the UN China seats, and American Cold War propaganda focused international attention on the Chinese lack of genuine enthusiasm for responsible participation in international organisation.⁹ Chinese recognition of Vietnam, was, for example, interpreted as an ideological decision which wilfully scuttled early French recognition. Diplomatic squabbling with the British was cast in the same light.

Zhou, however, was deadly serious about the restoration of China's rights at the UN, and this factor became quite important in later negotiations concerning the Korean War. The US government's

Table 2.1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 1950

Minister: Zhou Enlai	Deputy Ministers: Wang Jiaxiang Li Kenong Zhang Hanfu
<i>General Office</i> Director: Wang Bingnan	Deputy Directors: Yan Baohang Dong Yueqian Lai Yeli
<i>USSR and Eastern European Division</i> Director: Wu Xiuquan	Deputy Director: Xu Yixin
<i>Asia Division</i> Director: Shen Duanxian	Acting Director: Qiao Guanhua Deputy Director: Chen Jiakang
<i>Western Europe and Africa Division</i> Director: Huan Xiang	Deputy Director: Wen Pengjiu
<i>US and Australian Division</i> Director: Ke Bonian	
<i>International Division</i> Director: Dong Yueqian:	Deputy Director: Gong Pusheng (f)
<i>Intelligence Division</i> Director: Gong Peng (f)	
<i>Treaty Committee</i> Director: Zhang Hanfu	Members: Liu Zerong Mei Ruao Specialists: He Sijing Zhang Jiungbo Ye Jingxin Lu Diandong
<i>Foreign Policy Committee</i> Director: Zhou Enlai	Deputy Director: Qiao Guanhua Secretary: Yang Gang (f) Advisor: Mei Ruao
<i>Protocol Office*</i> Director: Wang Zhuoru	Deputy Director: Shen Ping

Note: *The *Protocol Office* works in close conjunction with the *Bureau of Ceremonies* (*Tianliju*) of the Central People's Government under Director Yu Xinching.

(f) indicates those personnel who are female.

Source: US Consulate General, Hong Kong, *Current Background*, no. 18, 23 October 1950, pp. 1-2.

claim that it would not veto PRC membership if seven members of the UN Security Council voted in favour was especially frustrating for the Chinese whose propaganda focused on the US 'voting machine' at the General Assembly.

Chinese 'self-reliance' favoured a wide exchange of diplomatic relations without reference to social and ideological considerations, but this was almost impossible given US hostility and the strategic necessity of 'leaning to one side' (*yibiandao*). The die had been cast in Europe even before the establishment of the People's Republic.

Mao had confirmed on 30 June 1949 that, under CCP leadership, China would 'lean to one side'. Certainly the large-scale American material support for Chiang Kai-shek in the Civil War had predisposed the CCP to 'lean' to the Soviet Union. The real question was how far China could 'lean' and still maintain 'independence and self-reliance'.

There was widespread speculation in the West which assumed that Mao, might, given the right circumstances, become another Tito. US State Department intelligence in 1948–9 described a tension between the doctrinal and material interests in Chinese Communist policy¹⁰ and freely speculated about the possibilities of Titoism in China.¹¹ The British Foreign Office used this argument in attempting to persuade the American government of the virtues of quick *de jure* recognition of the new Communist regime.¹² Soviet attempts to acquire special interests in Manchuria fanned speculation on the incompatibility of Chinese and Soviet interests. Zhou Enlai personally found such speculation particularly irritating in its disparagement of China's independence.

In 1948 there was a serious debate at Xibaipo, but the CCP leaders, despite their 'concrete Marxism', agreed with Stalin that Tito's doctrinal deviations amounted to 'national communism'. They dropped 'sinification' from their own vocabulary, but they did not change their definition of 'people's democracy' to conform with Dimitrov's 1948 designation of East European 'people's democracy' as a special form of 'proletarian dictatorship'. In June 1949 Soviet experts belatedly confirmed that China's 'people's democracy' should enjoy a different status than that of the East European states.¹³

Nationalism in the Eastern European, as opposed to the Far Eastern, context allegedly had more sinister political implications. Liu Shaoqi equated the 'Titoist clique' with 'national conservatism', but he kept China's options open in his emphasis on 'the complete equality of all nations' and the achievement of 'world unity' through the 'voluntary association' of nations embarked on 'different concrete paths' in the building of socialism.¹⁴

Recent Chinese historiography insists that the idea of 'leaning' emerged in the 'special historical conditions of the time', and that it

did not entail 'complete reliance or dependence or giving up individual initiative'.¹⁵ Zhou and Mao 'leaned', but they, none the less, sought to keep open as many diplomatic and business options as possible. The Cold War creation of 'two great camps' (*liang da zhenying*) limited the Chinese united front to the USSR and Eastern Europe, but Mao and Zhou favoured 'doing business' with states of different social systems.¹⁶

In November 1948, despite mounting antagonism towards the US, Mao indicated that China would have good relations with all countries including the US. The CCP hoped to join with the Soviets in influencing the outcome of the war and the peace treaty with Japan. The diplomacy of Zhou Enlai stressed the Yalta and Potsdam agreements and the necessity of joint agreement on questions relating to post-war Japan. The CCP expected to inherit the Nationalist government's position as one of the 'Big Five'. In May 1949, however, the US unilaterally cancelled Japanese reparations and the Japanese Diet created a 150 000-man security force. In early July Zhu De claimed a Chinese role in the Far Eastern Commission and called for a joint meeting of foreign ministers.

On 17 April Zhou had stated there would be no concessions to imperialism for the sake of quick and easy recognition, but the CCP leadership still hoped 'to co-operate with all countries that treat us as equals'.¹⁷ Mao's 30 June speech on 'people's democratic dictatorship' provides the *classicus locus* of 'leaning to one side'. At the time Mao reprimanded those Party cadres who believed that 'victory was possible without international help'.¹⁸ The servile Guomindang (GMD) dependence on US aid was inconsistent with 'independence and self-reliance', but Soviet aid, he suggested, was extended on a different basis.

In China, in the early 1950s, there was ongoing debate over the comparative advantages of 'equidistance' from the Soviets and Americans as opposed to 'leaning'. Domestic propaganda and cadre study materials countered objections to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 and the Soviet position in Inner Mongolia, as well as hostile sentiment towards Soviet China policy as just as self-serving as US policy towards the Guomindang. Even the friendship treaty of February 1950 had its detractors who believed that it would make China the battleground for the Third World War. Within non-Party circles there was even speculation that China had signed a compromising secret protocol with the Soviets at the time of the signing of the much acclaimed friendship treaty.¹⁹

The creation of two mutually exclusive 'camps' was not especially compatible with Chinese 'concrete Marxism' which assumed a 'dual strategy' for winning over 'the middle elements'. The single most important summation of New China's new foreign policy appeared in the Common Programme. On the issue of recognition chapter 7 reiterated the CCP's policy pronouncements of 1948–9.²⁰ Article 54 cited Chinese opposition to the imperialist aggression and invasion and the importance of China's independence, freedom and sovereignty.

Article 55 stated that the PRC would be selective in its approach to the international commitments of the former government, and Article 56 affirmed the desirability of talks relating to mutual recognition. The latter article required that foreign governments first break off relations with the GMD 'reactionary' authorities and that recognition be premised in 'equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for sovereign territory'. The constant refrain of 'equality and mutual benefit' (*pingdeng huli*), in the early negotiations of Zhou Enlai's foreign ministry, reflected the desire to assert independence and self-reliance against the humiliating 'imperialist' treaty-port regime of special privileges, but this formulation also appeared later in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950.

The flexibility in the Chinese position was picked up by the British. The British Foreign Office advised the US Secretary of State on the 'China Problem' in August 1949:

the only hope of encouraging the emergence in China of a less anti-Western tendency is to give the new regime the time to realize both the necessity of Western help in overcoming its economic difficulties and the natural incompatibility of Soviet imperialism with Chinese national interests (e.g. Manchuria).²¹

The US government was distressed at the British reply to Zhou's 1 October circular suggesting their desire for 'informal relations' pending the conclusion of their study of the situation. This conciliatory reply of 5 October conspicuously lacked any reference to formal preconditions concerning established British rights in China. The Americans only received the text of the British reply on 11 October and, much to Washington's consternation, London went ahead with *de jure* recognition on 6 January 1950. The US responded by not only refusing recognition but by also acting to bar the PRC from taking up its seats in the UN. The US government embarked on an ultimately futile course of containment, and the Chinese went to Moscow to negotiate a treaty of friendship with Stalin.

CHINESE 'SELF-RELIANCE' AND THE ALLIANCE WITH STALIN

Stalin recognised the new national government in Beijing, but he had serious doubts about Mao and the Chinese revolution. In retrospect, Mao commented on the fact that his revolution had been won 'by acting contrary to Stalin's will': 'When our revolution succeeded, Stalin said it was a fake. We did not argue with him, and as soon as we fought the war to resist America and aid Korea, our revolution became a genuine one [in his eyes]'.²² Mao later told a CCP gathering: 'We wanted to sign a Sino-Soviet treaty of amity, but he didn't want to. We asked for the return of the Chinese Eastern Railway, but he was reluctant to give it up. However, there is still a way to get a piece of meat from the mouth of the tiger'.²³

Mao took a great risk in personally going to Moscow, for he could not be sure of Stalin's generosity. On the way, somewhere in the depths of the Siberian winter, he fell ill. His train arrived in Moscow on 16 December 1949. The formalities at the station were kept to a bare minimum as Mao was whisked away to recuperate in one of Stalin's suburban villas.

At 6 p.m. on the same day Mao was personally greeted by Stalin and the entire membership of the Politbureau. Stalin was somewhat chilly in his forced magnanimity when he said: 'You have won a great victory, and victors will not be censured'.²⁴ Stalin seemed to invoke past arguments over the proper course of the Chinese revolution. He doubted China's 'guiding principles', and he feared that '... China would follow the "Road of Yugoslavia"'. Stalin questioned the fact that the new government in Beijing included the representatives from the democratic parties and wondered out loud whether Chinese political development might veer towards 'pro-British and pro-American lines'.

Mao repaid Stalin's welcome by inviting him to dine at the inappropriately sleazy Metropole Hotel.²⁵ Dinner was yet another occasion for 'tit-for-tat struggle'. Two weeks after his arrival, Tass revealed that Mao was insisting on staying in Moscow until he received satisfaction on 'various questions of interest to the People's Republic of China'.²⁶ Mao, however, avoided direct personal involvement in the drafting of a treaty of friendship, claiming that it was a governmental matter involving substantive negotiation between Zhou Enlai and his counterpart, Foreign Minister Vyshinsky.²⁷

Mao returned from a sightseeing trip to Leningrad in time to greet Zhou Enlai on his arrival in Moscow on 20 January. At the Moscow

railway station, Zhou made a short speech referring to both the 'correct international policies of Marshal Stalin' and Chairman Mao's firm policy of 'alliance with the Soviet Union'.²⁸

The Soviet attitude towards Zhou may have been less guarded, for at one time Zhou had enjoyed a great reputation in Moscow. In his talks with Vyshinsky, Zhou was assisted by Wang Jiaxiang, who later became China's ambassador to the USSR, and by Li Fuchun and Ye Jizhuang. Wu Xiuquan and Lai Yali were responsible for documentation. According to the account of Wu Xiuquan the Soviet side first worked out a draft, and this tallies with the following account by Mao:

In 1950, I argued with Stalin in Moscow for two months. On the questions of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Chinese Eastern Railway, the joint stock companies and the border we adopted two attitudes: one was to argue when the other side made proposals we did not agree with and the other was to accept their proposal if they absolutely insisted. This was out of consideration of the interests of socialism.²⁹

Stalin would not allow major changes, but Zhou still went over the wording with meticulous care. The significance of the treaty, as a treaty of military alliance, was contained in Article 1 regarding mutual obligations to resist any future Japanese aggression in Asia. Zhou insisted that the wording of this article be strengthened, hence he inserted after '... the other contracting party shall render assistance' the phrase, 'by all means at its disposal'.³⁰

The treaty of friendship was negotiated together with agreements relating to the leasing and management of the Changchun railway, and the Soviet military installations at Dalian and Lushun, as well as to various properties the Soviets controlled in Beijing and the North-east. It was a matter of sovereignty for Zhou, but the Soviets argued the importance of these fortifications in light of the American rearming of Japan and the uncertainty of a jointly negotiated peace treaty with Japan. The agreement covering the railway and military installations in the North-east thus allowed for the continuance of the status quo until no later than the end of 1952.

The Soviets argued that their continued management of the North-eastern facilities would be beneficial to China, given the lack of Chinese managerial and technical expertise, but it was obviously convenient for them to use the Changchun railway to Vladivostok as opposed to using their own Far Eastern Railway.³¹

There was a second agreement providing a US \$300 million credit at 1 per cent per annum for the Chinese purchase of Soviet machinery and equipment. The amount was not impressive; it was perhaps one-tenth of what Mao had asked for.³² There was a third agreement pertaining to miscellaneous properties which the Soviets had acquired from Japan and the imperial Chinese government in North-east and North China. The issue was quite sensitive as the Chinese memory of the Soviet army's 'rape' of the industrial facilities of the North-east was still fresh. The Soviets showed some sign of belated magnanimity as they transferred these properties to China without compensation. In his speech at the 14 February 1950 signing of the treaty and accompanying agreements, Zhou underlined the great sense of excitement of the Chinese people over such an expression of friendship by Marshal Stalin; however, he neglected to mention China's acceptance of the independence of Outer Mongolia.³³

The negotiations were difficult, but they afforded Zhou some opportunity to reinforce China's new status as an independent nation-state. Zhou featured '*pingdeng huli*' or 'equality and mutual benefit' in the wording of the treaty, and the Soviet leadership, despite their reservations, had made a commitment to the defence of the People's Republic of China. The inclusion of a special statement on the principles of the new Sino-Soviet relationship was formally important; it went beyond the wording of Soviet undertakings in the East European context. The following language of equality is particularly explicit:

The High Contracting Parties undertake in the spirit of friendship and cooperation and in conformity with the principles of equality, mutual interest, and also mutual respect for the state sovereignty and territorial integrity and noninterference in internal affairs of the other Party to develop and consolidate economic and cultural ties between the Soviet Union and China. . . .³⁴

This phraseology accorded with the Chinese view of socialist states relations as based on non-exploitative voluntary association between equals, and it foreshadowed the emergence in 1953 of the 'five principles of peaceful coexistence'.

The Americans reacted to the treaty with a policy of embargo and blockade; however, the treaty provided the new regime with a measure of international prestige, and it countered Western rumours concerning Soviet control of North-east China.³⁵ The US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, had, in a speech to the national Press Club on 12 January, assumed the 'detachment' of whole areas, including the

whole of Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, Mongolia and Xinjiang from China and their 'attachment' to the Soviet Union, which he described as 'the single most important fact, in the relations of any foreign power with Asia'.³⁶ Acheson was, if nothing else, consistent in that he viewed the treaty as an indication of Communist Chinese dependence on the Soviet Union in a second speech of 15 March. On 20 March Zhou Enlai bitterly ridiculed Acheson's assumptions as a specious attempt 'to dope some people who still lack experience of America's aggressive policy'.³⁷

The Sino-Soviet negotiations were a learning experience. Zhou's lieutenant, Wu Xiuquan, has written that, while the Sino-Soviet relationship was generally premised in the principle of socialist unity, there were still 'contradictions': 'But their friendship at the time was marked by contradictions and the unity did not mean the absence of conflicts'.³⁸

Negotiations on the details of the Sino-Soviet economic relationship continued in Moscow from February to April 1950. The agreements, signed on 27 March, included regulations concerning the working conditions of Soviet experts in China and provisions for the establishment of joint stock companies involving the development of oil and non-ferrous production in Sinkiang and air travel between the PRC and USSR. Zhou's negotiators laboured over the details of the new Sino-Soviet commercial relationship. Their Soviet counterpart, Mikoyan, bargained hard. They were unable to force any movement on a currency agreement, which assigned an unreasonably high value to the rouble as compared to the *renminbi*. There were, of course, glowing public statements about everlasting, unbreakable socialist fraternity; however, China's negotiators felt that the extent and conditions of Soviet credits were underwhelming.³⁹

The agreement with Stalin did not mean the Chinese Communists were out of the woods in so far as the Americans were concerned. The Chinese leadership may have mistakenly assumed that the treaty would establish a more stable regional environment allowing them to concentrate on the domestic task of 'economic rehabilitation'. The most important element in the regional strategic picture was President Truman's 5 January declaration indicating that the US would not be responsible for the defence of Taiwan. At the time, the CCP was focusing on the liberation of Taiwan, and even given this priority, the PRC had already initiated a programme of demobilisation.

ZHOU ASSERTS CHINESE 'SELF-RELIANCE' IN THE KOREAN WAR

It is now generally assumed that Mao Zedong was not a party to North Korean calculations of June 1950, and that the hostilities, which commenced on 25 June came as a big surprise to the Chinese.⁴⁰ The Chinese were engaged in preparations for the invasion of Taiwan, when President Truman, responding to hostilities in Korea, reversed his neutrality position of 5 January and directed the US Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Straits to interdict the projected Communist invasion.

Zhou and Mao followed the unfolding Korean military situation with intense interest. The placement of United Nations forces in Korea directly threatened the security of the North-eastern industrial heartland at a time when the new regime was sensitive to the rearming of Japan and internal and external threats to the liberation of Tibet. Zhou issued a statement on 28 June condemning President Truman's ordering of the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait as an 'armed invasion of Chinese territory in total violation of the United Nations Charter'.⁴¹

The Premier also stepped up the pressure for his government's acquisition of the China seats in the UN. On 20 August he solicited Malenkov's support as the Chairman of the Security Council for the PRC's involvement in UN deliberation of the Korean situation, and on 26 August he cabled the UN General Secretary giving him the names of the 'legally' appointed China delegation to the General Assembly. Zhang Wentian headed the delegation which included Li Yimin, Zhou Shidi, Meng Yongqian, and Yi Chaoding.⁴² Subsequently, on 30 August Zhou telegrammed the UNSC complaining of US violations of Manchurian airspace, and a Chinese radio broadcast of 8 September insisted that the UNSC should have invited the PRC to Security Council discussions concerning US forces in Korea.

Only one year after the foundation of the New China, the Chinese Communist leadership was plunged into an international crisis which threatened newly-won liberation. The war-torn national economy had to be reintegrated, the Party had yet to strike its organisational roots in vast 'newly-liberated areas', when war suddenly loomed on the horizon.

MacArthur's recapture of Seoul and the rapid collapse of the North Korean forces only allowed time for a short, intense debate

within the CCP. Mao paced the floor for three days and nights before reaching a final decision.⁴³ He decided for intervention over the opposition of those in the Party who had argued that intervention would disrupt domestic economic recovery. The *Renmin Ribao* explained the decision as follows:

Would it not be better that we should strive our utmost not to afford any pretext under which the enemy might undertake an attack on us and utilize the intervening period for the peaceful reconstruction of the nation? . . . Such reasoning is erroneous, because it presumes that the enemy who has started the attack will permit us an intervening period and environment for peaceful reconstruction. . . .⁴⁴

Zhou's diplomatic response was predictable. At the level of propaganda warfare, his diplomacy incorporated the notion, 'strategically despise the enemy, while taking full account of him tactically' (*zhānlüeshang miaoshi diren, zhānshushang zhōngshí diren*); on the other hand, in his dealings with the Guomindang Zhou had stressed the importance of following up words with deeds. In a critical context of political confusion it was best for the 'Marxist' to mean what he says.

As Premier, Zhou had realistically focused on the need for a peaceful international environment, so as to further the process of 'economic restoration', but he could ill afford to confirm MacArthur's interpretation of China's weakness and to 'supinely tolerate seeing their neighbours being savagely invaded'.⁴⁵ The potential costs of war with the US was not lost on Zhou, who, in support of Mao's position, warned his officials: 'If necessary, we must be prepared to retreat from the coastal provinces to the interior and to make the northwest and southwest the bases for planning a long war'.⁴⁶

Zhou, nevertheless, resorted to eleventh-hour diplomacy. The lack of international recognition was a frustrating liability under the circumstances. On 3 October Zhou met with India's ambassador, K.M. Pannikar. He warned of imminent Chinese involvement in the Korean peninsula, but he hinted of a possible compromise. China would only intervene if US, as distinguished from South Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel.

India's Beijing ambassador, K.M. Panikkar, provided a regular diplomatic channel to the Americans. Information concerning China's position was passed from him through India's Secretary-General of External Affairs, Sir Girja Bajpai, to the Indian ambassador at the UN, Sir Benegal Rau and thence to the Americans. In this case,

Zhou's important warning was also passed on to the British minister in Beijing. Zhou's messages made no impression in Washington.

The Communist tendency to 'strategically despise the enemy' served to confirm American analysis in its Cold War assumptions. It was easy to dismiss the warning as propaganda. The Americans also distrusted Indian diplomacy, which had favoured the recognition of 'Red China', and Ambassador Panikkar was known in Washington for his sympathetic view of the Chinese Communists. Also, Panikkar had only recently reported that China would *not* intervene in Korea.⁴⁷

President Truman treated Zhou's warning as a propaganda attempt to influence a pending vote in the UN. US military intelligence calculated that intervention was unlikely, citing the Chinese Communist fear of war with the US, the related development of anti-Communist forces, the consequent loss of diplomatic opportunity at the UN, and probable dependence on Soviet aid and loss of control in Manchuria to Stalin.⁴⁸

The involvement of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) in Korea came as a great shock to Truman, who, in his private papers, cursed 'the great general', MacArthur, for his misleading assurances at Wake Island in November 1950, that the Chinese would not dare to intervene.⁴⁹ Zhou was as good as his word, but he did not invite an extension of the war through the formal declaration of war on the United States, and the sending of a volunteer army into Korea also avoided the necessity of invoking Article 1 of the Sino-Soviet friendship treaty. As suggested in the following US intelligence report, the Chinese took the pressure off Stalin to act:

The Soviets . . . recognized . . . it was only the Sino-Soviet alliance that provided the USSR with an alternative to the dilemma of either accepting the defeat and destruction of the north Korean regime or intervening overtly with Soviet forces – an act that the USSR recognized might have led to world war.⁵⁰

The Chinese, themselves, could not be absolutely certain that their friendship treaty with Stalin foreclosed any serious American consideration of an invasion of mainland China, but this course of action was commonly viewed as only an hypothetical alternative in American diplomatic and intelligence circles. US support for 'effective' subversive guerrilla warfare inside China, however, was under active consideration.⁵¹

Zhou postponed the advent of China's first five-year plan, but in

the early 1950s he sought to preserve the integrity of the process for national 'economic reconstruction' (*jingji huifu*) which entailed the re-establishment of pre-war peaks in industrial and agricultural production. While the Korean involvement involved the siphoning off of scarce material resources into a new war effort, the war context occasioned a renewed emphasis on nationalism in the rapid development of war-related mass organisations and campaigns, and private enterprise was forced more quickly through a process of joint enterprise in the Five-Antis Campaign. As Premier, Zhou had to insure that, even in wartime, the process of political consolidation and 'economic reconstruction' moved forward. As Foreign Minister, he dismissed foreign critics, such as Acheson, who assumed that the Korean War would aggravate an already desperate domestic economic and political situation.

Zhou did not want the US to read into Chinese economic concerns, and the concomitant desire for a peaceful regional environment, a willingness to make fundamental strategic concessions, and in reporting on the first year of the People's Republic, Zhou stated:

It is perfectly clear that after the liberation of their soil, the Chinese people are in need of peace and security in order to restore and develop industry and agriculture to develop cultural and educational work. But if the American aggressors regard this as an expression of weakness on the part of the Chinese people, then like the Kuomintang reactionaries, they have cruelly miscalculated.⁵²

The enemy was indeed 'strategically despised' and the 'overturned cart ahead' was in plain sight; however, the 25 October involvement of the CPV included heavy costs at the UN. The full-blown extension of the Cold War to East Asia made it all that more difficult to establish the new Ministry through a greater pattern of recognition. The initial advance of the CPV into North Korea was suddenly followed by a unilateral disengagement, during which there was a flurry of negotiations at the UN. The analysis of Melvin Gurto and Byong-Moo Hwang on this point is quite plausible. The Chinese leadership had typically 'fired a warning shot' to test American resolve and to force a reconsideration of MacArthur's proposed all-out offensive in North Korea.⁵³

An opening had appeared within Security Council debates. Even before Zhou's warning the UNSC had, on 29 September, agreed to invite the Beijing government to make representations concerning

the US and its position on Taiwan some time after 15 November. The deployment of the US Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait, and perhaps the erratic aim of US pilots on the Korean-Manchurian border, may have given some propaganda advantage to the Chinese in so far as they could claim that the underlying US intent in Korea was secondary to an attack on the new Communist regime in China.

On 8 November 1950, the UNSC accepted a British proposal inviting the PRC to send a representative to discuss MacArthur's report on Chinese involvement in Korea. The British even mooted the possibility of establishing a buffer zone in North Korea. Zhou declined this invitation, describing the UN position in Korea as 'illegal', but he accepted the 29 September invitation regarding the US and Taiwan; and he despatched Wu Xiuquan as his special representative to New York.⁵⁴

Truman's 5 January position, and Zhou's linkage of the Korean and 'Formosan' situations, provided some opportunity for the Chinese attempts to gain the moral high ground at the UNSC. Wu Xiuquan in the UNSC reiterated the PRC's right as 'the sole legal government to represent all the people of China'. He complained that the UNSC agenda item, 'Complaint of Armed Aggression Against Taiwan' had been given an 'imperfect form' due to American procedural manipulations.⁵⁵ Wu waxed prophetic. Without Chinese 'legal' representation, the UN could not 'solve any major problems, particularly those which concern Asia'.⁵⁶ Wu then warned the General Assembly not to turn over Taiwan to UN 'trusteeship'.

Following Zhou's instructions, he closely linked the Korean situation to US 'aggression on Taiwan', highlighting the legal requirements of the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Agreement and President Truman's own 5 January statement. The US argument to the effect that the lack of a peace treaty with Japan left Taiwan's status as undetermined was characterised as a 'preposterous farce'. Wu scathingly referred to the assumption of US Supreme Headquarters that a 'firm stand on Formosa' would have a 90 per cent chance of heading off a Chinese invasion ' . . . because the Chinese themselves are not ready for a head-on tilt with American power. . . .'⁵⁷ The Chinese leadership was concerned that its position be interpreted as one inspired by fear and weakness. As for American claims that the US acted to protect security in the Pacific region, Wu rebutted: 'Have the Chinese armed forces invaded Hawaii of the United States or have United States armed forces invaded Taiwan of China?'⁵⁸ Wu wanted to know how the US could claim that it had not 'encroached on

Chinese territory'. He asked rhetorically: 'Where, then, have the United States 7th Fleet and 13th Air Force gone? Can it be that they have gone to the planet Mars?'⁵⁹

In reality, the Americans were deterred by the Sino-Soviet friendship treaty from extending the war to the mainland, but this was not necessarily an operational assumption in Beijing. Indian diplomacy went to great lengths to explain Chinese motivation to the Americans. Secretary-General Bajpai conveyed Panikkar's view that the Chinese leadership had become 'very emotional' in its belief that the US had taken over Japan's historical role as the aggressor against China by establishing beach-heads in Korea and 'Formosa'.⁶⁰ India's UN Ambassador Rau also conveyed to the Americans his view that the Chinese genuinely feared an American attempt 'to strangle their infant regime at birth'.⁶¹

On 14 December the UN General Assembly passed a resolution establishing a Cease-Fire Group including the Assembly President Nasrollah Entezam (Iran), Lester Pearson (Canada), and Sir Benegal Rau (India). The difficulties of coming up with a universally acceptable statement of principle were explicit in the Indian reluctance to compromise good relations with China by appearing to be too close to US influences on the Group, and by contemporary US attempts to push through a UNGA vote labelling the PRC as an 'aggressor' in Korea. Chinese diplomacy stressed that any cease-fire proposal would have to be accompanied by major political understandings. The complicated relation between military and political issues no doubt reminded Zhou of the difficulties of the Chongqing negotiations of the 1940s. The central issue was the American 'scheme of cease fire first and talk later' (*xian tingzhan hou tanpande guiji*).

Zhou cabled his response to the Cease-Fire Group's proposals on 17 January 1950, indicating that any cease-fire would have to be contemporaneous with negotiations for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea *and* the formal acceptance of the PRC's representatives at the UN. Zhou was not impressed that extensive UN discussion on the subject had already taken place without reference to China's legitimate representatives, and he bluntly observed:

The purpose of arranging a cease-fire first is merely to give the US breathing space. Therefore, regardless of what the agenda may be, if a cease-fire comes into effect without first conducting negotiations to fix the conditions thereof, negotiations after the cease-fire may entail endless discussions without solving any problems.⁶²

As expected, Zhou insisted that such substantive negotiations include discussion of the US withdrawal from Taiwan, but he further demanded that the conference of the US, France, USSR, UK, India and Egypt take place in, of all places, China! Indian diplomacy argued with the Americans that Zhou's 17 January position demonstrated some movement in so far as Zhou had gone beyond his earlier position to the effect that Korea's internal problems should be dealt with exclusively by the Koreans.⁶³ Zhou accepted a seven-nation conference even though this wider forum included states which had not been party to the Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Agreement.⁶⁴

Prime Minister Nehru personally intervened, appealing to Zhou to declare his willingness to hold immediate negotiations without pre-conditions, and Zhou replied on 28 January that such a declaration in the current context of a motion pending before the UNGA, condemning China as an 'aggressor' state, would appear as a demonstration of weakness in the face of such allegedly scurrilous charges at the UN.⁶⁵

The UNGA resolution, condemning Chinese aggression, was passed on 1 February with 44 voting in favour, 7 opposed and 9 abstentions. On 2 February Zhou issued a statement repudiating the resolution. The proposed conference was now out of the question. Noting the failure to respond to China's proposals of 17 January, Zhou repeated that the UNGA had acted illegally without the benefit of legal Chinese representation and in violation of the prerogatives of the UNSC. Zhou was well aware that, in light of the Soviet veto in the Security Council, American UN diplomacy chose to focus on the General Assembly, where there was a pro-US majority. Zhou approvingly cited the Indian characterisation of the UNGA First Committee debate as 'no cease-fire, no talks and no peaceful solution' (*buting huo, butanpan, ye buheling jiejue*).⁶⁶

Sino-American hostility was further intensified as a result of the American-British initiative to draft a peace treaty with Japan. Upon receiving a draft copy from the Soviet embassy in Beijing, Zhou sent a note on 22 May 1951 to the Soviet Ambassador, N.V. Roschin, indicating that the Soviet view of the draft corresponded 'completely' with that of the Chinese government. The US-sponsored treaty was allegedly at variance with the legal requirements of the Potsdam Agreement requiring a joint agreement between the US, Britain, the USSR, China and Japan. The 'central aim' of the new treaty was none other than 'the revival of Japanese militarism, in order to continue and expand its [US] aggression against the Asian countries'.⁶⁷

Zhou stressed the importance of an independent Japan in the establishment of a regional structure of peace in Asia. A year later, Zhou issued another statement indicating that the treaty had become all the more invidious because it was followed up by a Japanese 'peace treaty' with Taiwan, and taken together these treaties created 'a military menace to the People's Republic of China'. The second treaty explicitly challenged the legal existence of the PRC in its inclusion of a statement to the effect that its provisions would' . . . apply to all the territory which is now under the control of the Republic of China or which may come under its control in the future'.⁶⁸

Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida had personally inclined towards independence on the issue of Chinese participation in the peace treaty negotiations, and had wished to postpone the finalising of a draft pending the international settlement of the question of Chinese representation.⁶⁹ John Foster Dulles, however, strong-armed him into signing the treaty despite the objections of the British who interpreted American 'tactics' in this matter as yet 'another example of their weakness for pursuing a temporary domestic political objective . . . regardless of longer term consequences in the international field'.⁷⁰

Surprisingly or not, there appeared to be little Sino-Soviet co-ordination on a proposal for a cease-fire in Korea. In a rather unconventional manner, Soviet Ambassador Malik suddenly announced the new proposals for a 'cease-fire and armistice' in a UN radio broadcast of 23 June 1951. Malik made no reference to the often-stated Chinese position linking a cease-fire to larger regional political concerns. He simply suggested that as a 'first step' the belligerents might establish a 'cease-fire and armistice' providing for a mutual withdrawal from the 38th parallel. The initial British reaction assumed that Malik must have consulted with the Chinese, who presumably would not have publicly associated themselves with the proposal because they did not consider the Chinese government as 'belligerent' in Korea.⁷¹

The US ambassador in Moscow scrambled to seek clarification from Andrei Gromyko, who carefully explained Malik's reference to 'entering the path of peaceful negotiations' in terms of an 'interim military armistice' whereby the commanders in the field would conclude a military armistice, which was to be limited to military, as opposed to political, or territorial considerations. When pressed by Ambassador Kirk to explain the Chinese view of the situation,

Gromyko pointedly remarked that he did not know what the Chinese government's view of Malik's statement was. If the US wanted to know, he said, the US could always ask China.⁷²

It is still not clear, even today, as to how and when the Soviets broached the subject with the Chinese. The proposals did, however, come at an opportune moment. The sudden dismissal, on 11 April, of General Douglas MacArthur, whom, the Chinese knew only too well, wished to extend the Korean War to North-east China, was dramatic confirmation of Truman's 4 January 1951 declaration that he would not bomb any part of mainland China without reference to the US Congress and the UN. Also, the military situation had reverted roughly to the circumstances of the initial Chinese involvement. The opposing sides were militarily entrenched along the 38th parallel, and this had been the precipitating factor in January 1950, when the Chinese warned American armies not to cross exactly the same parallel.

That Malik's proposal was a surprise is sometimes inferred by the slow response of the Chinese media which did not deal with the substantive content of the proposal until 3 July.⁷³ However, the *Renmin ribao* editorial on 25 June generally supported the proposal. The editorial focused mainly on the issue as to whether the US military command had the ability to insure Syngman Rhee's compliance to the requirements of an armistice.⁷⁴ Perhaps, as the US ambassador in Moscow suggested, Malik was trying to 'finesse' the difficult formal dimensions of Chinese involvement in Korea. Gromyko's clarification had included in 'belligerent parties' the 'representatives of Chinese volunteer units' and US General Omar Bradley interpreted this as a way of allowing the Chinese 'to save face'.⁷⁵

Wu Xiuquan has noted with respect to his Moscow experience, that while there was an overall identity of interests between Moscow and Beijing, there were also 'contradictions'. The Chinese government had to bear a much greater share of the responsibilities of 'proletarian internationalism' in Korea. Taking a position on the 'first line of defence' against the US so that the USSR 'might stay in the second line' was accepted by the Chinese as necessary to averting a general war and possible US nuclear retaliation, but still there was Chinese resentment over the Soviet limitation of arms shipments to the Korean theatre.⁷⁶ Stalin was an ally, and the friendship treaty was a necessary deterrent, but Stalin apparently denied the Chinese any significant volume of weaponry which might possibly enable them to achieve decisive victory over US military positions in Korea.

There were also 'contradictions' in light of a more significant Chinese penetration of the North Korean Party, and continuing tension over Mao's position in world socialism. Mao's theoretical contribution to Marxism-Leninism had already been the occasion for an inter-Party row over the Manifesto of the Indian Communist Party.⁷⁷ A leading CCP theoretical spokesman, Chen Boda, went so far in June 1951 as to claim the 'universal significance' of Mao's 'theory of the Chinese revolution' as the 'concentrated experience of the revolution in the East'.⁷⁸ Moscow theoreticians responded warning against the Chinese revolution as a 'stereotype' and an unhealthy 'fetish'.⁷⁹

Beijing paid much higher dues for its involvement in the Korean War than did Moscow, but the Chinese consequently had a major voice in strategic decision-making and in the formulation of joint policies regarding Korea, and as a result of their sacrifice in the war, they enjoyed considerable influence in the affairs of Asian Communist parties.

The Chinese had pulled their own weight in Korea. The senior British diplomat in Beijing attempted to spell out the underlying motivation of Chinese policy for the Americans. Stressing the Chinese desire to play a more significant role in Asia and their primary focus on the internal dimensions of national economic reconstruction, Sir John Hutchinson repeated some of the earlier wisdom of the Dixie Mission. The Chinese leadership had succeeded in revolution without any significant obligation to the Soviet Union. The Chinese leaders, he argued, are indeed committed Marxist-Leninists, but, on the other hand, they are not at all prepared to subordinate themselves to the Soviet leaders, and, contrary to American assumptions, Hutchinson claimed that the Soviet influence was not especially evident in Beijing.⁸⁰

Hutchinson's analysis was quite deft. As both Premier and Foreign Minister, Zhou knew 'leaning' was not a general panacea for the problems of Chinese economic development. The Soviets had their hands full at home; they did not have the material capacity to rebuild the Chinese economy. Their influence was concentrated in Chinese large-scale capital construction, but, even with the advent of the First Five-Year Plan, it was unevenly focused at certain points in the economy. Soviet assistance was magnified in Western Cold War propaganda; however, to a great extent the Chinese had to rely on their own domestic economic resources and organisational experience.

In his political report to the First National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) on 23 October 1951, Zhou summed up his government's foreign policy.⁸¹ He treated the Sino-Soviet friendship treaty as a buffer for peace against the US attempts to plunge the world into general war. He warned against the American attempt to use the tension created by the Korean situation to extend containment, citing the San Francisco peace treaty, the bilateral US-Japan security pact, the US-Philippines mutual defence treaty and the 1951 tripartite security treaty between the US, Australia and New Zealand.⁸² He was, nevertheless, optimistic that the US imposition of heavy military costs on its allies would help to generate splits within the 'imperialist camp'. Zhou found gratification in the emerging split between the American and British ruling circles.⁸³ He repeated that the primary concern of the Chinese motivation of New China lie in the post-liberation struggle to restore the economy and society of China. Zhou indicated support for peaceful coexistence: ' . . . the people of our country consider that the countries of diverse social systems all over the world can exist peacefully side by side.'⁸⁴

As for the Korean negotiations, Zhou referred to 'Mr. Malik's proposal' and the 'pressure of world public opinion' as having forced the US into armistice talks at Panmunjom.⁸⁵ Once again he condemned American dominance of the UN, which he claimed had ' . . . become a tool of American imperialism'. Zhou was confident that the contrived American UN resolution of 18 May 1951 to place an embargo on China as an 'aggressor' in the Korean conflict had back-fired. At the time the Foreign Ministry had not only objected to the resolution as 'illegal' given the exclusion of China's rightful representative in the UNGA, but it was a further extension of 'imperialism' inasmuch as the US government hoped 'to disrupt normal relations in the world market' by securing a monopoly of raw materials on behalf of 'American gun merchants'.⁸⁶

In his 23 October report Zhou claimed: 'Actually this 'blockade' and 'embargo' were utilised by us . . . to shorten the road for reaching complete independence and self-reliance in our economy'.⁸⁷ Zhou highlighted what was to become a significant theme in his future diplomacy, namely, the theme of *Asian* self-assertion and independence.

That the armistice negotiations dragged on interminably is often ascribed to Stalin's intransigence, and, as John Gittings has so compellingly argued, this view assumes that the Chinese position was

'incomprehensibly counter-productive' in its bull-headed insistence on continuing the war regardless of its cost to Chinese economic reconstruction.⁸⁸ Such an assumption also presumed Chinese 'subservience' towards Stalin. The Communist side might not appear as so intransigent if it is understood that Malik's initial proposal deliberately skirted the underlying intractable fundamentals.

Also, the US side helped to complicate the negotiations with its focus on the voluntary repatriation of prisoners-of-war – an issue which essentially challenged Chinese sovereignty and socialist legitimacy. The Korean issue had had, all along, extraordinary implications for Chinese sovereignty in general as it was entangled in the international refusal to recognise China at the UN. In a letter to Lester Pearson, President of the UNGA, Zhou Enlai challenged the legal basis of a resolution, advanced by India and sponsored by the US, claiming that the Geneva Convention could in no way be construed '... as authorising a detaining power to employ force to effect the return of individual prisoners of war to their homelands'. Captured 'combatants', according to Zhou, were 'at the forcible disposal of their enemy', so any statement on their part indicating personal resistance to repatriation was subject to the manipulations of the 'enemy', thus the US insistence on 'voluntary repatriation' was specious.⁸⁹

While the Panjungmom negotiations were stalled over the prisoner-of-war issue, the Chinese lost no time in focusing their energies on domestic capital construction. Zhou Enlai once again travelled to the Soviet Union in August 1952, and once again the Soviets proved to be very difficult. Zhou extracted only modest concessions from the Soviet side including a joint communiqué, issued on 15 September, announcing the transfer of the Changchun railway to China. The communiqué announced the continued Soviet use of Port Arthur naval facilities. Zhou later insisted that it was the Chinese government which had requested the extension as a means of insuring against any American plan of attack on China's north-east.⁹⁰

On 31 December 1952, in Harbin, Zhou Enlai signed the final papers transferring Soviet rights in the jointly administered Changchun Railway to China. Publicly, Zhou accepted Soviet generosity as an expression of a 'completely new pattern' of state relations, unparalleled in the annals of international diplomatic history.⁹¹ In the context of China's transition to five-year planning and shift from the period of 'economic reconstruction' into a new period of 'large-scale capital construction' (*daguimodejiben jianshe*), Soviet aid was almost negligible.

In his report to the First National Committee of the CPPCC on 4 February 1953, Zhou again discounted US propaganda, claiming that Chinese involvement in Korea had set back the domestic Chinese programme for social transformation and economic rehabilitation.⁹² Zhou also returned to the theme of 'contradictions within and between the various capitalist countries'. He restated the policies of 1948–9: 'We do not discriminate against any capitalist country that is willing to develop trade relations with us on terms of equality and mutual benefit. We believe that countries with different systems can co-exist peacefully.'⁹³

While claiming US obstruction to the Korean negotiations, Zhou was already making adjustments towards the changing structure of international relations so as to activate the 'dual strategy' of united front. He outlined the contradiction between American, British and French imperialisms in Asia and Africa and denounced US attempts to make 'Asians fight Asians'. Zhou was just as vitriolic as Mao. He singled out the barbaric American 'testing' of 'new weapons': 'Their first two bombs were dropped in Asia; their first germ bombs were dropped in Asia'.⁹⁴ As for the Korean situation, Zhou again denounced American controlled voting in the UNGA, where the Indian resolution of 'voluntary repatriation' was manipulated and then foisted on the voting members of the UNGA.

Subsequently, in March, Zhou led a delegation to Moscow to attend Stalin's funeral. Zhou was honoured as the only non-Soviet pallbearer.⁹⁵ The Soviet leadership contenders hoped for Mao's blessing and were effusive in their respect for Mao, but Mao did not go to Moscow. He had bitter memories of his late 1949 trip to Moscow – a trip which had not been reciprocated by senior Soviet Party representatives. While Mao may have had trouble with Stalin in life, he waxed eloquent about his contributions in death. Mao wrote that Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin was 'the greatest genius of the present age'.⁹⁶

In the context of Soviet leadership uncertainty, but perhaps with Soviet encouragement, Zhou Enlai issued a statement on 30 March to break the deadlocked Korean truce negotiations.⁹⁷ Zhou held out a compromise, based upon Article 3 of the Korean Armistice, whereby prisoners of war who failed to declare themselves in favour of repatriation would be handed over to the neutral nations supervisory commission, for determination of their status.

The cessation of Korean hostilities and Stalin's death marked a new period of Chinese diplomatic initiative. Zhou's diplomacy was not able to secure an immediate linkage between the Korean cease-

fire and wider regional political issues, but the rigorous participation in the Korea War had rebounded to China's credit. The Chinese reaction to US 'imperialism' encompassed a complex relation of diplomacy and force, but China did emerge as a recognised power in Asia, and contemporary Chinese historiography is by and large correct in its assumption that the principles of 'independence and self-reliance' were not essentially compromised in 'leaning to one side'.

Zhou had set out to create a new style of diplomacy focusing on Lenin's idealistic view of the non-exploitative relations between socialist states; however, he realistically responded to the 'contradictions' which became apparent in negotiations with the USSR, and despite US containment, Zhou built his 'new kitchen' during the Cold War in Asia.

3 ‘Peaceful Coexistence’ v. Containment at Geneva and Bandung

The international position of the PRC was greatly enhanced as a result of CPV involvement in the Korea War. Chinese diplomacy became the focus of international attention at the Geneva Conference of 1954. Zhou relied on diplomacy in meeting the threat of US-sponsored alliances. He gained tremendous personal stature in Asia as a result of his Geneva performance, and in the spring of 1955 world attention once again focused on Zhou’s masterful diplomacy at Bandung, where he stymied Cold War containment by successfully identifying China with national independence in Asia.

It was only with great difficulty that the US resisted the arguments of its own allies that the PRC should be involved in negotiations relating to the ‘political conference’ called for in the Korean Armistice. In response to the Berlin four-power agreement to convene a conference on Korea and Indo-China, US Secretary of State Dulles instructed: ‘We maintain our refusal to give it [the PRC] any position of preferment, or to contribute to the enhancement of its authority and prestige.’¹ Indeed, the 19 February 1954 Berlin communiqué, empowering the establishment of the Geneva Conference for the restoration of peace in Korea and Indo-China, contained an explicitly worded caveat ascertaining that the invitation to attend or the holding of the conference, itself, could not be ‘deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded’.² Dulles refused to accept the PRC as one of the ‘Five Big Powers’. The PRC was to attend as an ‘invited’ rather than an ‘inviting’ power. Such disclaimers lacked credibility in light of Zhou’s pivotal role at the Conference table.

Dulles had some success in excluding neutrals from the Conference, but this did not stop Zhou who, in the multilateral context of the negotiations, excelled in setting off British and French realism against the ideological rigidity of US containment policies. In the end, the larger settlement of the Korean issue still alluded Zhou, particularly because the UN allies of the US were not prepared to

accept any compromise of the UN's role in the political settlement, but his diplomacy placed the US on the defensive in Asia. The failure of Zhou's final proposal in the Korean sessions was a source of bitter personal frustration, but within days of the closing of these sessions, Zhou moved ahead of Molotov, seizing the initiative in the Indo-China sessions. Zhou was able to get an agreement on a cease fire and settlement in Indo-China despite Dulles's delaying tactics. Both inside and outside of the Conference negotiations, Zhou's diplomacy constituted an effective united front offensive which sought to join Asian 'neutralism' with his Marxist-Leninist conception of 'peaceful coexistence'.

The holding of the Conference was, in itself, an amazing feat. On 27 July 1953 the belligerents had signed the Korean Armistice, which had included an important, but ambiguous provision for the holding of a political conference 'at a higher level'. The Chinese position on this political conference was spelled out in Zhou's 13 September telegram to Dag Hammarskjöld.³ Zhou protested US insistence on a 'two-sided' conference which would oppose the two groups of belligerents across the table from one another. Zhou supported UNGA resolutions which invited the Soviet Union to the projected conference as a 'neutral', but he argued for a 'round-table conference' which would include concerned 'neutrals' such as India. The South Koreans, wary of any kind of negotiation with Communist governments, vigorously resisted the idea of a 'round table' in UNGA debate, citing past experiences of the Communist ability to manipulate 'intermediate sides' in negotiation.⁴

Zhou's emphasis on neutrality, defined in terms of non-belligerence, turned out to be quite important in subsequent negotiations. Zhou may have hoped to avoid a conference which would range the UN as a belligerent against the PRC. The formula for international supervision in Korea, however, was complicated by the UN's own military involvement in Korea and its resolution against the PRC as an 'aggressor'. From the Chinese viewpoint, the UN acting as the military extension of US imperialism in Korea was itself a 'belligerent'. The UN was an uncertain, if not hostile, forum which had refused China admission.

The growing post-colonial tendency towards 'neutralism' favoured China's positive engagement in international negotiations. Zhou's particular interest in India's 'neutralism' can be explained in the specific terms of India's involvement in negotiations relating to the Armistice and the prisoner-of-war question; however, Zhou was also

generally interested in regionwide consultations, which would allow more opportunities to interact with 'neutrals' as 'middle forces'.

Even before Stalin's death, and as early as his February 1953 report to the CPPCC, Zhou had affirmed the principle of 'peaceful coexistence' in Chinese foreign policy. Subsequently, 'neutral' India, became the lynchpin in a diplomatic exercise challenging American containment. Zhou Enlai's secretary and chief interpreter, Pu Shou-chang, recounts that Zhou first mentioned the 'five principles of peaceful coexistence' during a meeting with an Indian delegation on the New Year's Eve of 1953.⁵ Zhou then claimed that ever since the founding of New China these five principles had in practice governed Sino-Indian relations.⁶ During the Geneva Conference, China signed an agreement with India concerning Tibet, which for the first time featured the five principles (including mutual respect for territory integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence) in an international agreement.

Zhou challenged the UN's responsibility for collective security in Korea, emphasising instead the international role of 'neutrals'. Throughout the Korean sessions of the Geneva Conference, Zhou refused to accept the supervising role of the UN, which had yet to recognise the PRC as one of the 'Five Powers'.

The holding of the Geneva 'political conference' had been endorsed during the 'four power conference' in Berlin on 25 January–18 February 1954. Britain, France and the US were then sufficiently co-ordinated to reject Soviet proposals for an All-European Treaty on Collective Security. However, there was a growing desire among US allies to reduce tensions in Asia. The French wanted to extricate themselves from an increasingly difficult military position in Indo-China. Britain was overseeing the transition from Empire to Commonwealth and was receptive to the pleas of the 'Colombo powers' for Asian national independence.

Dulles reluctantly agreed to a conference on Korea and Indo-China, which would include the PRC as an 'invited' power, and he foisted an invitation on South Korea. The latter was not convinced that Dulles had indeed 'won a great diplomatic battle in Berlin'. Dulles wrote to President Rhee explaining the necessity of attendance in terms of his ongoing efforts to 'organize a strong anti-Communist front in relation to Indochina'.⁷ The premature jettisoning of the Geneva Conference would have compromised his efforts to gain allied support towards the organisation of this 'front'.

The British were reluctant to participate in a new regional collective defence organisation without first giving diplomacy a chance at Geneva. The Chinese presence at Geneva, however, proved to be quite unsettling for Dulles. Zhou came to his first international conference with a staff of 200, as compared to the Soviet delegation of 160 and the North Korean delegation of 60.⁸ Pham Van Dong of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) arrived almost unnoticed, but Zhou's airport arrival at four in the afternoon of 24 April was a media sensation.⁹

China's Consul in Switzerland, Wen Pengjiu, had arranged very grand accommodation for the principals of the delegation at the estate, '*Grand Mont-Fleuri*', at Versoix, just 7 kilometres outside of town.¹⁰ Priceless antiques and furnishings were shipped from China to add to the stately rooms and corridors of *Grand Mont-Fleuri*. Zhou, who at home made a point of insisting on a modest life-style, adapted to the international spotlight.

During Dulles's remarks at the third plenary session of the Conference on 28 April, the Chinese delegation requested to be inscribed, and Zhou then made his debut with an hour-long speech at the Palais des Nations.¹¹ Zhou insisted on the Asian desire for peace and freedom. He portrayed the US attempt to establish bloc politics in Asia as the greatest obstacle to Asian independence. He also recounted the achievements of his government in rebuilding the national economy and the undertaking of a great social revolution.

In outlining his country's foreign policy, Zhou challenged the American image of China as an 'aggressor'. This outline, as suggested in the following remarks, anticipated the later formulation of the 'five principles of peaceful coexistence':

The Chinese government and people have all along favoured peace and opposed war. We have not invaded others, and we will not invade other countries. We respect the rights of the peoples of other countries to choose and to safeguard their own way of life and state system and to be free of foreign intervention; at the same time we would require that other countries adopt the same attitude towards us.¹²

Zhou cited the friendly co-operation between the USSR and PRC as an example of economic and cultural relations based upon the principle of 'equality and mutual aid' (*pingdeng huzhu*).

The issue of Asian independence dominated the early discussions on Korea, and the balance of Zhou's remarks of 28 April were

directed to the question of Asian independence. Zhou contended that the thrust of Dulles's speech was in direct opposition to Asian welfare. For the first time, Dulles had to face the Chinese head-on in an international forum, and he was more than annoyed over Zhou's maiden speech. On 28 April Dulles cabled his reaction to the State Department. He initially characterised Zhou's speech as the 'standard CC boiler plate propaganda line in phraseology as well as in content'.¹³ It was not, he claimed, the expected 'sophisticated approach', and it was 'designed for propaganda appeal in Asia'. In a subsequent message on 29 April, Dulles admitted that the speeches of Molotov and Zhou Enlai '... lead me to rate more highly than heretofore the probability that any open US intervention [in Indochina] would be answered by open Chinese intervention with consequence of general war in Asia'.¹⁴

Dulles met with Eden at the latter's villa on 30 April. He told Eden that it was 'galling' to the US to have to listen to such 'vicious' attacks. Dulles wanted to know why the British had not countered the Communist accusations, and he pointedly informed Eden that he was personally eager 'to beat the Communists at their own game and to sponsor nationalism in the independent colonial areas', but that he had only been restrained from doing so as not to embarrass Britain and France in the colonial world.¹⁵ Dulles was angry, for he had already postponed a decision regarding a mutual defence treaty with Taiwan for fear of fall-out at the Conference.

The two reviewed some of their problems in co-ordination at the Korean sessions of the Conference. Eden noted disagreement over the South Korean election formula as well as the difficulties of preventing the Colombo Conference countries, including Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan, from taking a hard line on the Indo-China question.

In the restricted session of 1 May, Molotov sat back while Zhou and the North Korean delegate, Nam Il, took turns blasting the US position on Korea. Zhou criticised Dulles's memorandum for its lack of 'concrete proposals' and its failure to list 'divergent views'. In a tense discussion over the North Korean proposal for the withdrawal of all foreign troops three months before elections, Zhou engaged in a sharp exchange with the French Foreign Minister, Georges Bidault, who in referring to Zhou's obstinacy in refusing to recognise China's belligerence in Korea, sarcastically inquired how the CPV could be withdrawn 'when they have not been sent'.¹⁶ Zhou parried and thrust. He asked Bidault to search his failing memory to recall that

the Korean Armistice had been signed by both the UN Command and CPV representatives. Furthermore, Zhou repeatedly informed the delegates: 'This conference has nothing to do with the UN'.

Zhou's principal antagonist at the Conference was John Foster Dulles, and the UN question was the *point d'honneur* separating them at the table. Dulles continued to plan for collective defence in South-East Asia. Despite some of the irritants in his allied relations, he focused the Western delegations on the Chinese refusal to recognise the UN as an agency of collective security in Korea, and as the appropriate agency for the international supervision of a political settlement in Korea.

Dulles used the UN issue to rationalise the sudden termination of the Korean phase of the Conference. The 'middle forces' in this scenario were not prepared to accept a compromise which would significantly diminish the moral authority of the UN. Furthermore, Dulles did have his own priorities straight. What was important was the usefulness of Presidents Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek in the regional struggle against Communism. Dulles refused to 'attempt coercive pressures on Rhee', and, as is indicated in the following excerpt from a top secret memorandum to the US Geneva Delegation, support for Rhee and Chiang was ultimately more important than winning points with European allies:

In view of our desire to develop a strong anti-Communist position, with particular relation to Indochina, and the prospect that we might still intervene there and this might involve a clash with Communist China, I think it important that we basically follow a line which will keep the confidence of our anti-Communist allies in Asia rather than seem to be working against them with a view to winning favor of Western European countries.¹⁷

Zhou recognised the need for some form of international supervision, and he re-emphasised his positive view of 'neutral' involvement. Dulles did not want 'neutrals' 'cluttering up' the Conference, and his support for the UN related to US predominance within the General Assembly and the US veto in the UNSC.

Huang Hua, in a 7 May news conference, dealt with the American offensive on the question of UN involvement. In replying to New Zealand Foreign Minister Clifton Webb's argument that Zhou's attack on UN activities in Korea was inconsistent with his desire for the China UN seats, Huang retorted: 'It is precisely for the purpose of upholding the prestige of the UN that illegal resolutions adopted in

the past should be eliminated . . .'.¹⁸ Huang asserted that, because the UN resolutions on Korea had failed as a basis for settlement, the Geneva Conference had had 'to be arranged through other quarters'. Huang reiterated that the PRC very much favoured the UN Charter and that Dong Biwu, as the Chinese Communist representative at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, had signed the Charter. Thus the PRC was one of the original sponsors of the UN.

The US Under-Secretary of State, Walter Bidell Smith, warned Dulles that the Communists might be planning to propose a *quid pro quo* allowing PRC admission into the UN in return for the acceptance of the UN's supervisory role in Korean elections. Dulles focused on Huang's 7 May remarks as just another indication of an identity of views between the Chinese and Soviets on China's place in the world. Both delegations were trying to 'create the impression that Communist China is a great power'.

Dulles ordered his delegation not to encourage Conference speculation about Sino-Soviet differences. Perhaps, he had the Indian government in mind when he noted: 'Allegations of Chinese independence of policy can only contribute to Asian wishful thinking that Communist China is somehow more Asian than Communist . . .'.¹⁹

Molotov tried to convince the Americans that the key to understanding the Chinese lie in their Asian identity. General Walter Bidell Smith later informed Molotov that it was easier to sit down at the conference table with the Soviets than the Chinese, whom he considered to be 'intransigent' and lacking in 'restraint'. Molotov advised Smith not only that China was a 'young country' but also that ' . . . China is always going to be China, she is never going to be European'.²⁰ Smith's view of the Chinese underwent change during the Conference. Wang Bingnan's recollection suggests that Smith was uncomfortable with Dulles's instructions not to shake hands with the Chinese delegates. Despite Dulles's strictures, Smith tried to make friendly overtures to Zhou.²¹

Huang Hua's press statement was not, as was so freely speculated, a 'hint' of compromise, but merely a restatement of Zhou's established position on the UN. Zhou approved of the UN Charter, particularly its provisions for the equality of nations, but he would not accept the UN's 'illegal' actions in so far as they were determined by US 'imperialism'. Zhou repeated this in his 22 May Conference speech on Korean problems, in which he endorsed a neutral nations commission to supervise Korean elections. Zhou referred to the UN Charter, indicating that the US, USSR, France, Britain and China

have 'special responsibilities', *teshude zeren*, for the maintenance of international peace.²² Zhou wished to make China one of the 'Big Five'; on the other hand, his understanding of 'peaceful coexistence' incorporated a notion of the equality of all states. Zhou, in accepting the UN Charter, had also to accept its contradictions.

The denouement of the Korean sessions did not come unexpectedly. During the first weeks of June Zhou was struggling to consolidate what little agreement there was. In the Indo-China session of 9 June and again in the Korean plenary of 11 June, Zhou recommended 'taking those views which were shared in common as a positive basis for moving forward in the talks, and at the same time in those areas where there was some disagreement, seeking a method for their solution'.²³ This was a presentiment of Zhou's later formulation at Bandung, namely, 'seeking common ground, while reserving differences', *quitong cunyi*. Zhou may have been mulling over the latter formulation as it applied to the relations between all states, but as events unfolded it became more or less exclusively associated with China's relations with Third World countries.²⁴

Dulles warned his delegation to be wary of Communist united front chicanery. In fact Zhou's talents for carefully crafted diplomatic compromise often went unnoticed by the Americans. The Chinese delegation, on the other hand, was finely tuned into the differences among the UN allies of the US. Dulles's whole approach to the Conference was that it was not in and of itself a real concern; it was merely an exercise to placate the British and French and to fall on the right side of the international propaganda equation. Dulles did not see any room for exploiting differences between the Chinese and the Soviets, for he was convinced of monolithic Communism.

On 14–15 June the heads of the 16 allied delegations worked out their tactics for the termination of the Korean sessions. They highlighted the need to defend the UN's right to take 'collective action' and to provide international supervision of the Korean elections. The allied manoeuvres were not all that well executed in the Fifteenth Plenary Session on 15 June. Smith conceded that the Communists had foreknowledge of the allied strategy, and thus they were 'cocked and primed' to take maximum propaganda advantage of the allied intention to disengage.²⁵

The Communist side spoke in conciliatory terms of the necessity of reaching some agreement on the transition from armistice to North-South unification. Zhou Enlai took the floor to support Molotov's proposal for the issuance of a conference declaration on the Korean

question. Rather than throwing out some of the commonalities, reached in hard negotiation, he called for the adoption of a resolution committing the Conference participants to continuing their efforts towards a negotiated settlement. Zhou suggested a diluted wording omitting specific references to the time and place and simply stating that this question would be settled 'separately by the states concerned through negotiation'.²⁶ This made it more difficult to cite Communist intransigence as the reason for the termination of the Korea sessions.

Zhou engaged in an exchange with the Belgium foreign minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, over his proposed resolution. Spaak argued that Zhou Enlai's proposal was unnecessary as it was already self-evident in the provisions of the Korean Armistice. Zhou raised his delegation's sign and challenged Spaak's assumption. Zhou believed that no such provision requiring the Geneva powers to seek a Korean settlement existed in the Armistice Agreement.²⁷

Article 4 of the Agreement was undoubtedly subject to widely different readings, as it only referred to a 'political conference of a higher level' which would be attended by representatives chosen by both sides. In so far as Zhou was concerned, however, it was but a small thing to ask of the Conference participants to state their general agreement to future negotiation.

Spaak persisted, to the annoyance Smith, in qualifying his point further by suggesting that while Zhou's proposal was not explicitly included in the Armistice Agreement, it did conform with the spirit of the 16-nation declaration on the Korean negotiations. Zhou rejoined, arguing that he could not see how this was so, for the declaration was a 'one-sided statement'. According to the Americans, he 'baited' Spaak, suggesting that they should get together on a common statement since there was such a measure of agreement in spirit.

General Smith was not inclined to prolong the debate. He dismissed the whole idea, claiming that the Conference is not a permanent body.²⁸ Co-chairman Eden added that there was no formal voting procedure by which to endorse such a proposal. He limply suggested that, while there was no conference mechanism for the adoption of a draft resolution, the statements of the delegates would form part of the official record of the Conference.

The closing of the Korea sessions was a bitter, frustrating experience for Zhou. The British reported to the Americans on a 16 June meeting between Zhou and Eden. Eden claimed that Zhou was

shaken by the conclusion of the Korea sessions and that he was particularly upset over the rejection of his final proposal. Zhou saw in the rejection a move to preclude the PRC from future negotiations on the Korean question. Eden reassured Zhou that this was not necessarily the case.²⁹ In an interview of 19 July 1971, Zhou later described his own view of the rejection of his proposal:

We said . . . we should at least set a date for another meeting. At that time the foreign ministers of certain countries were persuaded, for instance Mr. Spaak of Belgium. He had worked with the United Nations. The chairman of the meeting at that time was Mr. Eden. At that time he wavered a bit and he tended to agree with this view. And . . . there was an authoritative representative who was seated at the conference and who waved his hand in opposition and the result was that it was not passed. You probably know who he was: the deputy of Mr. John Foster Dulles, Mr. Smith. Of course, it might not have been his own personal opinion but he did so on instructions. He didn't say anything, he couldn't find any words. He just waved his hand.³⁰

Dulles did not want any substantive agreement at the Conference; Zhou did. The Indo-China question was not nearly as intractable. It was for Zhou an Asian question, and it was to be effectively approached on the basis of a diplomatic offensive, encompassing the 'five principles of peaceful coexistence'. The French defeat at Dien-bienphu was a favourable intervening circumstance in that the French became even more anxious to disengage from Vietnam. Their alternatives were reduced to either active US military intervention, or a negotiated disengagement. The British, who feared the unlimited consequences of the American zeal for fighting Communism, were hoping to find a way out at the Conference which would avert the internationalisation of the Indo-China War. As the UN had not been directly involved, its moral authority and prerogative to constitute collective action against aggressor states was not on the line to the same extent as was the case in Korea. Given the relative uncertainty of the French and British positions, the American capacity for united action was hampered, and Zhou's ability to cultivate the 'middle forces' was enhanced.

The most controversial aspect of the Indo-China sessions has been the Chinese-Vietminh relationship. Western research has suggested that at the Conference the Chinese delivered a settlement which was more favourable to their own peace initiative in Asia than to the

prosecution of the Vietminh's war effort in South-East Asia.³¹ During the mid-1970s deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations, the Vietnamese charged that Zhou sacrificed their revolutionary movement at Geneva when he agreed to the neutrality of the Laotian and Cambodian royal governments. This hostile view claims that Zhou's support for separate settlements in Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia was inspired by a hidden agenda of annexation in South-East Asia,³² and it is premised by an extreme exaggeration, which misconstrues both Chinese objectives as well as Ho Chi Minh's reaction to the international politics of the time.

Undoubtedly the Chinese were concerned over the possibility of the internationalisation of the Indo-China war. They had participated in the Korean War only at the expense of sacrificing the advent of their own first five-year plan and the liberation of Taiwan. They had done so to avoid 'front line' Soviet involvement which would have encouraged the US invasion of the North-east. However, Zhou had apparently informed Khrushchev, in a Moscow meeting prior to the convening of the Conference, that China could not afford another costly commitment such as the one in Korea, and that China would not, therefore, send troops into Vietnam.³³

As Premier, Zhou was responsible for internal economic development, and, as Foreign Minister, he focused on a cost-efficient diplomatic strategy which would stymie American containment while enhancing China's international position in Asia. It was an opportune time to carry out such a strategy. The Soviets were in the midst of a leadership struggle and were looking for a general reduction of tensions with the US. Furthermore, with Stalin's death Mao had become a leading figure in the Communist world. Surviving leadership hopefuls in the Soviet Union wanted Mao's support. At the Geneva Conference Zhou generally followed Molotov's lead in the Korea sessions, but on the Indo-China question he demonstrated independent policy initiative, which was supported by the Soviets in turn.

François Joyaux's Sorbonne dissertation on China and the Indo-China question has effectively summed up the Chinese position.³⁴ Militarily, the Indo-China situation was different from Korea. North-east China as a great rear area of China's war effort was also China's industrial heartland, and therefore the CPVs had the advantage of a relatively well-developed system of Chinese communications and supply, whereas across-the-border supportive military operations in Vietnam were logistically more difficult.

Also, according to Soviet sources, the Chinese had diplomatic reasons for avoiding an internationalisation of the Indo-China conflict. It was strategically necessary to avoid an extension of US-sponsored alliances to India and Indonesia. Ho Chi Minh's position on this is not well documented, but it was not in the interests of North Vietnam to precipitate the expansion of pro-US alliance structures in Asia at a time when the Chinese and Soviets were reluctant to undertake major commitments. According to Khrushchev, Zhou Enlai had informed him just before the start of the Geneva Conference that Ho Chi Minh was, himself, doubtful as to whether the Vietminh could win a military victory in Indo-China.³⁵ Sometime between Ho's 2 September 1953 rejection of negotiations, and his acceptance of the same on 28 November, there was a significant change of course within the Vietnamese leadership.

The Vietminh's take-over of the French command at Dienbienphu on 7 May, however, had a very sobering effect on the Geneva Conference, and the Vietminh leadership did not want to lose through diplomacy what had been gained on the battlefield. The imminence of French defeat, nevertheless, increased the likelihood of the US internationalisation of the conflict.

The Indo-China phase of the Conference started on 8 May, just one day after the French flag had been lowered over Dienbienphu, and lasted until 21 July. The cast of characters was different. The US did not have to co-ordinate 15 UN allies. Eden and Molotov co-chaired the Indo-China sessions which were attended by delegations from the US, USSR, PRC, France, Britain, Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the two Associated States in the French Union, Laos and Cambodia. There was squabbling over the seating of Ho Chi Minh's representatives, but Smith described this as the 'more or less inevitable consequence of French acceptance of negotiations without any prior conditions'.³⁶ Smith predictably objected in the First Plenary Session on 8 May to the joint Sino-Soviet invitation to the Vietminh to attend the Indo-China sessions as contrary to the Berlin terms of reference.³⁷ The Bao Dai regime would have preferred observer status, but was given no choice but to participate. Smith also wanted the Laotians and Cambodians to attend so that the Chinese and their Vietnamese allies would not be able to claim an exclusive right to speak for Asians. The Western allies refused to accept the credentials of representatives of the Pathet Lao and Khmer Issarak, and Zhou and Molotov did not press the issue.

The delegations were all aware of the mounting domestic pressure

within France favouring a settlement, and the Communist delegations were expected to demand harsh terms in light of the French military defeat. At the Third Plenary Session on 12 May, Zhou Enlai extensively examined the question of French colonialism, asserting that the Chinese people wanted to see a cessation of hostilities in Indo-China just as there had been in Korea.

Zhou then cited the 24 March Parliamentary comments of Prime Minister Nehru, who had described the war as an 'anti-colonial movement'. He regretted Georges Bidault's failure to understand this and proceeded to describe the growing cleavage within French society on the subject of the war. Apparently, the 'war faction' within French 'ruling circles' dared not abandon their colonialist policy even though the French people, by and large, had come to regard the war as a 'dirty war', *angzang zhazheng*³⁸ Zhou bluntly told Bidault that as the representative of French colonialism he could not presume to dictate the terms of a cease fire. Bidault retorted that he was not about to take any lessons from Zhou Enlai on French politics.³⁹

Zhou's main concern on 12 May, however, was the US promotion of an Asian system of alliances, and in response to the American strategy of 'Asians fighting Asians', he proposed 'peaceful coexistence' in Asia. He discussed aspects of the 'five principles' in the following statement:

It is the view of the government of the People's Republic of China: Asian countries must mutually respect each other's independence and sovereignty and not interfere in each other's internal affairs; they must solve their disputes through peaceful negotiation and not through threats and military force; they must establish normal economic and cultural relations on the basis of equality and mutual benefit and disallow discrimination and limitations. Only in this way can the Asian countries avoid the neocolonialist exploitation of the unprecedented catastrophe of Asians fighting Asians and achieve peace and security.⁴⁰

Zhou's Conference strategy was informed by a successful agreement with India on the Tibet question. An Indian delegation had been engaged in Beijing negotiations with Zhang Hanfu in the period 31 December 1953 to 29 April 1954. The 29 April communiqué formally highlighted for the first time 'five principles of peaceful coexistence'.⁴¹

This agreement had been struck at the time of the Colombo Conference of 28 April–2 May in Ceylon. Zhou, at Geneva, was

especially mindful of the Colombo influence on the British, and in his 14 May morning meeting with Eden, he pressed the point that the principles of Chinese foreign policy had been enshrined in China's agreement with India on Tibet. Eden was politic. He would do what he could to reduce tensions between the 'five great powers'. The reference to the 'five' was pleasing to Zhou's ear, but he insisted that recognition of China as a 'great power' was not a precondition for the settlement of the Indo-China question.⁴²

The British feared a tremendous conflagration in South-East Asia which could go beyond anything which had been seen in Korea. On 17 May Prime Minister Churchill told the House of Commons that until the outcome of the Geneva Conference was known, his government would not be in a position to reach a decision as to Britain's participation in a collective defence system in South-East Asia and the Western Pacific.

The French were under tremendous domestic pressure, and the British wanted to give negotiations a chance. The time was ripe for Zhou Enlai to exploit the differences between London and Washington; however, the British and the Americans were at least in agreement that the military and political situations of Laos and Cambodia were different from that of Vietnam; they took the position that the Vietminh had invaded Laos and Cambodia and that there was no major nationalist movement in these countries.

Zhou Enlai stressed that the case was the same in all three countries, as the underlying political problem of French colonialism was the same; however, he moved closer to the British-American position in accepting that they were after all dealing with three different countries where the conditions for national independence were bound to be different. Wang Bingnan in fact had told the French on 18 May: 'We are not here to sustain the point of view of the Vietminh, we are here to exert all efforts towards the re-establishment of peace'.⁴³

Zhou's qualification as to the differences in national context in Indo-China paved the way for his cease-fire proposals of 27 May. The six-point proposal to the seventh restricted session on Indochina constituted what François Joyaux has described as '*un coup de théâtre*'.⁴⁴ Zhou attempted to co-opt the other delegations with a proposal which brought together elements which had been mooted by the various delegations.

The proposal encompassed an immediate cease fire throughout Indo-China, contact between military commanders at Geneva and in

Indo-China, a moratorium on the introduction into the area of fresh military personnel and arms, the establishment of a joint commission and a neutral nations supervisory commission after the pattern of the Korean Armistice, the collective guarantee of the participating states at Geneva against violation of the armistice and an agreement on the exchange of prisoners of war and interned civilians. The idea of a supervisory commission, composed of 'neutral' states had been raised by the Soviets on 14 May. Zhou claimed that he was of the same mind as the British and French on the question of all the parties at Geneva joining in a collective guarantee of the proposed agreement.⁴⁵ He noted that no objections had been raised to this point, but this was certainly an unwarranted assumption in so far as the US delegation was concerned.

Zhou also expressed interest in Bidault's 24 May suggestion of 'demilitarised zones', which he thought might be the subject of direct discussion between the parties involved. His third point did not explicitly address the US concern for the withdrawal of Vietminh forces from Laos and Cambodia, for his wording referred to a moratorium on any future introduction of 'various kinds of new troops and military personnel as well as various kinds of weapons and ammunition' (*gezhong xinde budui he junshi yiji wuqi he danyao*).⁴⁶ Zhou's primary concern was the exclusion of direct US military intervention in Indo-China. His 27 May proposal, however, set the stage for the 9 power agreement of 29 May calling for a simultaneous cessation of hostilities throughout Indo-China.

The proposals sparked an argument over the definition of 'neutrality' as the delegations jockeyed over which countries could act as 'neutrals' on the proposed neutral supervisory commission. Smith, on 31 May, attacked the Polish and Czechoslovak performance on the Korean neutral supervisory commission as lacking in 'neutrality'. He submitted that 'Communist' states could not, by definition, be 'neutral'.⁴⁷ Gromyko, standing in for Molotov, countered that the same reasoning could be equally applied in the 'opposite direction'. Ironically, the stern Marxist-Leninist upbraided his indignant American counterpart, reminding him: 'Ideology is one thing and cooperation for the maintenance of peace is another.'⁴⁸

On 2 June the French Foreign Minister mischievously cited Mao's comments in 'On New Democracy' to the effect that China could not choose neutrality in relation to the US and USSR.⁴⁹ That very morning, during a press briefing, General Smith had referred to a State Department paper, entitled 'War by Cease-fire'. He was not

then prepared to release the paper, but he noted that it started with an 'extremely significant' quotation from Zhou Enlai concerning the political necessities of 'coalition government' as the tactical 'corollary of an armistice'.⁵⁰

Zhou believed that Bidault's insistence on the 'objective' impartiality of the members of a control commission was counterproductive as the Vietminh would certainly not agree to the commission if they had no confidence in its membership. He informed the Conference on 9 June of his view that 'neutral', as he understood it in the context of the Korean Armistice Agreement and current international usage, implied a state which was not directly engaged in hostilities.⁵¹

Zhou reasoned that if 'ideology' and 'social system' were to be used as the basis of such a definition then all countries would have to be disqualified. Zhou was losing his patience with the French whom he accused of playing a double game of participating in the Conference while urging the Americans to intervene directly to save the French position in Indo-China.

One day before Pierre Mendès-France's election as Premier of France, and just one day after the closing out of the Korean session on 15 June, Zhou attempted another major initiative. Zhou informed Eden in private that he understood the British position on Laos and Cambodia as it affected their position in Malaysia, and, provided the US did not establish military bases in Indo-China, he was prepared to recognise Laos and Cambodia as independent states 'in the same manner as India and Burma'.⁵²

Zhou also informed Eden that it would 'not be difficult' to get the Vietminh to agree to withdraw from Laos and Cambodia provided all foreign forces were to withdraw from Indo-China. Zhou's timing was crucial, for the Americans were actively considering a withdrawal from the Indo-China sessions, and the earlier termination of the Korean sessions was a worrying precedent.⁵³

With the election of Mendès-France, Zhou had a new variable with which to work, for the new French Prime Minister had made an election promise to secure a settlement by 20 July. Zhou's newly-found flexibility on the recognition of the Laotian and Cambodian royal governments may have averted the break-up of the Conference. His sudden extension of 'neutrality' to these countries fell into line with his initiative for 'peaceful coexistence' in Asia, and potentially distracted those countries from US-sponsored collective defence in South-East Asia.

On 21 June Zhou invited the Laotian and Cambodian delegates to

dinner together with Pham Van Dong. At dinner Dong was amazingly convivial, for he not only accepted the withdrawal of Vietminh 'volunteers' from Laos, but apparently accepted the continued existence of French Union bases on Laotian territory.⁵⁴ The operative distinction in the Sino-Vietnamese discussion of 'neutralisation' then related primarily to the exclusion of US military bases in Laos and Cambodia and the opting out of these two states from the planned American system of collective defence.

The next important step in Zhou's strategy was to meet with the new Prime Minister of France.⁵⁵ Zhou rejected any suggestion of meeting Mendès-France in France, due to the French failure to recognise the PRC; however, a meeting was scheduled for neutral Berne, Switzerland, where Mendès-France ostensibly had a protocol duty to meet with the President of Switzerland.

As was the case in his previous meetings with Eden, Zhou, in this 23 June meeting, did not give the Americans any leverage by making specific demands regarding French recognition of his government and its position in the UN. Zhou obligingly reported on his dinner with the Vietminh, Laotians and Cambodians. He also spoke sympathetically regarding the French Union.

Both sides had interpreters, but Zhou's conversational ability in French, and his earlier student days in Paris, stood him in good stead in this critical parley which resulted in an agreement to attempt to iron out the details for the first stage of military settlement within three weeks. Zhou was sympathetic to Mendès-France's concern that, in the second state of political settlement, elections in Vietnam should not be too precipitous. Zhou made no specific reference to French Union bases in Laos and Cambodia, but he did urge contact between the Vietminh and their southern counterpart after the same fashion as recent contact between the Vietminh and the Laotians and Cambodians. Zhou personally, at Mendès-France's request, undertook to help persuade the Vietminh to speed up the negotiations.

The makings of a deal on Indo-China were within Zhou's grasp, but not certain. Churchill and Eisenhower issued a statement in Washington on 28 June indicating that the planning for collective defence would continue regardless of the outcome of the Conference. To round out his own diplomatic offensive against the extension in Asia of US-sponsored collective defence, Zhou left Geneva on 24 June for quick visits to India, Burma and the DRV. Zhou wanted the support of the 'middle forces' in Asia, and it was, therefore, necessary to clarify Chinese initiatives in New Delhi and Rangoon. Prime

Minister U Nu of Burma had sent Indian Prime Minister Nehru a note expressing his serious concern over Chinese Communist activities on the Burmese border and Chinese support for the Vietminh military position within Laos and Cambodia. It was really during this semi-recess of the Conference that Zhou established the five principles as the central tenet of Chinese foreign policy. The principles were specifically to apply to Asian countries aspiring to independence.⁵⁶

During three days of discussion in New Delhi, Zhou and Nehru issued a joint communiqué reiterating the 'five principles of peaceful coexistence' as the basis for their bilateral relations. This 28 June statement was intended to influence developments at the Geneva Conference, as it explicitly endorsed the idea of 'neutral' status for the three Associated States of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.⁵⁷ India had long been working against the US policy of containment, favouring instead the constructive involvement of the Chinese in Asian affairs, and the neutralisation of Indo-China corresponded with Nehru's desire for an 'area of peace' in Asia.

Zhou responded to fears of Chinese aggression with his statement in a New Delhi press conference of 27 June. He explicitly stated that 'revolution cannot be exported', *geming shi buneng shuchude*.⁵⁸ This was consistent with China's own expression of national 'independence and self-reliance'. Zhou's impact in New Delhi was later discussed by Nehru in a report to the Congress Party on 22 August, in which Nehru indicated that Zhou's visit had brought India and China closer together.

Zhou's 27 June statement concerning the non-exportability of revolution had special meaning for the Burmese, and Nehru urged Zhou to meet with U Nu in Rangoon before returning to China. According to U Nu's speech in Beijing on 2 December, Zhou's June visit was indeed critical to Burma's China policy. U Nu candidly remarked:

Before Premier Zhou Enlai came to Rangoon, I did not know what attitude I should adopt towards our distinguished guest.

... We were wondering and feeling uneasy whether we would have to deal with a difficult man or a proud man or a man of violent temper. But no sooner had we met him than we discovered that all our anxieties were unfounded, because he showed in his relations with us that he did not behave as a Premier of a powerful country but as that of a brotherly country.⁵⁹

No doubt, Zhou went to Rangoon with Nehru's warm introduction; however, Zhou was naturally familiar with historical Asian sensitivities, and he congratulated the Burmese for their country's 'moral integrity'.

Dulles only saw in Zhou the 'Communist'. The French, however, were enamoured of the mandarin-like qualities of the Confucian gentleman or *junzi*, and it is not surprising that Asians also looked for expression of such qualities in Zhou Enlai. The Communist element in China was relatively recent, and there was always the expectation that the noble elements of China's venerable tradition would reassert themselves. While there were fears of a reversion to historical pattern of Chinese imperial conquest, there was also a historical awareness of the positive elements of Chinese tradition which distinguished between the 'way of the hegemon' (*badao*) and the 'way of the king' (*wangdao*). U Nu, in fact, made a point of arguing that Chinese aggression had historically occurred under non-Chinese Emperors.

The Confucian classical distinction had deliberately contrasted the use of brute military force with the demonstration of moral integrity in state-to-state relations, characterised in terms of the external policy expression of the inner sageliness of the ruler. The expected moral standards, which were to govern individual relations in society, were sanctified in exacting principles of social decorum, or '*li*', as this conceptualisation was superimposed on the standards governing relations between rulers.⁶⁰

The casting of the relations between states in the familial terms of brotherly love was metaphorically appropriate to Sino-Burmese relations. In this context there was no mention of China as one of the 'Big Five', but instead Chinese diplomacy focused on the equality of small and big states. There remains an important question as to whether Nehru and U Nu had both failed to understand Zhou Enlai as a Marxist-Leninist. Zhou had incorporated into the 29 June Sino-Burmese communiqué 'revolution cannot be exported' (*geming shi buneng shuchude*) as well as his commitment to the 'five principles of peaceful coexistence', but he did so as a Chinese Marxist-Leninist.⁶¹

The most difficult aspect of Zhou's trip was his meeting with another Marxist-Leninist, Ho Chi Minh, on the Sino-Vietnamese border from 3 to 5 July. Zhou's diplomatic offensive had already helped to define Ho's options. The Sino-Soviet position at the Conference clearly favoured a settlement which would avoid the internationalisation of the war. Undoubtedly Zhou told Ho that a settlement

could be reached with Mendes-France which would avoid an anti-Vietnam and anti-China collective defence system. Zhou had already moved towards neutralisation in Laos and Cambodia, and he had encouraged the Indian and Burmese proclivities towards 'neutralism' and 'peaceful coexistence'. Furthermore, at the Conference the British and French were showing some degree of independence *vis-à-vis* Dulles, and it was important to act quickly before the Americans were able to react.

Even with the military success at Dienbienphu could Ho have resisted his allies' strategic requirements and also risked the American internationalisation of the war? A hardline approach would have spelled isolation in Asia. Apart from a general statement on the need for a peaceful settlement, the Zhou-Ho communiqué of 5 July lacked substance;⁶² however, in his report of the Vietminh Party Central Committee on 15 July 1954, Ho recognised the alternatives, for in referring to intra-Party 'leftist deviation' he remarked: '... some people intoxicated with our repeated victories want to fight on at all costs. . . . they are partial to military action and make light of diplomacy. . . . They set forth excessive conditions unacceptable to the enemy.'⁶³ Zhou later noted in his 11 August report to the Central People's Government Council that Ho, during their meeting at the Sino-Vietnamese border, had indeed subscribed to the 'five principles of peaceful coexistence' as applicable to Vietnam's relations with Laos and Cambodia.⁶⁴ Vietnamese subscription to these principles was clearly stated in a joint Sino-Vietnamese statement of 7 July 1955.

The Chinese chronology of the five principles later highlighted the fact that Vietnam was the first country to respond to the joint Sino-Indian and Sino-Burmese statements on these principles. The Vietnamese response was followed by joint Sino-Soviet, Sino-Indonesia, Soviet-Yugoslav and Polish-Indian statements.⁶⁵

Also, Zhou did not go to Ho without some inducements. The discussions on the border in the summer of 1954 included consideration of economic aid. No sooner did Zhou return from his secret meeting than China signed three commercial agreements with the DRV.⁶⁶

When Zhou returned to Geneva on 12 July, he faced a more positive set of circumstances than was the case in the Korean sessions. Dulles was chafing under Eisenhower's constraint; the US President would not go it alone in Indo-China without allied support. The British and French vigorously pressed Dulles to upgrade his

delegation's status at Geneva and to return Smith to the conference table. When Zhou met Mendès-France on 13 July, the French leader inquired as to Ho Chi Minh's current thinking, and Zhou responded rather characteristically: 'Each side would need to step toward the other. . . . Which is not to say that each has an equal number of steps to make. . . .'⁶⁷ Three days later Zhou informed Eden that the Vietminh leadership would accept an agreement which included partition at the 16th parallel, pending a demarcation at the 17th parallel. This position created a new momentum at the conference.

Prior to Zhou's whirlwind tours to India, Burma and the DRV, the conference had been grappling with the issue of selecting appropriate 'neutrals' to serve on the international supervisory commission for Indo-China. Molotov had proposed Poland, Czechoslovakia, India and Pakistan. Eden proposed the five Colombo powers. On 18 July Zhou finally proposed India, Canada and Poland, and as Eden recounts: 'From that moment, the tangled ends of the negotiations began to sort themselves out.'⁶⁸

The Conference, however, did not solve the underlying intractable reality of US refusal to recognise the PRC, hence the issue of the Conference participants signing a treaty and guaranteeing Conference agreements was finessed, but not addressed and solved. Dulles was rigid and ideological right up to the end, whereas Zhou was both ideological *and* flexible. Dulles adhered to his Berlin qualifications, and the US side simply issued a statement that the US would do nothing to stand in the way of the informal agreements which had been reached. In a later interview with James Reston, Zhou conceded his own failure to challenge the US on this point:

And on this issue at that time we Chinese, and at the time also our Vietnamese friends, lacked experience in international subjects. At that time the representative of the United States was allowed to not sign the documents and to only make a statement that they would not disturb the agreement. But the reality was not so.

How could it be that a country which would not sign an agreement would agree to truly not disturb the agreement?⁶⁹

The ideological character of American, as opposed to Chinese, diplomacy in the end shaped the Conference results. The ultimate futility of the Conference was explicit in its bizarre body language. Dulles had refused to shake Zhou's hands. Wang Bingnan recounts Smith's personal embarrassment on this score. Near the end of the Conference, Zhou spotted Smith in conversation with one of his own

interpreters, and knowing that Dulles had forbidden such contact Zhou deliberately sought out Smith. Zhou proffered his hand. Smith responded taking the cigar out of his mouth so that he appeared to have his two hands full, one with a cigar and the other with his coffee. On the last day of the conference, Smith, having recovered his equilibrium, went over to Zhou and generously expressed his admiration for Zhou's diplomatic talents at which point Zhou responded: 'We haven't refused contact with you. Last time wasn't it I who took the initiative in holding out my hand to you?'⁷⁰ Unable to shake Zhou's hand, Smith vicariously shook his arm.

Zhou scored considerable points against Dulles's diplomacy at the Geneva Conference, but ultimately he could not arrest the US move towards collective defence in Asia. The US National Security Council, presided over by Eisenhower on 8 and 12 August reached the conclusion that the Geneva agreements were 'catastrophic', and, in Manila, on 8 September, the US and its allies brought into being the South-East Asian Treaty Organisation.

Immediately before the signing of the Treaty, the Chinese had shelled Guomindang-controlled islets off the mainland perhaps as a warning to Asian states not to become encumbered by the heavy commitments entailed in US China policy. A mutual defence treaty was subsequently signed in Washington by Chiang Kai-shek's government on 2 December. These events were discussed in China in terms of US attempts to construct a three-front aggression against the PRC, which centred on Korea in the North-east, Taiwan and Japan in the East, and Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines in the South-east.

Zhou had, however, managed to render this ambitious security project as less meaningful by denying the Americans full Asian participation. He also had the option of moving on to the diplomatic offensive by citing American bad faith at Geneva, for the Manila Pact had extended its protection to neutralised Laos and Cambodia. On 23 September, at the first session of the National People's Congress (NPC), Zhou pointed to the US failure to gain the support of the Colombo powers.⁷¹ The Manila Pact included only three Asian powers, and Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines had little independence *vis-à-vis* the US.

Zhou's 'peaceful coexistence' offensive against US containment gained momentum after the Geneva Conference. On 12 October China and the Soviet Union issued a joint communiqué affirming the application of the five principles to their relations with Asian coun-

tries. Zhou also consolidated the results of his summer 1954 trips to India and Burma during Nehru's visit to Beijing in late October 1954, and during the subsequent visit of U Nu in early December. Thereafter it was claimed that the 'initiators' of the five principles included China, India and Burma.

The exchange between Zhou and U Nu during the latter's farewell banquet in Beijing was remarkably candid.⁷² U Nu recalled his apprehension prior to Zhou's June visit to Rangoon. He was then relieved to receive Zhou's assurances that the PRC would not interfere with the internal affairs of Burma, and then placing himself in Zhou's shoes he acknowledged that the Chinese may have had some apprehension over Burmese policy. Burma, he said, was a small country, which could not genuinely interfere in the internal affairs of a great and powerful neighbour such as China, but Burma could hypothetically cause 'trouble' by playing the 'stooge' and granting access to key strategic areas for foreign naval and military activities. U Nu pledged that Burma would not become such a 'stooge' and accept 'one-sided aid'.

Zhou was comfortingly diplomatic in his response. He said: 'It is quite natural that there should be certain apprehensions and lack of understanding in the first contacts between two nations having different social systems and bordering each other'.⁷³ Zhou believed that Sino-Burmese friendship would, none the less, prevail against the machinations of agent-provocateurs, and the five principles would govern their relationship regardless of the difference in size of their two countries. Moreover, the two sides reached an understanding on the nationality question, which was always a source of friction between Asian governments and Beijing. Zhou insisted that his government would urge local Overseas Chinese to respect the laws and social customs of Burma.

The Colombo powers' growing interest in China's constructive engagement in regional politics was apparent in the late December decision at Bogor to invite China to a coming Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung. China's participation at Bandung in 18–24 April became a significant diplomatic challenge to US containment.

Contemporary Chinese historiography especially stresses the fear of the US over the possible strategic implications of the impending Conference, and has described the mysterious blowing up of the airliner, the *Kashmir Princess*, on 11 April 1955 as an attempt to prevent Zhou's attendance through assassination.⁷⁴ A bomb was planted in the wings of the Air India plane during flight preparation

at Hong Kong's Kaitak Airport. Eleven passengers including eight Chinese diplomats and reporters died in the air over the coast of North Borneo. Fortunately, Zhou had changed his travel plans at the last minute so as to attend a pre-Conference summit with the Prime Ministers of Burma, India, and Egypt in Rangoon. In his 13 May report on the Bandung Conference, Zhou simply mentioned that the airliner had been blown up by Guomindang secret agents.⁷⁵

According to an unsubstantiated Red Guard account of 1968, the story may have been more complicated.⁷⁶ Zhang Wentian had allegedly failed to act on prior knowledge of the bomb threat. This account suggests that Zhou phoned the Foreign Ministry requesting that new security arrangements be made on the basis of recently received 'secret information'. Apparently, Zhou asked that the Ministry request that the British government confer on the matter with authorities in Hong Kong. Certainly, a bomb attempt, engineered in Hong Kong, would have been incompatible with British interests in Hong Kong. The Red Guards accused Zhang of a dereliction of his duties which resulted in incomplete security arrangements. A recent Harbin account has also suggested that the incident was one of several engineered with the help of a five-man assassination team, set up by the US CIA in 1953.⁷⁷

The Soviet Union sent enthusiastic greetings to the Bandung Conference. The United States did not send greetings, but, according to Chinese accounts, sent a 70-man group of 'journalists' to disrupt the Conference with unfounded rumours.⁷⁸ Bandung was Zhou's second international conference, but it was quite different. There was no 'Five Power' element, and the multilateral dynamic encompassed delegations from 29 Asian and African countries. The participants were generally gratified in the exclusion of the colonial powers from the Conference. The Cold War, nevertheless, found its way into the Conference debates.

Putting aside his formal text, Zhou spoke extemporaneously on the basis of supplementary notes drafted in the lunch hour of the second day of the Conference. The formal text, which was circulated to conference participants, referred in general terms to the application of the five principles of peaceful coexistence to relations among Asian and African states stressing their common history of colonialist exploitation;⁷⁹ however, Zhou's off-the-cuff remarks addressed the acrimonious debates of the first day of the Conference. Zhou was normally very careful to keep Mao Zedong informed about his activities abroad, but in this case there was no time to check back

with Beijing, and Zhou went ahead to establish China's position on the basis of 'seeking common ground'. He dropped any intention of pressing for Conference resolutions on either the recognition or Taiwan issues. In fact, during most of 1955 Mao was preoccupied with domestic industrial and agricultural policies.⁸⁰

On 18 April, President Sukarno of Indonesia had held forth on the need for the 'Moral Violence of Nations' in the cause of peace.⁸¹ The Prime Minister of Ceylon, Sir John Kotelawala, in his speech singled out the Soviet Union as one of the colonial powers, and the delegates of Turkey and Iraq condemned Communist imperialism. The Thai delegate, Prince Wan Waithayakon, expressed some concern over the lack of definition of the five principles. He refused to support 'peaceful coexistence', but he thought some of the other principles might be consistent with the accepted practice of international law.⁸² Specifically, he defended the Thai decision to join the SEATO in 'self-defence' against Chinese interference in Thai affairs.

In his extemporaneous response on 19 April, Zhou was patient and conciliatory. Zhou recommended a compromise approach of 'seeking common ground while reserving differences' (*quitong cunyi*).⁸³ This 'strategy' (*fangzhen*) became the organisational basis for the application of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.⁸⁴ In their discussion of Zhou's early 1950s contribution to the development of Chinese diplomatic practices, Ma Lie and Wang Ning recall that Zhou likened states to people. Zhou, remarking on the political differences between states, noted that 'human nature differs just as human faces differ', and that could be equally said of countries and peoples.

As Zhou Enlai had done with Eden and Mendès-France at Geneva, he insisted that China had not come to the Conference to force resolutions on admittedly difficult issues such as China's recognition at the UN. In fact the Conference invitation, issued in Djakarta on 15 January, had explicitly stated that participation would not imply any change of view on the status of any other country attending the conference.

Zhou claimed that China had not come to raise differences of ideology and political system, but rather to discuss the central commonality of the colonial experience and its economic implications for post-colonial sovereignty. He referred the delegates to the fact that both Communist and Nationalist regimes in Asia had gone through a difficult struggle to achieve their sovereign independence, and that they, therefore, did have a common interest in supporting

the content of the five principles. Zhou personally disclaimed any intent to further communal strife in Asia, and he abandoned the traditional Chinese policy, extending the Chinese government's prerogatives over Overseas Chinese. Zhou called upon the countries of South-East Asia to negotiate a solution to the problem of dual nationality with the PRC. During the Conference Zhou actually negotiated such an agreement with Indonesia.

Zhou received plaudits for his speech and approach, but there was wrangling in the Conference's Political Committee over issues relating to the meaning of 'peaceful coexistence' and the right of nation-states to enter into alliances. Nehru was exasperated by some of the views, and it was Zhou who stepped into the breach to take the lead in advancing the process of conciliation.

Nehru was antagonised by the Iranian delegate's remarks which he, in unusually strong words, characterised as a 'tirade . . . full of irritation, hatred and disregard'.⁸⁵ He also took issue with the Turkish delegate's reference to NATO, which Nehru argued was 'one of the most powerful protectors of colonialism'. He could not refrain from referring to NATO's 'gross impertinence' in telling India what to do about its claim to Goa.⁸⁶ Nehru was disappointed over frequent objections to the wording, 'peaceful coexistence', stating incredulously: 'That word is considered dangerous!'⁸⁷ He countercharged that it was entirely possible to do something positive in this world without being Communist or anti- Communist. Nehru did not see the wording as 'Communist', and he disputed the proposed wording of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, whom he accused 'under cover of words' of scheming to gain a surreptitious endorsement of the idea of pacts in world politics.

Zhou was baited too, but he responded in a conciliatory fashion to discredit the accusations of his enemies. This indeed was the same man who negotiated in Xi'an with Chiang Kai-shek. His deliberate, measured responses discussed the problems at a general level from the Chinese point of view, but without rancorous reference to the specific positions of delegates. Since some delegates were suspicious of 'peaceful coexistence', he did not insist on retention of this specific wording, and proposed instead 'live together in peace'.⁸⁸ Zhou took the position: 'The wording of the Five Principles can be revised, and the number of principles may be increased or reduced; for what we seek is to identify our common aspirations.'⁸⁹ In this way, Zhou ultimately managed to fold into the final draft of 'Ten Principles' much of the content of the 'five principles'. Mao Zedong later

boasted to Khrushchev that Zhou Enlai had essentially authored the Bandung statement.⁹⁰

Zhou deftly faced two significant challenges to his position. Sir John Kotewalala initiated the discussion of the cultural co-operation section of the final communiqué, and insisted that either 'colonialism' be dropped from the wording, or that it had to be qualified in such a way as to include the 'colonialism' of the Communist as well as of the Western variety.⁹¹ Supporting this view, some of the delegates argued for the inclusion of 'any form of' just before 'colonialism'. The Prime Minister of Pakistan then attempted to rescue the situation claiming: 'China is by no means an imperialist nation and she has no satellites. . . . The Prime Minister of Ceylon . . . was directing his criticism against the Soviet form of imperialism. . . .'⁹²

Zhou was grateful for such a qualification, but he said China could not be entirely exempted on such a basis, as China too had a Communist Party. In reply to this implication, Zhou would only repeat: 'We, on our part, do not want to do anything for the expansion of Communist activities outside our own country.'⁹³ Zhou simply restated his view that 'revolution cannot be exported'. He then went on the offensive to ask why some delegates wished to criticise the Cominform in particular when there were many other international organisations, some of which were objectionable to the PRC. Zhou did not go too far to defend the Soviet Union, but then he may have realised that a systematic defence of the Soviet Union would only complicate the debate. In a private exchange with Sir John he reportedly remarked that the Cominform ' . . . was a Russian organization and had nothing to do with China'.

The Chinese objected to 'any form of', and India and Pakistan thereupon suggested that 'the existence of colonialism in Asia and Africa' had after all to be stated if the phrase, 'any form of' was to be included in the wording. The Chinese did not persist, but instead adopted 'seeking common ground' while recognising that there was some real disagreement on the issue. The final wording emerged as: 'The Asian-African Conference took note of the fact that the existence of colonialism in many parts of Asia and Africa, in whatever form it may be. . . .'

Zhou later explained this issue in his 13 May report to the NPC. He referred to the 'ulterior motives' of certain persons at the Conference who wanted to use the issue of colonialism 'in all its manifestations' (*zai yiqie biaoxianzhong*) as a critique of 'socialism'.⁹⁴ He repeated the orthodox position that socialist states were in fact engaged in the

creation of a new type of international relations. Zhou reiterated the Leninist argument that colonial exploitation was the result of contradictions in capitalist economies, and insisted that he had made no compromise. He understood 'colonialism in all its forms' to imply 'in all its manifestations' including political, military, economic, cultural and social factors.

The Conference 'Declaration on the Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation' co-opted the thrust of the 'five principles', but it also included as its fifth principle 'Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself, singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations'. Zhou accepted Article 51 of the UN Charter as consistent with the sovereign right of 'self-defence'; however, he drew the NPC delegates attention to the inclusion of wording in the sixth principle which amplified the distinction between legitimate 'self-defence' and the aggression of 'military blocs' cloaked in the right of collective self-defence.⁹⁵ In his view, Article 51 could only be invoked in response to armed attack, and the SEATO was, therefore, illegitimate for it had been signed, not in response to an actual 'armed attack' by China but, on the contrary, it had been signed immediately after the conclusion of the Geneva peace conference. Zhou also quoted the strength of Nasser's 27 April statement to the effect that the defence system in any given area should be 'inspired by the people of that area'.⁹⁶ Again, SEATO, in Zhou's view, was not representative of Asia, for its councils were dominated by the former colonial powers.

Also in his 13 May NPC report, Zhou explained his position on the economic relations between states in the prevailing neocolonial context. The ninth principle of the Declaration referred to the 'Promotion of mutual interests and co-operation' and this closely approximated 'mutual benefit and equality', one of the 'five principles' originally included in China's Common Programme in 1949. Zhou had recommended to the Conference a notion of 'self-reliance'. He explained to the NPC that 'the most essential thing' is for countries 'to develop their own production and rely on their own efforts'.⁹⁷ Under this requirement, countries are expected to engage in mutually beneficial co-operation. Sino-Soviet relations stood out as 'an example of this new type of co-operation'.

Zhou, in his report, discussed a second significant challenge at the Conference. The tension in the Taiwan area had eclipsed the formal discussion of 'colonialism in all its forms'. Again it was Ceylon, which injected the issue into the debate, and Zhou had replied with a

statement on 23 April that China was 'willing to sit down and enter into negotiations with the United States Government to discuss . . . the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area'.⁹⁸ Zhou was candid in his 13 May report. China did not formally raise the Taiwan issue at the Conference for fear that the whole enterprise would have been jeopardised as a 'result of outside pressure'.⁹⁹

The Chinese position was clearly stated to the effect that the disposition of Taiwan was an 'internal affair'; however, China did not ask for a supporting resolution. Zhou featured the US and its policy of containment in his 23 April statement. He appeared reasonable without making any fundamental compromise. His position was that Taiwan belongs to China, but he would be willing to discuss 'tension in the Taiwan area' as an 'international issue' with the US. Dulles later complained of the cleverness of Zhou's two-part position on this question. In his view the Communists were attempting to disengage the US from the area with the call for renunciation of force as it applied to relations between the PRC and the US in the Taiwan area, while reserving the right to use force to settle the Taiwan question as a 'domestic issue'.¹⁰⁰

Zhou intervened in a realistic and prudential manner at strategic moments in the life of the Conference to push it towards its final draft Declaration. Zhou effectively challenged American propaganda which described Communist China as naturally aggressive. He emphasised China as part of Asia and raised doubts about the logic of SEATO. Zhou publicised China's commitment to the five principles of peaceful coexistence, which were actually included in the formulations of the Conference. He challenged containment with an effective diplomatic offensive rather than opting for a counter-alliance in Asia. The successful conclusion of the Conference was internationally self-evident, and even the US State Department's intelligent services conceded that the 'generally favorable impression left by Communist China at the Bandung Conference' had to 'be attributed to Chou En-lai's diplomatic virtuosity'.¹⁰¹ At Bandung, US diplomacy lost yet another significant engagement with a supposedly irrational Communist foe.

4 'Peaceful Coexistence' and the Sino-Soviet Split

One of the most important issues leading up to the public clash between the Soviet Union and China related to conflicting interpretations of 'peaceful coexistence'. Zhou Enlai's diplomacy of the 'five principles of peaceful coexistence' was predicated in the Geneva-Bandung strategy to avert US penetration of Asian politics and to establish a stable regional environment conducive to Chinese economic development.

'Peaceful coexistence' poses at least two interrelated problems of interpretation. Prior to October 1956, Zhou was not always clear as to whether this notion applied to both socialist-capitalist state relations and inter-socialist state relations. Orthodox Leninist emphasis presumed that in the former case the concept had tactical rather than strategic significance in the struggle against 'imperialism', and that in the latter instance 'peaceful coexistence' was inappropriate to the standards set by socialism. 1950s Chinese analysis presumed that the socialist countries would demonstrate international relations of a 'new type'.¹ 'Peaceful coexistence' between states with different social systems constituted a tactical *modus vivendi*, inferior to the genuine co-operation and equality expected between socialist states practicing 'international relations of a new type'.

Currently, the Deng Xiaoping regime emphasises the five principles of peaceful coexistence as basic to Chinese foreign policy. It is sometimes assumed that these principles, in the 1950s, applied exclusively to states with different social systems.² The contemporary emphasis on its application to the relations between socialist states is regarded as a new break-through; however, there was at least some anticipation of this latter application in the mid-1950s diplomacy of Zhou Enlai.

The enduring quality of the five principles in Chinese foreign policy is not surprising when one considers the Chinese leadership's continuous identification with the problems of the post-colonial world, and the relevant ideological importance of China's own 'national

independence and self-reliance'. The Sino-Soviet split to a great extent originated in questions relating to Chinese 'national independence and self-reliance', and the disagreement over Lenin's 'peaceful coexistence'.

'Peaceful coexistence' has its liturgical sanction in Lenin's enunciations of 1920. It was originally conceived as a 'tactical' respite within an inevitable cycle of wars engendered by the inherent contradictions of capitalism.³ In the mid-1950s, Zhou, with Mao's support, viewed the five principles, of which 'peaceful coexistence' is the fifth, as more than a momentary tactic. His calculation of the 'balance of forces', or 'correlation of forces' derived from united front calculations which presumed major structural changes would result from the growing trend in the post-colonial world of Asia and Africa towards 'neutralism'.⁴

At Geneva and Bandung, Zhou envisaged an international political alignment between the socialist states and a 'second group' of 'nationalist' states which had adopted 'neutralism'. This assumption, taken together with the expectation of debilitating contradictions within the imperialist camp, presumed that the correlation of forces was moving away from world war, and that the imperialist states would be politically forced to abandon their war plans. The five principles were to facilitate this strategic trend.

The original 'tactical' connotations of 'peaceful coexistence' are not well sustained in mid-1950s Chinese interpretations which were more specifically rooted in the experience of the Chinese revolution. The concept of *qiutong cunyi*, ('seeking common ground while reserving differences'), might claim a relation to Leninism, both in terms of the flexibility of the Brest-Litovsk tactics, and the positive assessment of nationalism as a force favouring socialism as opposed to capitalism, but Zhou appeared to be talking about more than momentary tactics, especially in relation to the Colombo 'neutrals'.

On the other hand, Zhou Enlai was serious about the fundamentals of Leninist argument which presumed that with the solution of domestic problems of society and political economy under socialism, the modern socialist state would enjoy a new form of international relations. Socialist international relations were by definition fraternal and genuinely co-operative, and hence socialist states would be better able to apply the five principles in their international relations with the newly-independent countries.

By the time Khrushchev decided to call for major policy initiatives at the twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet

Union (CPSU), the Chinese had gained a certain maturity. The Sino-Soviet relationship was an essential part of Chinese foreign policy, and significant in terms of domestic economic development, but Mao and Zhou stressed the necessity of objectively and realistically assessing the relevance of Soviet experience to the specificity of ongoing Chinese revolutionary development.

At the 20th CPSU Congress, Khrushchev reiterated the importance of 'peaceful coexistence', and he referred to a 'vast zone of peace' composed of newly-independent states seeking greater independence in neutrality. Since Geneva, the Soviets and Chinese had entertained largely identical views on the international correlation of forces. As early as October 1954 they had jointly stated that they would adopt the five principles in their relations with other states in Asia.

Furthermore, both the USSR and the PRC wanted an improvement in their relationship with the US. Zhou had followed up his Bandung statement on the Chinese desire for a negotiated relaxation of 'tensions in the Taiwan area' with a statement in July 1955 in which he indicated that there was no war between the US and the PRC, and that there was no need of a 'cease fire'; he then reiterated the opportunity for 'peaceful coexistence' and 'peaceful competition' between the PRC and the US. Zhou went on the diplomatic offensive against US containment. He claimed: 'We are against placing our relations with certain countries on the basis of excluding other countries.' In the same report to the third session of the First National People's Congress on 28 June 1956 he asserted: 'Facts are more eloquent than words. The iron curtain or bamboo curtain is not here on our side'.⁵

Mao made two different remarks as to the occasion of the massive Sino-Soviet split which convulsed the socialist world. On one hand he admitted that it was something which had deep historical roots in the interrelation of the two revolutions since the 1920s.⁶ On the other hand Mao noted that the dispute started at the 20th Congress, when in advocating 'peaceful coexistence' with the US, Khrushchev 'dropped Stalin's sword'.

Mao and Zhou wished to establish China's independence within the unity of the socialist camp, headed by the Soviet Union, and they did not publicly raise objections to Khrushchev's policies at the 20th CPSU Congress. Zhou and Mao worked to strengthen the alliance with the Soviet Union. The US had extended its interlocking systems of collective defence since the Geneva Conference. On the other

hand, Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin's leadership had serious implications for the Chinese leadership, and lack of Soviet forewarning did not agree with China's new-found status in the international socialist movement. Mao conceded that the criticism of Stalin was necessary 'to break down blind faith'; however, he stated: 'But we did not agree with demolishing him in one blow.'⁷

At the CCP's September, 1956 National Party Congress, Zhou Enlai's five principles were endorsed along with 'peaceful coexistence' and 'peaceful competition'. Liu Shaoqi in his 15 September speech reported that China's 'international position' had been 'elevated' as a result of the successes in applying the five principles.⁸ Liu's report followed closely the united front reasoning in Zhou's earlier report of June 1956. He also emphasised the alignment between the socialist world of 900 million people and the nationally independent countries, including the 'neutrals' which could boast of a collective population of yet another 600 million. Liu argued that under such compelling circumstances the US would have no choice but to adopt a 'realistic, reasonable attitude' towards China.⁹

The 27 September resolution of the Congress synthesised existing foreign policy guidelines under eight points, including the consolidation of friendship with the USSR and Eastern Europe, friendly relations with the Asian and African countries on the basis of the five principles, normal diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with all countries, opposition to the preparations for a new world war and support for the international peace movement, opposition to colonialism, support for the international socialist movement and the education of Chinese personnel 'in all their contacts with foreign countries and their peoples and to treat others on a really equal footing'.¹⁰

In his report to the Congress on the proposals for the second five-year plan, Zhou raised the related issue of China's economic relationship with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states. He and Mao held identical views on this question. Mao had the previous April given his famous speech 'On the Ten Major Relationships'. There was no question that Soviet aid would be important – a point which Mao and Zhou had reiterated since the late 1940s – but China's own comprehensive industrial development was the ultimate objective and Soviet technical achievements had to be adapted to China's particular national economy.

Zhou and Mao reacted to the excesses of the first five-year plan in distinguishing between the wholesale 'copying' as opposed to the

selective and balanced importation of Soviet technology and expertise. In January 1956 Zhou warned the cadres to 'discard servile thinking' and admonished those who espoused: 'Since we cannot immediately change the backwardness of the scientific situation in China we shall at any rate have to rely on Soviet assistance'.¹¹ Zhou urged them to distinguish 'what is essential and urgent' on the basis of China's own specific priorities. In Zhou's opinion, China could not indefinitely rely on Soviet experts, and China had to have its own intellectual resources.

In his synthesis of 25 April Mao summarised the basic principles of Chinese development with reference to Soviet experience. Mao later explained that he had purposefully formulated these ten relationships as a means of educating the Party on the differences between Soviet and Chinese economic development.¹² Mao did not, in this then secret speech, spare the Soviets any criticism, for they had committed 'mistakes of principle' (*yuanzexing cuowu*) in their collectivisation programme, and their lop-sided primitive accumulation favouring heavy industry over agriculture.¹³

In effecting comparisons for the purpose of studying Chinese conditions and alternatives, Mao stressed the epistemology explicit in the Party's Yan'an tradition of 'seeking the truth from the facts'. The Chinese would have to formulate an 'independent opinion' on matters relating to the applicability of the Soviet experience in China. Mao emphasised the 'policy of learning the strong points of all countries' instructing his cadres not to adopt the same conceit and arrogance which had characterised some Soviet comrades. Mao found the origins of the latters' conceit in 'Tsarist Russia' and the fact that the October Revolution had occurred in Russia.¹⁴

In August, Mao talked at length about the need to study not only the Soviet Union but Western technology and culture. He believed that the Chinese people would not accept either 'national nihilism' or 'left-wing closed doorism'. The thinking Party member had to study the Soviet Union selectively and critically, and, while he had to 'firmly reject and criticise all the decadent bourgeois system', he had to filter out those positive aspects of 'bourgeois' culture and technology which might facilitate Chinese economic development.¹⁵

Zhou was in exact agreement with Mao. On the Congress issue as to whether or not and how to achieve a comprehensive industrial system in China, Zhou identified two opinion groups. He rejected the 'parasitic view' to the effect that China could depend on international assistance, and did not, therefore, need to build a comprehensive

industrial system. This, he argued, would be irrational in light of China's great population and rich natural resources. He then rejected the 'isolationist view', arguing that it is necessary for China not only to acquire assistance from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but also to 'develop and expand economic technical and cultural exchanges with other countries'.¹⁶

The opportunity to express China's new found stature in socialist councils may have come sooner than expected. Disturbances in Poland and Hungary focused attention on the principles governing socialist international relations. 'Peaceful coexistence' was at issue, as was the survival of socialism in Hungary. The Chinese were concerned about Hungary's impact on international socialist unity. They had presumed that a united socialist camp would join with the 'neutrals' to force American imperialism to abandon its war plans. The five principles did not exactly sanction the defection of socialist states from the Warsaw Pact, but the Chinese, themselves, had argued that 'peaceful coexistence' was featured in the UN Charter and that the Charter was consistent with Zhou Enlai's 'seeking common ground while reserving differences'.¹⁷ In the last days of his regime in Hungary, Imre Nagy desperately appealed to the Charter and Zhou's five principles.

The situation in Eastern Europe became so critical as to call for the personal intervention of Zhou Enlai, who, at Khrushchev's request, interrupted an Asian tour to go directly to Poland, Hungary and the Soviet Union. The question of how to regain socialist unity was central to his negotiations in Eastern Europe. 'Proletarian internationalism' required direct fraternal assistance in case of external aggression and internal counter-revolution; on the other hand, the agreement to dispense with the Cominform was extensively rationalised in the maturity of the Communist Parties and the need for conscious expression of equality and independence in the relations between socialist states. Equality and independence had been featured in Khrushchev's reconciliation with Tito.

Mao told Zhou over the phone that the Russians were 'blinded by their material gains, and the best way to deal with them is to give them a good dressing down'.¹⁸ Mao was afraid that the Soviet leadership might have lost its nerve, and he urged Khrushchev to intervene in Hungary to put down 'counter-revolution'.

The Chinese ambassador in Budapest, He Deching, had secured a copy of Nagy's mimeographed report, *On Communism*. The following excerpt of January 1956 had disturbing implications:

. . . the five basic principles cannot be limited to the capitalistic system or the battle between the two systems, but must extend to the relations between the countries within the democratic and socialist camps.

The five basic principles do not spring from differences between the two systems . . . but they are factors independent of social and political relationships in the international field.¹⁹

This went beyond what Zhou had in mind by 'reserving differences'. The reference to the five principles was not the most important question for the Chinese. On the streets of Budapest the dissenting intellectuals were heard to say 'the Chinese are with us'.²⁰ However, the Chinese leadership, as a whole, believed that Nagy had gone much too far in his withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and in his retreat into a social democratic multiparty political system.

The instability in Poland and the 'counter-revolution' in Hungary was a major upset for Khrushchev, who had personally taken the initiative in de-Stalinisation and in the *rapprochement* with Yugoslavia. On the surface, these events tended to prove the Stalinists in the Eastern European leaderships as right; however, the Chinese zeroed in on Soviet mistakes from a different perspective, arguing that the unrest was derivative of heavy-handed Soviet impositions on the East European leaderships during the early 1950s. On the one hand the Chinese were anxious to restore the unity of the socialist world, 'headed by the Soviet Union,' but, on the other, they bluntly upbraided the Soviets in private for significant mistakes in their East European foreign policy.

Tito had, since 1954, been encouraging the five principles in his relations with the Indians and Burmese. Ironically, Tito had been telling the Americans that the Chinese had adopted a wiser course in their foreign policy at Bandung, and that they were quite independent of the CPSU, for China, like Yugoslavia, had carried out its revolution in defiance of Stalin's wishes.²¹

Tito and Khrushchev had incorporated the five principles into the Belgrade Declaration of 1955, and the two leaders incorporated 'peaceful coexistence based on principles of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, non-aggression, equality, mutual respect as well as non-interference with each other's internal affairs' in their Moscow Statement of June 1956. The *Renmin ribao* cited the language of the latter with polite approval, taking special note of the joint statement's inclusion of supporting references to China's UN and Taiwan positions.²²

With de-Stalinisation and his new relationship with Tito, Khrushchev had precipitated a sudden political decompression in Eastern Europe, which he was unable to control. Zhou argued that Stalin had caused unnecessary tension in 1948 with the Yugoslavs, and Chinese policy welcomed Khrushchev's formal reassertion of the Leninist principle of national equality in the socialist world; on the other, the Chinese were suspicious of Tito's attitude towards the West. Nagy had taken his cue from Tito in advocating 'active coexistence'.

In December 1956 Mao Zedong set out his own thinking on the Hungarian case. Mao believed that the former Stalinist regime of Rákosi had been dead wrong in its forced industrialisation and its rough treatment of native capitalists. Rákosi's problem lay in the fact that '... they copied Soviet methods to the hilt without any regard for their own concrete circumstances. . . .'²³ While he was critical of forced industrialisation, he was implicitly comparing the Chinese and Hungarian revolutions. Depending on the Soviet army, and without consolidating the domestic process of class struggle, the pro-Stalin Hungarian leadership had goose-stepped the population through an economic programme which caused major dissatisfaction. Subsequently, Khrushchev's sudden decompression generated a counter-revolutionary backlash in Hungary.

Mao disagreed with Tito's policies. He was not at all gratified by Tito's use of the 20th Congress of the CPSU. The imperialists were also 'using' it for their nefarious political purposes. Mao predicted:

circumstances will force the Soviet comrades gradually to change for the better. Neither at home nor abroad can they go on with the old style of rule. We can take advantage of the 20th Congress; imperialism has taken advantage of it, so has Tito, . . . we must talk about it face to face.²⁴

Mao repudiated domestic opinion which stressed 'Don't stand together.' Referring to the PRC and USSR as 'the principal components of the socialist camp', he disparaged this argument as worthy of Tito's subterfuge: 'They think China should take a middle course and be a bridge between the Soviet Union and the US. This is the Yugoslav way, a way to get money from both sides. . . .'²⁵ This 'way', Mao argued, had only the appearance of 'independence'. Tito's notion of 'independence', which he had recommended to Hungary, played into the hands of US imperialism, and the notion of East-West mediation was accompanied by a desire for 'profit'. Mao insisted that imperialism would not give the Chinese a 'full meal'. The imperialists

would keep their technology a secret rather than genuinely helping the Chinese people to develop their economy. Under the circumstances, Mao had expected the Soviets to show greater resolve in relation to US imperialism, but he confided to a gathering of local Party secretaries in 27 January 1957:

To be the first secretary [i.e., Khrushchev] is some kind of material gain, which is also liable to swell one's head. When a man's head gets too swelled, we have to give him a good bawling out one way or another. This time in Moscow, Comrade Chou En-lai did not stand on ceremony and took them on, and consequently they kicked up a row. . . . We didn't come straight to the point on every question. . . . There will always be contradictions. As long as things are tolerable on the whole, *we can seek common ground and reserve differences*. . . . If they insist on having their own way, sooner or later we will have to bring everything into the open.²⁶

Mao on this occasion may have been even more prophetic than he, himself, realised, and herein Mao applied Zhou's formula to socialist relations.

Zhou and Khrushchev in their Moscow meeting had more than a 'frank exchange of views'. Stalin's Eastern European foreign policies had raised the issue of equality between states. Zhou later claimed that he had told Khrushchev ' . . . that the Soviet Union had taken too much territory, ranging from Japanese territory in the east, to China, the Middle East, Eastern Europe and Finland'.²⁷ Unsubstantiated East European accounts tell of how Khrushchev in exasperation blurted out: 'It is all very well your criticising us like this, Comrade Zhou, but you must agree that it is I who spring from the working class, whereas you are a bourgeois by birth.' Zhou reportedly parried and thrust: 'Yes, Comrade Khrushchev. But at least we have one thing in common. We have both betrayed our class!'²⁸ Meanwhile, back in China, Mao, at the January meeting, reiterated the need to study not only the Soviet Union, but other countries as well, and he endorsed Zhou's 'slogans' 'to seek peace, friendship and knowledge'.²⁹

How did Mao and Zhou define correct relations between socialist states? They supported the 30 October Moscow Declaration highlighting independence and equality within the commonwealth of socialist states. The Declaration conceded that it was precisely 'because of the unanimity of ideology and aim of struggle' that unnamed personnel had neglected the principle of 'equality'. It was because

these states were 'united by the common ideal of socialism and the spirit of proletarian internationalism' that they were capable of establishing relations between themselves on the basis of the five principles.³⁰

The Chinese, however, would never accept an emphasis on equality and the five principles as justification for the abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In assessing the Hungarian case, even Tito had to endorse the 2 November intervention of Soviet armies to put down the 'counter-revolution', but in his 11 November speech, at Pula, he equivocated in his stress on the understandable desire of the Hungarian people 'to free themselves and to be independent'.³¹

Pravda, on 23 November, responded, citing the importance of 'creative diversity within the common path of socialist development', but then proceeded to compare the Chinese and Yugoslav attitudes in responding to their respective 'concrete, objective conditions'. Tito had been overweening in assuming the universal significance of the Yugoslav road to socialism, whereas Pravda noted: '... the Chinese comrades always maintain that they are far from claiming that their methods of socialist construction are universal, although these methods have fully justified themselves in their country'.³² The Chinese leadership in the Soviet view did not 'oppose the experience of building socialism in their country to the experience of other countries. . . .' It was on this basis that Zhou Enlai was welcome in Eastern Europe in January 1957.

While the Soviet and East European leaderships were swallowing hard on the Hungarian situation, Zhou was announcing in Asia that he believed that the 'five principles' should apply to the relationships of all countries. This is stated in the 1 November Chinese endorsement of the Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1956, emphasising that socialist countries are inherently better able to apply the five principles in their international relations with all countries. The Declaration was hailed as of great importance 'in correcting errors in mutual relations between the socialist states'. The Chinese statement recognised that the demands of the Polish and Hungarian peoples for democracy, independence, equality and improved material well-being were 'completely proper', but that these demands were manipulated by 'reactionary elements'. The statement also explicitly referred to the mishandling of the Yugoslav situation in 1948 and in recent happenings in Poland and Hungary. Personnel in socialist countries, namely Stalin's ambassadors in Eastern Europe, and Stalin

himself, had neglected the principle of equality and had committed the error of 'big-country chauvinism' (*daguoshawenzhuyi*).³³ The familiar principles of equality, territorial integrity, national independence, sovereignty and non-intervention in each other's affairs had to be applied to insure against 'estrangement and misunderstandings among socialist countries'.

In Djakarta on 9 December, Zhou was asked why it was that the US and the Soviet Union maintained contact, while China and the US did not. Zhou observed that ideology should not affect the US to such a degree.³⁴ Ironically, Nagy had cited the Chinese in his case against military blocs. Zhou, during his remarks at Nehru's New Delhi banquet of 29 November, continued to emphasise the replacement of military blocs with 'collective peace' (*jiti heping*).³⁵ In an interview with correspondents of the Columbia Broadcasting Corporation on 20 December, Zhou directly attacked the view that the neutral countries constituted a 'vacuum'.³⁶ Zhou saw in this viewpoint an extension of colonialist thinking which insulted the national dignity of these countries.

Zhou arrived in Moscow from Asia on 7 January 1957, and he subsequently visited Warsaw on 11–16 January and Budapest on 16–17 January. In his meetings with the Polish leadership Zhou was unable to fashion an unequivocal joint statement concerning Soviet leadership of the socialist world. Gomulka, Cyrankiewicz and Rąpacki were more interested in discussing the 30 October references to equality and different roads to socialism under different national conditions. They did, however, agree not to make an issue out of their reservations in public.

On 12 January Zhou and He Long toured the Zeran Motor Car Factory and then met with the Polish Council of Ministers. At a Warsaw rally on the following day, Zhou thanked the Polish people for their technical support of China's economic programmes, their continued support in the UN, and their assistance in the field of maritime shipping. Accentuating the positive, Zhou proclaimed a new situation in Eastern Europe:

all errors in the mutual relations between socialist countries can be corrected through friendly negotiations. At present the whole world can see that the clouds overhanging the mutual relations between the Soviet Union and Poland have dispersed, that certain misunderstandings have been eliminated. Once more the Marxist-Leninist principles of the equality of nations and proletarian internationalism have passed the test.³⁷

The 16 January joint communiqué, signed by Zhou and Prime Minister Jozef Cyrankiewicz, cited the growing number of states adopting the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and 'peaceful coexistence' was again contrasted with the anti-peace policies embodied in military blocs.³⁸

The relations between independent socialist states were described only in terms of three of the five principles, including respect for sovereignty, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and equality and mutual benefit. Reference to aggression and peaceful coexistence in the socialist context would perhaps have too explicitly endorsed the arguments of Imre Nagy. The two leaders expressed their confidence in the Kadar leadership's abilities. While they mentioned the unity of the Soviet Union, China and Poland, the absence of the stalk reference to 'fraternal unity and friendly co-operation of the socialist countries, headed by the Soviet Union' (*yi sulan wei shoude shehuizhuyi geguode qinmi tuanjie he youhao hezuo*), was conspicuous. Zhou's constant references to this formulation were reported in the Polish press but the Polish leaders, themselves, refrained from referring to such 'leadership'.

At a Hungarian banquet of 16 January, Zhou again insisted that the solution of any problems between socialist countries lay on the basis of equality and proletarian internationalism through friendly consultation. On 17 January Zhou and Kadar signed a joint communiqué criticising 'Eisenhowerism' (*Aisenhaoweierzhuyi*), while upholding the five principles of peaceful coexistence as the basis for the practice of international relations.³⁹ Zhou and Kadar committed themselves to the co-operation between socialist countries and the 'peace-loving countries' in the struggle to thwart the war plans of the imperialist governments.

On 17 January Zhou returned to Moscow for discussions, and at a mass rally on the same day he described what had happened in Hungary as a 'vicious attack' on the socialist camp, which could not be viewed in isolation from the aggressive US position in Egypt where 'Eisenhowerism' was challenging 'peaceful coexistence'.⁴⁰ In the evening of 18 January Zhou and Marshal Bulganin signed a joint statement advocating the elimination of military alliances in favour of collective security agreements in both Europe and Asia.⁴¹ The two sides agreed that the Soviet Union had 'fulfilled its internationalist duty to the peoples of Hungary and the other socialist countries'.

Zhou Enlai subscribed to the 30 October Declaration as a basic pronouncement on equality between sovereign socialist states; however, he ceased to apply 'peaceful coexistence' to the relations

between socialist states. Throughout 1957 Zhou's formulations generally stressed the international significance of the five principles, but specific statements regarding socialist relations omitted the principles of mutual non-aggression and 'peaceful coexistence'. The first three principles were restated in the 27 March treaty of friendship and co-operation with Czechoslovakia, and the joint Sino-Polish statement of 11 April. The Sino-Bulgarian joint declaration, which Zhou signed in Beijing on 11 October, recapitulated the themes of Soviet peace policy as against 'Eisenhowerism', and it also referred to the Sino-Bulgarian agreement on the need for 'peaceful coexistence' between different social systems, but there was no explicit reference to the five principles.⁴²

On his return from his 80-day odyssey to South, South-East Asia, the USSR and Eastern Europe, Zhou reported to the third plenary session of the second Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on 5 March. He described his tour in terms of China's quest for friendship, peace and knowledge, and he was gratified by the massive, enthusiastic welcomes which he had received while abroad.

While the opportunity for 'study' (*xuexi*) in each country was admittedly quite short, he asserted that the process of studying the conditions and achievements of foreign countries had been greatly advanced.⁴³ Zhou also noted that his delegation learned from the Soviet criticisms of their own mistakes.⁴⁴ He reported that the Polish Party under Gomulka's leadership had corrected past political and economic mistakes and was successfully resisting the extremes of 'dogmatism' and 'revisionism'. The Premier acknowledged that the entire socialist camp had drawn a lesson from the Hungarian 'counter-revolution'. Mistakes in the relations between socialist states were due to their comparative youth and inexperience.

Zhou repeated the formulations of the January, joint Sino-Soviet statement, concerning the need for both 'proletarian internationalism' and national equality in socialist international relations. 'Great country chauvinism' was eschewed while the Leninist principle of national equality was upheld. Zhou once again referred to the comparison between relations between socialist, as opposed to capitalist, states. While 'fundamental contradictions' and 'conflicts of interest' were not possible among states, which had achieved genuine socialism, the capitalist states were constantly at each other's throats, and they were incapable of mutually beneficial economic co-operation.⁴⁵ Zhou also repeated the 1954 formulation to the effect that 'revolution cannot be exported'.⁴⁶

In his coverage of the two Asian segments of his tour, Zhou focused on the five principles of peaceful coexistence in the establishment of a 'great zone of peace' (*guangda héping qu*). Whereas in the Eastern European context, he had stressed the importance of common ideals and ideology, Zhou discussed the historical relations of friendship and cultural interaction between China and South and South-East Asian countries, which had only recently been disrupted by imperialist interventions. US imperialism, in particular, was bent upon achieving control of the region's post-colonial governments through policies of 'divide and rule' (*fen er zhizhi*), and 'Asians fighting Asians' (*Yazhouren da Yazhouren*).⁴⁷

In his address to the Consultative Conference, Zhou devoted some time to the explanation of the 'Eisenhower Doctrine' or 'Eisenhowerism'. He reacted to a lingering pro-American viewpoint, within the 'democratic' circles of domestic united front politics. 'Rightist' elements within these circles tended to distrust the Soviet Union, especially for its involvement in the pre-1949 pre-revolutionary experience; whereas there was a certain admiration for the technological and democratic development of the US. Irregardless of US statements ostensibly repudiating colonialism, Zhou pointed to Eisenhower's request for Congressional authorisation allowing him discretion in the military assistance of any Middle Eastern country which came under the threat of armed aggression from international Communism.

Zhou contended that the expansive tendencies of the US alliance system were proving to be too costly for Britain and France. He predicted that the English and French peoples would demand that their governments constitute a 'third force' in international politics.⁴⁸ Zhou extended this united front analysis to cover neutralism. The neutralist countries were increasingly embracing the five principles of peaceful coexistence and collective security in order to sustain their independence *vis-à-vis* the US attempt to extend its alliance systems around the world. According to Zhou, peaceful neutrality was a rational policy for the newly-independent countries, for it allowed for the reduction of domestic military expenditure in favour of much needed capital investment in domestic economic development. Ever since his student days in Europe, Zhou had argued against the bankrupting of poor, debtor nations with the consequences of international militarism.

Zhou acknowledged at the Conference that quite a few countries had expressed their hope for an improvement in Sino-American

relations, but he replied that the anti-China policies of the US government were clearly demonstrated in the continued obstruction of the restoration of China's position within the UN, the imposition of a commercial blockade against China, and most seriously in the military control of Taiwan, where the US planned to install guided missile.⁴⁹

The spring and summer months of 1957 saw unusual signs of disagreement within the Chinese leadership over a range of domestic and international issues. It was a period of increasing tension with the United States and Japan in Asia. Dulles's sabre-rattling, and his disparagement of the PRC as a 'passing phase', was accompanied by American decisions to locate atomic guided missiles in both Taiwan and Korea.

Zhou had been pursuing 'people's diplomacy' with respect to Japan, but he was stung by Prime Minister Kishi's remarks in Washington and in New Delhi. Zhou took exception to Kishi's remarks concerning Chiang Kai-shek's recovery of Mainland China, and was angered by his contention in New Delhi that the PRC did not deserve recognition in the UN, as the UN resolution concerning China as an 'aggressor' was still valid. Zhou saw this attempted disruption of Sino-Indian relations as an 'unfriendly action'.⁵⁰

At the same time, there were ongoing debates in Beijing concerning the fundamentals of national economic policy and the relevance of Soviet experience and assistance to Chinese economic development. As he had done in his 1956 distinction between the 'isolationist' and 'parasitic' approaches to Sino-Soviet economic relations, Zhou argued for a balanced approach respecting Soviet experience and welcoming Soviet assistance in so far as these were consistent with the specific dimensions of China's national economy.

In his report to the fourth session of the National People's Congress on 26 June, Zhou pointed out: 'Some people are against learning from the experience of the Soviet Union, and even say that the mistakes and shortcomings in our construction work are also the result of learning from the Soviet Union'. Zhou argued that the fault did not lie with the Soviet Union but with 'how we ourselves do the learning'. Zhou agreed that it was more appropriate for a socialist country to learn in its economic construction from the Soviet Union as opposed to the US, but he rejected any 'mechanical copying' of the experience of other countries.⁵¹ This was consistent with Mao's 'On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People'.⁵²

The domestic political stage was set for the Great Leap Forward.

There was a growing antagonism to the failings of the first five-year plan, which had too faithfully reflected Soviet experience. Zhou characteristically advocated a middle-of-the-road approach. He rejected 'doctrinaire methods of learning', but he would not accept the repudiation of Soviet experience as 'mere dogma'. Perhaps the Yugoslav situation was uppermost in his mind when he stated: 'At present, when the rightists are opposing socialism with revisionism, it is of even greater importance that we combat revisionism'.⁵³ The Hungarian counter-revolution and its relation to Tito's policies informed the definition of Chinese domestic political alternatives as the CCP girded itself to do battle in an intense 'anti-rightist campaign'.

The potential for Sino-Soviet tension increased with the new-found Chinese tendency to engage in direct debate with the CPSU and Khrushchev. Khrushchev feared that Mao had many of the characteristics of Stalin. Khrushchev, himself, acknowledged that the findings of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU would pose difficulties for Mao in the international socialist world.⁵⁴ Mao, on the other hand, had already indicated to Zhou that the time had come for genuine give-and-take between the CPSU and the CCP. He had noted that in Zhou's January 1956 debate with Khrushchev, the Chinese side had not raised all the matters which were outstanding.

One such outstanding issue was almost certainly Khrushchev's stand on the 'peaceful transition' to socialism. As early as 15 November 1956, Mao had commented before the CCP Central Committee:

Khrushchev's report at the Twentieth Congress . . . says it is possible to seize state power by the parliamentary road, that is to say, it is no longer necessary for all countries to learn from the October Revolution once this gate is opened, by and large Leninism is thrown away.⁵⁵

The extent of Mao's antipathy was revealed in his remark concerning the paternalism of 'comrades' from other countries who had criticised China's mass line. On this one occasion, Mao referred to the application of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and he claimed that China would practice non-interference in each other's internal affairs and mutual non-aggression. Mao tartly concluded: 'We have no intention of exercising leadership over any country save our own. . . .'⁵⁶

The CCP leadership objected to the Soviet position on the question of 'peaceful transition' in the Moscow meeting of Communist

and Workers Parties in November 1957. Out of concern for unity, the CCP did not immediately raise the issue after the CPSU's Twentieth Congress, and even at the 1957 meeting, commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution, while an objection was raised, the CCP still co-operated with the CPSU in finding a compromise wording highlighting the problems posed by both dogmatism and revisionism. Chinese patience was starting to wear thin, but they continued to regard 'revisionism' as a 'non-antagonistic' contradiction within the communist movement, rather than as an 'antagonistic contradiction' requiring 'struggle between the enemy and ourselves'.⁵⁷ The CCP Central Committee, in its letter of 10 November to the CPSU Central Committee, clearly objected to the Soviet stress 'on the possibility of peaceful transition, and especially on the possibility of seizing state power by winning a majority in parliament. . . .'. This stress was countered in the following assumption: 'To the best of our knowledge, there is still not a single country where this possibility is of any practical significance'.⁵⁸

This ideological issue related to the international correlation of forces. The Chinese leadership feared that any emphasis on 'peaceful transition' would weaken the unity of the socialist camp, and thereby undo the united front strategy of resisting the US through the extension of the vast zone of peace. Mao's view of the correlation of the forces was more positive than that of Khrushchev. He wanted to press the propaganda advantage which came with Soviet scientific successes in the October and November launchings of a sputnik on 4 October and an intercontinental ballistic missile on the previous 26 August. Mao's statement to Chinese students in Moscow on 17 November to the effect that the 'east wind prevails over the west wind' (*dongfeng yadao xifeng*), reverberated around the world.

Khrushchev records in his memoirs his forebodings with regard to Mao whom he believed 'suffered the same megalomania Stalin had all his life'.⁵⁹ Khrushchev was distressed by Mao's gratuitous references to thermonuclear war as winnable.⁶⁰ Mao's off-the-cuff ruminations concerning the possible loss of 300 of China's 600 million population shocked Khrushchev; however, Mao was simply repeating late-1940s propaganda indicating China would not be intimidated by the US possession of the atomic bomb. Zhou Enlai had used this same argument in 1948 in order to resist defeatism within the Party.⁶¹

Khrushchev was not especially well informed on either the Chinese revolutionary experience, or the origins and nuances of Mao's 'strategic' thinking, hence he was surprised by Mao's characterisation

of US imperialism as a 'paper tiger'.⁶² As he was unaware of the difference between Mao's historical, or strategic, conceptions and his immediate tactical calculations, Khrushchev later failed to fathom Chinese actions in the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958.⁶³

Mao did make strong statements in favour of Soviet leadership of the socialist camp, and Khrushchev recalls that when he suggested that the PRC focus on revolutionary movements in Asia and Africa while the USSR focused on Western Europe and the Americas in order to achieve some form of a rational division of labour, Mao, himself, rejected the idea as inconsistent with the assumption of a single centre for world communism in the Soviet Union.⁶⁴ Mao supported Soviet 'headship', but he served notice that the Soviets were to be on their best behaviour. He expected the Soviets to show resolve in their response to the Yugoslavs.

Convinced of the need for unity in the socialist world, the CCP leadership had, none the less, made the self-conscious decision to be independent and direct in its inter-party discussions with the Soviet leadership. Mao and Zhou self-consciously applied Yan'an standards of criticism and self-criticism as a means of achieving greater unity.

The 12-party Moscow Declaration included an endorsement of 'peaceful coexistence', which it said '... coincides with the five principles put forward jointly by China and India in the programme adopted at the Bandung conference. . . .' The issue of whether 'dogmatism' or 'revisionism' was the more pressing concern was finessed, but not settled, with a statement to the effect that while 'revisionism' was the 'main danger', 'dogmatism and sectarianism can also be the main danger at different phases of development in one party or another'.⁶⁵

In February 1958 the fifth session of the National People's Congress met, and Zhou's long-time colleague, Chen Yi assumed the post of Foreign Minister. Some Western analysis has tied the change-over to domestic arguments over economic policy.⁶⁶ However, if there was fundamental opposition on Zhou's part to the Great Leap Forward economic strategy, it is would have been more logical to challenge his position as Premier.

The decision may have reflected prevailing emphasis on collective leadership as the antidote to Stalinist 'personality cult'. Mao, himself, had recommended to the Central Committee that he should not be reappointed as Head of State on 10 December 1958. The transition at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not involve policy change. Chen Yi had given the report on international relations to the September

1956 meetings of the Eighth Party Congress, and on 10 February 1958 Zhou made the report on the current international situation. Zhou was relieved of a killing schedule at the Ministry, but he remained as the CCP's foremost spokesman for foreign affairs. Zhou and Chen worked closely together after the latter's appointment. Just a few days after the Congress, the two left for Pyongyang to negotiate the withdrawal of the CPV from North Korea.

Zhou's 10 February reporting stressed the Moscow position of Mao, which had featured a qualitative shift in the international correlation of forces. The 'east wind' prevailed, despite stepped-up US subversion in Egypt and Hungary; the Soviet Union had achieved a scientific superiority which would deter US imperialism. Zhou hastened to add:

We have never taken, nor will we ever take advantage of our supremacy to bully others. On the contrary, we are working all the more actively for peace and we are all the more confident that we will be the victor in peaceful competition precisely because we have attained supremacy.⁶⁷

Zhou emphasised 'peaceful coexistence', and the extension of the five principles in the alignment of socialism and neutralism remained as the basic strategic response to US containment. Zhou believed he could turn the tables on the US, for he concluded: '... shutting out New China from international life has not only failed to prejudice in the least the existence and development of New China, but, on the contrary, has more and more isolated the United States, itself'.⁶⁸

The issue of China's 'self-reliance' was highlighted during the Great Leap Forward in the summer of 1958, and Mao had been discussing the divergence in Chinese policy and experience from that of the Soviet Union since 1956. On 28 June 1958, Mao admonished dogmatists within the CCP for 'slavishly copying' the Soviet Union, and he instructed: 'It is very necessary to win Soviet aid, but the most important thing is self-reliance'.⁶⁹ Mao did realise that the assessment of the relevance of Soviet experience was best conducted behind closed doors, for he instructed:

As regards learning from the Soviet Union, for internal use we say 'study critically'. In speaking publicly, in order to avoid a misunderstanding it would be better to put it: 'Study the advanced experience of the Soviet Union analytically and selectively'.⁷⁰

Despite such good intentions, Soviet Ambassador Yudin became very alarmed by the sweeping criticisms of the Soviet Union, which were occurring within the Chinese leadership.⁷¹

Proletarian internationalism presumed fraternal interaction and advice on such issues, but the dogmatism-revisionism debate led to ideological fratricide which engulfed the socialist camp. The more the Chinese became involved in the self-conscious definition of a Chinese policy of development, the more confident they became in their recommendations to the Soviet leaders. On the occasion of Mao's 28 June remarks, for example, Foreign Minister Chen Yi interjected: 'Soviet comrades who have returned home said that when they came, they brought their experiences with them; now they are returning they are taking our experiences back'.⁷² Mutual 'study' apparently constituted a pathology of socialist diplomacy, as neither side could refrain from ideological commentary on the integrity of the other's social and political system.

On another front, in May, the Chinese responded to the March publication of the draft programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, publicly linking Yugoslav 'modern revisionism' (as the reincarnation of Kautsky's social democracy) with imperialism.⁷³ The Yugoslav position had challenged the existing conception of proletarian internationalism as it related to the conception of Soviet leadership as at the centre of the socialist world. They have also opposed a concept of 'active coexistence' to alliance politics. Mao and Zhou continued to view the world in terms of the two alliance systems. At the propaganda level, 'collective security' in both Europe and Asia had been regularly offered as an alternative to military blocs; on the other hand, the Chinese united front strategy had presumed the lasting integrity of the socialist camp, which would win over the 'middle forces' of neutralism. Tito's view was more radical in that it elevated Yugoslavia's neutrality in such a way as to ignore the distinction between the socialist and capitalist camps.⁷⁴

The *Renmin ribao* savaged the Yugoslav position on 5 May. The Yugoslav domestic programme allegedly threatened the abandonment of socialism. The Yugoslavs were reminded that the 1948 Comintern condemnation of the Yugoslavs had not been formally reversed, and they were castigated for having supported 'counter-revolution' in Hungary.⁷⁵ The formula for socialist relations, as suggested in Zhou's January 1957 Moscow and East European discussions, which in the wake of the Hungarian situation had theoreti-

cally united principles of national equality and proletarian internationalism, failed to overcome the problem posed by Yugoslavia. Professor Donald Zagoria summed up the problem as follows: 'Tito's crime, in short, was not neutralism, but Communist neutralism'.⁷⁶

In the meantime there was a growing hostility towards the US in Beijing which was reflected in the stronger line taken on the issue of American and British withdrawal from Lebanon and Jordan. The Chinese belatedly endorsed Khrushchev's 19 July appeal for a summit of the heads of government of the USSR, US, Britain, France and India to deal with the Middle Eastern crisis on 22 July. Khrushchev flew to Beijing on 31 July for talks which resulted in a communiqué of 3 August calling for a summit conference on the Middle Eastern question and 'an uncompromising struggle against revisionism – the principal danger of the Communist movement'. The communiqué referred to 'peaceful coexistence' between states with different social systems, but surprisingly there was no mention of Taiwan.⁷⁷

Zhou rejected any reference to the UN Security Council as a forum for the solution of the Middle Eastern crisis given China's lack of representation there. Khrushchev had agreed to British Prime Minister Macmillan's 22 July proposal for a summit conference 'in the forum' of the Security Council; however, on his return to Moscow, he wrote to Eisenhower noting that the UNSC was ineffective in dealing with such international crises given the absence of the PRC.⁷⁸ Khrushchev responded to Chinese concerns by alternatively calling for an emergency session of the General Assembly.⁷⁹

Khrushchev notes in his memoirs that it was Zhou Enlai who, as a Premier and as a 'masterful diplomat'⁸⁰ was usually given the responsibility of raising potentially controversial subjects with the Soviet Union; however, Mao, himself, took the lead in the August 1958 negotiations with Khrushchev, which touched on very sensitive issues of Sino-Soviet military co-operation. Mao was provoked by Khrushchev's request for Soviet submarine access to bases in China. Khrushchev was alienated by Mao's reflections on the possibility of general war in the nuclear age. Khrushchev also engaged Mao in an indelicate discussion concerning the 'people's commune' in China. He had the temerity to tell Mao that he was violating objective economic laws.⁸¹

There were many reasons why the Chinese leadership would have at this time responded to US 'imperialism' as the most serious threat to Chinese national security. One-third of Chiang Kai-shek's total

ground forces, 100 000 men, were located in the Quemoy and Matsu Islands. US Defence Department officials had publicly stated that the stationing of Matador missiles on Taiwan would add to American 'atomic punch' in the Far East. The Taiwan missiles were tested on 2 May. The construction of missile bases in Korea had already started. The US showed no inclination to open the Warsaw talks. Tension with the Kishi government had led to the suspension of Sino-Japanese trade relations, and the Chinese were convinced that US and GMD intelligence operatives were stirring up rebellion in Tibet.⁸²

The artillery bombardment of Quemoy beginning on 23 August was probably a strategically pre-emptive move designed to demonstrate China's resolve not to be intimidated and perhaps also to draw American attention to Chiang Kai-shek's attempts to involve them in a conflict with the PRC.⁸³ In the early 1950s, Zhou had emphasised that China could not afford any US speculation as to the passiveness of the Chinese leadership. The bombardment of 23 August to 4 September was in effect a warning which was reinforced in the 4 September declaration of the PRC's 12-mile territorial limit. Western analysis, which suggested that Beijing wished to use an adventure in the Taiwan Strait as a means of achieving political consolidation, ignored the fact that only coastal radio stations played up the crisis.⁸⁴

On 6 September Zhou vigorously restated the Chinese government's position on Taiwan and then, without precondition, unilaterally offered to restart the stalled talks in Warsaw. The talks in fact resumed on 15 September. The crisis had extremely important implications for Sino-Soviet relations. Soviet support for the Chinese position only started up on 31 August, and strong and clear high-level expressions of support only came after Zhou's 6 September statement. Khrushchev wrote to Eisenhower on 7 September indicating that an attack on China would be considered as 'an attack on the Soviet Union', and that the USSR would 'do everything' to insure the integrity of both the PRC and the USSR. In a second letter of 19 September he indicated that, in the event of a nuclear attack on China, the aggressor would 'at once get a rebuff by the same means'.⁸⁵

The Chinese leadership read into the Soviet response the importance of their own "self-reliance", and the crisis engendered less confidence in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950. In the open polemics of 1963, the CCP later indicated that Khrushchev acted only when it was clear that danger of nuclear war had passed.⁸⁶ The fraternal, unbreakable, everlasting friendship looked more and more like a 'fair-weather' friendship.

On 30 November Mao commented on Khrushchev's brinkmanship

on the Berlin question and revealed: 'Khrushchev also knows how to create a tense situation. Let us also create some tension, so that the West will ask us not to do so'.⁸⁷ Zhou's 6 September statement had been backed up in a supreme state conference, presided over by Mao on 5 September.⁸⁸ It contained specific reference to the previous American intervention in the Middle East and to Chiang Kai-shek's military plan for invasion of the mainland. The statement referred to China's Bandung formulation which distinguished between the international question of regional tension and the internal problem of Taiwan's liberation.⁸⁹ On 8 September, Mao once again asserted his belief that the 'east wind prevails over the west wind', claiming a propaganda victory in the worldwide opposition to the US position in the Taiwan Strait.⁹⁰

Mao, in his 1 December 1958 speech, 'On the Question of Whether Imperialism and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers', outlined the terms of reference which governed Chinese debate over the Taiwan Strait crisis. The US was only a 'paper' or 'beancurd' tiger in the larger ultimate sense of historical development.⁹¹ At this 'strategic' level, or as Mao put it, 'from a long-term point of view', Party propaganda was to make light of the enemy in accordance with the maxim, 'despise the enemy strategically and take full account of him tactically'. The term 'paper tiger' had originated in the pre-1949 Chinese Communist propaganda against US support for Chiang Kai-shek, and it entered the English language in the Civil War period.⁹² In an ultimate ideological sense, the US would become a paper tiger; however, Mao also told the cadres that in objective reality, the US was a 'real tiger' capable of 'devouring people'.

On this latter point the cadres were instructed to carry out a proper 'scientific research' to assess the tactical reality which must be respected in the short term. Probably there was opposition to Zhou's 6 September position as Mao noted that 'some comrades' were having difficulty in combining hotheaded enthusiasm with coolheaded research. Mao quickly came to the point:

Some people in our country are a bit too hot headed at present. They are in no mood to allow a cooling off period, unwilling to make an analysis and all for hotheadedness. . . . Comrades, such an attitude is not good for people in positions of leadership and they may trip and fall.⁹³

In a Party meeting of 30 November Mao complained that Khrushchev was 'too cautious' and that 'many people' both within and without the party had failed to understand the 'paper tiger issue'. In

light of the fact that in present circumstances the US is a 'real tiger', Mao was surprised that they would still ask: 'Since it is a paper tiger, why don't we attack Taiwan?'⁹⁴

Chinese foreign policy circles had been engaged in debate over the degree to which the imperialists were split by the internal contradictions of the capitalist social system. Mao commented on a report, which was being circulated, but he did not settle the issue. He was not prepared to rule out either Western unity or disunity. He characterised the contradictions besetting the Americans, British and French, in united front terms: 'They unite together and struggle against each other simultaneously'. Referring to his own article of 1946, he predicted that the US would focus on the 'buffer zone' between the US and the USSR, and Mao calculated: 'If the buffer zones are attacked [by the US], it will create resistance in the buffer zones and with the vastness of the buffer zones, they cannot come over.'⁹⁵

This optimistic view of the state of affairs in the vast zone of peace highlighted the newly-achieved level of socialist superiority which was to be guaranteed in the Soviet headship of the socialist camp. In 1959 this conception of the international correlation of forces was essentially threatened by the warming trend in Soviet-American relations. Behind the public posturing which consecrated socialist unity at the 21st Congress of the CPSU in January, there was bitter polemic as to the approach to take to the West. Khrushchev focused on economic competition with the West, and the relaxation of tensions in the military and political context.

Zhou Enlai, as leader of the CCP delegation, spoke to the CPSU Congress on 28 January. His emphases were slightly different. He stoutly defended the achievements of China's Great Leap Forward before a skeptical audience. He predictably addressed the importance of the unity of the socialist world under Soviet headship. Zhou called upon the Congress to resist 'modern revisionism'.⁹⁶

Zhou also spoke in much more expansive terms than Khrushchev of the opportunities for national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America even while reiterating the continued importance of collective security in Europe and Asia, based upon peaceful coexistence. Zhou continued that it was, nevertheless, important to maintain vigilance against the wild actions of the 'imperialist mad men', and he cited the following wording of the August 1958 communiqué of Mao and Khrushchev:

If imperialisms' madmen dare to bring down war on the heads of the peoples of the world, then all the peace-loving, . . . countries

and peoples of the world will closely unite and thoroughly eliminate imperialist aggression and establish a lasting worldwide peace.⁹⁷

Zhou insisted on the unbreakable fraternity of the Sino-Soviet alliance, and yet he had serious reservations concerning Khrushchev's conception of the correlation of forces. Zhou did not endorse Khrushchev's proposal for a 'nuclear free zone' in the Far East, and Khrushchev's bid to co-opt the PRC into his policy of 'peaceful coexistence' with the US failed. The Chinese had already made up their minds on the necessity of an independent nuclear deterrent, and they thought that they had a formal commitment from Khrushchev in 1957 for Soviet assistance in the manufacturing of a nuclear bomb.

On 18 April 1959, Zhou, as Premier, summed up China's domestic and international status before the Second National People's Congress. In the spring of 1958 the first five-year plan had been analysed, and the Chinese leadership 'succeeded in finding out a better way of building socialism in our country . . .'.⁹⁸ Zhou also indicated that, while there were 'shortcomings', China would continue 'to leap forward' in the 'simultaneous development of industry and agriculture'. Zhou had all along supported the economic strategies, outlined in Mao's 'On the Ten Major Relationships'. Zhou also numbered among those who were increasingly critical of the Soviet Union, and he had defended China's particular road to development in discussions with the Soviets.

Zhou insisted that it was 'fundamental policy' to strengthen Sino-Soviet unity, but he warned against the external forces which were actively seeking to undermine this unity. Zhou promised: 'We are ready to give support and assistance to the full extent of our capabilities to all national independence movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America'.⁹⁹ But, at the same time, Zhou pledged to maintain established policy with respect to the application of the five principles within the Asian 'peace area'. He confirmed that the 'disintegration' of capitalism is a 'general trend' and that socialist countries would uphold 'peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition' with the capitalist countries.

Khrushchev, in his search for a stable nuclear relationship with the US, wished to eliminate the 'Cold War' at a time when China felt increasingly threatened by US 'imperialism' in Asia. Khrushchev's decision on 20 June not to provide a prototype of the atomic bomb was especially upsetting to the Chinese in this context. The Chinese

believed that Khrushchev had misinterpreted Mao's views on the question of war, and the 20 June decision was a slur on China's backwardness. A Chinese statement of 1 September 1963 noted that in 1959 '... the Soviet leaders made a gift to the United States of their refusal to provide China with the technical data required for the manufacture of nuclear weapons'.¹⁰⁰ The statement explicitly condemned the Soviet failure in its obligations of 'proletarian internationalism', and the Soviets were quoted as having asked: '... how can the Chinese be qualified to manufacture nuclear weapons when they eat watery soup out of a common bowl and do not even have pants to wear?'.¹⁰¹

Chinese antipathy towards the Soviets was explicit in the internal leadership struggles of the Lushan Plenum in the summer of 1959. Peng Dehuai's 'Open Letter' criticising some of the policies of the Great Leap Forward, caused a sensation. Peng may have shown Khrushchev a memorandum outlining his criticisms of Mao's policies during a meeting in Albania in the spring of 1959,¹⁰² but it was, none the less, extraordinary that Peng was denounced for his secret dealings with the Soviets.

Also, the Chinese were antagonised by Khrushchev's statements during his official visit to the US from 15–28 September. Given 'Eisenhowerism', it was to them unbelievable that Khrushchev would have paid such highly flattering tributes to President Eisenhower. On his return home Khrushchev changed planes to go to Beijing for the 1 October national day celebrations. It was to be his last journey to Beijing. The Soviet leadership had realised that Khrushchev had to go to Beijing to represent the CPSU at the important occasion of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the PRC.¹⁰³ Not to have done so, just after the trip to the US, would have given cause for serious diplomatic offence.

During the enforced conviviality of the banquet celebrations, Zhou exhibited his well-known capacity for gracious civility. His welcoming speech on 30 September was short, but he toasted his guest as 'an envoy for peace'.¹⁰⁴ Zhou referred to the achievements of the Great Leap Forward and 'some shortcomings in the light of inexperience'. He alluded to the consolidation of the socialist camp and its developing relationship with the struggle for national independence and freedom in Asia, Africa and Latin America. He raised his glass to the socialist camp with the Soviet Union as its head, but made no mention of 'peaceful coexistence'.

Khrushchev spoke at length on 'peaceful coexistence'. While it was

not a slogan readily used in the capitalist world, Khrushchev noted that the leaders of the capitalist states were beginning to display an 'attitude of realism' (*xianshizhuyi taidu*) in their understanding of the relations between the socialist and capitalist systems.¹⁰⁵

The following day the Mayor of Beijing, Peng Zhen, gave a more ominous meteorological forecast of world affairs. Reminding his Soviet guests of the 'prevailing east wind', he described the serious contradictions which had cast a dark cloud over imperialism.¹⁰⁶ National day meteorology did not mask the tensions rippling beneath the surface. Khrushchev's memoirs tells of how the Chinese decided 'to unleash Chen Yi on me'. Chen was 'agitated' and 'downright rude'.¹⁰⁷ Khrushchev left Beijing without the benefit of the usual joint communiqué.

Sino-Soviet relations reached such an impasse that there was no longer need for metaphor. Peng Zhen clashed publicly with Khrushchev in full view of the delegates attending the Romanian Workers' Party Bucharest meetings of late June 1960, and the polemic was carried forward to the November Moscow meeting of Communist and Workers Parties.

The seriousness of the controversy was explicit in the Soviet government's indication of 16 July that all Soviet technicians would be withdrawn from China over the next month. The technicians left with their blueprints at a time of desperate domestic economic crisis. The cancellation of 343 contracts for technical aid and the termination of Soviet co-operation in 257 scientific and technical projects was an even more serious blow to China's economy.¹⁰⁸ The episode reinforced the national movement for economic self-reliance in the 'Learn from Daqing' campaign, but it was a bitter lesson for the Chinese who had all along claimed that socialist international relations of a 'new type' would be based upon 'equality and mutual benefit'.¹⁰⁹

Deng Xiaoping publicly stated at the November Moscow Conference that 'no considerations of diplomatic protocol can explain away or excuse Khrushchev's tactless eulogy of Eisenhower and other imperialists'.¹¹⁰ The Chinese and Soviet delegations to the 81-Party meeting in Moscow could not agree on how 'peaceful coexistence' would be applied as a strategic response to US imperialism, and these differences were compounded in argument over the relative danger of Yugoslav 'modern revisionism'. The CCP delegation charged that '... while prettifying US imperialism, the leadership of the CPSU was actively vilifying China and extending the ideological differences between the two Parties state-to-state relations. . .'.¹¹¹

Fundamental disagreement raised the issue of international organisation. The Soviets accused the Chinese of 'fractionalism' and argued that the majority decisions of the fraternal parties should be binding on the minority of parties. In January 1956 the Chinese had stressed both the principles of equality and socialist unity, but in the Moscow context of November 1960, they focused on the importance of unanimity through democratic consultation in opposition to the CPSU's 'policy of suppression'. Deng cited the experience of the Bolshevik-Menshevik split to suggest that what had initially been a correct minority later developed into a majority.¹¹²

The issue brought into the open Chinese complaints about the history of the Communist International. During 14–15 July 1960 meeting of party secretaries, Premier Zhou went over CCP-Comintern relations in 1919–43. Zhou cited the 1935 Comintern decision not to become involved in the internal affairs of the various Communist Parties and the subsequent decision disbanding the Comintern in June 1943. These decisions had been necessary because the Comintern, in fact, had made many mistakes in interfering with the internal affairs of the Parties. The Comintern failed to promote the uniting of 'general calls and the practice of the various countries' and had become involved in day-to-day 'concrete arrangements' instead of concentrating on 'general guidance'.¹¹³ Zhou reiterated that the building of the revolution in each country had to be based in 'independence and self-reliance'.¹¹⁴

Zhou Enlai took this historical analysis a step further at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in Moscow in October 1961. At the Congress the two parties engaged in polemical subterfuge by which Chinese attacks on Yugoslavia applied to Yugoslavia and Soviet attacks on Albania were equally directed at China. In coming to the aid of Albania, Zhou defended China, condemning the 'open unilateral condemnation of a fraternal party' which he charged was inconsistent with the Marxist-Leninist conception of unity based upon national equality.¹¹⁵ Citing the relevant sections of the 1960 Moscow Statement of the 91 Parties, Zhou insisted that it was not Marxist-Leninist to 'lay bare' a dispute between parties in the face of the hostility of imperialism, and he indicated that '... if a dispute or differences unfortunately arise between fraternal parties or fraternal countries, they should be patiently resolved in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and on the principles of equality and unanimity, through consultation'.¹¹⁶

At the Congress Khrushchev attacked Stalin's 'personality cult'. Zhou correctly understood this as an attack on Mao and Chinese

policies. Zhou replied in a public act of poignant symbolism; he laid a wreath at Stalin's tomb in Red Square and then left Moscow before the closing of the Congress.

The opening of Sino-Soviet polemics to a great extent reflected a divergence of strategic priorities. The original Leninist conception of 'peaceful coexistence' as merely tactical respite, in an otherwise eluctible progress towards the final confrontation between the capitalist and socialist systems, had its origins in Lenin's perception of the First World War and its conventional military requirements. In light of his need for a stable nuclear relationship with the US, Khrushchev pushed 'peaceful coexistence' much harder than had Lenin.

The Chinese had a different view of the political and military implications of the advent of nuclear deterrence, but there had, in the mid-1950s, been a significant degree of convergence on questions relating to 'peaceful coexistence'. Chinese diplomacy conceived the latter in the ideological terms of their own united front experience. The latter provided the conceptual basis for socialist unity and the struggle against US imperialism. The united front strategy had assumed the need to maintain an inner discipline and independence within complicated shifting of political alignments; it also assumed the largest possible co-operation of 'middle forces'. While Khrushchev was at one level pursuing a new relationship with the US, the Chinese, on another, sought to thwart US containment through the process of consolidating the unity of the socialist camp and aligning with the 'neutralists' in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Yugoslav 'modern revisionism' threatened to undermine this strategy.

Subsequent to the Hungarian events, Zhou's emphasis on the five principles applied more exclusively to socialist relations with neutralist states, as opposed to the relations between socialist states. The Chinese formula for the latter stressed both the Leninist principle of national equality and the requirements of unity and proletarian internationalism. There was controversy as to the specific organisational requirements for the achievement of such unity. The divergence of Sino-Soviet strategic priorities was addressed at the level of ideological principle in terms of very different readings of the relative position of capitalist and socialist systems, and the necessities of their respective international relations. Under these circumstances, unity, achieved on the basis of any notion of majority rule in the international movement, was unacceptable to China's 'independence and self-reliance'.

5 Zhou Enlai, Jawaharlal Nehru and Estranged ‘Afro – Asian Unity’

Even after the promotion of Chen Yi as Foreign Minister, Zhou Enlai continued to assume responsibility for Asian affairs. Zhou paid special attention to India, as Sino-Indian relations were pivotal to the application of the united front strategy of the 1950s which divided the world into the ‘socialist camp’, the ‘imperialist camp’ and an intermediate camp of national independence and ‘neutralism’.

At Bogor Jawaharlal Nehru had helped China to gain access to the Colombo powers. Zhou and Nehru enshrined the five principles of peaceful coexistence, or *Panchsheel*, in the preamble of the April 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement concerning Indian trade and cultural exchange with Tibet as an autonomous region of China. Both sides saw their new relationship as a model for the conduct of Asian international relations.

US containment of ‘Red China’ had been resisted by India in a very forthright manner. On 1 April 1950, India became the third Asian country to recognise the PRC.¹ India’s good offices had been useful to the Chinese in negotiations at New York, Panmunjom, Geneva and Bandung. In fact, since the founding of the PRC, Nehru had focused on the constructive engagement of the China in regional politics. Nehru believed that the emergence of a ‘new Asia’ had upset ‘the old equilibrium and balance of power’.² The failure to recognise China, he said, was the failure of ‘recognising a major event in history’.³ Nehru conceded that, while India had a certain ‘moral’ influence in the world, it, nevertheless, had to be conceded: ‘The fate of the world depends more on the USA, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China than the rest of the world put together’.⁴

This realistic emphasis on China’s role in the ‘emergence of a new Asia’ suited Zhou’s strategy of an united front in Asia, particularly as Zhou so successfully applied the five principles in the improvement of China’s relations with bordering countries. In Asia Zhou did not lay the same heavy stress on ‘proletarian internationalism’ as had been the case in Eastern Europe. His public statements underscored the

historical and cultural links which, he claimed, had been disrupted by the regional penetrations of imperialism, particularly since the nineteenth century.

Zhou was almost perfectly cast in his role as the representative of Chinese civilization. Both he and Nehru were keenly interested in 'Asian' self-identification, if not self-assertion, in international relations. Perhaps, the 'Asian' component in international relations was nowhere more strong than in the Indian slogan, *Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai*, or 'The Chinese and Indians are brothers'.

Nehru wished to foster a new spiritual attitude in international relations – one which accorded with the Gandhian view of mankind, living in peace. 'Peaceful coexistence' was thus a rational, mental outlook which accepted differences of religion and ideology within the unity of the human community. Nehru believed that the African and Asian countries at Bandung demonstrated a 'practical idealism' which was exhibited in the mature and deliberate conduct of Conference business.⁵ The equality of states was recognised as the basis for agreement. 'Truth' in international politics was predicated in such equality, hence '*Panchsheel*' encompassed 'different ways to progress' towards the same 'ultimate objectives' Nehru asserted India's own independence and equality in the following way:

Our development in the past thirty years or so has been under Mahatma Gandhi. Apart from what he did for us . . . the development of this country under his leadership was organic. It was something which fitted in with the spirit and thinking of India.⁶

This organic 'truth', however, had to be 'fitted' to the modern world through '*Panchsheel*'. 'Truth', Nehru believed, was 'not confined to one country or one people'.⁷

The modern Sino-Indian disagreement has been traced to differences in the philosophies of Hinduism and Confucianism, and the former's 'pluralism' has been contrasted with the latter's monism. This distinction, however, ignores the historical eclecticism of Confucianism and the more important relevance of the modern-day Chinese Marxist-Leninist emphasis on praxis.⁸ Somehow nationalism had to be squared with realism. Zhou's discussion of 'independence and self-reliance' in its relation to praxis approximated a reasoning similar to Nehru's discussion of 'truth'. Chinese Marxism-Leninism presumed the relativity of truth in its dialectical conception of objective reality. Also, Zhou's conceptualisation of 'independence and

'self-reliance' presumed that revolution could not be exported. Revolution could only succeed as a natural internal growth; it was in this sense 'organic'. His espousal of the five principles reflected the Chinese preoccupation with equality in the relations between states.

Zhou was very concerned that 'Asians' not fight 'Asians', and thereby provide imperialism with regional political opportunities. His speeches referred to ancient cultural links, but, while both sides espoused Asian nationalism, neither the Indian or Chinese leaders could point to an authentic cultural unity in the region. Nehru and Zhou agreed on the importance of equality, but they were spokesmen for very different revolutionary experiences. For Nehru, '*Panch-sheel*' accorded with the spiritual dimensions of modern India, which had vigorously assimilated the British parliamentary tradition in the struggle to achieve independence through revolutionary non-violence.

The modern Chinese revolution was explicitly predicated in class struggle as an opportunity for the raising of mass political consciousness. The revolution challenged the centrality of harmony in Confucian thought. Indeed, Zhou had on occasion waxed eloquent about China as a 'peace-loving nation', but it would be very difficult to imagine him addressing the NPC in the way in which Nehru, in the midst of the 1962 border crisis, addressed the Lok Sabha stating: 'Now I am free to confess to this House that my whole soul reacts against the idea of war anywhere. That is the training I have received throughout my life and I cannot easily get rid of it at the age of 72'.⁹

Nehru realistically insisted that the regional prospect for peace required the constructive engagement of China in international politics. In his view the American policy of non-recognition only served to strengthen the Sino-Soviet alliance. Nehru supported the PRC's claim to the UN China seats, but he did hope that the 'Asian' element would come to the fore in Chinese society and foreign policy.¹⁰

Zhou, on the other hand, as much as he was identified with the civilised practices of an ancient society, was a Marxist-Leninist who viewed the five principles of 'peaceful coexistence' as part of a united front strategy. Zhou regarded negotiation and armed conflict as two interrelated forms of struggle. Like Khrushchev, Nehru was only dimly aware of the diplomatic and strategic reference points of the Chinese revolutionary experience. In his view of Zhou, Nehru may have failed to distinguish 'between personal relations with world leaders and their respective political behaviour'.¹¹

The border clashes, which started in seriousness in 1959 and led up to a brief border war from 20 October to 20 November 1962 had

significant consequences for the integrity of Chinese foreign policy and strategy throughout the world. Zhou and Nehru more than any other two leaders were associated with the five principles, which had become integral to the 'Asian' reaction to the modern history of imperialism. Together, they had nurtured an international example of Sino-Indian 'practical idealism' as an alternative to Cold War alignments.

The border issue was, therefore, an extremely bitter surprise. The sides could not agree on mutually acceptable terms of reference. Zhou believed that he had made exceptionally significant concessions to assure Nehru of Chinese goodwill. He was disillusioned because Nehru had not budged one iota in an effort to meet him half way. Not surprisingly, after Nehru's death Zhou remembered him as one of the most arrogant men that he had ever met.¹²

In a 9 August 1971 interview with James Reston, Zhou conceded, in hindsight, that it was easier to talk about the five principles as opposed to applying them in the reality of international relations. The legacy of imperialism in the form of ill-defined colonial boundaries disrupted even Sino-Indian relations. Zhou lamented:

For instance, it was with India that we have first reached an agreement on the five principles of peace peaceful coexistence . . . Because both China and India are two big countries, and in history there was no aggression by either against the other. . . .¹³

Despite such historical harmony, the border became a modern problem. It was, as Zhou had described, 'a question left over from history', but it was a question which would not go away.

As for Nehru in the midst of the border crisis, he was surprised by the Chinese response. Even before the serious clashes of October 1962, he had addressed the Lok Sabha noting that the Chinese 'reasons' are 'rather difficult to find out'. Nehru believed that the territory concerned was of little consequence to the Chinese compared to jeopardising relations with India and the 'goodwill' of many other countries in Asia. Nehru rambled in his reply to the persistent questioning of Hem Barua:

Everybody who . . . meets me, American or English . . . asks me; why do you think China has taken this step against India, losing the friendship of India which is a valuable thing; at the most they, in the hope of getting some rare mountains. I have no answer to give them. I cannot. I can guess about various things, what is happening

in Tibet, this and that; their old policy of spreading themselves out . . . whatever it may be; it is extraordinary to me.¹⁴

Nehru, in heated Parliamentary debate in the Rajya Sabha, regretted Zhou's 'betrayal' of China's long tradition of 'culture behaviour' and professed that he was indeed shocked by the rude and extremist language which marred contemporary Chinese statements.¹⁵

The Indian accusations of Chinese 'expansionism' had serious implications for Afro-Asian unity. The border issue raises several important questions. Why were the two sides unable to 'reserve' their differences? Why did two of the greatest statesmen of the time become so profoundly disappointed in one another? According to one Indian account, Nehru was so distraught that he ' . . . died the day the Chinese crossed our border'.¹⁶ What effect did the issue have on the Chinese united front response to American containment whereby 'neutralism' was to align with the socialist camp in opposition to 'imperialism'?

In 1959–62, Zhou often reiterated that there was no 'fundamental issue' separating the two countries. In hindsight, Zhou came to the conclusion that the Tibet had, in fact, posed a significant problem for Sino-Indian relations, as the Indian government had never really reconciled itself to the China's possession of Tibet.

Nehru, in the early 1960s, came under constant Parliamentary attack for having failed to respond to the Chinese PLA's 1950 occupation of Tibet. Nehru took the position that Tibet was not 'something in our pocket which we handed to China'.¹⁷ India did not have the military power in 1950 to challenge China, hence Nehru found the debate as to whether he had personally failed to clarify the difference between Chinese 'suzerainty' as opposed to 'sovereignty' to be rather beside the point.

The border dispute originated in an extraordinary failure to communicate. In the early to mid-1950s both sides were focusing on regional and international issues, and the border issue was not then seen as pressing in light of more important developments of the Cold War in Asia. As newly-independent states, both India and China were bidding for international attention. Zhou and Nehru both focused on the big picture. There was some early disagreement in India's foreign policy circles as to whether it was necessary to ask for Chinese recognition of the MacMahon Line, but Nehru sided with former Ambassador Panikkar against Bajpai's advice.¹⁸

Zhou Enlai arrived for his first trip to Delhi on 25 June 1954, and in

a warm demonstration of friendship Nehru embraced Zhou at the airport. Zhou was in between Geneva sessions and in search of Asian support for his initiatives on the Indo-China question. It was an opportune time to formalise the growing Sino-Indian relationship. Without specifically mentioning the border, Zhou had earlier, in Beijing, reassured Ambassador Panikkar that China had every intention to facilitate India's historical cultural and economic interests in the Tibet region. The April 1954 Agreement on Tibet, facilitating such relations, served as the formal basis for the Sino-Indian relationship, but it also served as part of Zhou's united front offensive at Geneva.

In Parliamentary debate Nehru cajoled opposition members who had cast the Agreement in terms of the recognition of Chinese sovereignty in Tibet. Nehru replied: 'This Agreement is good not only for our country, but the whole of Asia and the rest of the world'. Nehru lectured the opposition saying that while there may be many things in this world 'which we don't like' one must not 'go like Don Quixote with lance in hand against everything that we dislike'.¹⁹

Zhou's diplomatic 'work-style' was exactly right. He was in India to 'study'. He wanted to learn about India's economic and industrial experience. Zhou modestly protested that he had a limited knowledge of most Asian countries, even of Burma, Indonesia and Ceylon, and that he needed the informed opinions of Nehru, whose extensive personal knowledge of these countries he graciously acknowledged.²⁰

With the Agreement on Tibet, Zhou and Nehru became the 'initiators' of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. Nehru cleared the way for Zhou's visit to Burma, and U Nu became the third 'initiator' of the five principles. Zhou went on to meet Ho Chi Minh, who accepted the strategy of 'peaceful coexistence' as the basis for the Geneva settlement.

Nehru returned Zhou's visit and arrived in Beijing in October 1954 to a tumultuous crowd of one million which lined the road from the airport to downtown Beijing. Referring to the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru told his audience in Beijing: 'But peace is not merely the absence of war. It is something positive. It is a way of life and a way of thinking and action'.²¹ Zhou toasted India. He was grateful for Nehru's support during the war of resistance against Japan, for India's speedy diplomatic recognition, its support for the Chinese position in the UN and its supervisory role in the Indo-China armistice.²²

According to Indian sources, Nehru raised the border issue, noting what he believed to be incorrect border lines on Chinese maps. Zhou informed Nehru that his government had yet to complete its study of the maps and had, therefore, to rely on old Guomindang maps.²³ Zhou may have too readily assumed that the border issue would work itself out in the fullest of time.

The international significance of the Sino-Indian relationship was uppermost in Zhou's mind. At the Bogar Conference in December 1954, Nehru and U Nu sponsored China's invitation to the Bandung Conference. They succeeded in the invitation, but were unable to overcome the opposition of Pakistan and Ceylon to the inclusion of the five principles in the final communiqué.²⁴ Zhou went on to win considerable prestige at Bandung, and when he returned to India in November-December 1956 he was everywhere popularly hailed with '*Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai*'. In discussions with Nehru he carefully explained Tibet's status as an autonomous region with China, but he pointedly inquired as to clandestine activities in Kalimpong, India, where an émigré Tibetan community was agitating against China's sovereignty in Tibet. This activity, according to Zhou, was promoted by American and Taiwanese intelligence operations.

Nehru reassured Zhou that the Indian government would never condone such activity, and in the course of the conversation Zhou mentioned that, while the MacMahon Line was historically illegitimate, Chinese military and administrative personnel would refrain from crossing the line so as to ensure border tranquility. This point became a source of later disagreement, for the Indian government claimed that Zhou's undertaking amounted to recognition of the MacMahon Line, whereas, in Zhou's mind, he was merely making a gesture of friendship pending the future delimitation of the border.²⁵

The Kalimpong issue was sensitive in light of the festivities surrounding the late November visit to New Delhi of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. Zhou regretted that such a joyous occasion was marred by 'unfriendly statements'; for example, the Mayor of Bombay had referred to Tibet as a separate country.²⁶

The border issue was inextricably tied to the Chinese position in Tibet. In late 1958 Nehru finally issued a protest over the Chinese building of a road through the north-west sector of Aksai Chin; the road was a critical logistical supply line, linking Xinjiang province with Tibet. On 14 December 1958 Nehru wrote to Zhou stressing that the Agreement of 1954 had indicated that there were no border disputes.²⁷

Zhou replied on 23 January 1959, explaining that his reasons for not raising the issue of the formal delimitation of the border in 1954 were misconstrued as an endorsement of the customary border as an acceptable formally delimited border. It was China's declared intention to study and make preparations for the formal delimitation of the border when 'conditions were ripe'.

The Sino-Indian commitment to the five principles was put to a severe test in the context of the Tibetan Rebellion, which broke out at Lhasa on 10 March 1959. Chinese reports indicated that members of the Tibetan local government joined with a number of 'upper-strata reactionaries' to 'put the Dalai Lama under duress'. Citywide fighting broke out on 19 March, but Chinese military forces had brought the situation under control by 22 March. Nehru wrote to Zhou on the same day, once again noting that he was ' . . . somewhat surprised to know that this frontier was not accepted at any time by the Government of China'.²⁸

On 31 March the *Renmin ribao* editorialised on the need for the complete suppression of 'reaction' in Tibet, and, while it welcomed Nehru's statements on non-interference, it featured Kalimpong as a centre of 'reaction'.

The 'abduction' of the Dalai Lama to India posed a significant problem in Sino-Indian relations. The Chinese government was displeased by the fact that the Dalai Lama's statement of 18 April, referring to the necessity of Tibetan independence from China, had been issued through the Indian Foreign Ministry's information service. The former Director of the US State Department's Office of Research and Analysis has detailed the extensive US and Guomindang intelligence activity in Tibet since the early 1950s, which included CIA involvement in the escape of the Dalai Lama to India.²⁹

Zhou applied an explicitly Marxist-Leninist analysis to the situation in Tibet. Zhou told the first session of the Second National People's Congress, on 18 April 1959, of feudal resistance on the part of some of the upper-strata in Tibet to social reform. The 'reactionaries', he claimed, were using religion to subvert social reform. Zhou, in the following condemnation, called for an analysis which penetrated the religious appearance of the 'reactionary, feudal regime' in Tibet:

The Tibetan reactionaries often put on pious airs and express the hope that everyone will go to heaven, but they turned Tibet into a hell on earth; they want to force the Tibetan people to live

perpetually in the abysmal darkness of a life of barbarism and cruelty worse than that of the Middle Ages in Europe.³⁰

Zhou calculated that only 20 000 of Tibet's population of 1 200 000 took part in the rebellion and insisted that the great majority of the population supported social reform.

His statement contained the following message to Nehru:

We hope that all well-intentioned friends – I refer to those who are willing to persist in practicing the five principles of peaceful coexistence with our country and have pledged not to interfere in China's internal affairs – will in the first place note this clear distinction between the overwhelming majority and the small handful.³¹

Zhou refused to believe that the 'ill-intentioned provocations' of a 'handful' could disrupt relations between the 'initiators' of the five principles.³² The NPC in its final resolution of 28 April, however, referred to 'extremely unfriendly acts' committed by 'certain people in Indian political circles'.³³

In early May the Chinese media criticised Nehru's parliamentary analysis of the Tibetan situation. Nehru's statement of 27 April, including his categorical denial that Kalimpong acted as 'the centre of the Tibetan rebellion', was featured in full in the *Renmin ribao* of 30 April. The *Renmin ribao* argued that, while Nehru insisted that he would abide by the principle of 'non-interference', he was, nevertheless, interfering in Chinese politics. Interference allegedly took on 'diverse forms'.³⁴ Nehru's public analysis of the revolt was judged as political interference. Nehru, himself, was disassociated from right-wing Indian politicians, but he had given them succour in his suggestion that the revolt was of 'considerable magnitude' and the result of 'a strong feeling of nationalism'.³⁵ Nehru's view of the revolt as a 'tragedy' stood as an indictment of China in violation of the five principles. The *Renmin ribao* editorialised: 'As friends of India and as the people whose affairs Nehru is discussing, we deem it necessary to point out this error. If one agrees with Nehru's logic, not only the revolution in Tibet, but the whole Chinese revolution would be impermissible'.³⁶

While it was acknowledged that the Indian people had a sense of 'kinship' with the people of Tibet, the latter were part of the Chinese multinational state, and the paper wanted to know what happened to 'Indians and Chinese are brothers'.³⁷ In all probability Zhou personally approved the editorial. He retained his old interest in journalism,

and he often reviewed the page proofs of the *Renmin ribao*'s leading articles on foreign policy.³⁸

Zhou's stated confidence in the stability and importance of Sino-Indian relations contained a veiled warning to Nehru as to how gravely China viewed the situation in Tibet and on the border. Each side reassured the other that there would be no commission of unilateral acts on the border. Each side was aware of Sino-Indian relations as a critical component of their respective foreign policies. In a statement of 16 May, the Chinese Ambassador told Indian Foreign Minister Dutt that the Chinese government was especially gratified by the Indian decision not to join SEATO, and he frankly conceded: 'China will not be so foolish as to antagonize the United States in the East and again to antagonize India in the West'.³⁹ It was assumed that the Indian Foreign Office was aware that the putting down of the rebellion in Tibet was not a threat to India, and that China would want to avoid the creation of 'two centres of attention'.

The two sides were aware of the stakes, but there was, nevertheless, a military clash at Longju in late August. In a long letter to Nehru, dated 8 September, Zhou conceded that there was, indeed, a 'fundamental difference' between their respective positions on the border issue.⁴⁰ He was just as surprised as Nehru that this was the case, but he could place no other interpretation on Nehru's letter of 22 March. Zhou explicitly linked the border clashes at Longju to the Tibetan situation, claiming that just as 'Tibetan rebels' started moving into India, Indian troops intruded into areas even beyond India's own sponsored MacMahon Line in order to shield 'armed Tibetan rebel bandits'. Zhou asked Nehru not to misconstrue Chinese troop movements which had no motive other than the pursuit of the Tibetan rebels. Zhou gave the following assurance:

I can assure Your Excellency that it is merely for the purpose of preventing remnant armed Tibetan rebels from crossing the border . . . to carry out harassing activities that the Chinese Government has . . . dispatched guard units. . . . This is obviously in the interests of ensuring the tranquility of the border and will in no way constitute a threat to India.⁴¹

On 10 September, the Indian government proposed that neither side send military personnel to the Longju area, but another border clash occurred on 21 October. Zhou, writing on 7 November, desisted from elaborating his views on the border and concentrated on the necessity of obviating the border tension. He proposed that the

Indian proposal of 10 September be extended to cover the entire border, and that the two sides agree to a separation of their troops by a 40-kilometre corridor along the whole of the border, pending the negotiated delimitation of the border. Zhou expanded on the proposal on 17 December, claiming that such a separation of forces would in no way compromise either side's view of the boundary. He denied that China had any territorial ambitions, arguing that in socialist China the pro-imperialist 'exploiting classes' were no longer in a position 'to profit by outward expansion and provocations'.⁴²

Zhou elaborated further:

China has such a vast expanse of territory, more than half of which, moreover, is sparsely populated and will take great efforts to develop. It would be extremely ludicrous to think that such a country would still want to seek trouble in some desolate areas of a neighbouring country.⁴³

Chinese diplomacy directly addressed 'prevalent observation' within India concerning inherent Chinese historical tendencies in favour of imperial 'expansionism', for this 'opinion' threatened to reinforce the US policy of containment in Asia and to undo Zhou's work at Bandung.

Zhou's argument to Nehru was restated in a Chinese Foreign Ministry Note of 26 December. The Ministry appealed to the Indian sense of logic. Half of China's own territory had yet to be developed, and thus the Chinese people were not compelled 'to seize the territory of other countries to feed themselves'. China has 'rich natural resources' and a 'huge domestic market'; therefore there was no domestic pressure 'to grab raw materials from abroad' or 'to dump its products in other foreign countries'.⁴⁴

Zhou's letter of the 17 December featured a proposal for direct talks between the two prime ministers. Zhou indicated that he would be happy to receive Nehru anywhere in China, but that, if this was 'inconvenient', he was willing, subject to Burma's consent, to hold the talks in Rangoon.⁴⁵ For Zhou, the issues and their possible consequences were too significant to depend on correspondence.

The Indian government, however, wanted further correspondence. Nehru took a more legalistic approach. He wanted all the documents out on the table before any decision could be reached as to talks between Prime Ministers. Nehru had earlier insisted on 16 November that a 'proper understanding of the facts' was a critical precondition to the working out of a formula for disengagement on the border.⁴⁶

Nehru believed that he already had the facts, and he was convinced of his own moral position.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry's note of 26 December referred to Indian complaints about the Chinese side's failure to answer specific Indian assertions as to the status of the border, and proceeded with an extended analysis of the border. The note referred to the 'absurd idea' of two great countries with a combined population of more than a billion people going to war over 'temporary and local disputes', and it implored the Indian side to consider negotiations. In a reply of 5 February 1960 Nehru agreed to meet with Zhou. He had earlier rejected a meeting on 26 December in Rangoon, but he was then prepared to invite Zhou to New Delhi. Nehru asked Zhou to come to India in March and claimed that he, himself, could not leave India during parliamentary discussion of the national budget.

The meeting took place on 19–26 April. It was characterised by very tense atmospherics. In comparison with the ecstatic expressions of friendship in the past, the banquet speeches were subdued in tone. Despite 20 hours of private discussion with interpreters, Zhou and Nehru were unable to achieve a significant breakthrough.⁴⁷ According to an Indian source, Chen Yi told Swaran Singh that any Chinese recognition of the Simla Convention or the MacMahon Line would 'cause an explosion in China', and that, if Zhou Enlai had at any time recognised the Line then he certainly '... had no right to do so'.⁴⁸

The sides were well aware of the influence the Tibetan situation had had on their respective relations. The Indian finance minister, Morarji Desai, alienated Zhou in his assertion that the PLA presence in Tibet conflicted with a mutual understanding that Tibetan autonomy would be respected from within Chinese sovereignty.⁴⁹ The Minister seemed to think that this understanding precluded the stationing of Chinese troops on Chinese sovereign territory. The Indian government had already recognised Chinese sovereignty, and, even in the more limited historical terms of Chinese 'suzerainty' (*zongzhuquan*), troops could be stationed on the territory of a 'tributary' state.

Zhou offered a major *quid pro quo* on the border issue by which he would endorse the Indian claim regarding the MacMahon Line in return for acceptance of the Chinese position at Aksai Chin in eastern Ladakh. The Indian government was not ready to accept such a bargain as it was 'a derogation of the juridical validity of the northern border'.⁵⁰ Nehru stuck to the Indian understanding of

British historical agreements. The Chinese side refused to accept the historical impositions of British imperialism, which had so blatantly ignored Chinese sovereignty. Indeed, recognition of the Simla Convention would have called into question Tibet's status as part of China. In so far as the Chinese government was concerned, China, as an independent state, had never entered into a legitimate act of agreement formally delimiting the border, and such delimitation should be made on the part of two newly-independent Asian states on the basis of practical administrative realities along the border which the Chinese referred to as the 'traditional customary line'.

Zhou left New Delhi without a deal. He later told a correspondent: 'I could not move Nehru at all'.⁵¹ Earlier in November 1959, Nehru had commented on the need for extensive consideration of the 'facts' prior to the meeting of the two Prime Ministers. Nehru wrote: 'The nature of the discussion at our meeting should, therefore, be such that we do not lose ourselves in a forest of data'.⁵² Nehru at the actual meeting was bound and determined to get at the 'facts'. The Prime Ministers' meeting had produced only an agreement to compare facts.

Zhou tried to focus on what minimal common ground there was in 'six proposals' to Nehru. The joint communiqué of 25 April attempted to establish a holding pattern in the talks. The officials of the two governments were to meet alternately in Beijing and New Delhi to study and to exchange their respective 'facts'. Between June and September they created an inventory of disagreements.

Zhou expanded on an earlier emphasis to maintain a 'line of actual control' which would in no way prejudice the formal claims of both sides. The danger of unilateralism was evident to Zhou and his 'six proposals' emphasised that neither side should put forward 'territorial claims as pre-conditions' to discussions on the settlement, and that each side should refrain from patrolling 'all sectors of the boundary'.⁵³ In his 26 April statement to the Lok Sabha, Nehru emphasised that, in his discussion with Zhou, they '... came up against a rock of entirely different sets of data'.⁵⁴

As far as Zhou was concerned, the central problem was the Indian failure to reconcile itself to the Chinese position in Tibet. In an October 1960 interview with Zhou, Edgar Snow referred to a comment by Nehru to the effect that the underlying problem had to do with the fact that both India and China were 'newly-independent nations' under dynamic nationalistic leaderships. In reply, Zhou

compared India to Burma. The latter was also 'newly independent', but Burma took 'a positive attitude' in direct talks. Zhou then described India's motivation as follows:

India doesn't want to settle the boundary questions. The real idea they have in mind is to turn China's Tibet region into a buffer zone. . . . They don't want Tibet to become a Socialist Tibet. That is why after the rebellion . . . they became more dissatisfied and shortly afterwards the Sino-Indian border question came to the fore.⁵⁵

Zhou believed direct political negotiation between prime ministers was the key to the situation. Zhou tried drawing the Indian government's attention to his success in negotiating a treaty delimiting the Sino-Burmese border. He had been formally appointed by the NPC in January 1960 to act as China's plenipotentiary, and on 28 January he signed two treaties, one setting out the arrangements for the settlement of the Sino-Burmese border, the other a treaty of friendship and mutual non-aggression. The former was especially relevant to India, because Zhou had claimed that, in 1954, he was not able to give China's view of the border due to the lack of proper surveys and the fact that China had still to consult Burma concerning the MacMahon Line.⁵⁶ While there was increasingly less reference in New Delhi to '*Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai*', there were choruses of China and Burma as '*pauk phaws*' (i.e., born of the same parents) in Rangoon.

Originally, Zhou had been invited to New Delhi in late March, but on 21 March, Zhou signed the Sino-Nepalese Boundary Agreement. The latter embodied a formal delineation even though the maps and actual jurisdictions conflicted. Similar to what Zhou had suggested in the Sino-Indian case, the Agreement included a provision whereby each side undertook to withdraw its armed personnel 20 kilometres from the border. Nepal's Prime Minister, Koirala, congratulated Zhou on his 'unswerving efforts' to apply the five principles in international relations.⁵⁷

The latter emphasis was again featured in the signing of the Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty on the 1 October 1960 anniversary of the People's Republic of China. The Sino-Burmese border was another 'problem that had been left over from history'. U Nu acknowledged that the settlement was 'not an easy achievement', but he paid special tribute to the virtuosity of Premier Zhou:

A special word of gratitude is due to Premier Chou Enlai, the principal architect on the Chinese side, of this treaty. Premier

Chou Enlai has been associated with this treaty from its earliest beginnings. In the course of the negotiations . . . he has always been friendly, courteous, patient and understanding. Even when difficulties seemed insurmountable, these qualities never deserted him.⁵⁸

Nehru, on the other hand, was upset with Chinese diplomacy and propaganda. He told the Rajya Sabha on 11 December 1961:

Policies may differ, even differ very greatly . . . , but there are certain criteria of good conduct which till recent years were supposed to govern diplomatic relations. Unfortunately, the cold war has rather put an end to that but what grieves me is that a country like China which perhaps more than almost any other country has had a reputation for hundreds . . . even thousands of years in particular of extreme courtesy, politeness, and if I may use the word, cultured behaviour, should behave like this. . . .⁵⁹

The resolution of the Sino-Indian border problem was linked to other boundary negotiations involving Nepal, Burma, and Pakistan. Zhou's alacrity in moving towards border agreements with these states disturbed rather than comforted the Indian government. The latter officially indicated a reservation as to the maps appended to the Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty, and in May 1961, Nehru's government strenuously objected to an agreement between the governments of Pakistan and China to enter into negotiations to establish their mutual border. Chinese assurances to the contrary, the Indian government saw in the agreement a Chinese move away from its established policy of non-interference in the Kashmir dispute.

The Sino-Indian border investigation failed to head off the growing conflict. Nehru made further high-level negotiations conditional on border adjustments, and the Chinese press in September attacked his dual policy of 'phoney negotiations and real incursions'.⁶⁰ The Chinese claimed that India was committed to a unilateralism which interpreted Chinese willingness to negotiate as a sign of weakness rather than self-restraint.

From 20 October the Chinese military took direct action on the border in what was represented as at an attack in 'self-defence'. The *Renmin ribao* blasted Nehru personally for so many 'lies' – a particularly cutting accusation given his great concern for the 'truth'. Zhou, in his correspondence, personally never went so far, but he allowed the editorial to stand. Nehru allegedly 'lied' when he claimed that China had, in its 1954 commercial agreement concerning Tibet,

accepted the frontier as delimited. Like the British 'imperialists', Nehru accepted China's 'special position' in Tibet, but he would not respect China's full sovereignty there. The *Renmin ribao* charged: 'it is an indisputable fact that after China had quelled the Tibetan rebellion, the Indian authorities deliberately sabotaged the status of the boundary. . . .'.⁶¹

The Chinese placed diplomacy and force on the same continuum. The occasion for force was similar to that of the Taiwan Strait crisis of the summer of 1958. The Chinese sharply reacted to unilateralism and Nehru's 'forward policy' on the frontier; this exercise of a carefully limited military option was in response to what was viewed as the massive general offensive of the Indian army in the western and eastern sectors of the border.

Neither side wanted a full-blown regional war which would compromise domestic economic development. Zhou Enlai had several good reasons for bringing the conflict to a rapid close. The international campaign to paint China as the aggressor threatened the strategic alignment of socialism and neutralism. Zhou had several times pointed to the danger of 'imperialism' taking advantage of the conflict to achieve greater penetration of the Asian continent. In fact, it was the view of American intelligence that the continuation of the conflict would serve American interests. In this context, China was especially eager to firm up border arrangements with Nepal, Burma and Pakistan.

During the dispute, the two sides differed over current trends in international relations. An Indian note of 1959, for example, stated that Sino-Indian border tension was a matter of 'special regret' when the US and USSR were moving closer together to end the Cold War.⁶² The Chinese, on the other hand, were engaged in a severe ideological struggle with the Soviet Union over the threat of US 'imperialism'.

The October border clashes precipitated a quick round of statements and correspondence between Prime Ministers. The statement of the PRC's government on 24 October regarded the clashes as 'serious' and 'most unfortunate', especially given that India and China were the 'initiators' of the five principles. The statement called for both sides to 'respect the line of actual control between the two sides along the entire Sino-Indian border'. The Chinese offered 'through consultation' to withdraw to the north of the 'line of actual control' in the east, if India would agree to respect the 'traditional customary line' in the middle and western sectors. The third proposal



1. (left) Zhou Enlai, the young party worker, Paris 1922. (© Camera Press)



2. (right) Zhou Enlai, December 1936, upon his return to Yan'an from the Xi'an negotiations which resulted in the release of Chiang-Kai-Shek and the creation of the second united front to resist Japanese aggression in China. (© Camera Press)




3. The Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov (*left*) greets Zhou Enlai at Geneva airport on 25 April 1954. (© Popperfoto/Peter Hunter)

4. Zhou Enlai and part of his delegation at the Palais des Nations on the second day of the Geneva Conference, 27 April 1954. (© Popperfoto)





5. (above) Zhou Enlai and Sir Anthony Eden, Britain's Foreign Minister, at an informal meeting during the Geneva Conference, April 1954. In the centre is the interpreter. (© Camera Press/NCNA)



6. (right) Zhou Enlai and Mr Nehru at New Delhi airport, 28 June 1954. (© Popperfoto)



7. Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary General of the United Nations, with Zhou Enlai during discussions at Beijing, 18 January 1955. (© Popperfoto)
8. Zhou Enlai and the Chinese delegation after the first session of the Bandung Conference, 18 April 1955. (© Popperfoto)





9. Mme Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Ceylon (presently Sri Lanka), meets with Zhou Enlai in Beijing. (© NCNO/Camera Press)

10. Premier Zhou Enlai being warmly greeted by President Sukarno at Djakarta Airport, April 1965. (© China Photo Service/Camera Press)





11. Dr Henry Kissinger meets Zhou Enlai during their secret negotiations of 9–11 July 1971. (© Camera Press)

12. Zhou Enlai on arrival at Rawalpindi for talks with Pakistan's President Ayub Khan, 20 February 1964. (© Popperfoto)





13. Zhou Enlai with President Nyerere on his visit to Tanzania, 7 June 1965. (© Popperfoto)



14. Zhou Enlai holds a little Chinese girl's hand as President Nixon stops to talk to her during his 21–28 February 1972 visit to China. (© Camera Press)

once again called for direct talks between Prime Ministers.⁶³ Zhou repeated the proposals in a letter of the same date to Nehru, but he indicated that, rather than tracing the origin of the conflict, he preferred the two sides 'should look ahead'.⁶⁴ Zhou closed by again suggesting that if it was 'inconvenient' for Nehru go to Beijing, he would be happy to pay another visit to Delhi.

Nehru wrote back on 27 October indicating that his cabinet and several other interested governments were unable to comprehend 'the niceties' of the three-point proposal. In so far as he was concerned, the 'line of actual control' should be that of the period immediately prior to September 1962.⁶⁵ Zhou in his reply of 4 November indicated that the Chinese government and people found the 'unfortunate border clashes' to be 'most painful'; however, on the question of the 'line of actual control' he referred Nehru to his letter of 7 November 1959. The difference of dates was crucial to both sides.

Zhou claimed that the reversion to the earlier date would make the undertakings of both sides 'equal' and that it would agree with the 'so-called' MacMahon Line in the east and the customary line in the western and middle sectors of the borders. Nehru's line would have the effect of guaranteeing the gains of his 'forward position' since 1961. Indian military personnel allegedly established 43 'strong points' at a time when China had unilaterally ceased patrolling in the hope of reducing tensions. Zhou suggested: '... neither side should assume the attitude of a victor, no matter how the clashes may develop.' Zhou noted that the Indian government, in its insistence on the pre-8 September line, was putting to his government 'humiliating conditions such as forced on a vanquished party'.⁶⁶

Zhou's 4 November letter was followed four days later by an important *Renmin ribao* editorial placing the border struggle in international perspective. The editorial warned that India in its search for 'enormous US aid' was compromising its 'non-aligned' position, and that Nehru was abetting the US strategy of 'using Asians to fight Asians'.⁶⁷ In asking Nehru to reverse his present course before it was too late, the paper reminded him of the Buddhist proverb: 'The sea of bitterness is boundless but once you turn your head, you see the shore'.⁶⁸

On 11 November the *Renmin ribao* was even more explicit in its association of Nehru with US 'imperialism', charging that he had, in the Belgrade 1961 meeting of non-aligned countries, defended the US on questions relating to the Congo, South Vietnam and Cuba.⁶⁹

The escalation in border hostilities drew international attention, and Nehru issued a circular message to heads of governments detailing his views on Chinese 'aggression'. Zhou Enlai responded with his own 15 November circular to African and Asian leaders, accusing India of 'military adventure'. Zhou summed up Indian calculations as follows:

India thought that China's economic difficulties were so grave that it could not be able to overcome them, and that China's southwestern defences must have been weakened owing to the fact that its national defence forces were tied down by the attempt of the US-supported Chiang Kai-shek clique to invade China's southeastern coastal areas. Therefore India considered the opportunity ripe for launching massive armed attacks along the entire Sino-Indian border.⁷⁰

Zhou disparaged India's 'open begging' for US military aid, but he reiterated that he would go once again to New Delhi. Zhou responded to India's charges of Chinese 'expansionism' by indicating '... there is no conflict of fundamental interests between China and India ...' and by pledging: 'So long as there remains a ray of hope, [we] will continue to seek a way to conciliation. . . .'⁷¹

Zhou moved quickly to seize the diplomatic initiative by unilaterally announcing the three measures of 21 November 1962, including a cease fire on 22 November, a phased withdrawal of Chinese military personnel to positions 20 kilometres behind the 'line of actual control' from 7 November 1959, and the establishment of civil police checkposts to insure public order on the Chinese side of this line.⁷²

Zhou grabbed every opportunity to get China's point of view across; for example, he engaged in personal correspondence with Bertrand Russell, who had sent him messages on 8, 16 and 19 November. Zhou responded to Lord Russell's concerns by pointing to China's proposals of 24 October and the three measures of 21 November, asking him to exercise his influence with the Indian government to adopt corresponding measures.⁷³

US Department of State intelligence did not expect Nehru to adopt corresponding measures and thus to call into question his own position regarding the pre-8 September 'line of actual'. The Acting Director of Intelligence and Research, Thomas Hughes, in his assessment for the President, summed up the strategic implications:

... continuation of the conflict would realistically be to the US advantage. It would give us leverage to solve Indo-Pakistan problems, keep Chinese aggression in its least favorable context, obtain Indian support in Asian matters, manage an historic international political reorientation, and keep the Soviets on the horns of their dilemma.⁷⁴

The Chinese government received many foreign suggestions for the resolution of the conflict. Zhou Enlai was, for example, receptive to the 13 November cable of President Sékou Touré of Guinea, especially for his condemnation of all foreign intervention in the Sino-Indian border conflict. On 13 November Zhou replied to the cabled suggestions of the Tanganyikan government. The first two points of the Tanganyikan five-point proposal were favourably reviewed as consistent with Zhou's 24 October position, but the fourth point regarding arbitration by three countries was politely rejected. It went against Zhou's established position that the border issue should be settled by direct negotiations between China and India. Zhou hoped that Prime Minister Kawawa would agree that '... the positive role of a third party friendly to both sides does not lie in getting directly involved in the dispute between the two sides, but in promoting direct negotiations between the two sides'.⁷⁵

On the question of outside involvement, the Chinese government responded vitriolically to Yugoslavia's attempts to establish its position in the dispute as a 'non-aligned' mediator. The Chinese were already burned by Khrushchev's urgings that they should give more consideration to India's security needs on the border,⁷⁶ and Tito's comments that the Soviet Union should play a 'pacifying' role in relation to the border dispute, was like adding salt to an open wound.⁷⁷

While the Chinese government was certainly less hostile to the United Arab Republic, Nasser's four-point proposal of 31 October was not especially welcome for it favoured India's emphasis on the withdrawal of both sides to positions held before October, that is, behind the lines of 8 September.⁷⁸ In fact, Nehru readily cited Nasser's proposals in Parliamentary debate. He was pleased that Nasser '... took the trouble to understand the facts. . .'.⁷⁹ He complained in debate:

The difficulty with the Chinese is that they have a singularly perverted opinion and perverted view of what happens in the rest

of the world. It is an old characteristic of the Chinese, being a great nation with a vast territory, it begins to think all outside the limits of its frontiers are subhuman types. . . .⁸⁰

While Nehru tried to draw on the alleged ethnocentrism of the 'Middle Kingdom', Zhou pointed to his successful border negotiations with Nepal, Burma and Pakistan, and with considerable effect he cited China's unilateral cease fire and withdrawal. Nehru was not as able to get his message across in Asia as he was in the West, where he enjoyed considerable reputation.

With the dispute out in the open and both sides appealing for international support, Zhou had to formulate carefully his government's response to outside offers of help. The six non-aligned countries of Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia and the United Arab Republic conferred on the Sino-Indian border question on 10 to 12 December. The six proposals which emerged in these deliberations were released on 19 January 1963, after the Ceylonese Prime Minister had had a chance to confer with the two principals in Beijing and New Delhi.⁸¹ The Conference supported the *de facto* cease fire and the carrying out of the three measures contained in Zhou's announcement of 21 November; however, the third point regarding the disposition of forces in the eastern sector appeared to favour the Indian 8 September position.

Zhou did not give Nehru the satisfaction of the rejection of the proposals. Indeed, rejection would have belied his diplomatic efforts to establish China as the aggrieved party, which had sincerely sought a negotiated settlement. Zhou wrote to the Ceylonese Prime Minister, Madame Bandaranaike, on 9 January, indicating Chinese acceptance of the Colombo proposals in 'principle' and as a 'preliminary basis' for direct, substantive discussion between China and India.

Zhou indicated that, while accepting the proposals in principle, China wished to raise 'two points of interpretation'. Apparently, the proposals discussed disengagement in the western sector, but they had not specifically applied the exact same principle of disengagement in the eastern sector, where, according to Chinese claims, the Indian army had established 43 strongpoints after violating the 1959 line of actual control. Zhou officially apprised the Colombo powers of his reservations, namely, that the stipulation, requiring Indian military personnel to keep to their existing military position in the western sector, should apply to the entire border. Zhou emphasised that ' . . . in the eastern sector, India will refrain from sending its troops to re-enter the areas south of the line of actual control as of 7

November 1959 vacated by the Chinese frontier guards, and will send there only civilian personnel. . . .⁸² Secondly, 'with a view to responding to the peace call of the Colombo Conference', Zhou undertook not to set up civilian checkpoints on the Chinese side of the 7 November 1959 line of actual control, provided that Indian military and civilian personnel did not re-enter the disputed areas.

Zhou expected that China and India would naturally have two different interpretations of the Colombo proposals. Nehru predictably chose to see in the proposals an emphatic endorsement of India's 8 September line of actual control, hence he indicated that India, unlike China, accepted the proposals *in toto* as a 'definite' rather than 'preliminary' basis for negotiation.⁸³ Nehru may have hoped to reap a propaganda advantage; however, his view of the proposals fundamentally conflicted with Zhou's in so far as he characterised the Colombo operation as an exercise in arbitration. Zhou then repeated his earlier claim that India was trying to set preconditions for its participation in direct negotiations.⁸⁴

The two governments had already passed the point of no return. In Zhou's mind, India was becoming another centre of 'reaction' like Yugoslavia. The latter, in its 'modern revisionism', feigned the role of the 'non-aligned' for the purposes of surreptitiously extending the influence of US 'imperialism'. 'Tito's clique', in proferring their neutralism, were 'seeking to pass the eye of a fish for a pearl'.⁸⁵ Tito's support of Indian 'reactionaries' thus demonstrated the underlying purposes of Indian foreign policy, which was to woo neutralist countries of Asia and Africa into a specious association of non-aligned countries in the hope of stalling the global process of national liberation.

Both Tito and Nehru were, therefore, dangerous in the sense that they threatened to undermine the Chinese united front strategy in the Afro-Asian setting. Had not Nehru refused to accept the fact that the MacMahon Line was the 'legacy of British imperialism'? Furthermore, the partaking of US military aid was really the litmus test for the Indian 'ruling circles'. The 'Indian bourgeoisie' were then said to have a 'blood relationship with the British bourgeoisie and the Indian landlord class'.⁸⁶ The *Renmin ribao* cited a 'spokesman of the US monopoly groups', who claimed that Nehru's own use of the word 'socialism' constituted a strategic godsend: '[Socialism] is a highly popular word among the Asian peoples, where capitalism has become closely identified – almost synonymous – with colonialism. The Indians have taken it away from the communists'.⁸⁷

The accusations concerning specious non-alignment were developed

in relation to the performances of Tito and Nehru at the first meeting of the non-aligned at Belgrade in September 1961. While the Chinese government had reservations about their respective roles in non-alignment, they did not directly attack the movement, *per se*. Instead it was Zhou's policy, beginning in 1963, to focus on the Indonesian initiative to call a second Bandung Conference.

The Sino-Indian border dispute vitally affected the Chinese response to US containment, and China's position in the Afro-Asian world. At the level of general perception and propaganda, the border issue was tied in with the general assessment of China as a peace-loving or potentially aggressive state. This assessment hinged to a considerable extent on the Chinese reaction to the growing *rapportement* between Washington, Moscow and London on the question of a nuclear test ban treaty. While Nehru was pointing to Chinese 'aggression' on the Sino-Indian border, the Soviets were complaining of Mao Zedong's eagerness to catapult the world into a nuclear Armageddon.

Both American and Soviet propaganda stressed the ideological craziness of Mao Zedong's regime, and his commentary on the nuclear bomb as a 'paper tiger' was taken as evidence of a terrifying irresponsibility. The treaty, signed in Moscow on 5 August, had immediate implications for the Chinese who were in the midst of developing their own nuclear programme.

The use of nuclear weaponry against the Chinese had been actively considered at the policy level in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, and it is controversial as to how exactly this factor influenced the Chinese.⁸⁸ 'Nuclear blackmail', as Zhou called it, was certainly considered at the highest levels of US administration. The US intelligence community had informed the White House that there was a suspected test site in the Tarim Basin and that the Baotou reactor was about to go critical. A defence department memorandum to the White House had recommended: 'Such a development cannot help but hurt our cause [in Asia], and everything should be done to defer the day when the Chinese detonation takes place'.⁸⁹

In September 1964 President Johnson approved the policy proposals of Rusk and McNamara, whereby the US would for the moment abstain from 'unilateral US military action against Chinese nuclear installations'. Over lunch, it was also agreed that, in the event of future Sino-US hostilities, that the option would be more actively considered. The Secretary of State was authorised 'very privately' to broach the subject of 'joint action' with the Soviets through Am-

bassador Dobrynin. Such action ranged from warnings against Chinese tests to a 'possible agreement to cooperate in preventive military action'.⁹⁰

Following up on his government's 31 July statement, Zhou sent a letter, dated 2 August, to all heads of state, proposing that they all join in an international conference to achieve the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.⁹¹ The Soviet government replied in a lengthy, vitriolic statement of 3 August, describing the Chinese position as 'tantamount to actual connivance with those who advocate thermo-nuclear world war'.⁹² This exchange led up to the Chinese revelation of 1 September that the Soviets had given the Americans details of the 1957 Sino-Soviet agreement on nuclear weapons.

The Chinese government's statement of 1 September complained of the 'insolence' of the Soviet government: 'The Soviet government in its statement is insolent enough to say that we are able to criticise them only because China enjoys the protection of Soviet nuclear weapons'.⁹³ The Soviet statement regarding China's 'inhuman policy' and 'bestial conception' whereby socialism would win its struggle with capitalism 'through thermo-nuclear war' placed the Chinese government in a defensive position in Africa and Asia.

Mao's 1957 statement on the prevailing east wind, had to be explained and re-explained to the effect that Mao did not actively support nuclear war. On the contrary, Mao's entire strategic emphasis was related to the prevention of a new world war. Mao had debated the issue of nuclear war with Nehru. He did not say that China would precipitate such war, but he did ask what would happen should 'war maniacs' (presumably Americans) 'drop atomic and hydrogen bombs everywhere'. Nehru believed that the whole of mankind would be wiped out while Mao speculated that 'imperialism' would have the most to lose under such an eventuality.⁹⁴ Strategically, Chinese statements on the power of US nuclear weapons had been designed to discount their effectiveness against China. It was even apparent to the CIA that the Chinese government believed that its refusal to bend in the face of US nuclear superiority pre-empted any attempt at 'nuclear blackmail'.⁹⁵

Zhou Enlai, on the occasion of Somalian Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali Shermarke's visit to Beijing on 4 August, offered his reassurances on the questions of general disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear weapons to Africans saying: '... the Chinese government shares a common language and a common desire with the

governments of the African states'.⁹⁶ However, if Zhou was looking for an international condemnation of the test-ban treaty, there was no such reaction. The Asian and African cabled replies to his letter of 2 August generally welcomed any constructive suggestions in the field of nuclear disarmament; however, most governments chose to see the treaty as a positive step forward.

Even the President of Ghana, Nkrumah, who shared Zhou's view of the potential for political revolution in Africa, expressed the following reservation:

I agree with you to some extent and perhaps such a conference could help towards complete and general disarmament. But I feel that this could be done effectively within the context of the United Nations, and this is the reason why I am pressing . . . for the admission of China into the United Nations now.⁹⁷

The UN was certainly a consideration in Zhou's mind. He had all along been keeping his arithmetic on the UN's annual voting on the admission of China as an 'important question'. Zhou believed that the time was ripe for a major diplomatic offensive, which would offset the negative effects of the Sino-Indian border war and the test-ban issue, while reaping the political advantages accompanying the accelerated pattern of national independence in Africa.

The extension of the process of post-colonial independence was strategically very positive from the point of view of increasing opportunities for the application of a united front strategy in Chinese policy, and Zhou was not prepared to inhibit the development of this process with the UN admission question. On 12 December the Foreign Ministry, reiterating its September communications to the Soviet Union as well as several Asian and African states, formally announced the Chinese position on UN organisation. The statement noted that the Asian and African countries constituted more than half of the UN membership, and this increase in numbers should be reflected in a redistribution of seats within the UN's principal organs. The Foreign Ministry disclaimed any intention of urging charter revision, and adopted the following pre-emptive position:

The Chinese Government wishes to point out that the question of revising charter articles concerning the total number of seats in the principal UN organs and the question of restoring China's legitimate rights in the United Nations are two matters of entirely different nature.⁹⁸

As head of state, Liu Shaoqi personally helped launch the Chinese diplomatic offensive in his May 1963 visits to Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia and Vietnam. Zhou, however, undertook a much more arduous routine in a 72-day journey from 13 December 1963 to 1 March 1964. His 14-country tour covered the United Arab Republic, Algeria, Morocco, Albania, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Burma, Pakistan and Ceylon.

The Chinese government supported Sukarno's initiative to launch a second Bandung Conference so as to offset the alleged pro-American manoeuvres of Tito and Nehru within the non-aligned movement. Zhou was personally very impressed with African national independence. In his April 1964 report on the tour, he stressed that at the time of the first Bandung Conference there were only four independent states in Africa, but, at the time of tour, 34 of the 59 countries and regions in Africa had attained independence. Zhou's pre-1955 united front strategy had been largely confined to Asia, but the convening of a second Bandung promised a much wider diplomatic offensive in Africa. In fact, Chen Yi had quietly advised Sukarno not to insist on the holding of the Second Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung and that an African venue was more desirable.⁹⁹ There was even at this early stage some misgivings as to the possible success of the planned conference, as well as to Sukarno's own personal abilities.

The London *Observer* quipped that Zhou on safari was 'embarrassed . . . by the need to wear the diplomat's topper and guerrilla's beret at the same time'.¹⁰⁰ As an individual, Zhou had made 'a very good impression'. But there was a great deal of suspicion of Chinese motives in Africa. Zhou encountered the reservations of several African leaders, who were concerned about the implications of the Sino-Indian border war and China's apparently hardline position on the test-ban treaty.

Zhou would probably have found the *Observer*'s distinction between the 'topper' and 'beret' somewhat curious, for he, himself, did not make a distinction between gentle diplomacy and politics. Zhou's remark about Africa being 'ripe for revolution' made the international headlines, but the major theme, upon which he recapitulated was the extension of the five principles against the inequalities of 'imperialism' and the achievement of Afro-Asian unity through 'seeking common ground while reserving differences'.

Zhou described the concrete application of the five principles of peaceful coexistence and the 'Bandung spirit' in terms of a discrete set of five principles governing China's relations with African and

Arab countries, namely, support for national independence against imperialism and colonialism, support for African and Arab 'peace, neutrality and non-alignment', support for the African and Arab peoples to achieve unity and solidarity in the manner of their own choice, support for their efforts to settle their disputes through peaceful consultation, and support for the principle of non-interference.

Wherever Zhou went, he emphasised Chinese support for the Colombo proposals as 'the basis' for direct Sino-Indian negotiation without preconditions. Zhou insisted that the Afro-Asian states could settle their own problems without 'imperialist' intervention. However, at a Cairo news conference Zhou indicated that China could not participate in the conference of the non-aligned, as China was a 'committed country'.

Zhou believed that, even given Sino-Soviet disputes on matters of principle, the Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship represented a significant commitment of alliance. As for the upcoming meeting of the non-aligned, Zhou hoped that this second conference would up hold the 'banner of combating imperialism and old and new colonialism'.¹⁰¹ Irregardless of China's reservations concerning the 'positive coexistence' of Tito and Nehru, Zhou did not try to force the Africans' choice between 'Bandung or Belgrade'.¹⁰² This would have attracted attention as interference. Later in his tour he included the wording in the Sino-Ceylonese joint statement to the effect that the Second Asian-African Conference, and Second Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries, were not mutually exclusive.¹⁰³

In attempting to counter anti-China propaganda in Africa, Zhou resorted to the logic of the Chinese conception of 'self-reliance'. In Algiers on 26 December, Zhou made a clear statement on this point:

The Asian and African countries, in liquidating the colonial forces and developing their own national economies, should mainly rely on the efforts of their peoples, that is, 'rely on oneself' [zili gengsheng], a phrase we often use. On the other hand, we should also rely on mutual support of friendly countries and mutual assistance with no political conditions attached.¹⁰⁴

The second half of Zhou's formulation, referring to the importance of mutual support, indicated that Zhou did not conceive of 'self-reliance' in the exclusive terms of domestic economic autarchy.

Zhou described his stop in Tunisia in terms of 'frank talks with

President Bourguiba' and the necessity of applying 'seeking common ground while reserving our differences'.¹⁰⁵ Zhou indicated that the essence of the test-ban treaty would over time be 'increasingly revealed', while President Bourguiba declared in a rather reserved banquet speech: 'China, which is held in high esteem in Asia and the world, although at times it is blended with disquietude, can do much to strengthen peace and friendship between the peoples. . . .'¹⁰⁶ Bourguiba was brutally 'frank' in his private admonishments. He told Zhou: ' . . . some of China's attitude had caused doubt in the Tunisian mind, for instance, China's resort to force to settle frontier problems with India and her opposition to the nuclear test-ban treaty. Do you not regard this treaty as a promise of hope for all humanity?'.¹⁰⁷

On the other hand, the tone of the China-Ghana joint communiqué issued in Accra on 16 January 1984 was more forcefully positive in its emphasis on the 'community of views' between the two countries. Just a few days before there had been a coup attempt against Dr Kwame Nkrumah. Zhou's staff had discussed putting off the trip for security reasons; however, Zhou overruled them, for he wished to demonstrate his support for Nkrumah. Zhou requested that his hosts dispense with the usual protocol at the airport welcome and send off ceremonies, so as to insure Nkrumah's safety. What ceremony there was took place inside a fortress.¹⁰⁸

At a press conference on 15 January, Zhou outlined China's principles of foreign aid as these related to the five principles of peaceful coexistence, especially in their emphasis on equality and reciprocity, and China's principle of 'self-reliance'. In his instructions to his own diplomats, Zhou had likened China's foreign policy to 'the two wings of a bird' (*ru niao zhi liangyi*). While the body of the bird was the framework of state-to-state relations, one wing represented cultural relations while the other represented economic relations.¹⁰⁹ In relation to the campaigning for the second Bandung conference, Zhou reiterated themes of economic self-reliance and cultural self-assertion.

Zhou, in his answers to the reporters of Ghana's News Agency, summarised the essence of China's foreign aid programme under eight principles. Zhou insisted that these 'socialist principles' would never allow the compromising of another country's sovereignty:

[Chinese aid] never takes the form of the export of capital, direct investment and profit-seeking. It consists of providing economic

and technical assistance to the governments of these countries and helping these countries develop their own independent national economies.¹¹⁰

Zhou had made an exhaustive study of China's aid projects and, at his desk at Zhongnanhai, there was an updated dossier with copious marginal notation on the subject.¹¹¹ While on tour Zhou personally requested inspection of Chinese aid projects. His 'study' included extensive comparison with the aid programmes of other countries. The eight principles were a positive statement of China's own programme, but they were also explicitly a critique of Soviet and US foreign aid programmes.

The first principle, 'equality and mutual benefit' restated the Chinese revolutionary demand for reciprocity in the economic relations between states. This had been stated in the Common Programme of 1949 and was carried forward in the articulation of the five principles of peaceful coexistence in 1954. The second principle stipulated that there would be no conditions or privileges attached to Chinese aid. Thirdly, Chinese loans were to be extended on an interest-free or low-interest basis. The fourth principle restated the Chinese understanding of 'self-reliance'. Aid was clearly to help the recipient state 'embark on the road of self-reliance'. Fifthly, China would support projects involving modest investment and quick results. This principle borrowed from the domestic emphasis on the development of small enterprise under 'the policy of combining large, medium and small' (*dazhongxiao xiangjiehede fangzhen*). The sixth principle promised the 'best-quality equipment and material of its own manufacture at international market prices'. The seventh constituted an undertaking to insure that the personnel of the recipient country would be adequately trained in any techniques and technologies transferred from China. Finally, the last principle prescribed that Chinese experts in the host countries were to adapt to the standard of living extant in the host countries and that they are not allowed to make 'any special demands or enjoy any special amenities'.¹¹²

Zhou's discussion of 'self-reliance' had considerable political implications. At the first Bandung Conference Zhou had insisted that 'revolution could not be exported'. In response to American and Yugoslav contentions that China would intervene in African politics to stir up revolution, Zhou returned to the same theme. In answering an American correspondent's questions as to whether the current revolutionary situation in Zanzibar was 'the work of Communists', Zhou turned the question back on to the questioner:

In the case of the revolution in Zanzibar we only learnt about it from the newspapers. Is it not crediting us with others' merits to say that such incidents were caused by us? Revolution can neither be exported nor imported. Of course we do not conceal the fact that we sympathize with and support the revolutionary struggles of the peoples. But when US imperialism alleges that the national liberation struggles in all places are the work of the Communist Party, it can only be doing publicity work for us Communists while it will never frighten away the peoples who want to rise in revolution.¹¹³

During the tour Zhou made some modest gains. Diplomatic relations were established with Tunisia; and Zhou was gratified that Ethiopia resisted American pressure and signed a joint communiqué. He received general support for the preparations for a Second Afro-Asian Conference, but this support was certainly not interpreted as a lack of support for the upcoming conference of the non-aligned. Zhou claimed that his talks with the heads of state in Asia and Africa indicated that ' . . . they all realised that the Sino-Indian border situation had eased'.¹¹⁴ Probably the most enduring consequence of the tour related to the articulation of the eight principles, which became influential in later UN debates concerning the New International Economic Order.

On the other hand, there was concern within the Chinese delegation as to the effectiveness of American propaganda, which had painted an apparently beguiling picture of the end of colonialism and a new era of Soviet-American understanding for peace. Expressions of concern for India and the obvious support for the partial nuclear test-ban treaty had some effect.

The Vice-Chairman of the People's Republic, Soong Ching Ling, said as much in her 28 February 1964 speech at the Sri Palee Institute, Ceylon. She complained about the US unleashing a 'campaign of calumny' against Chinese people. Referring to the Sino-Indian border situation, she said: 'They have tried to turn China's unwavering stand for peace and its willingness to settle all problems by means of negotiation on the basis of principle, into a war-like stance'. And with reference to the Chinese position on thermo-nuclear war and its irrelevance to national liberation, she said: 'They have tried to twist China's earnest expressions of sympathy and support to those struggling against oppression and exploitation into a psychotic wish to reduce the world to a cinder'.¹¹⁵

Despite the US diplomatic and propaganda offensive in Africa, a

small victory was won in the Afro-Asian preparatory conference of twenty-two states in Djakarta in 10–15 April. It was decided that since the first Conference had been held in Bandung, that the second would take place in Africa. The preparatory meeting was, itself, governed by the principle of ‘unanimity through consultation’ – a principle which the Chinese had sponsored in the context of Soviet attempts to orchestrate the international censure of Albania. The principle proved useful in the Djakarta context, as the delegations were unable to agree on extending an invitation to the Soviet Union.

The head of the Chinese delegation, Chen Yi, was quite candid in his view of the sessions. He highly apprised the principles of ‘*Mushawarah*’ (consultation) and ‘*Muphakat*’ (agreement) as a ‘common code of conduct’, whereby neither the majority could impose its views on the minority, nor could the minority impose on the majority. Chen dismissed the Indian proposal to invite the Soviets as ‘improper’, for ‘. . . as everyone knows, the Soviet Union is not an African or Asian country’.¹¹⁶

There was an Indian counterattack at the Cairo Conference of the non-aligned in October 1964, where Nehru attempted to gain the endorsement of the Colombo countries for his position on the Sino-Indian border issue. The Chinese government circulated a statement on 9 October, protesting Nehru’s activities in light of the absence of China at the conference.¹¹⁷

In 1964 there was a shift in emphasis in Zhou’s discussion of the five principles. At Bandung Zhou had dramatically announced that China was willing to enter into negotiations with the US to reduce tensions in the Taiwan area, and his subsequent calls for the establishment of a collective security arrangement in the Asia-Pacific region had made an elaborate public point of including the US in such an arrangement. On his 1963–4 tour, however, Zhou stressed the difficulties of achieving ‘peaceful coexistence’ with the US. In a Dacca press conference on 25 February, Zhou repeated: ‘Only by strictly adhering to these Five Principles is it possible to practice peaceful coexistence; otherwise peaceful coexistence becomes meaningless’.¹¹⁸ Countries which were being violated by imperialism, Zhou noted, should not have to ‘beg for peaceful coexistence’.¹¹⁹ Zhou took a harder line with respect to US domination of the UN and UN reorganisation in the light of Sukarno’s withdrawal in retaliation for the seating of Malaysia in the Security Council. While the ‘non-aligned’ movement focused on the development of equality through UN collective security, Zhou even speculated in his state-

ment of 24 January about the creation of a revolutionary alternative to the UN.

Zhou could not re-create the circumstances of 1955. The development of the 'five points' in relation to the African and Arab states formally represented a further development of the positive features of his Bandung position. However, the circumstances, the second time around, were more intractable, for while the Cold War was winding down in Europe, it was becoming more extensive in Asia due to the failure of the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962. In 1965 China was at loggerheads with the Soviet Union, and the competition for mutually exclusive support from fraternal socialist states, as well as from Afro-Asian states, was a new complicating factor even in the dynamic context of an expanded pattern of decolonisation. In fact, 'non-alignment' threatened the Chinese united front strategy which anticipated the co-optation of 'neutralism' by the 'socialist camp' in the triumph over 'imperialist' war plans. During Soviet-American *rapprochement* it was difficult to convince others of the enhanced dangers of US imperialism.

A smaller group of countries had attended the first Bandung conference at a time when there was a unity of purpose between India and China. Within the larger forum of newly-independent states it became more difficult to achieve 'unanimity through consultation'. In 1965, 'non-alignment' offered an attractive alternative to the Afro-Asian forum. Also, the circumstances of US containment in Asia were exceptional to China, and, while newly-independent states were often sympathetic, there was no pressing reason to share the consequences of containment with the Chinese.

In this context, support for Sukarno was a liability. The response to the Chinese position on nuclear disarmament had clearly indicated strong support for the UN on the part of the newly-independent countries. The Second Afro-Asian Conference had been scheduled for 10 March 1965. Although there was a coup in Algiers, it was immediately rescheduled. In Cairo, on 28 June, Nasser, Zhou, Sukarno and Ayub Khan decided on a longer postponement.

Recognising the political difficulties of achieving unity at the Conference, Zhou sponsored the termination of the Conference. He argued the differences were too great to be 'reserved', and the consequent split would undermine Afro-Asian solidarity. The *Renmin ribao* described the concerns which had emerged in the preparatory meeting of foreign ministers on 28 October.¹²⁰ The Chinese government was especially apprehensive over US involvement in

Taiwan and Vietnam, but the conference participants were not able to agree on opposition to US imperialism. Furthermore, the ministers could not agree on whether UN Secretary General U Thant should be invited. The Chinese joined with Sukarno in condemning the UN as an extension of American power.

Originally, Indian sponsorship of an invitation for the USSR had been rejected, but, at the June preparatory meeting, several Asian and African states again insisted on the Soviet invitation. Also the Chinese feared that the Conference proceedings would grind to halt in light of 'new tensions' between participants. The *Renmin ribao* cited 'Indian aggression against Pakistan and India's creation of incidents at the China-Sikkim border' in particular. The Chinese regrettfully concluded that the holding of the Conference as scheduled would be 'unrealistic'.

Zhou wrote to Afro-Asian governments on 22 October and concluded:

the Chinese government has come to the conclusion that, rather than forcibly to convene the conference in disregard of the principle of achieving a consensus of opinion through consultation, thus leading to a split among Afro-Asian countries, it would be better to refrain from holding the conference for the time being. . . .¹²¹

The failure of the Conference suggested the difficulties of applying a united front strategy in the context of Soviet-American *rapprochement*, and it demonstrated the growing estrangement within Afro-Asian relations as the newly-independent countries coped with what the Chinese called the 'questions left over from history'. The post-colonial integration into the nation-state system was in this sense a fall from innocence. There was, at the level of perception, some 'common ground' concerning the historical inequities of imperialism and old and new colonialism, but it was not so easy to 'reserve' conflicting national interests within the context of the changing relation between the two superpowers.

Zhou's 'strategies and policies' were realistic in terms of his historical understanding of US 'imperialism' and national 'independence and self-reliance'. They also had a certain appeal in the post-colonial context in which all newly-independent states were seeking equality, but there were still developing contradictions within Chinese policy. As borne out in the Western study of the Chinese 'calculus of deterrence', Zhou had realistically responded to the Sino-Indian crisis, but the international consequences of the border conflict,

nevertheless, threatened to destroy the 1955 Bandung edifice of Afro-Asian unity.¹²²

6 The ‘Revolutionary Diplomatic Line’ in the Cultural Revolution

In 1949 Zhou stressed to New China’s diplomats that Chinese diplomacy could not exactly duplicate the pattern set elsewhere, for it was to be the self-conscious extension of China’s own revolutionary experience. It was to incorporate a socialist world view – one which challenged the underlying assumptions of European international law and diplomacy in so far as these had been conceived in the matrix of European imperialism.

It comes, therefore, as a great surprise that in the early Cultural Revolution of 1966–8, there was a sweeping internal challenge to Zhou’s diplomacy which was allegedly at odds with Mao’s ‘revolutionary diplomatic line’. Chinese diplomats underwent ‘revolutionisation’ as ‘red diplomatic fighters’ (*hongse waijiao zhanshi*) responsible for propagating ‘Mao Zedong Thought’ around the world. This diplomatic style was incompatible with ‘seek common ground while reserving differences’ (*quitong cunyi*). With the increasing political differentiation between the two class lines of capitalism and socialism, Chinese radical diplomacy explicitly challenged ‘bourgeois’ international law in the struggle to make China the ‘centre of world revolution’, and the propagation of ‘Mao Zedong Thought’ became the single most important issue in foreign policy. It appeared as though Chinese diplomacy had, itself, confirmed Western assumptions concerning the lack of realism in the Chinese radical socialist world view.

Hedley Bull has argued that diplomacy axiomatically declines in inverse proportion to the universal claim to justice which it embraces. Commenting on the ‘ideal ambassador’ of seventeenth century European rationalism, Bull draws the following conclusion: ‘Diplomacy can play no role where foreign policy is conceived as the enforcement of a claim to universal authority, the promotion of the true faith against heretics, or as the pursuit of self-regarding interests that take no account of the interests of others’.¹

One may, of course, assume otherwise. Perhaps, all diplomacy is

directly or indirectly affected by ideology, and universal claims may be assumed in almost any given national context. The uninhibited adulation of 'Mao Zedong Thought' certainly smacked of a universal claim to justice, but to what extent was the diplomacy of the Cultural Revolution representative of Chinese 'proletarian diplomacy'?

Historically, 'proletarian diplomacy' had encompassed the international 'propagandising of the Party'. Zhou's pre-1949 diplomacy, in Wuhan and Chongqing, had focused on the translation and dissemination of Mao's united front writings for the purpose of winning greater international, especially American, acceptance.

Throughout the formative building of policy and diplomacy in the 1950s, Zhou drew on Chinese praxis, as it had been formally conceived in Yan'an 'rectification', to stress Chinese 'self-reliance' in a cautious and realistic manner. Succinctly, revolution 'could not be exported'. Chinese experience dictated that it had to be an indigenous outgrowth of domestic political forces. The conception of 'national independence and self-reliance' contributed to Zhou's diplomatic emphasis on the equality of all states. This equality and its corollary of non-interference in the sovereign affairs of states was firmly entrenched in the five principles of peaceful coexistence by which Zhou had hoped to circumvent US containment.

The Cultural Revolution radical 'left' insisted on much more. The active diplomatic recommendation of 'Mao Zedong Thought' was presumed relevant to the domestic politics of all states. This, in itself, posed a basic dilemma. While Zhou's five principles presumed non-interference, the international propagation of 'Mao Zedong Thought' was externally construed as an active interference in the domestic politics of other states, particularly in those states which had large Overseas Chinese communities. The formal content of 'Mao Zedong Thought' did not literally enjoin such interference, but the practice of the Cultural Revolution rallied China's diplomats as 'red diplomatic fighters' to propagate Mao's revolutionary ideas abroad.

CHINESE DIPLOMACY AND THE CENTRAL PARADOX OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION.

The practice of diplomacy became secondary to the domestic requirements of the Cultural Revolution. Zhou Enlai had made significant gains in breaking down the walls of American containment, despite the complications of the early 1960s Sino-Indian border clashes, the

extension of the Sino-Soviet competition to Africa, and the internal conflicts of the Afro-Asian movement for national independence and international political solidarity. This trend was reversed in the politics of the Cultural Revolution, which obviated the five principles and 'seek common ground, while reserving differences'.

The agenda and organisational structures of Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy were subordinated to the Cultural Revolutionary process, which, itself, constituted a monolithic domestic contradiction. Domestic political anarchy and social conflagration were justified in appeals to the supremacy of 'Mao Zedong Thought'. Historically, the latter had presumed the careful dialectical reading of 'objective' reality through study and investigation, but the Cultural Revolution, in the attempt to 'touch men's souls', constituted an all encompassing social pathology which threatened the social status of almost everyone in society and the legitimacy of established organisational principles and structures of leadership. According to Deng Xiaoping, even Mao, just a few years before his death, conceded that the Cultural Revolution had been wrong in 'overthrowing all' and in the waging of 'full-scale civil war'.

The Yan'an aspects of 'Mao Zedong Thought' had particularly stressed investigation and study, and yet the Cultural Revolution became the theatre of the absurd as right and wrong became moral absolutes. In the hands of radicalised Red Guards, the 'two-line struggle' became a lethal fiction which denigrated normal reference to the disciplined requirements of study and investigation.

Premier Zhou Enlai stood right at the centre of this revolutionary vortex. Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were purged for having failed to make genuine attempts to push through the Cultural Revolution in the Party and the State. Zhou worked to keep the Party Central Committee functioning. As Premier, he also had to direct Cultural revolutionary rectification while maintaining the basic functions of the government, including functions relating to foreign policy and national security.

Perhaps his heaviest responsibility is what he called, in December 1967, the 'organisational revolution'.² This involved a massive rectification and structural reorganisation of all major institutional systems, and it involved Zhou in a seemingly endless round of negotiations with conflicting mass organisations, which had staked conflicting claims within government organisation.

Both the leadership of Zhou and Mao in the Cultural Revolution have been recently assessed by Deng Xiaoping with reference to

'Mao Zedong Thought'. Referring to 'seeking the truth from the facts' as the quintessence of Mao's thought,³ Deng condemned Mao's leadership in the Cultural Revolution as the irrational extension of China's long historical tradition of 'feudal autocracy' and 'patriarchal ways'.⁴ Mao, himself, had contravened the 'scientific' features of 'Mao Zedong Thought'.

As for Zhou's role, Deng told the Italian journalist, Oriana Fallaci, that Zhou was politically compelled to take the actions that he did. Deng summed up:

I have always look upon him as my elder brother. We took the revolutionary road at the same time. . . . Fortunately he survived during the Cultural Revolution when we were knocked down. He was in an extremely difficult position then, and he said and did many things that he would have wished not to. But the people forgave him, because, had he not done and said those things, he himself would not have been able to survive and play the neutralizing role he did.⁵

Deng's analysis confirms some aspects of Western analysis. Professor Thomas Robinson, for example, has discussed Zhou's 'pragmatism' in the Cultural Revolution, suggesting that Zhou 'voted' with the 'winning side' at each critical juncture 'regardless of the probable policy consequences of the issues under discussion'.⁶ However, in the early Cultural Revolution, Zhou may have been genuinely on Mao's side. In his assumption of greater responsibility for the conduct of the Cultural Revolution he drew on 'Mao Zedong Thought' as the basis for 'study and investigation'. The workstyle, which he so assiduously recommended to the Red Guards, was Mao's own Yan'an 'workstyle'.

In 1966 it was not clear to anyone in what direction the Cultural Revolution was headed. Just before his own downfall, Deng Xiaoping prophetically spoke of the Cultural Revolution as a 'new thing' in which the Party had 'no experience'.⁷ Certainly, the emphasis on the presence of a 'new bourgeoisie' as a 'class' within the Party was new, but the conception of 'rectification' was not. It was in his persistent use of 'Mao Zedong Thought' as a rational instrument of investigation and study as the means whereby to achieve rectification that Zhou earned popular acclaim as Mao's 'good student' in 1967-8.

Some observers have stressed that foreign policy was a 'secondary consideration in the minds of the social revolutionaries'.⁸ Certainly, Zhou was not able to take any major diplomatic initiatives. Although

there was a basic continuity with earlier analysis on US imperialism and Soviet revisionism, the international extension of 'Mao Zedong Thought' threatened to undercut established united front strategy.

While contemporary official Chinese analysis has dealt with the distortion of 'Mao Zedong Thought' in the Cultural Revolution, it has not dealt with it as a foreign policy issue. The definitive Party interpretation of 27 June 1981 deliberately avoids this question. The decision briefly states that even in his later years Mao 'stood up to the pressure of social-imperialists' and 'pursued a correct foreign policy'.⁹ The Soviets are blamed for turning the argument over ideological principle into a 'conflict between the two nations'.¹⁰ The brevity of the discussion may in part be explained by the fact that the issues involved are still sensitive in Asian countries, where there are Overseas Chinese communities.¹¹

The Party pronouncements have not yet commented specifically on the unfolding of the Cultural Revolution within the Foreign Ministry. Initially Zhou may have hoped to limit the Cultural Revolution process in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but in April 1967 he had to assume direct personal leadership over this process at the Ministry. Even prior to this, beginning as early as September 1966, the unprecedented recall of almost all of China's senior diplomatic service from embassies around the world had begun. Any attempt to exempt institutions from rectification invited radical criticism of scheming to subvert the Cultural Revolution.

Domestic polemics restricted Zhou's strategic options. In a context where it was politically and socially compelling to prove through explicit, and often over-stated, political acts that one was not part of 'capitalist revolution', 'neutralism' became a less acceptable point of view. No leader could afford neutrality on questions relating to the correctness of 'Mao Zedong Thought' and, internationally, 'neutralism' was increasingly associated with 'reactionary' governments. At one time, the neglect of 'middle forces' was construed as an 'infantile disorder on the left'. It was one thing to condemn Soviet exposition on the importance of 'realism' in US-Soviet relations, but what happened to Zhou's Chinese Marxist-Leninist 'realism'?

In the Cultural Revolution Zhou did emphasise 'Mao Zedong Thought' as a rational instrument of analysis in an attempt to stem the tide of political extremism, but the political praxis of radical mass organisation became a tortured caricature of the formal praxis of the Yan'an tradition. Radical students in the various international relations institutes extended the 'two-line struggle' between socialism and

capitalism to the policy and functioning of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The issue of 'modern revisionism' had focused attention on 'new bourgeois' bureaucratic privilege, and once Red Guard organisations targeted the 'luxuries' of diplomatic service and the exemption of diplomats from the study of 'Mao Zedong Thought', not even Zhou was sufficiently powerful to prevent the intervention of the Cultural Revolution into the foreign affairs system.

There was also a question of the 'two-line struggle' and the integrity of China's commitment to world-wide national independence and revolution. In the radical Red Guard mind, given the devolution of the Soviet Union into 'modern revisionism' and its status as the 'No. 1 Accomplice' of 'US imperialism', China had become the 'centre of world revolution'. The Soviet-American alignment, disparaged as the 'Holy Alliance' in the critical August 1966 eleventh plenum of the CCP, had already been formally factored into Chinese foreign policy.

Zhou, himself, was not very forthcoming on the issue of China as the 'centre of world revolution', but he agreed with the condemnation of the 'three peacefuls and two entires' (*sanhe, liangguan*). The Soviet formulation, 'a state of the entire people and a party of the entire people' was at the heart of the Sino-Soviet ideological controversy. Zhou and Chen Yi agreed with Mao's conceptualisation of the international correlation of forces in terms of the 'three bigs, and one deep' (*sanda, yishen*). The former bitterly despised formulation included Khrushchev's old saw of 'peaceful coexistence, peaceful transition and peaceful competition' as well as his alleged denial of class struggle in Soviet society, epitomised in the abolition of the dictatorship of the proletariat in favour of a Party and State of the 'whole people'. The latter formulation, which highlighted 'big upheaval, big splitting, big reorganisation and the deepening of struggle', referred to the changes in the international balance of forces attendant upon the everwidening process of national independence in Africa, Asia and Latin America.

Red Guard critics not only focused on the dangers of revisionism in terms of the domestic potential for capitalist restoration, they also targeted the Chinese variant of Khrushchev's 'three peacefuls and two entires' as part of a 'two-line struggle' in Chinese diplomacy. The central problem became 'three surrenders and one elimination' (*sanxiang, yimie*) or surrender to imperialism, to modern revisionism, to reaction and the elimination of the world-wide trend towards national independence.

While Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi had formally condemned the

nefarious co-ordination of 'US imperialism', Soviet and Yugoslav 'modern revisionism' and 'reaction' (e.g., India and Japan), the radical left claimed that the Foreign Ministry was operating with its own hidden agenda of 'peaceful coexistence'. Under these circumstances it was difficult to challenge the international propagation of 'Mao Zedong Thought'. The compelling insistence on the latter was part of an ultra nationalistic demonstration of China's greatness, which was virtually indistinguishable from the greatness of Mao as the 'Red Sun' at the centre of the universe.

Chinese students, and even some diplomats, abroad believed that they had a right to show their 'love' for Chairman Mao in a public manner. These activities provoked other governments, which judged their demonstrations as interference in domestic politics. China became involved in diplomatic incidents with 32 countries.¹² While international tension was created along the entire length of China's international borders, the more governments protested against local Red Guard activity, the more this was interpreted as evidence of their weakness in the face of revolution.

Not surprisingly, military tension along the border with India increased, but the sudden deterioration in Sino-Burmese relations was astonishing. Zhou had focused on Sino-Burmese co-operation on the basis of the five principles as a model of international relations. This model was used in the international explanation of China's border conflict with India. In 1961 Zhou and Chen Yi had travelled to Rangoon with an enormous delegation of 400 to sign a boundary treaty. And yet in 1966-7, Burmese neutrality suddenly became dispensable as the Chinese government focused on the issue of communal politics, involving the rights of Overseas Chinese to love Chairman Mao. The Burmese 'reactionary' government was accused of 'large-scale brutal persecution of Overseas Chinese'.¹³

The Chinese government also became entangled in the web of 'sanguinary atrocity' in Hong Kong and Macao. In early 1967 unruly Red Guards virtually seized control of Portuguese Macao, and in the summer of 1967 the British rejection of an ultimatum concerning demands for the lifting of a ban on pro-Communist newspapers and the release of political detainees in Hong Kong ended in the burning of the British Embassy in Beijing.

Also, only the last-minute personal assurances of Zhou Enlai to Sihanouk, guaranteeing respect for neutrality and the principle of non-interference, averted the Cambodian withdrawal of Embassy staff in October 1967.¹⁴ Considerable diplomatic initiative was also

lost in Africa. Chinese diplomacy scrambled to reaffirm Chairman Mao's commitment to the five principles of peaceful coexistence as well as the five concrete principles of Zhou's 1963–4 tour,¹⁵ so as to counter Soviet and American propaganda regarding the Chinese attempts to spread the Cultural Revolution abroad. The New China News Agency (NCNA) in March 1967 complained of spurious reporting '... vilifying China's great proletarian cultural revolution, estranging the relations between China and African countries, and slandering China's foreign policy'.¹⁶ The NCNA regretted the fact that '... the propaganda machines of the imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries have worked in closer coordination'.¹⁷

The Soviet propaganda offensive bore fruit as a result of a meeting of the Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation in Cyprus, which reversed an earlier secretariat decision to hold the Organisation's fifth conference in Beijing.

Chinese diplomacy attempted to discredit the Brezhnev strategy of support for the US 'peace talk' scheme in Vietnam, and denounced the Permanent Secretariat as falling under the control of Soviet revisionists in its failure to focus on Soviet-American co-operation in Vietnam. The Soviets allegedly 'attacked China's great proletarian cultural revolution and the great and invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung', but the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity drew on a January 1963 poem of Chairman Mao to metaphorically dismiss the Soviets as 'mayflies lightly plotting to topple the giant tree [i.e. China]'.¹⁸

The ecstatic adulation of Mao figured greatly in Soviet propaganda.¹⁹ Mao was depicted in terms of personality cult. His Marxism-Leninism was a vulgar extension of traditional Chinese philosophy. His politics were allegedly 'feudal'. Mao did not have a 'stable broad base of support in society', hence he resorted in his 'personal dictatorship' to a 'feudal cult' which drew on a long tradition of emperor worship. Mao was an alleged Confucianist disguised as a Marxist-Leninist, but he was also a Trotskyite who was convulsing China in an orgy of 'permanent revolution'. Mao had somehow managed to combine the worst of traditional Confucian authoritarianism with 'infantile disorder on the left'.

The themes of the Cultural Revolution inflamed already very sensitive Sino-Soviet relations. Mao and Zhou had carefully outlined China's position in the socialist world based on the strict adherence to principles of equality between fraternal socialist states, as these had been spelled out in the 1957 joint Sino-Soviet communiqué and the

1960 Moscow Declaration. In the international relations of socialist states, Mao and Zhou would accept nothing short of a unanimity principle which respected the equality of all socialist states. They would not accept majority criticism of the domestic politics and policies of any socialist state. However, the Cultural Revolution, while it focused on the prospect of 'capitalist restoration' in China, was informed by the historical pattern of revisionism in the USSR.

Zhou Enlai became the first CCP leader to bring the issues of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution out into the open on 30 April 1966. Zhou firmly aligned himself with Mao on the question of taking class struggle as the key link in the socialist education movement in the countryside when he spoke before a mass rally welcoming the Albanian delegation of Mehmet Shehu and Hysni Kapo. Zhou praised the Albanian Party of Labour for its policies to 'revolutionise ideology and working style'.

Zhou warned that the question of the 'ownership of the means of production' persisted even under socialism. He reiterated Mao's recent theory on 'classes and class struggle in socialist society', when he stated: 'New bourgeois elements may still be constantly generated in the ranks of the working class, among the collectivized peasants and in the government organizations and cultural institutions. These bourgeois elements, old and new, invariably try in a thousand and one ways to restore capitalism'.²⁰

Zhou highlighted the 'counter-revolutionary dual tactics' of the Soviet leadership, which was practising 'Khrushchevism without Khrushchev' in its efforts to support a peace settlement in Vietnam. He could not see any distinction between Khrushchev's Vietnam policy of 'disengagement' and the Brezhnev-Kosygin 'policy of involvement' in so far as both policies focused on collaboration with the US to the detriment of a genuine process of national liberation in Vietnam.²¹

Mehmet Shehu, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Albania was more sweeping in his hostility towards the Soviet Union. Sino-Albanian proletarian internationalism apparently did not discriminate between 'big' and 'small' countries. The Chinese and Albanians did not believe that revolutionary parties could be 'categorized into "patriarchal party" and "filial party"'. Mehmet Shehu dismissed Soviet anti-China propaganda suggesting that China was encouraging nuclear war, and he affirmed China's peaceful intentions: 'The whole world knows that People's China is the initiator and unwavering follower of the well-known five principles of peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems'.²²

The joint Sino-Albanian statement, signed by Zhou and Shehu in Beijing on 11 May, was a blunt condemnation of American 'counter-revolutionary dual tactics' on the question of peace in Vietnam and of the restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union. The 'Tito clique of renegades' was not unexpectedly denounced as 'the first revisionist group to emerge in a socialist country'. The statement stressed that the 'international united front' against US imperialism had to be both broad and true, and under no circumstances was it to 'include the lackeys and accomplices of US imperialism'.²³

Zhou carried forward the offensive against 'modern revisionism' in his tour of Romania and Albania during the last two weeks of June. In Romania, Zhou publicly emphasised Mao's theory on class struggle under socialism. On 17 June, he discussed 'the spearhead of the Cultural Revolution' in terms of a limited target, namely, 'a small handful of anti-communist villains' and 'a small handful of anti-Party, anti-socialist and counter-revolutionary bourgeois intellectuals'.²⁴ Zhou also stressed Romanian resistance to 'interference from outside'.²⁵

General Secretary Nicolae Ceausescu was bland in his expressions of fraternity. The General Secretary preferred not to comment on the Cultural Revolution. He did condemn US aggression in Vietnam, and he took the opportunity to repeat his general foreign policy line to the effect that Romania would persist in co-operation and fraternal alliance with socialist countries while also seeking to develop relations with all countries irrespective of differences of social system.²⁶ The latter half of this formulation approximated Tito's position, but it did not elicit an explicit response from the Chinese. On leaving, Zhou referred to 'useful talks' and 'a frank exchange of views . . . on questions of common interests'.²⁷

Romania had demonstrated a considerable degree of independence from the Soviet Union on questions of CMEA planning, but Zhou was not able to extract from Ceausescu a substantive statement concerning the collusion of 'modern revisionism' and US imperialism. US intelligence, based on Yugoslav reports on Romanian diplomats, dubiously interpreted Zhou's seeming lack of revolutionary rhetoric in Bucharest as confirmation of his lack of enthusiasm for the vitriolic condemnation of the USSR and Yugoslavia, and his antipathy towards the initial purges of the Cultural Revolution.²⁸

During the Albanian portion of Zhou's tour, there was no mention of a 'frank exchange of views'. Zhou's response on 24 June to Enver Hoxha's banquet speech was rather brief, especially given Hoxha's impassioned statements. Zhou again congratulated the Albanians on

their recent measures for 'revolutionization in the political, economic, military, ideological and cultural fields', but he did not discuss the Cultural Revolution. He was even less forthcoming on this issue than he had been in Bucharest.²⁹

Zhou's visit to Albania was duly featured in the *Renmin ribao* on 29 June, which saw in the domestic upsurge favouring Cultural Revolution and the Albanian 'measures of revolutionization' a striking parallel between the Chinese and Albanian 'revolutionary situations'.³⁰ Beijing, on Zhou's return, was seething with intense leadership conflict, as Mao accused Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping of evasive action to thwart the mass participation in the Cultural Revolution through the use of controlling Party work teams. The Liu-Deng element was accused of a strategy of 'hitting at many in order to protect a few', or of diluting mass action by distracting everyone's attention away from the senior Party's failure to come to terms with its own shortcomings.³¹

Mao had already signalled his intentions in the Party's 16 May Circular which focused on the danger of the proletarian dictatorship lapsing into 'the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie'. The same circular denounced the powerful leader of the Beijing municipal Party Committee, Peng Zhen, and announced the dissolution of the 'Group of Five', which had, under Liu Shaoqi's leadership, supervised the first months of the Cultural Revolution.

The 16 May Circular was substituted for the 'February Outline' of the Group of Five. Mao's attack on Liu's use of party 'work teams' to circumvent mass 'rectification' was explicit in his own character poster of 5 August warning against 'certain leading comrades' who were seeking to establish 'bourgeois dictatorship'.³² At that time the Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee dropped Liu Shaoqi from second to eighth place in the leadership and endorsed the famous '16 points' as the organisational guidelines for the Cultural Revolution.

These points established the 'main target' of the revolutionary movement as 'those within the Party, who are in authority and are taking the capitalist road';³³ however they also asserted traditional principles of 'rectification'. The rejection of Liu's 'work teams' was rationalised in the mass-line emphasis on active and conscious mass participation in the politics of rectification.

The fifth point incorporated united front strategy in its required isolation of the most reactionary rightists, the winning over of the middle forces, and unity with the great majority whereas the sixth

point highlighted the Yan'an notion of 'seeking the truth from the facts' in its emphasis on investigation and persuasion through reasoning as opposed to coercion. In the organisation of the masses' 'great debates', the following was emphasised: 'The method to be used in debates is to present the facts, reason things out, and persuade through reasoning. Any method of forcing a minority holding different views to submit is impermissible'. The restatement of these points may help explain the continued willingness of Party leaders to endorse 'Mao Zedong Thought'.

ZHOU ENLAI AND THE 'ORGANISATIONAL REVOLUTION' IN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS SYSTEM

There was no exemption from agonising 'rectification' either for the officials of the foreign affairs system or the members of China's diplomatic corps around the world. The entire foreign affairs system (*waishi xitong*), under the State Council's Foreign Affairs General Office (*waishi bangongshi*), experienced the trauma of the Cultural Revolution. The 'system' was inclusive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*waijiaobu*), the Committee on Foreign Economic Relations (*dui wai jingji weiyuanhui*), the Committee for Cultural Exchange (*dui wai wenhua lianjie weiyuanhui*), the Overseas Chinese Commission (*Huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui*), and the Foreign Affairs Publications Bureau (*waijiao chubanju*). The radical challenges to the system largely originated in the Beijing tertiary institutions for foreign language training and the study of international relations and trade.

What happened in the 'system' can best be explained in terms of the unfolding of the larger process of Cultural Revolution. Zhou was in constant contact with the revolutionary student organisations in Beijing. He often traded on the analogy of these student organisations with the historical Red Guards as a 'reserve' of regular military forces to emphasise the disciplinary features of the PLA's traditional 'workstyle'.

In a rally of 31 August Premier Zhou, together with Mao, urged the student masses that in 'concentrating their forces to strike at the handful of bourgeois rightists' it was necessary to emulate the PLA's 'three-eight' working style, which included firm political orientation, an industrious and simple style of work, and flexibility in strategy and tactics. He insisted that any differences of opinion had to be resolved 'through investigations, studies and through consultations on an

equal footing'.³⁴ Above all, he cautioned the Red Guards to use 'reasoning' as opposed to force in their struggle. At this juncture, 'struggle' in Zhou's mind related to the development of informed criticism, and the 'main task' of the Red Guards was to carry out this 'struggle' in their own schools.³⁵ They were not to interfere with the Ministerial 'supervision of business'.

Speaking in the annexe of the People's Great Hall on 1 September, Zhou came directly to the point. First of all he stressed that the Red Guards were not to replace 'Mao Zedong Thought' with 'The Doctrine of Mao Zedong', even though the latter had acquired popular acceptance. Zhou seemed to regard 'doctrine', (*jiaotiao*) as an unfortunate appellation which ignored the importance of unity and practice and raised a question of doctrinairism or dogmatism (*jiaotiaozhuyi*).³⁶

Secondly, Zhou stressed that the 'Red Guards' as a 'reserve' of the PLA needed strict organisation, and as a matter of 'policy' he urged them to adopt a united front programme of struggle by 'relying on the left, educating and winning over the middle and isolating the very few rightists'. He recommended the '16 points', noting that while these mentioned both 'struggle by reasoning' and 'struggle by coercion', the more important task was ideologically to win the enemy over through reason. Zhou instructed the 'Red Guards' to take 'Mao Zedong Thought' as a 'guide' and the '16 points' as the 'foundation'.

Zhou announced the following caveat: 'All important ministries and leading departments of the State must be protected'.³⁷ On 9 September Zhou once again informed a group of Red Guards: 'Our students must not engage in activities in the ministries, because they are different from you. You promote the movement all day long, but they still have work to do'.³⁸ Ultimately, Zhou was much too sanguine in his assumption that the limits of 'struggle' could be retained in praxis.³⁹

Again on 10 September Zhou insisted that the Red Guards were a 'reserve' force, which would only at some unspecified time in the future become a fully fledged 'fighting corps'. Zhou explained their 'three main tasks' as the establishment of 'revolutionary ties, exchange of experience, and visits to and learning from others'. Zhou insisted that 'study' was critical to the Red Guards' intellectual development. He asked them to move beyond the mere repetition of quotations, culled from Mao's selected works, and to study the entire original texts creatively relating them to 'actual situations'.⁴⁰ Zhou argued that if 'older Communists' would have to continue to learn

and engage in lifelong self-reform, this would be even more true of his audience of young Red Guards. Zhou flatly stated: 'You have little social knowledge and know little about the Party's policies, and therefore you must learn all the more and must not feel contented'.⁴¹

Zhou referred to his own experience in correcting his own errors. He several times alluded to unidentified 'errors', which Chairman Mao helped him to correct during Mao's trip to Chongqing and later in the warfare in North Shenxi.⁴² Mao's writings on the Chongqing negotiations were cited in the Cultural Revolution as evidence of Mao's adherence to principle in a complicated struggle with counter-revolution.

The Red Guards' lack of 'social knowledge' had international implications. Zhou advised them they were allowed 'to do propaganda' amongst foreign businessmen and tourists, but they were not to cross-examine foreigners about their class background. Zhou was annoyed with abuse of foreigners whom the students often called 'bad eggs'.⁴³

In his 13 September speech at the historic altar of Beijing's Agricultural Park, Zhou elaborated on this question of proper contact with foreigners. Zhou's late 1930s 'diplomacy' had focused on 'propagandising the Party' in the limited terms of friendly explanations of Mao's policies to interested American journalists and celebrities. Zhou in his speech instructed: 'Only propaganda will be given foreigners. We must not impose our views forcibly on others and cannot act for them. Foreigners in China include leftists, middle-of-the-roaders, bourgeoisie and reactionary bourgeois elements and diplomats'.⁴⁴

The Red Guard animus to the Soviet Union was of particular concern. Zhou had no problem with the students of the Second Girls' Middle School who changed the name of Yangwei Road, wherein the Soviet Embassy was situated, to Fanxiu Road or 'Anti-Revisionist' Road. He commented favourably on a 100 000 strong 'anti-revisionist demonstration' of 11 September, but he gave instructions that the students were not to enter the Soviet Embassy or paste character posters on the walls of its compound. As for trains moving between the Soviet Union and the PRC, Zhou had already ordered a group of students off one train, insisting on the need to respect Soviet sovereignty. The students were not to disrupt the operations of the trains, but Zhou did allow the pasting of character posters on the trains.

According to later Red Guard allegations, Chen Yi had obstructed the propagation of 'Mao Zedong Thought' in 30 September 1966. Chen had allegedly claimed:

Personnel of the Soviet Embassy are asked to bring along with them the book of quotations and Mao's selected works when they go out . . . This wouldn't do. We cannot force others to accept. Some foreigners say that we are promoting the cult of personality and making the thought of Mao Tse-tung an absolute thing.⁴⁵

The students foisted Chairman Mao's selected works on Soviet personnel and slapped stickers on their luggage, reading 'Fry Breznev in Oil'.

Diplomatic incidents focused radical opinion on the international relevance of 'Mao Zedong Thought'. All of China's leaders had accepted the authority of the latter. Zhou Enlai, for example, wrote the following to the Revolutionary Rebels Command Headquarters for Beijing colleges and schools: 'In our great proletarian cultural revolution, there can be only one norm of truth, that is, everything should be gauged by Mao Tse-tung's ideology'.⁴⁶

The Cultural Revolution travelled to Moscow. On 7 October the first Secretary of the Chinese Embassy in Moscow, Jin Mingjiang was informed of the suspension of the training programmes for Chinese citizens in the Soviet Union. S.I. Sohin informed Jin that the Soviet government was merely responding to a Chinese note of 20 September which had raised the issue of the students leaving the Soviet Union in order to participate in the Cultural Revolution.⁴⁷

According to Chinese accounts, 69 Chinese students, while laying wreaths at Lenin's Mausoleum and at Stalin's tomb, were victimised in a 'sanguinary atrocity' committed by two to three hundred Soviet police and secret agents on 25 January. The incident exposed a raw Chinese nerve. The Chinese Foreign Ministry informed the 'chieftains of Soviet revisionism' that they would come to a 'no good end'. The latter, accused of a hysterical reaction to China's Cultural Revolution, were told: 'Since we dread neither heaven nor earth . . . how can we possibly dread you, a few flies freezing to death in the whirling snow'.⁴⁸

On 6 February 1967 the *Renmin ribao* reported that in Moscow on 3 February there was yet another violent incident, ' . . . the savagery of which has seldom been seen in the history of world diplomacy. . . .'⁴⁹ This time the 'Soviet revisionists' roughed up Chinese diplomats and violated Embassy grounds when they destroyed photo display cases, featuring pictures of the Cultural Revolution and the '25 January Incident'. Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi telegrammed the Chinese embassy staff in Moscow hailing them as 'worthy red diplo-

matic worker personnel' and congratulating them for having, 'with blood', defended 'the dignity of our great socialist motherland'.⁵⁰

These incidents were contemporaneous with the radical phase of 'power seizure' in central institutions. The radicals focused on the Foreign Ministry for a number of reasons. According to a Red Guard account, Mao had issued a directive on 9 September 1966 sanctioning a 'revolutionisation' in the foreign service. The thematic content of the Cultural Revolution had stressed the emergence of 'new bourgeoisie' who enjoyed a profligate and luxurious lifestyle and the privileges of diplomats naturally came under hostile scrutiny.

According to the chronology of political events, compiled by the elite security units at Zhongnanhai, at the end of December 1966, the 16 June Red Guard Corps of the Beijing Foreign Languages Institute was set up for the purposes of 'bombarding' Zhou Enlai.⁵¹ Similar groups within the State Economic Commission, the Normal University and the Colleges of Commerce and Foreign Trade formed to denounce Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi. In late December Foreign Minister Chen Yi welcomed 41 young Overseas Chinese from Indonesia. The Chinese leadership, and particularly radical student opinion, had been very distressed about the series of bloody incidents involving the Chinese Embassy and the Overseas Chinese community in the aftermath of the Indonesian military coup of October 1965. These events resulted in a shrill advocacy of the universal significance of 'Mao Zedong Thought'. Even the Foreign Minister, in his speech to a rally of 29 December, responded: 'The radiance of the great thought of Mao Tse-tung is shining over the whole world, . . . We are now in a great new era of world revolution'.⁵²

In a late January Shanghai broadcast, Mao announced that the Cultural Revolution had entered a 'new stage' during which revolutionary organisations were to unite to seize power from the 'capitalist-roaders'. In response, on 22 January Zhou stressed the need for organisational discipline and democratic centralism, carefully distinguishing between 'power seizure', meaning the seizing of power from one class by another, and 'power struggle between factions motivated by individualism'.⁵³

According to Taiwanese sources on the 'January storm' of this period, Chen Yi was opposed by Wang Li, a member of the Cultural Revolution Group, which had been set up to oversee the development of the cultural revolutionary process, and on 18 January, in defiance of Chen, a revolutionary rebel liaison station had been established within the Ministry.⁵⁴ The Cultural Revolution Group

was politically ascendant, but technically it was a subcommittee of the Central Committee.

On 24 January, Zhou Enlai presided over a mass rally during which Chen Yi made an abject self-criticism. Chen confessed that he was guilty of Liu's technique of dispatching work teams, of a bureaucratic workstyle, and of stressing expertise at the expense of ideology. Chen pledged that he would study Mao's writings and the 'good points' of Lin Biao and the members of the Cultural Revolution Group.⁵⁵

Zhou sought an organisational means whereby the basic functioning of important ministries could be preserved in the face of an ongoing struggle for cultural revolution. At a 17 February meeting at Zhongnanhai, Zhou had sanctioned the formation of the Revolutionary Rebel Liaison Committee for the Finance and Trade system, which was to oversee the cultural revolutionary process through the exchange of experience, the conveyance of instructions of the higher levels for the 'guidance' of the lower levels, and the upward reporting of local conditions from the lower levels of the national finance and trading system. Zhou noted that many liaison stations had been set up in Beijing without proper Central Committee approval.⁵⁶

The 'January storm' was followed by what became known in immediate retrospect as the 'February adverse current', during which central leaders, particularly the Minister of Agriculture, Tan Zhenlin, attempted to stem the tide of the Cultural Revolution. The supporters of this 'current' relied on the same Party traditions which Zhou, himself, had originally advanced in September 1966, calling for investigation and study and a struggle by 'reason'.

Chen Yi also counter-attacked against the radicals for their arbitrary labelling of Ministry cadres as 'revisionist'. Bristling with indignation, he sternly lectured the Red Guards at the Beijing Airport on 12 February. Chen stated that his self-criticism of 24 January had been forced out of him, and he bluntly told his critics that if they wanted to make revolution they could go and fight in Vietnam.⁵⁷ Their attacks were unjustified and they were drawing the whole of the Party leadership into disrepute. Chen told the Red Guards that their criticism of the Liu-Deng line in foreign policy as 'revisionism' was trumped up, for there was no difference of line in foreign policy.

The Cultural Revolution, as a question of 'power seizure', posed tremendous political difficulties as different factions engaged in positional warfare to control the identification of 'capitalist roaders' and the reconstitution of institutional authority under a revolutionary regime. This process was described by Zhou in terms of an 'organis-

ational revolution', which he predicated in Mao's directive to establish the 'great revolutionary alliance', or 'three-in-one alliance' in all major institutions.

In a February reference to the 'good' experience of the Guiyang Cotton Mill, Mao had stressed the creation of 'great alliances' in individual 'systems'. The 'seizing of power' was to include the 'supervision of business' within administrative systems. Zhou pointed out that the idea of 'power seizure' was unique to Mao. It had not been mentioned by Marx, Lenin or Stalin. Furthermore, the organisation aspects had yet to be worked out by Zhou.

Zhou accepted the importance of the Shanghai example of power seizure, but he attempted to control the development of liaison committees within central government departments so as to prepare for the reunification of political authority on the basis of 'three-way combination'. Zhou insisted that 'power seizure' required very deliberate preparation; it had to be done so well that building could take place in the very midst of destruction. In a public exchange, Mao had told Zhou 'to lay hold of models', and Zhou replied by stressing the Chairman's insistence on organisation flexibility in light of differing circumstances. While conceding that a 'strong leftist force' would be necessary to the consolidation of power, Zhou also stressed:

Taking over is an important affair, which will give rise to a series of changes, and is a revolution. It is necessary to determine the object of taking over. There must be concrete policies (for bureaux, sections and departments . . .) as regards what problems should be solved, the takeover method, and how problems should be handled when encountered.⁵⁸

Zhou explained some of his thinking at a rally in the Chinese Academy of Sciences on 26 May 1967. Zhou indicated that Mao's 'three-way combination' involved bringing together of old, middle and young cadres in such a way as to 'absorb tremendous new-born forces into the leadership organs'. He hoped that the combination of representatives from various mass organisations could be accomplished through 'large, medium and small meetings'; however, he referred to a second 'form of combination' whereby some units horizontally imposed 'military administration, run by military representatives, representatives of revolutionary leading cadres, and representatives of revolutionary mass organisations'. This 'form' also encompassed the combination of 'old, middle and young'.⁵⁹

Due to intense factional strife between rival mass organisations,

the Ministry of Railways failed to achieve a proper reconstitution of authority on the basis of the 'three-way combination', and Zhou personally imposed military control over the Ministry. Also, in April, he assumed direct responsibility for the process in the Foreign Ministry. Chen Yi's condemnation of the Red Guards complicated Zhou's political position as there was an increasing pressure on Zhou, himself, as the 'back-stage boss' of the 'February adverse current'. Zhou was then struggling to maintain a semblance of good relations with the Cultural Revolution Group.

Beginning in late March, radical organisations revived their campaign to discredit the 'revisionist line' in the Foreign Ministry, focusing on 'false power seizures' allegedly engineered by Chen Yi. In early April the Revolutionary Rebel General Command headquarters of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission accused Chen of having 'collaborated' with Liao Chengzhi, the Director of the Commission. Chen and Liao had allegedly conspired to set up, within the Commission, the 'United Power-Seizure Committee' for purposes of staging a phoney power seizure. The 'Red Guided-Missile Fighting Team' of the Dongfanghong Commune (People's University) charged that when Zhou requested a meeting of representatives from the various mass organisations of the foreign affairs system, Chen Yi stacked the meeting with the representatives of his 'United Power-Seizure Committee'.⁶⁰

Even more damaging were charges that Chen was attempting behind the scenes to obstruct the propagation of 'Mao Zedong Thought'. In the Red Guard mind, the latter was applicable anywhere on earth, but Chen was on record as having said that it was distinctive to the Chinese revolutionary experience and thus not exportable.⁶¹ Chen's position was consistent with both 'Mao Zedong Thought' and the diplomacy of Zhou Enlai, which had interpreted 'self-reliance' in terms of a distinctive Chinese response to Chinese conditions.

Chen tried to return to the emphases of September 1966, but in doing so he clashed with Chi Benyu of the Cultural Revolution Group. He was denounced for the following heresy: 'Speaking about fixed notions, the thought of Mao Tse-tung is just one big fixed notion. . . . This Mao Tse-tung's thought is downright Chinese stuff; Let's not take it abroad'.⁶²

Zhou Enlai personally took over the supervision of the Foreign Ministry in the middle of April, and 'Bombarding Chen Yi' became officially 'revolutionary'. Chen was not dismissed; he was brought once again before the masses. Chen stubbornly refused to co-

operate. In a meeting with representatives from the liaison station within the Ministry and with the representatives of several other 'revolutionary organizations' it was agreed that Chen would have to make a pilgrimage of self-criticism to the Foreign Ministry, the Foreign Language Institute, the Foreign Affairs Institute and the Second Foreign Languages Institute where Zhou would personally chair the meetings.⁶³ A violent clash between the pro- and anti-Chen groups occurred just outside the Foreign Ministry on 16 May.

In his 26 May speech Zhou gave his blessing to the 'liaison station' which had been set up within the Ministry. Zhou stated:

Now I give full support – come what may – to the liaison station set up by the revolutionaries to lead revolution and supervise business operations. I still hope that a model can be set up in this respect to realize revolutionary 'three-way combination'. That is why it has not been an easy matter to set up models in various central organs.⁶⁴

The Proletarian Revolutionaries Liaison Committee in the foreign affairs system focused attention on the 'two-line struggle', and the 'spearhead' against Chen was once more explained in terms of Chen's 'hitting of the many to protect the few'.⁶⁵ However, the *Waishi honggi*, (Foreign affairs red flag) counter-attacked against a big-character poster of the 6 June Red Guard Corps of the Second Foreign Language Institute. The claim that Zhou Enlai, himself, 'plays the dual tactics of counter-revolution' was cited as evidence of yet another 'adverse current', and it was alleged: ' . . . it will not be difficult to see that their criticism against Ch'en Yi is a cover and their criticism against Premier Chou is real! Their defense of Chairman Mao is a sham, while their isolation of Chairman Mao is real!'⁶⁶

From spring to the autumn of 1967, Chinese diplomacy very publicly featured the notion of the diplomat as 'red diplomatic fighter'. 'Strategically despising the enemy' reached the heights of the absurd. The increasing list of countries which opposed China, were each described in terms of the fool 'who picks up a rock to drop it on his own foot'. While the Foreign Ministry was convulsed in factional politics of power seizure, there was an escalating rhetoric, which focused on a series of diplomatic incidents involving Indonesia, Hong Kong, India, Burma, Cambodia, Outer Mongolia, Tunisia, and Kenya.

The idea of a 'red diplomatic fighter' was contextually very important in the ongoing denunciation of Liu Shaoqi's 'revisionist, capitulationist line of diplomacy' as it had become manifest in Indonesia.

Liu's visit there, in April 1963, was caricatured. Liu was accused of not having made any mention of 'Mao Zedong Thought' and of attempting to side-track the issue of revolution, and his wife, Wang Guangmei, was reviled for her provocative dancing to rock and roll. The criticisms of Chen Yi also highlighted the apparently incriminating fact that he had accompanied Liu on the 1963 tour. The intense radicalisation of the Indonesian issue undermined established policy regarding non-interference in Overseas Chinese communities, and within the foreign affairs system there was an increasing focus on 'sanguinary atrocities' in Indonesia.

According to a Ministerial statement in April 1967, the Chinese Consul General in Djakarta, Xu Ren, had only just stepped out of the Embassy gate on his way to the Indonesian Foreign Ministry when he was 'abducted by force of arms by Indonesian troops', who carted off the protesting diplomat to the Djakarta 0503 Military District Command.⁶⁷ Xu and Yao Dengshan, Charge d'Affaires *ad interim*, were subsequently expelled as *personnae non gratae*.

Yao, on his return to China, became a leading 'red diplomatic fighter' and opponent of Zhou Enlai's within the liaison station of the foreign affairs system. Yao focused radical attention on Liu Shaoqi and the alleged 'two-line struggle' in diplomacy, arguing that Liu supported Khrushchev's 'peaceful coexistence' and played 'the shameful role of political broker' for US imperialism by promoting the federation of Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia.⁶⁸

Yao described to eager Red Guards how 60 embassy personnel in the Djakarta embassy tried to hold off more than a thousand soldiers and two armoured vehicles with broken wine bottles and fire-extinguishers. Yao asserted that the force of revolution could not be restrained by diplomacy. He would raise Chairman Mao's revolutionary banner in defiance of the conventional wisdom of bourgeois international relations. He exhorted his supporters:

We must dare to make revolution; we must dare to rebel. Diplomatic law must be brought down. We ought not to be restricted by such law [in making revolution]. We must rebel and bring into existence this 'new born thing' creating a new diplomatic law.⁶⁹

Yao asserted that the struggle in foreign affairs is the struggle to propagate 'Mao Zedong Thought'. He urged diplomats in the Overseas Chinese communities to transform their respective embassies into 'the great red school of Mao Zedong Thought'.

While left-wing radicalism focused on class struggle, even Zhou Enlai was politically vulnerable. Mao acknowledged, at one point, that the Red Guards were increasingly frustrated with Zhou because of his 'habit of combining and compromising'.⁷⁰ If Zhou actively participated in the campaign to discredit Liu Shaoqi, it was alleged that he did so in order to distract the revolutionary masses with a 'dead tiger'. Zhou was, by innuendo and poster, associated with Liu's denial of class struggle.

The campaign to 'revolutionise' the foreign service was heating up. The top levels of the foreign affairs system, including the Foreign Minister, his vice-ministers and department heads, were all depicted as part of an old revolutionary generation which had become decadent and bureaucratic. They had turned China's embassies abroad into 'on doctrine halls' and 'family-type gangster inns'.⁷¹

On 3 June, Kang Sheng, Chen Boda and Jiang Qing of the Cultural Revolution Group met with representatives from the mass organisations within the foreign affairs system to denounce the 'counter-revolutionary, revisionist line in foreign affairs'. Wang Li declared that he and Kang had studied materials on foreign affairs and had found evidence of the deviation of 'three surrenders and one elimination' (*sanxiang, yimie*). Zhou was not named directly, but it was alleged that the problem started in 1951 at a time when he was Foreign Minister. Wang referred to the talk of Soviet revisionists and Chiang Kai-shek about 'Mao Zedong Thought' as irrelevant to world affairs, and the meeting attacked Chen Yi's failure to propagate 'Mao Zedong Thought' in Asia, Africa and Latin America.⁷²

Chen Yi was also attacked for his position on the UN, but his position was historically known to everyone as Zhou Enlai's position. Chen was quoted as having said in 1961: 'I do not always oppose the UN. I support the good side and oppose the bad side [of the UN]'.⁷³ Both Zhou and Chen had stressed China's status as one of the original founders of the UN, and they supported its Charter on questions of equality and national independence despite the acknowledged problem of American and Soviet dominance over the UN's institutional proceedings.

The *Guangming ribao* rose to Zhou's defence in June. Zhou's united front strategy had been grievously distorted. The *Guangming ribao* noted that a 'fallacy' had emerged during the forging of 'the most extensive revolutionary great alliance with the left wing as the core'. Zhou's opposition had rendered 'the seeking of common ground while reserving differences' as 'eclecticism, mixing of loose

earth and combining two into one'. This accusation, suggesting that Zhou had bargained away revolutionary principle in a contrived revolutionary great alliance in the foreign affairs system was discounted in a counter-attack on the weak dialectics of the opposition which had failed to 'subordinate minor truths . . . to the major truth'. Zhou's critics had failed to correctly identify the 'principle contradiction' at hand.⁷⁴

In this potentially dangerous political context, the situation in Hong Kong threatened to explode. There had been a series of clashes between Hong Kong police and demonstrating workers on 6-12 May. The Foreign Ministry issued a statement on 15 May in the form of five demands, requiring the British authorities to accept worker demands for better conditions, the cessation of 'all fascist measures', the release of arrested workers and journalists, the punishment of 'the culprits responsible for these sanguinary atrocities' and a guarantee against any future incident.

On several occasions the Chinese government demanded a reply to the 15 May 'statement'. The student radicals in the liaison station and elsewhere focused on the British attempt to deny Chinese compatriots the right to study and practice 'Mao Zedong Thought'. The Foreign Ministry on 13 June, for example, had to issue a statement condemning the raid on a cinema in Kowloon where the British authorities had 'committed the outrage of smashing a bust of our greatest leader Chairman Mao. . .'.⁷⁵

On 24 June Zhou, himself, informed the visiting Zambian President Kaunda that the 'sacred right' of Chinese in Hong Kong to study and propagate Mao Zedong Thought 'brooked no encroachment'.⁷⁶ While Zhou told Kaunda of the tremendous influence of 'Mao Zedong Thought' and the Chinese people's undying hatred of British imperialism, he was not explicit as to China's response. Zhou observed: 'The Chinese people are determined to give in accordance with needs of the situation every support to their patriotic countrymen in Hong Kong till final victory'.⁷⁷ His official position was a study in contrast. His anti-British rhetoric was full blown, but no specific action was threatened. 'The needs of the situation' were left undefined.

From May to July, Chinese diplomacy and news services bombarded the British in extremist language. The British were said to owe the Chinese people an 'old debt' for the launching of the dirty Opium War.⁷⁸ They were reviled for returning to 'gunboat diplomacy' of the nineteenth century, and for having turned Hong Kong into a logistical staging area for the US military operations in

Vietnam. British Foreign Minister George Brown's position that Britain would both defend Britain's interests in Hong Kong and maintain relations with the PRC was derided by the *Renmin ribao* as clever 'counter-revolutionary dual tactics'. Mao was widely quoted as having said that British statements often lacked truth but always professed great attachment to humanity, justice and virtue.⁷⁹

The situation in Hong Kong was influenced by the unfolding of the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou and throughout Guandong province. Zhou explained in mid-April that the 'extreme urgency' of the situation there required the isolation of military control by the Guangzhou Military Command.⁸⁰ Such a measure of military control was rationalised in terms of the close proximity of Hong Kong and Macao and the need, in the context of 'very complicated' class struggle, to insure the strategically important Chinese rear area to the war in Vietnam.⁸¹

Military control was not able to contain the clashes between rival mass organisations in the area. Furthermore, just as the Hong Kong situation appeared to be reaching a boiling point, there was an unauthorised 'power seizure' in the Foreign Ministry itself. On 11 August frenzied radicals lambasted Chen Yi and physically threatened to assault him on the rostrum of the meeting hall. Walking out in protest, Zhou suspended the session.⁸² Apparently, for 14 days in August, the radical, Yao Dengshan, held court as Foreign Minister with the support of Wang Li, one of the members of the Cultural Revolution Group.⁸³ What is known about this incident is largely based upon *ex post facto* denunciations of the '16 May Corp' which allegedly 'spearheaded' attacks on Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao.

This conspiracy was denounced for its attempt to extend the Cultural Revolution into the ranks of the army, and for its challenge to the Premier. Members of the Cultural Revolution Group clearly and publicly condemned this challenge as it adversely affected the state and threatened to plunge China into civil war. The Premier's great prestige both at home and abroad was acknowledged, and it was emphasised that attacks on Zhou would tarnish China's prestige abroad.

Accounts of 16 May propaganda stressed the attempt to drive a political wedge between the Premier and the Cultural Revolution Group. Zhou had been cited as the 'general root of capitalist restoration' and as the real back stage boss of the 'February adverse current'.⁸⁴ He was depicted as the head of 'the old government', which allegedly included Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, Chen Yi, and Nie Rongzhen.⁸⁵ The '16 May Corp' was associated with the '16 June

Corps' which had been busy undermining Chen Yi. The First Congress of this 'counter-revolutionary group' took place at the conference room of the '16 June' at the Beijing Foreign Languages Institute.

Some of the reasoning behind the ferreting out of the '16 May' conspiracy was later spelled out by Cultural Revolution Group leaders, Chen Boda, Chi Benyu and Xie Fuzhi, to members of the central group of the Red Guard Congress, and to representatives of organisations which had been involved in the big-character poster campaign against Zhou.⁸⁶

The attempt to 'drag out' Foreign Minister Chen Yi, as opposed to having him studiously address his own shortcomings, was criticised as it opposed Chairman Mao's personal wishes. Chen Boda derisively castigated the radicals saying: ' . . . none of you are capable of becoming a foreign minister. You are not even clear in your speech'.⁸⁷ Chi Benyu, who was later, himself, implicated in the '16 May' conspiracy, stated that the Cultural Revolution Group was fully behind Zhou as Mao's 'chief staff officer'. He warned the radicals of their lack of mass support, suggesting that if they did have the further temerity to oppose Zhou Enlai, they would, themselves, be opposed as counter-revolutionaries. Chi was anxious less foreigners judge their action as suggestive of a clash between Zhou and Chen Boda.

There were a number of indications suggesting that the central leadership was becoming increasingly concerned over the international loss of prestige which was incurred in the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. Chen Boda criticised the radicals for having 'misjudged the important affairs of the State' and for having ignored 'the State's prestige'.⁸⁸ On 17 September Zhou Enlai, himself, told a group of representatives for Beijing universities that those who wanted to cause dissension between himself and the Cultural Revolution Group were acting in a way which would please 'the imperialists' and the 'revisionists'.⁸⁹ Also, on 28 September Zhou instructed the Red Guards not to use the title, 'Zhangzhun Commune'. He reminded them of Mao's objections to 'Shanghai Commune'. 'Commune' was not appropriate to international realities; the foreign powers would not recognise the PRC as 'China Commune', and the title was reserved for sub-national rural organisation.⁹⁰

In September Zhou related how he had confronted Yao Dengshan in the Foreign Ministry:

I supported the Foreign Ministry in the Central Committee [in August]. When the Foreign Ministry went to the brink, I held a

meeting. . . . I was directly responsible for running the Foreign Ministry and as a result they seized power from me. They sent telegrams directly to foreign embassies. As a result they were sent back. Yao Teng-shan went everywhere making reports and creating trouble. . . . I criticized him on the spot.⁹¹

Premier Zhou was in Guangzhou on 14–16 August, where he assumed direct responsibility for Liang-Guang (Guangdong and Guangxi). This important strategic area had become politically destabilised despite the efforts of the Military Control Commission. The organisation of the Canton (Guangzhou) Trade Fair was in embarrassing disarray. In urging the representatives of competing mass organisations to form 'a great revolutionary alliance', Zhou remarked:

In this way [restoration of order through such an alliance] the trade fair, the support to communists in Hong Kong, and the struggles against the enemies and against the US can be dealt with easily. I have just seen information. The enemies in Hong Kong described Canton as a mess and a dead city where dead bodies lay in heaps. This certainly is nonsense.⁹²

Zhou continued in the language of the Cultural Revolution, but his concern for the troubled relation between the Guangzhou revolutionary process and the Hong Kong situation was evident. Two months later, he ordered the mass organisations in Guangzhou not to put out such a large number of Red Guard tabloids, carrying internal news, because these were finding their way out of Guangzhou to Hong Kong, where they were used by 'foreign agents' to discredit China. Zhou implied that they were undermining China's relations with the populations of Hong Kong and Macao.⁹³

In venting its revolutionary spleen, the radical left discredited itself in Mao's 'proletarian headquarters' in Beijing. Under the pressure of the radical dynamic at the Foreign Ministry, a note of ultimatum was sent to the British government, requiring that within 48 hours the British authorities in Hong Kong lift the ban on the 'three patriotic newspapers', release jailed journalists and suspend lawsuits against the said papers. When the British refused, the Beijing radical left imploded.

The radicals' burning of the British Embassy at this time, when the Foreign Ministry was, itself, the subject of a power seizure, was a source of personal embarrassment for Zhou, but it placed the 'left' on the defensive in its drive to discredit the Foreign Ministry. Mao's

wife, Jiang Qing, later publicly recognised this in the following excerpt from a conciliatory statement concerning the need for revolutionary unity:

In Peking a strange thing has happened. Some people went to the foreign embassies to make troubles and the office of the British Charge d’Affaires was burned down. We, of course, are determined to hit the American imperialists and reactionaries. But we must not make trouble at foreign embassies, and we must not go aboard foreign ships. It would be childish for good people to do so; and when bad people do this, they want to ruin the reputation of the country.⁹⁴

With the consolidation of the political situation in Guangdong, there was less risk of precipitous action on the border with Hong Kong, but the rhetorical outcries against British ‘imperialism’ continued. In strategic terms, however, the central leadership played down Hong Kong’s importance as secondary to the larger confrontation with the US in Vietnam.⁹⁵

Mao Zedong finally agreed that the Cultural Revolution had moved too far left and that uncontrolled revolutionary violence between rival mass organisations was threatening the political stability of the army and the integrity of what state authority there was left. This perception reinforced the trend to achieve ‘great alliances’ on organisational terms which resembled Zhou’s September-October 1966 position.

The element of ‘power seizure’ in its focus on class struggle to achieve ‘business supervision’ by the revolutionary ‘left’ yielded to a renewed emphasis on unity and united front. In September in Wuhan Mao issued the following instruction: ‘The principal task in the seizure of power is to conduct mass criticism and repudiation, forge a great alliance and bring about the three-in-one combination as quickly as possible’.⁹⁶ Mao repudiated the conceit of competing organisations which were always laying claim to act as the ‘core’. Mao was quoted: ‘If there are two sects in a unit, I don’t believe that one must be Left and the other Right. . . . It is very stupid to suggest who should be the core’.⁹⁷

A tentative co-operation was evident in the relations between Zhou and the Cultural Revolution Group as they focused on the ‘16 May’ conspiracy. Jiang Qing made an obvious aboutface in her 5 September Beijing speech to representatives of Anhui mass organisations. She reported that the ‘16 May’ group of conspirators was only a

handful, and hence there was no need for an extensive campaign to weed out conspirators. She explicitly endorsed Mao's call for 'peaceful struggle' and called for a round of 'self-criticism', noting that 'the factional mentality' was a 'petty bourgeois trait'.⁹⁸

On 26 September Zhou, in turn, stressed the organisational integrity of the Cultural Revolution Group as a 'very important component part' of the Party Central Committee. The 'Group', according to Zhou, acted as the 'general staff of the proletarian headquarters' and was organisationally 'equal' to the Party's Secretariat. Zhou stated: '... we cannot separate the Party Central Committee from the Cultural Revolution Group under the Central Committee, but should regard the two together'.⁹⁹

Under these circumstances, the contradictions between competing mass organisations became more benign 'contradictions among the people', and Zhou had greater political leverage in the overseeing of the process of institutional reintegration within revolutionary committees at the various levels of state administration. Zhou and members of the Cultural Revolution Group met the representatives of North-eastern mass organisations on 28 September. Zhou returned to the emphases in his autumn 1966 speeches instructing the representatives:

You are still young and should learn to wage class struggle. You must not vilify our great Communist Party because of one or two bad leaders. The Chairman opposes that most. Such vilification cannot touch a man's soul, but may adversely influence those who have a blurred understanding.¹⁰⁰

Zhou emphasised that the physical mistreatment of alleged capitalist roaders, for example, forcing them into the 'jet-plane style', obviously negated Mao's emphasis on the struggle through reason. Zhou also stressed that the 'three-in-one alliance', and the unity of the competing mass organisations, were prerequisites of 'power seizure'.

Zhou's deft handling of the acrimonious claims of mass organisation was evident in his 8 November visit to Guangzhou. He had the Military Control Committee admit that it had made some mistakes, but he pressed the point on the mass organisations that Liang-Guang was 'located on the front line of national defence'; and he interpreted Mao's September directives in the following manner:

In the past we said that we should take the Left as the core. Now ours all are revolutionary mass organizations. We sometimes say mass organizations, and sometimes say revolutionary mass organizations.

All the masses are determined to make revolution. Can it be that under the conditions of proletarian dictatorship the masses do not want to make revolution?¹⁰¹

However, the problem of leadership transition had not been fundamentally resolved, and the co-operation, hailed in Beijing, was politically fragile. There was an irresistible tendency, particularly on the part of those who had been challenged in the 'February adverse current', to strike back. Zhou was almost upstaged within his own Foreign Ministry in mid-February 1968, when 91 office directors and ambassadors put up a big-character poster criticising the bombardment of Chen Yi. The poster attacked petty bourgeois fanaticism and claimed that Chen's detractors, were the real opposition to Chairman Mao's 'revolutionary diplomatic line'.

The incident jeopardised Zhou's relations with the leaders of the Cultural Revolution Group, and Zhou was not willing to have his hand forced at this delicate stage of political reintegration. He required Chen Yi to make a 'self-criticism', and Chen repeated the gist of his 25 January 1967 'self-criticism'. In a letter to Premier Zhou, Chen agreed with Zhou's criticisms, conceding that the poster was indeed 'rightist', and that he and the 91 'comrades' had '... actually received no education in the Cultural Revolution'.¹⁰²

In a 6 March meeting of self-criticism, Chen professed his gratitude for the opportunity to meet with the masses. He confessed that he had always been 'protecting' old cadres and denouncing young revolutionaries as members of the extreme left. He conceded that he had been too self-centred in his assumption that only he knew what 'Mao Zedong Thought' involved, when, in fact, he had all along been pursuing a 'bourgeois reactionary line' through laying too much stress on 'policy'. Chen admitted that his own egocentrism was evident in the 91-cadre poster, for it had taken the issue of 'Bombard Chen Yi' as the demarcation between 'revolution' and 'reaction'. Such bombing was not the principal criteria, and to say so, he stressed, was to offend the true demarcation in Chairman Mao's 'proletarian revolutionary line and the opinion of the vast numbers of the revolutionary masses'.¹⁰³

Zhou did not spare Chen from yet another meeting with the masses, but he persisted in his attempts to revive the Yan'an terms of Party authority. In April 1968 he used Mao's instruction not to use the term, 'absolute authority', to discredit Chi Benyu and Yang Chengwu, whom in their attempts 'to establish the absolute authority of Chairman Mao' had violated the essence of 'Mao Zedong

Thought'.¹⁰⁴ In June Zhou used another of Mao's instructions to upbraid the immodest radicals within the 'foreign affairs system', ordering them not to use the formulation, 'Beijing is the centre of world revolution'.¹⁰⁵

A semblance of normality returned to the Foreign Ministry only after the Party's Ninth Congress in the spring of 1969, when most of directors and deputy directors of Foreign Ministry departments reappeared on the public stage and when Zhou was in a stronger position to begin systematically to send seasoned and experienced diplomats back to China's embassies around the world. An old score was only settled belatedly with the execution of Yao Dengshan in 1971.¹⁰⁶

The Cultural Revolution had produced the one big foreign policy issue relating to the international propagation of 'Mao Zedong Thought', but there had been remarkably little development in terms of the strategic evaluation of the international balance of forces. The condemnation of Khrushchev's 'peaceful coexistence' remained as the corner-stone. The imminent demise of US imperialism was still expected any time. The five principles had occasionally come under attack in poster polemics,¹⁰⁷ and Zhou had only sparingly referred to this formulation in his limited interactions with Third World delegations in Beijing.

In the context of the 'two-line struggle' in foreign affairs, the united front co-optation of 'neutralism' by socialism lost considerable policy significance, but Zhou innocuously prepared for the future. In his denunciation of Liu Shaoqi he reiterated the importance of Mao's January 1947 article on the international situation which stressed US imperialist focus on the neutral zones in the colonial world.¹⁰⁸ Zhou decried the perfidy of Liu's alleged henchman, Lu Dingyi, in his attempt to claim personal credit for an article which Mao had, himself, wrote. The proponents of the Left within the Cultural Revolution could hardly challenge Zhou on this point and still retain Mao's support. Kang Sheng, for example, in his 8 November 1967 discussion of Mao's thought as the 'summit of contemporary Marxism-Leninism', stressed that Mao, in the field of foreign affairs, had advanced the theory that imperialism is a 'paper tiger' and 'the theory of two intermediate zones'.¹⁰⁹

The salvaging of such theory would later turn out to be very important, but the general thrust of the Cultural Revolution confounded the development of Zhou's foreign policy and diplomacy as these were supposed to encompass the domestic expression of rational Chinese praxis. The virulent international propagation of 'Mao Zedong Thought' was inconsistent with the emphasis on 'propagan-

dizing the Party', as it was understood in early Chinese Communist diplomacy. The latter had presumed a realistic 'workstyle' and commitment to the principles of united front.

It was a bizarre paradox that the Cultural Revolution, itself, turned out to be the greatest contradiction of all. It was declared in the name of Mao and his thought, but, in practice, it represented the antithesis of 'Mao Zedong Thought' as a rational instrument for investigation and study. In the riotous polemics of the Cultural Revolution, Chairman Mao's 'revolutionary diplomatic line' became a patent absurdity from which neither the Foreign Ministry nor Chinese diplomacy was able to escape. Zhou, despite all of his political brilliance, was himself politically reduced to passive manoeuvring to achieve some modest degree of damage control.

7 Strategy and ‘Realism’ in Sino-American Normalisation

In the West, the Chinese view of Sino-American normalisation has often been cast as the triumph of post-Cultural Revolution ‘pragmatism’ over revolutionary ideology. Zhou Enlai was, indeed, a realist, but only in his own Chinese Marxist-Leninist terms, and an important part of the explanation of his ‘realism’, as it related to Sino-American normalisation, lies in his ideological understanding of ‘workstyle’ and ‘strategies and policies’.

Henry Kissinger described Zhou as ‘extraordinarily intelligent and subtle’.¹ Kissinger believed that Zhou was a ‘great diplomat’ with a ‘masterly’ grasp of international realities.² Indeed, Zhou could weave a spell over some of his most ardent critics; for example, the anti-Communist reporter, Joe Alsop, conceded after an interview with the Premier: ‘. . . I cannot recall any leader of a great country who more strongly conveyed extreme intelligence and total *sang-froid* than China’s present Premier’.³

Zhou Enlai, on the other hand, rarely commented on Kissinger. Critical colleagues at Harvard believed that Kissinger fantasised about reliving the career of the famous Austrian genius who crafted the post-Napoleonic reconstruction of Europe.⁴ Zhou responded to a comparison of Kissinger and Metternich with a rhetorical query: ‘How can there crop up in the present day a Metternich of the nineteenth century?’⁵ For Zhou, the world of Metternich had receded into the mists of time, and the social forces which had given rise to Metternich were no longer relevant. Kissinger, himself, rejected the comparison with Metternich referring to changes in communications, and the passing into history of interrelated European aristocracies whose diplomacy was marked by a ‘homogenous cultural reality’.⁶

Kissinger, in describing Zhou, laboured over the correlation of Chinese ideology and foreign policy. In his initial report to President Nixon concerning his secret trip to Beijing, he characterised the Chinese leadership as ‘deeply ideological, close to fanatic in the

intensity of their beliefs'.⁷ In his account of his 'journey for peace', Nixon indicated that his most 'vivid memory' was 'the unique personality' of Zhou Enlai. Nixon was impressed by Zhou's combined 'elegance and toughness', but his respect was comingled with the instinctive caution of a Cold War veteran. Perhaps, Zhou's knowledge was impressive, but Zhou's 'perspective' was 'badly distorted by his rigid ideological frame of reference'.⁸

Despite his early reservations, Kissinger, after having engaged Zhou in several stimulating discussions, concluded that Zhou had a realistic understanding of international politics, and Kissinger distinguished between propaganda and actual strategic calculations made in Beijing. Continuing anti-American propaganda did not necessarily imply a lack of realism as to the necessity of Sino-American normalisation.

As National Security Advisor, Kissinger moved beyond his own academic paradigms. As a Harvard professor, he had compared 'ideological' and 'pragmatic regimes' to show that the former, in its obsession with ultimate ends, was incapable of a rational assessment of international realities, but in the following assessment of Zhou's realism, Kissinger suggests a symbiotic relationship between 'faith' and disciplined rationality:

He was a dedicated ideologue, but he used the faith that had sustained him through decades of struggle to discipline a passionate nature into one of the most acute and unsentimental assessments of reality that I have encountered.⁹

Kissinger contrasted Chinese and American approaches to international relations in such a way as to make the former appear to be more realistic. The 'homogenous cultural reality' of European aristocracy may have passed into history, but the underlying rationality of classical European diplomacy had been reincarnated in the Chinese approach of Zhou Enlai. Kissinger concluded:

China was in the great classical tradition of European statesmanship. The Chinese Communist leaders coldly and unemotionally assessed the requirements of the balance of power little influenced by ideology or sentiment. They were scientists of equilibrium, artists of relativity . . . Only one principle was inviolate. No nation could be permitted to be pre-eminent¹⁰

Kissinger, on the other hand, regretted the confusion in the American approach which too often devolved to the level of adolescent

faith in great causes. Kissinger believed that the Nixon administration was mandated to educate Americans in the intricacies of the balance of power.

Kissinger, in a meeting with Mao and Zhou in the former's study on 17 February 1973, wistfully imputed a 'modern Machiavellianism' to the Chinese leaders:

Mao Zedong, the father of China's Communist revolution, who had convulsed his people in his effort to achieve doctrinal purity, went to great pains to show the slogans scrawled on every wall in China were meaningless, that in foreign policy national interests overrode ideological differences. Ideological slogans were a facade for considerations of balance of power.¹¹

Kissinger assumed a clever disassociation of principle and policy, but it is difficult to determine where, or from whom, Zhou and Mao might have willingly received their tuition in classical European balance of power. As a student journalist, Zhou had renounced this balance as a threat to China's national independence. Throughout his career Zhou had opposed the balance of power to the principle of sovereign equality. The conceptual roots of Zhou's realism did not lie in Europe. They originated in Chinese revolutionary praxis, which self-consciously studied reality though 'seeking the truth from the facts'. As it was integral to Chinese Communist 'workstyle', the latter was, at once, a 'scientific' and ideological exercise.

Kissinger assumed that the US, as a responsible nuclear power, was more flexible than the PRC in its relations with the USSR and that the Chinese in their burning hostility towards the Soviet Union were obsessed with 'hegemonism', meaning the Soviet domination of the world.¹² However, as a seasoned united front politician with a masterly grasp of the contradictions of 'objective' political reality and an intense dedication to China's 'independence and self-reliance', Zhou could lay claim to a much greater sophistication than what is implied in a singular, obsessive commitment to contain the Soviet Union.

'Hegemony', in the European history of the balance of power, connoted a neutral, mechanistic conception of dominance in the state system. The modern Chinese characters for 'hegemonism' (*ba-quanzhuyi*), appear to derive from a classical Chinese distinction between the 'way of the king' (*wangdao*), implying rulership and foreign relations premised in sagely conduct, and the 'way of the hegemon' (*badao*), meaning rule through physical force, and there

may be a plausible relation between an apparently modern penchant for didactic foreign policy statement and the moral determinism which characterised traditional Chinese political culture. However, the specific connotations of 'hegemonism' more directly relate to the Chinese interpretation of twentieth century imperialism.¹³

In his inner-Party explanations of Sino-American normalisation and the problem of 'hegemonism', Zhou rejected any suggested identity between his view of the international balance of forces and American realism's view of the balance of power. Zhou categorically rejected any suggestion of China becoming a 'superpower'. This would have deprecated his own personal struggle to achieve China's 'independence and self-reliance'.

In an interview with Neville Maxwell, on 19 November 1971, Zhou discussed Nixon's balance of power. He argued that the emergence of the European Common Market countries as a new force in international politics, had imposed itself on the unwilling Americans. He did not agree with Nixon's five-power configuration of world politics, including China, the US, USSR, the EEC countries and Japan.¹⁴ Nixon's inclusion of China in his own 'power politics' neglected the united front politics, which identified China with the Third World.

When Zhou stressed that China in the UN would stick to the principle of equality of all states, Maxwell inquired whether such an emphasis originated in 'idealism' and commented that a country with five million population could not be said in reality to have the same significance as China in international relations. Zhou agilely parried, insisting that if Maxwell wished to use 'idealism', he could very well do so, but policy recognising the political power of the post-colonial struggle of new states accorded very well with reality. The latter was a phenomenon which American 'realism' had failed to come to terms with. The very same 'realism' had excluded China from the UN for 22 years.

Zhou often traced the demise of the League of Nations to the European balance of power, which had failed to honour the principle of equal sovereignty in world affairs. Zhou told Edgar Snow, in October 1970, that the future of the United Nations was 'hard to predict', for even though there was growing opposition to super-power manipulation of the UN, it was still possible that the UN might 'suffer the same fate as the League of Nations'.¹⁵ Zhou claimed that China would align with Third World forces to try to prevent this from happening.

Superpower 'hegemonism' challenged the UN principle of sovereign equality of all states, and the problem of 'hegemonism' was

specifically a modern-day problem of 'imperialism' and 'social imperialism'. Kissinger understood 'hegemonism' as it appeared in the main body of the text of the Shanghai communiqué, as 'the new code word for Soviet expansionism'¹⁶ whereas Zhou saw 'hegemonism' in US imperialism and socialist imperialism.

The specific formulation, 'China will never seek hegemony', was of immediate Cultural Revolution vintage; it was part of a larger formulation, namely, 'dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony' (*shen wa dong, guang ji liang, bu chengba*). This orientation featured 'self-reliance' as basic to national defence, and it implied a defensive military strategy, predicated in war on Chinese soil. The latter tied in with emphases stressing the optimal development of domestic resources as conveyed in slogans such as 'develop the economy and ensure supplies'.¹⁷

'Hegemonism', *per se* was already an established construct relating to the Leninist theory of imperialism and the repudiation of the Second International for the sin of 'social chauvinism'.¹⁸ The latter achieved instant recognition during the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Chinese commentary charged the Soviet leadership with 'social imperialism'. As Zhou indicated in Beijing on 30 September 1968, the US and USSR were both guilty of 'imperialism'.¹⁹ The Americans and Soviets were cast in terms of an epic world struggle for 'hegemony' involving both mutual collusion and contention. Faithful to Mao's dialectics, Zhou stressed that contention was primary. Some of the time they would join with 'reaction' against China to act as a 'Holy Alliance', but they would seldom maintain consistent unity even in an era of 'so-called' détente.

The Cultural Revolution had inhibited united front realism to the point of threatening Zhou's alignment of socialism with neutralism. It was a magnificent abstraction which waged undifferentiated struggle against 'modern revisionism', 'imperialism' and 'reaction'. As 'infantile disorder on the left' it represented 'all struggle and no alliance'. However, even given the Cultural Revolution failure to clarify more realistic distinctions between China's enemies, persisting emphasis on 'self-reliance' precluded extensive overseas military commitments. 'Proletarian internationalism' seldom involved more than 'firm support' in terms of political declarations and material assistance. The rhetoric concerning the prospects for world revolution, notwithstanding, Zhou and Mao sought to avoid the costs of direct military involvement in Vietnam, and the seeds for Sino-American normalisation were actually planted in the Cultural revolution period.

The Chinese related the Czech crisis to the Sino-Soviet border

tension, where, since 1966, there had been a significant Soviet military build-up. Their media routinely focused on Sino-Soviet collusion.²⁰ The Chinese press cited Ambassador Dobrynin's detailed briefing to US Secretary of State William Rogers on the March 1969 border clashes as evidence of renewed Soviet attempts to engage the US in 'preventive action' against China.²¹

The Cultural Revolution focused more intensely on Soviet 'modern revisionism' than US imperialism. The former constituted the most serious internal threat to Mao's revolution. Mao and Zhou were, none the less, fascinated by the growing internal and external contradictions affecting American politics.²² Zhou dismissed Nixon's 'Vietnamisation' as a strategem to defuse the anti-War movement at home while sustaining US 'vassals' abroad. He compared 'Vietnamisation' to the 'dual tactics' of 'Chinaisation' which the Americans had concocted during the Civil War to save Chiang Kai-shek's regime.²³ The growing civil rights movement, the decline in the US dollar and the vociferousness of the anti-War movement, all suggested that the US would not be able to sustain its heavy overseas commitments.

In the light of the international events of the late 1960s, 'all struggle and no alliance' made little sense to seasoned united front strategists such as Zhou and Mao. Sino-American normalisation was part of their response to 'socialist imperialism', but this did not necessarily imply the cessation of the political struggle against a declining US imperialism.

THE US, USSR AND UNITED FRONT 'STRATEGIES AND POLICIES'

The Ninth Party Congress, 1–24 April 1969, summed up the latest Party thinking on the domestic process of political reintegration, and provided a comprehensive statement on foreign policy. Zhou and Mao had been deeply involved in the preparation of the final draft of the political report. Zhou Enlai had supervised the restoration of political order, but was not accorded pride of place. Lin Biao delivered the main political report on 1 April.

The report endorsed the Yan'an 'workstyle' premised in investigation and study and 'criticism and self-criticism'. Lin dutifully cited Mao's longstanding instruction 'to learn from past mistakes to avoid future ones'.²⁴ The theme of the Congress was 'unity and victory'. The Congress denied any quick transition to Communism, indicating

in the revised Party Constitution that ' . . . socialist society covers fairly long historical period . . . ', but it also stressed the continuing need to wage class struggle in order to avert 'capitalist restoration'.²⁵

The report's foreign policy statement offered nothing startlingly new. China would have to continue to maintain vigilance against *both* the US and the USSR. Lin repeated the Cultural Revolution formulation requiring the application of 'proletarian internationalism' between socialist states and the application of the five principles of peaceful coexistence in China's relations with states with different social systems. Soviet-American attempts to isolate China were described as 'in China's honour', and served only to reinforce Chinese 'independence and self-reliance'.²⁶

The late January analysis of Nixon's inaugural speech was reiterated.²⁷ The American 'paper tiger' was 'going down hill more and more'.²⁸ Weakened from internal contradiction, it played the game of 'counter-revolutionary dual tactics' covering its war preparations with a sweet 'peace-loving' appearance. Lin reiterated Mao's formulation, 'we will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack', which applied to the US in Vietnam.

Soviet theories of 'limited sovereignty', 'international dictatorship' and 'socialist community' were disparaged, but Lin confirmed Zhou's statements on the need for a negotiated settlement, 'through diplomatic channels', of the Sino-Soviet boundary question. Lin incidentally revealed that Premier Kosygin had, on 21 March attempted to phone the Chinese leadership.²⁹ Zhou later told Nixon that the Beijing operator had, without authorisation, denounced Kosygin over the phone as a 'revisionist' and disconnected him.³⁰ On 22 March the Chinese government indicated that communication through diplomatic channels would be preferred to the use of the Moscow-Beijing hotline.

The Chinese responded slowly and deliberately so as to represent the Soviet Union as the anxious supplicant trying to cover up the truth about the Zhenbao Island incident. The media reported that on 11 April the Soviet government had urgently requested that the Chinese despatch representatives to Moscow within four days for 'consultations'. The note was published on 12 April before the Chinese government replied on 14 April with the message: 'We will give you a reply, please calm down a little and do not get excited'.³¹

In the immediate aftermath of the border clashes, the Soviet government launched a diplomatic offensive, calling for the establishment

of a 'system of collective security in Asia'. Brezhnev received little support. Not even the Indian government could muster much enthusiasm. The Chinese took the propaganda offensive projecting Brezhnev's proposal as a transparent 'anti-China military alliance'.

On 13 July, in a banquet address, honouring Pakistan's Air Marshal Nur Khan, Zhou Enlai stressed that China and Pakistan had strictly abided by the five principles. The latter was contrasted to the 'so-called system of collective security' which Zhou described as 'a new step taken by social-imperialism . . . to rig up a new anti-China military alliance'. Zhou viewed Brezhnev's system as a successor to the SEATO, hence he concluded that ' . . . social-imperialism is simply stepping into the shoes of US imperialism'.³² In a second speech of 16 July, Zhou dismissed Soviet propaganda claiming that China had undergone a 'dynamic change' in foreign policy which was undermining the world struggle for national liberation. He berated the Soviets for 'their intention to make extensive counter-revolutionary deals with US imperialism'.³³

The Chinese propaganda offensive against Brezhnev's system of collective security disparaged the Soviet theory of 'international worker-peasant alliance' which allegedly established the Soviet Union as the 'advanced' component of the international working class with responsibility for bringing together a series of regional alliances. In the name of national liberation, national liberation would be stifled, thus Brezhnev's alliance theory was equated with Bernstein's 'old-line revisionism'.³⁴

On 11 September Zhou met Kosygin at the Beijing Airport terminal. Kosygin was passing through on his way home from the funeral of Ho Chi Minh. The two had a 'frank conversation'. While 'proletarian internationalism' could not apply to Sino-Soviet relations, Zhou was confident that state-to-state relations could be maintained on the basis of the five principles. Zhou reiterated the Chinese proposal of 18 September calling for both sides to withdraw its military personnel from all disputed areas.³⁵ Mao, in passing conversation with Nixon, mentioned that he had told Kosygin that he would reduce the coming ten thousand years of principled struggle by one thousand years in gracious acknowledgement of Kosygin's coming in person to Beijing.³⁶

On 7 October Zhou reassured a delegation of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation that China fully supported the 'unconditional withdrawal of all the US aggressor troops and its vassal troops' from South Vietnam, irregardless of 'de-Americanization', or 'Vietnamisation'.³⁷ Zhou later conveyed the same message in his

talks with the North Vietnamese leader, Pham Van Dong. The Joint Communiqué of 25 October on the Zhou-Pham talks challenged 'Vietnamisation' as a strategem of aggression, and proclaimed China as a 'reliable rear area'.³⁸

The Nixon Doctrine was likened to Eisenhowerism in its attempt 'to use Asians to fight Asians', and it focused Chinese attention on the strategic importance of Japan. The Nixon-Sato joint communiqué of 21 November had endorsed the 'reversion of Okinawa' to Japan; however, the indefinite renewal of Japan's security treaty with the United States was interpreted by the Chinese as the 'Okinawanization' of Japan.

The Chinese government angrily reacted to Sato's Washington comments to the effect that South Korea was vital to the Japanese national interest. The American attempt to highlight Japan's responsibility for regional security in the era of Vietnamisation elicited Chinese fears of revived Japanese 'militarism', and the *Renmin ribao* understood Nixon's repeated emphasis on the fact that the US was a 'Pacific country' to mean that '... US imperialism will never abandon its scheme for hegemony in Asia'.³⁹

In his 29 November remarks to Albanian Ambassador Xhorxhi Robo, Zhou stressed that in Asia '... US imperialism is energetically making use of the Japanese reactionaries as its main assistant'.⁴⁰ But Zhou was optimistic regarding 'revolutionary mass movements in Japan, Western Europe and North America', claiming that a 'new high tide of struggle against US imperialist aggression in Vietnam' was about 'to burst forth on a mass scale in the United States'.⁴¹

In October 1969, Kissinger had instructed the US ambassador in Poland, Walter Stoessel, Jr, to indicate US interest in the resumption of the Warsaw ambassadorial talks. In fact the Chinese had, themselves, earlier proposed such a resumption on 26 November 1968 in the hope of a favourable change in American policy with the 1968 elections. China agreed to Kissinger's offer, and the talks resumed on 20 January 1970. On 18 February Richard Nixon indicated in his Congressional report on foreign policy that it was in American interests to seek improved relations with 'Communist China'. Two days later the Chinese hinted at Warsaw that a high-ranking US official would be welcome to visit Beijing.

These soundings were complicated by a sudden deterioration in the Indo-China situation. Sihanouk was deposed on 18 March and he took asylum in Beijing. On 30 April President Nixon ordered US military actions 'in a limited operation for a limited time' against Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia. Zhou had, since the Geneva

Conference of 1954, focused on the necessity of neutralism in Cambodia and Laos, and the threatened expansion of the war was taken seriously in Beijing. Mao issued a directive indicating: 'The danger of a new world war still exists, and the people of all countries must be prepared. But revolution is the main trend in the world today'. However, during the 1 October celebrations, Mao, as he stood on the Tiananmen rostrum in Beijing, told Edgar Snow that he would welcome Nixon to visit China as President or tourist.

Even so, Zhou elaborated on Mao's May directive during the 21st anniversary of the founding of the PRC, insisting that the superpowers would not be able to divide up the world at will, and reaffirming China's 'firm support' for revolutionary struggle against imperialism, revisionism and reaction.⁴² Relations appeared to be set back even further in February 1971 when Nixon ordered military operations in Laos to prevent further North Vietnamese infiltration of South Vietnam via southern Laos.

Despite the complications of Indo-China, there was an ongoing pattern of diplomatic signalling. On 15 March the US State Department removed all remaining restrictions of the use of US passports for travel to the PRC, and that month there was a breakthrough in 'people's diplomacy'. An American table tennis team, which was in Japan for the world championships was invited to visit Beijing. Zhou had already ordered a cable disapproving of the suggested visit, when Mao personally intervened.⁴³ Zhou later explained to a visiting US delegation that Mao had personally made the decision '... at a time when the attitude of the Chinese Foreign Ministry and United States State Department was to wait for a while'.⁴⁴ Mao, himself, told Nixon in February 1972 that Chinese policy had for a long time insisted that major issues should be settled before people-to-people relations could take place. Mao then added: 'Later on I saw you were right and we played table tennis'.⁴⁵

There were several precipitating factors which moved Mao towards Sino-American normalisation, but Zhou told Senator Mike Mansfield in December 1974 that Mao had been particularly impressed with Nixon's 1967 article in *Foreign Affairs*.⁴⁶ In the article Nixon had dropped his previous insistence on the 'domino theory' and emphasised the need for 'patience born of realism' in understanding the importance of China's future role in world affairs.⁴⁷

The American table tennis team met Zhou in Beijing on 14 April 1971, and two days later Nixon announced further relaxations of trade and travel restrictions. The same month a message inviting an

'American envoy' to visit Beijing was passed on to Kissinger through Pakistan's Ambassador, Agna Hilaly. Initially the Chinese invited Nixon's envoy to make a public visit, but responded with alacrity to Nixon's request for secrecy. Nixon feared that a public trip would prematurely invite hostile Congressional sentiment.⁴⁸

Kissinger, together with three aides, Winston Lord, John Holdridge and Richard Smyser, flew from Nathia Gali, East Pakistan to the PRC. While the press thought that Kissinger was recuperating from 'Delhi belly', he was engaged in historic talks with Zhou in Beijing from 9 to 11 July. On 16 July a small square box appeared at the bottom of the first page of the *Renmin ribao* indicating that Zhou had invited President Nixon to visit China before May 1972 in order 'to seek the normalisation of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides'.

There were no accompanying policy concessions. There was no modification whatsoever on the Taiwan question. Nixon's 'Vietnamisation' and the dangers of revived Japanese 'militarism' were still highlighted in Beijing's exchanges with allies in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and North Korea, and Zhou continued to insist on the unconditional withdrawal of all American troops from Indo-China.

On 19 July, in an interview room of the Great Hall of the People, Zhou met with the delegation of the US Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS). Well briefed as usual, Zhou discussed CCAS accusations against an established generation of American scholars, who had apparently carried out 'mission-oriented' research for US agencies and had acquiesced in US Vietnam policy. Zhou was not unmindful of the views of his guests, but he commiserated with the 'establishment' scholars for many of them had been 'oppressed in the fifties during the McCarthy period'.⁴⁹

Zhou also put 'table tennis diplomacy' in perspective. However valuable 'people's diplomacy', Zhou opined that it could not substitute for state-to-state relations. Zhou simply stated: 'But the development of the contact between people, in itself alone, is not enough because in the world of today, the state structures of various countries still exist'.⁵⁰ It was, therefore, still necessary to meet with the representative of US imperialism, President Nixon.

Ranging across the whole historical spectrum of Chinese foreign policy, Zhou was engaging in his personal directness. He accepted blame for not having insisted in 1954 on a written agreement covering Indo-China, and he returned to the unconditional US withdrawal from Indo-China. Zhou argued that Nixon's coming to China

reflected a major shift of opinion within the US. For years he had been suggesting that the people of US would overturn the government's policy of containment. Zhou did concede Susan Shirk's point that the 'revolutionary movement' in the US was not sufficiently developed to 'transform society', but then he cited Mao to the effect that '... the United States is now on the eve of a great storm'.⁵¹

As for Japan, Zhou stressed 'militarism'. The issue was not merely a question of propaganda; it was a question of strategic calculation. Japan was tied in with the response to the Nixon Doctrine and the overall process of 'seeking normalisation' with the US. Kissinger later revealed that Zhou and Mao were concerned lest the 'Nixon shocks' generate an insecurity in Japanese society which might feed traditional ultra-nationalism. Mao later told Kissinger that he would not force Tokyo to choose between Washington and Beijing.⁵²

As a student journalist, Zhou had been impressed by the correlation of 'monopoly capitalism' and 'militarism'. Now, Zhou lectured a group of American academics on the subject of Japanese 'militarism'. The Japanese 'militarists' had lacked resources and regarded Manchuria and South Asia as their 'lifelines'. Zhou then observed: 'The Japanese militarists are now saying that the Malacca Strait is their lifeline. This place is a lifeline; that place is a lifeline'.⁵³ Historical economic arguments had certain parallels in contemporary times, and Zhou reasoned: '... Japanese militarism is being revived because the Japanese economy is developing in a lop-sided way. They lack resources, they must import their natural resources and for markets too they depend on foreign countries'.⁵⁴

Zhou acknowledged that 'Korean comrades' were 'rather early in taking note of this', and that it had been a major issue on his agenda during his recent visit to Korea.⁵⁵ Zhou was not altogether pessimistic. He was confident that there was popular antipathy in Japan towards 'militarism'. Furthermore, the regional situation was markedly different with the emergence, since the war, of new states such as the PRC and the Democratic Republic of Korea.

When members of the delegation pointed to the destructiveness of the American 'military-industrial complex', Zhou declined to offer any advice as he had no direct experience of American society, and it was a matter of Americans acting in accordance with their own principle of 'self-reliance'.⁵⁶ Zhou did, however, discuss the underlying motivation of the Nixon Doctrine. The US had overextended its resources overseas, and he explained this with the following metaphor:

And there is a saying in China, that that is like trying to catch ten fleas with ten fingers. When you are trying to catch one flea, another jumps out. And the result is that all of them escape. And at the most, you can only catch one flea by freeing one of your hands and letting go five fleas instead.⁵⁷

Zhou further expounded his views in his 9 August interview with James Reston, a Vice President and columnist of *The Times*. The interview started with a discussion of US Secretary of State Rogers's attempts to finesse the UN China question by admitting the PRC into the UN, while permitting Taiwan's retention of a seat in the General Assembly. Zhou was very distressed by the co-ordination between Tokyo and Taipei on this issue, but, in reply to Reston's query as to whether Rogers's position would derail the process of Sino-American normalisation, he was not prepared to come right out and say that it would. Instead, he simply observed: 'At least it is not a step forward. And what is more, a confused debate is bound to take place in the United Nations and in the international arena . . .'⁵⁸ The Premier made it clear that the PRC would not be entering the UN should a UN resolution, describing Taiwan's status as 'undetermined', ever be passed.

Reston also pressed Zhou on the fundamentals of Chinese foreign policy, inquiring where there was not a conflict between the UN Charter provision requiring that all disputes be settled without the use of force, and China's emphasis on revolution and national liberation. Zhou immediately went on the offensive. China had replied to US aggression in Korea only after American forces pressed to the Yalu River, and Zhou indicated that China would only 'help' other countries 'when they are subjected to aggression'.

Zhou pointed out that, despite American occupation of Taiwan, the PRC had showed self-restraint and, in the Sino-US agenda of important questions, had even placed the Indo-China question ahead of the Taiwan question, for, while there was no state of hostilities in the Taiwan area, there was a spreading war in South-East Asia.⁵⁹ Zhou added that, while the Indo-China problem had to be solved first, China did not want to become a 'mediator in any way'. He may have been responding to speculation suggesting that he had struck a deal with Kissinger to lend a hand in Indo-China in return for Sino-American normalisation.

Reston put it directly to Zhou as to whether there was a 'conflict' between the Nixon Doctrine and Sino-American normalisation.

Zhou readily agreed that there was a 'contradiction' which could only encourage a revival of 'Japanese militarization'. Reston drew Zhou's attention to the fact that the American people had not harboured any hatred towards the Japanese people since the war. Zhou thought the underlying comparison quite 'unfair' and rebutted: 'It is unfair. Because you didn't have any direct talk with us about our foreign policy, you just hear about some of our slogans'.⁶⁰

Zhou, in turn, drew Reston's attention to the developing pattern of people's diplomacy between China and Japan, emphasising the distinction between opposition to 'Japanese reactionaries' and 'hatred for the Japanese people'.⁶¹ Given the 'contradiction' posed by the Nixon Doctrine, Zhou stated: 'There should be an effort at relaxation by all parties concerned'.⁶²

Zhou's attitude towards the upcoming negotiations with Nixon reflected familiar tactics of equanimity. Just half an hour before the official announcement of Kissinger's second visit to Beijing, Zhou told a group of 60 Americans, including Black Panther leader, Huey P. Newton and John Service, formerly of the US Army's Dixie Mission, that Beijing's willingness to negotiate was not at all new. Zhou commented: 'We did this with the arch-enemy Chiang Kai-Shek for almost 10 years'.⁶³ This was the same Zhou Enlai who had displayed such extraordinary civility in Xi'an despite Chiang's' mountain of blood debts'.

Zhou's view frankly differed from Nixon's view of the coming event. Nixon had proclaimed the current era as one of negotiations. Zhou emphasised both negotiation and 'struggle by armed force'. He also noted that it was China's basic policy to negotiate with Moscow. Zhou was preparing for any eventuality, for he said: 'It is all right if the talks succeed and it is all right if the talks fail'.⁶⁴ At one point in the secret July negotiations with Kissinger, Zhou had even mused over the possibility that Europe, the USSR, Japan and the US might one day attempt another carving up of China.⁶⁵

There was no need for concessions on Zhou's part. The American position in Indo-China was fast deteriorating. Even while Kissinger was in Beijing, on 25 October the UN General Assembly voted to seat the PRC and to expel the Taiwan regime. The confusion in US policy had worked to China's advantage in the voting.⁶⁶ With such a result in hand, Zhou was at once frank and modest. He, himself, had not expected such an overwhelming majority.

In a 28 October interview with Moto Goto, managing editor of *Asahi Shimbun* in Beijing, Zhou insisted that China, in its entry into

the UN, would act with 'caution'. Zhou informed Moto Goto that this did not mean that China lacked confidence; it meant that China would engage in a cautious study. Zhou explained:

There is an old Chinese saying which goes, 'Be careful when facing a problem'. We do not have too much knowledge about the United Nations and are not too conversant with the new situation which has arisen in the United Nations.⁶⁷

Zhou at that point could not even answer as to what kind of mission China would form. He had yet to discuss the matter with Chairman Mao. As for the Japanese government's part in helping the US to sponsor 'the reverse important question', allowing Taiwan to retain its General Assembly seat, Zhou indicated that he was, none the less, very thankful for the support of the great majority of the Japanese, and he hoped that China's UN presence would give added impetus towards the restoration of diplomatic relations with Japan.

Zhou reaffirmed that China would never become a great power and would align with the less developed nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America to resist the 'domination' and 'power politics' of the 'major powers'. Zhou also indicated that the voting of the various countries on the China Question would have little effect on China's attitude. Taking Israel's 'yes' vote as an example, he insisted that there could be no official relations given Israel's aggression in the Middle East. He also served notice that Portugal, despite its vote, need not expect China to ease up in its support of national liberation in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea.

Nixon denounced the disgraceful behaviour of anti-Taiwan delegates who had danced in the aisles of the UN, but he continued with the planning of his trip to Beijing.⁶⁸ The Albanians, who, together with the Algerians and 18 other sponsoring nations, had worked towards the US defeat, drew a predictable conclusion. According to Enver Hoxha, the 'restoration of the lawful rights of the PRC' was a great victory because it had occurred against the will of both US imperialism and Soviet social imperialism.⁶⁹ Algeria's Boumédiène, believed that China's participation in the UN would 'effectively contribute to the establishment of a new international order',⁷⁰ and Norodom Sihanouk enthusiastically declared that the US had lost its control of the UN General Assembly and was about to go down to defeat in Asia.⁷¹

The official Chinese statement of 29 October proclaimed that the 25 October vote constituted 'a victory of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's

proletarian revolutionary line in foreign affairs'. The voting was described as representing a 'general trend' whereby ' . . . one or two superpowers are losing ground daily . . .' ⁷² Zhou's own 'idealism' was explicit in the reiteration of the equality of all states, and the requirement that ' . . . the affairs of the United Nations must be handled jointly by all its member states . . .' Later in December the *Renmin ribao* editorially summed up the 26th General Assembly assumption and stressed that the vote against 'dual representation' demonstrated how the 'power politics and hegemony of the superpowers' could be resisted. The paper editorialised: ' . . . the two superpowers are unreconciled to their defeat and will continue to push the policy of hegemony in every way.' ⁷³

Both the Americans and Chinese approached normalisation with great caution. Both sides stressed their bilateralism as a question of mutual benefit rather than as a trilateralist move against the Soviet Union. However, Kissinger thought the US was, in fact, 'more flexible' and 'less frontal' in its positioning *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union.⁷⁴ While confident of Zhou's intuitive understanding of the balance of power, Kissinger's explanation of Sino-Soviet animosity assigned a great deal of weight to the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute. Kissinger relates: 'To Zhou, China's conflict with the Soviet Union was both ineradicable and beyond its capacity to manage by itself'.⁷⁵

Kissinger's observation disputes Zhou's claim that China's Soviet policy gave priority to negotiations. Zhou had clarified that the question of principle need not confound normal state-to-state relations. This point was reiterated in the Chinese NPC's 6 November 1971 greetings to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers, which stated once again: 'The Chinese government has all along held that the controversies of principle . . . should not affect their state relations'. 'Normal relations' with the Soviet Union could be achieved on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence without reference to the problems of 'proletarian internationalism'.⁷⁶

To a certain extent, Kissinger still relied on the distinction between 'democratic' and 'totalitarian' regimes in explaining the effects of the Sino-Soviet dispute. In the latter case there could only be one authorised interpretation of 'the infallible truth'.⁷⁷ Indeed, during the Cultural Revolution, the 'theory of many centres' was denounced as a theory of 'no centre', which denied the necessity of class struggle.⁷⁸ On the other hand, Zhou's ideological emphases increasingly related to Mao's Yan'an dialectics, which presumed both the 'unity and clash of opposites' and the flexible application of principle. In his view of

the Sino-Soviet dispute, Kissinger saw absolute ideological considerations as reinforcing a positive trend in Sino-American relations. Kissinger concluded: 'The Chinese leaders saw no possibility of compromise . . . In their view the minimum aim of Chinese statecraft had to be that no other major country would combine with the Soviets . . .'⁷⁹

In what appears to be an authentic report on foreign policy, delivered by Zhou Enlai just two months prior to Nixon's visit, the issue of Sino-American normalisation was fitted into the framework of strategy and ideology.⁸⁰ The report largely relied on the political report of the Ninth Congress as the guiding explanation of Mao's views on international relations.

On the 'question of world war', Mao had projected a revolutionary optimism. There were only 'two possibilities', namely that revolution would either 'prevent' war or war would give rise to revolution. The first possibility had been part of the original strategic scheme of the five principles which presumed that the plans of 'war maniacs' could be countered in the alignment of socialism and neutralism. The second 'possibility' was the occasion for greater conflict, but, none the less, this was still cause for revolutionary optimism, for the Second World War had fostered a greater trend towards national liberation and independence.

Mao defined the different sets of contradictions in international affairs in terms of (a) the post-colonial contradiction between the developing countries, seeking independence, and imperialism and social imperialism, (b) the contradiction between the proletariat and bourgeoisie within the capitalist and revisionist countries, (c) the inter-imperialist conflict and the conflict between imperialism and socialist countries, and (d) the contradiction between socialist countries and imperialism and social imperialism.

Zhou's report of December 1971 referred to these sets of contradictions and added Mao's May 1970 statement, describing revolution as 'the main trend'. He spoke of the world divided into 'three parts' inclusive of the US, USSR and the Third World.⁸¹ In relation to 'the four contradictions', Zhou discussed Kissinger's explanation of American strategy as 'the Americas as the base', 'Western Europe as the pivotal point,' 'Asia being the flank', 'The Middle East being the throat', and 'the oceans being the centre of world struggle in the future'. Under this strategy the USSR was focusing on Europe and the Middle East. Zhou argued that, while the Soviets were concerned about the Sino-Soviet border dispute, it was not 'pivotal' in their

strategy. According to Zhou, the Third World developing countries constituted the 'main force'. There could be no alliance with the US, but only selective alignment depending upon the regional dimensions of US-Soviet contention for 'hegemony'.

The report reveals that Korea had wanted table tennis diplomacy in the Afro-Asian setting to include 'anti-imperialism', but Zhou alternatively emphasised the five principles in his 'people's diplomacy'. The relation of China to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia is described in terms of the 'front' and 'rear'. On the contradictions between the last three countries, Zhou suggested that Vietnam was not to be 'overpraised'. As for Vietnam's anxiety over the Nixon visit, Zhou simply observed: 'We have made explanations. If she [Vietnam] cannot figure it out for the moment just let her watch the development of the truth'.⁸²

Zhou conceded that Vietnam would have to be 'persuaded gradually',⁸³ but he dismissed Lin Biao's suggestion that Sino-US negotiation represented a betrayal of Vietnam as an 'insult' to the Party. The negotiations had very positive precedent in Chairman Mao's strategy of the 'Chongqing negotiations'. In any event, both the US and the USSR would remain as 'key enemies'.⁸⁴ Nixon's 'counterrevolutionary dual tactics' would be met on a united front basis combining negotiation and struggle.

'Dual tactics' provided the internal-Party justification of the 16 July invitation to President Nixon. In particular, Mao's united front writing, 'On Policy', required 'both unity and independence' and distinctions, made 'between the primary enemy and secondary enemy and between the temporary allies and indirect allies'. On the issue of shifting political alignments, Mao had stated: 'This united front is neither all alliance and no struggle, nor all struggle and no alliance, but combines alliance and struggle'.⁸⁵ Nixon's coming to Beijing did not alter the reality of the internal and external contradictions faced by the US in its contention with the Soviet Union for 'world hegemony'.⁸⁶

The 'Spirit of '76' touched down on Beijing Airport's cold, wind-swept tarmac on 21 February. Stepping down from his plane at 11:30 a.m., President Richard Nixon firmly shook the hand of Premier Zhou Enlai in a symbolic attempt to erase the memory of Dulles's silly, standoffish behaviour at Geneva in 1954. Nixon's public relations people were disappointed in the absence of 'photogenic Chinese multitudes'.⁸⁷ Chinese protocol was correct but cool. The reception of Nixon and his party was dominated by Chinese state personnel,

especially foreign ministry personnel. The Cultural Revolution 'radicals', Jiang Qing, Zhang Qunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen, were not on hand either at the Airport or at the evening banquet.

Just after lunch on 21 February, Kissinger was taken aside by Zhou and told that Mao would like to see President Nixon. Nixon, Kissinger and Winston Lord made a sudden mid-afternoon trip to Zhongnanhai to meet the Chairman. This early reception was internationally interpreted as a demonstration of Mao's support for the visit.

Both Nixon and Kissinger have described their encounter with Mao. Initially, there was personal banter. Nixon and Mao joked about Henry's girlfriends. Mao was lively, despite his bronchitis, and he indicated his preference for 'rightists' claiming that he had voted for Nixon in the last election.⁸⁸ With a sweeping gesture, the Chairman remarked: 'Our common old friend Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek doesn't approve of this'.⁸⁹ Zhou Enlai commented on how Beijing and Taipei exchanged insults, and Mao dryly observed: 'Actually, the history of our friendship with him is much longer than the history of your friendship with him'. Mao was ever the self-conscious student of Chinese united front history.

Just before leaving for Zhongnanhai, Zhou had agreed to supply the text of his evening banquet remarks to Kissinger. Nixon, for his part worked over a draft of his remarks, prepared by Kissinger, adding personal idiom and quotations from Mao's works. Zhou, in his speech, made almost no reference to specific issues. Zhou spoke of the strong desire of the two peoples for normalisation, and referred to the importance of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

While Zhou did not cite the Bandung formulation, 'seeking common ground while reserving differences' (*qiutong cunyi*), he quoted the speech that Nixon had made just prior to leaving Washington on his 'journey for peace'. Nixon had expressed the hope that the two sides could have 'differences without being enemies in war', and Zhou then expressed the hope that through 'frank exchange of our differences' the two sides could 'strive to seek common ground' (*nuli xunzhao gongtong dian*).⁹⁰

In reply, Nixon indulged in superlatives. There was no mention of Cold War images of China as the inwardly brooding giant which would plunge the world into nuclear annihilation. Nixon spoke of 'the incomparable hospitality' for which the Chinese were 'justly famous throughout the world', and remarked: 'What we do here can

change the world'.⁹¹ Nixon thought there was no question of 'hegemonism' in their newly-developing relations. He assumed that neither side sought the territory or the domination of the other.⁹² He too spoke of differences and principles: 'What brings us together is that we have common interests which transcend those differences. As we discuss our differences, neither of us will compromise our principles'.⁹³

On the evening of 25 February, Nixon repeated: 'You believe deeply in your system and we believe just as deeply in our system'.⁹⁴ Zhou acknowledged 'great differences of principle between our two sides', and obliquely observed that '... the general trend of the world is definitely towards light and not darkness'.⁹⁵ During the dinner conversation, however, Zhou told Nixon that the longer the US stayed in Vietnam, the greater would be the costs to the US. He approvingly cited de Gaulle's quick exit from Algeria, and bluntly stated that China would continue to resist the Nixon Doctrine.⁹⁶

'The Week that changed the world' resulted in the signing of a historic document, the Shanghai Communiqué, the substance of which had already been negotiated by Kissinger and Zhou in October 1971. In October Kissinger had fretted that the Chinese side might incorporate into the draft propaganda positions unacceptable to the US, and, in his draft he had opted for softly couched wordings obscuring the differences between the two sides.

Zhou objected to the 'untruthful appearance' of this draft and advanced a common practice in Chinese joint statements, namely, a separate statement by each side of its respective political position. Zhou believed that this was consistent with the principles of equality and independence of states. Also, Zhou had reason to be anxious about the perceptions of China's friends. He was looking for support against continuing Soviet efforts to isolate China at a time when the US had escalated its bombing raids into North Vietnam.

Zhou's counterdraft took Kissinger's breath away.⁹⁷ Initially Kissinger was fearful of the international perception of a Presidential visit ending in 'a catalogue of disagreements', but he warmed to the idea. He would not accept references to world revolution and China's position as 'the reliable rear area of North Vietnam' while US servicemen were dying in Indo-China, but a dry summary of each side's position had merit. Kissinger reasoned: 'A statement of differences would reassure allies and friends that their interests had been defended; if we could develop some common positions, these would then stand out as the authentic convictions of principled leaders'.⁹⁸ Forthright statements were then forthrightly identified with realism.

The text included a section outlining areas of common viewpoint, the most important provision of which was the joint statement of opposition to 'hegemony'. Kissinger has recalled: 'We outlined the key joint positions, especially the paragraph concerning both countries' opposition to hegemony. (Though this later became a hallowed Chinese word, it actually was introduced first by us.)'⁹⁹

The Chinese were accustomed to referring to the 'hegemonism' of 'one, or two of the superpowers'. Kissinger was content with the use of 'hegemony'. It was language which evoked the balance of power; however, in his understanding of the Chinese usage, Kissinger assumed that it was exclusively 'a euphemism for Soviet expansionism'. Zhou's usage of the term in his exchanges with allies and friends presumed reference to both the US and USSR. Nixon accepted Kissinger's reasoning on the proposed format, saying that a 'weasel-worded' communiqué would be inconsistent with strong leadership, which should directly acknowledge 'differences'.¹⁰⁰

Kissinger reports that there was, in October, substantial differences over phraseology relating to the Taiwan question, and that Zhou was especially impressed with the masterful ambiguity of Kissinger's formulation, acknowledging Chinese unity without explicitly supporting the claims of either Taipei or Beijing. The statement, 'The US acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China. The United States does not challenge that position', was worked into the draft announced in Shanghai on 27 February.¹⁰¹

The Communiqué described 'a serious and frank exchange of views'. The Chinese side refrained from an explicit reference to either 'US imperialism' or Soviet 'social imperialism'; however, it did make the following pronouncement: 'China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics *of any kind*' (author's italics).

'Five principles of peaceful coexistence' does not appear in the text, but each of the five were separately cited as governing Sino-US relations. During a news conference on 27 February, Henry Kissinger was asked whether the communiqué represented the first time that an American President had 'formally picked up on the language of the five principles of peaceful coexistence', and Kissinger evasively replied:

I have to say I am simply not sure. . . . The question is not who put forward the proposals. The question is: Does it contain principles that we can live by, and since we have said we are prepared to

apply these principles . . . , it does not really make a crucial difference who put it forward first.¹⁰²

The use of these principles reflected a basic change of attitude. Kissinger had finally released the ghost of John Foster Dulles.

Irregardless of Kissinger's misgivings as to the ferocity of Chinese animosity towards the Soviet Union, Zhou did not wish to precipitate a break in state-to-state relations with the Soviets. The conception of 'independence' within united front strategy forbade such an exclusive position, and the Chinese leadership was certainly not prepared to entrust China's national security to the outcome of Sino-American normalisation. The tension on the Sino-Soviet border had been partially defused in the Zhou-Kosygin meeting, and the greatest deterrent against precipitate Soviet adventurism lie in national unity and the promise of a war of attrition on Chinese soil.¹⁰³

Both Kissinger and Nixon eschewed 'card-playing' as the basis for Sino-American relations. Neither side would commit to an absolute alignment. While the Communiqué referred to joint 'opposition to hegemonism', it also stated that neither side was willing 'to negotiate on behalf of any third party' or 'to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states'.

Even given this disclaimer, the Communiqué was a major strategic event. Zhou had said to Nixon: 'You have come here first and Moscow is carrying on like anything'.¹⁰⁴ The 'third party' reservation was really no comfort. Gromyko sought consolation in the fact that the Americans could expect to be 'burned' just as the Soviets had been, and according to one senior Soviet source Brezhnev gave him a severe dressing-down for his failure to anticipate the *rapprochement* in Shanghai.¹⁰⁵

The Albanians, who had only months before sponsored the China resolution at the UN, were agitated. Even at the best of times, the dimensions of Chinese united front strategy were only dimly understood in Tirana. Enver Hoxha confided to his political diary a description of what he regarded as monstrous affair. The reserve and correctness of the Beijing reception of Nixon was a cover for a betrayal of class principles, and that, according to Hoxha, is why ' . . . Nixon was grinning like a horse, happy, laughing, regardless of the fact the streets through which he passed were empty . . . '¹⁰⁶ He wrote that, even while Zhou spoke of the world moving towards lightness, he had betrayed the 'world revolution' in his 'anti-Marxist' 'vacillating pragmatic policy'.¹⁰⁷ The Soviet press similarly focused on

the fact that Nixon's visit had taken place at a time while the US was bombing Vietnam.¹⁰⁸

The Nixon visit posed a policy dilemma for the Japanese. The Japan's co-sponsorship of the UN 'reverse important question' and 'dual representation' had alienated the Chinese. Zhou had indicated in late October that the process of Sino-Japanese normalisation should go forward, but he refused to deal with Prime Minister Sato.¹⁰⁹ Sato's response to the Nixon Doctrine had traded on the possibility of a closer security relationship between Japan and Taiwan.

The post-October 1971 conciliatory gestures of Sato's government were ignored by Zhou Enlai. His 'people's diplomacy' with Japan was in full swing, but Zhou waited for a change of government in July 1972. With the installation of Kakuei Tanaka's government, a formal joint communiqué came swiftly in 29 September 1972. Chinese concerns regarding revived 'militarism' had prompted frequent apologies for Japan's wartime role in China in various joint declarations of Japanese political parties and popular organisations. The communiqué, signed by Zhou and Tanaka, contained a similar apology. Zhou waived reparations claims against Japan, and he indicated that the 21 November 1969 US-Japan security treaty need not obstruct the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations. Tanaka, in turn, recognised the PRC as the sole legal government of China and 'fully understood and respected the Chinese government's position' regarding Taiwan as an inalienable part of the PRC.¹¹⁰ The Communiqué repeated the anti-hegemony formulation of the Shanghai Communiqué, together with its reservation concerning 'third parties'.

The Zhou-Mao united front strategy against Soviet 'hegemonism' was further advanced during the Beijing visit of Kissinger in mid-February 1973. Kissinger had just signed the Paris peace agreement on 27 January. Although the prospect of Sino-Japanese normalisation had been welcomed by the Nixon administration, Kissinger was, nevertheless, pleasantly surprised by Zhou's declining interest in Japanese 'militarism' and his pointed reference to China's understanding of the need for the Japanese-American security arrangements in light of Soviet 'hegemonism'.¹¹¹

The Kissinger visit resulted in an agreement to establish 'liaison offices' in Washington and Beijing. Zhou and Kissinger were able to establish a permanent point of political contact without incurring the heavy political costs associated with premature recognition. Kissinger

insists that Zhou, 'in the best of the Middle Kingdom tradition' structured the negotiation so as to make it appear that the proposal was coming from Kissinger, when in fact this was 'only marginally true'.¹¹² Kissinger does admit, however, that he 'dusted off the idea of a liaison office', which he had earlier presented to the Vietnamese. The latter had rejected the idea. Zhou was more flexible.

Kissinger was struck by the degree of fit between Chinese and American attitudes regarding Indo-China. While he believed that ideology prevented the Chinese from making explicit their realism on the threat of a unified Vietnam dominating Laos and Cambodia, it was clear to him that the Chinese saw in Sihanouk 'the best guarantee of Cambodian independence' as against 'Hanoi's hegemony over Indochina'.¹¹³ Indeed, Zhou had never wandered very far from his 1954 insistence on separate settlements so as to insure three distinct national entities in Indo-China. He had disagreed with the Vietnamese and adhered to this position also in terms of his rejection of the role of the UN Secretary-General as the Conference chairman in the Paris negotiations, but Zhou still expected the Vietnamese to pursue Ho Chi Minh's policy of relative balance between the PRC and USSR.

The Chinese had encouraged the Vietnamese to sign the agreement with the argument that it would expedite US withdrawal while the Vietnamese would have six to twelve months within which to rest and consolidate in preparation for the liberation of South Vietnam. Zhou believed that the Americans would never again send hundreds of thousands of men into Vietnam.¹¹⁴

As the second most powerful figure in the CCP hierarchy, Zhou delivered the political report to the tenth National Congress of the CCP on 29 August. Zhou formally set out an explanation of the 13 September incident and the death of Lin Biao.¹¹⁵ The Lin Biao problem was allegedly manifest at the earlier Ninth Congress, but Zhou endorsed the political and organisational lines of 1969 as essentially correct. Lin and his supporter, Chen Boda, had worked on the first draft of the Ninth Congress report, but during the proceedings the Central Committee, in particular Mao and Zhou, had revised it.

In identifying Lin with opposition to Mao's revolutionary theory of continuing the dictatorship of the proletariat, Zhou lost no time in placing Lin's 'counter-revolutionary coup d'état' on the 'right' side of the Cultural Revolution spectrum. He also laid the groundwork for the further development of the current campaign against Confucian-

ism, tying it to the discrediting of Lin. This was a subtle, but masterful political stroke, which warded off the hostile accusations of the survivors of the Cultural Revolution Group, who had been manoeuvring to identify Zhou with Confucianism. By identifying himself with Mao's praxis, Zhou seized the political initiative.

The inner-Party movement to criticise Lin became a movement to 'rectify workstyle' through 'seeking the truth from the facts'.¹¹⁶ The same emphasis had, of course, been used to foreclose the radical phase of the Cultural Revolution. Now it was used to discredit Lin, who had allegedly fostered the fascist adulation of Mao for the purpose of overthrowing Mao's revolutionary line. Zhou referred to Mao's observation that in Party history 'one tendency often covers another'. Rightwing 'all alliance, no struggle' was used by left 'opportunism' which sustained domestically and internationally 'all struggle, no alliance' and vice versa. Mao's proper dialectical flexibility required that, in the context of alliance, 'necessary struggles with the bourgeoisie' should not be forgotten, and that in the context of splitting, 'the possibility of alliance under given conditions' should also not be forgotten.¹¹⁷

Zhou rebutted Albanian charges of compromise quoting Lenin on the importance of 'necessary compromises'. The Albanians had forgotten Brest-Litovsk. He drew their attention to the following Leninist passage: ' . . . there are compromises and compromises. One must be able to analyse the situation and the concrete conditions of each compromise, or of each variety of compromise'.¹¹⁸

Zhou's focused on Third World resistance to the 'hegemonism and power politics of the superpowers'. Zhou again quoted Lenin: ' . . . an essential feature of imperialism in the rivalry between several great powers in the striving for hegemony'. In the contemporary context of contention for hegemony. Zhou cited Europe as the 'key point'. This agreed with Kissinger's analysis except that Zhou claimed that the West hoped to divert Soviet attention from Europe towards China, while the Soviets 'were making a feint to the East while attacking in the West'.¹¹⁹ As was explained in March 1973, the concentration of Soviet troops on the border, while dangerous, was not the focus of Soviet strategy; it was 'an intimidating pose' rather than a serious preparation for a 'big fight'.¹²⁰ Even so, Zhou underlined Mao's instruction to be prepared against any war which 'imperialism' might launch and also against 'surprise attack on our country by Soviet revisionist social-imperialism'.¹²¹

As for US imperialism, Zhou claimed: 'US imperialism started to

go downhill after its defeat in the war of aggression against Korea. It has openly admitted that it is increasingly on the decline . . .'¹²² Zhou set out an inventory of the transgressions of 'social imperialism':

Externally, [the Soviet Union] has invaded and occupied Czechoslovakia, massed its troops along the Chinese border, sent troops into the People's Republic of Mongolia, supported the traitorous Lon Nol clique, suppressed the Polish workers' rebellion, intervened in Egypt, causing the expulsion of the Soviet exports, dismembered Pakistan and carried out subversive activities in many Asian and African countries.¹²³

Even given this list, Zhou extended the five principles of peaceful coexistence to the Soviet Union.

Zhou briefly indicated to the Tenth National Congress several new facts. The 'legitimate status' of the PRC had been restored at the UN: 'the policy of isolating China' had become 'bankrupt' as China had established relations with an increasing number of countries on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence; and Sino-American relations had 'improved to some extent'.¹²⁴

Significantly, the latter improvement did not preclude Zhou Enlai's aggressive stance against both 'superpowers' at the UN. Within United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) for example, Chinese representatives advanced Zhou's 1964 'eight principles' for foreign aid and development.¹²⁵ The Chinese delegation in New York was at the forefront of the debate concerning the New International Economic Order. Zhou's diplomats sided with those advocating participation in the management of international finance, and the rescheduling and reduction of interest payments imposed by 'imperialism' on the debtor countries of the Third World.¹²⁶

China's own modern history with its emphasis on 'self-reliance and independence' was more germane to Zhou's position on China and the Third World than was any understanding of the classical 'balance of power'. The concept of 'self-reliance' which he had emphasised in the April 1949 negotiations with the Guomindang, and which had been further clarified in 1956, was not set against international exchange and technological transfer. It was contrasted with 'autarchy'.

Mao's 'revolutionary diplomatic line' included the expansion of international exchange, but only on the basis of 'equality and mutual

benefit'. As the Party's theoretical journal, *Hongqi*, editorialised in January 1974, proper exchange was to be distinguished from 'the blind worship of foreign things'. 'Self-reliance' meant: 'We shall never seize the wealth of the people of other countries, nor will we rely on any external force in building socialism'.¹²⁷

The emphasis on China never becoming a 'superpower' was central to the theoretical reworking of the Chinese perception of world politics. In February 1974 Mao had briefly pointed out to Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda that international political structures could be described in terms of 'Three Worlds'. Both the US and USSR inhabited the 'First World' as the proponents of 'hegemonism'. China was a part of the Third World of Africa, Asia and Latin American which, Mao hoped, would align with the 'Second World', including the developed countries of the Commonwealth and European Economic Community.

The central position of China within this projected united front alignment related to Mao and Zhou's understanding of 'self-reliance'. The Third World was to act as a 'main force' in the strategic transformation of the hierarchical structures of international politics. None other than Deng Xiaoping was sent to the UN to explain. In his April 1974 address to the UN General Assembly, Deng relied on Mao's analysis of the 'Three Worlds'. He set out a united front strategy whereby the Third World as the 'main force' would challenge 'imperialism' and 'hegemonism'. Deng attacked both the Soviet 'international division of labour' and American 'interdependence' as 'neo-colonialist' ploys.¹²⁸

Deng insisted that China would only pursue international exchange on the basis of 'self-reliance' as opposed to 'self-seclusion' or the 'rejection of foreign aid'. He suggested that 'self-reliance would vary in its application in specific national contexts; however, he advised that it required primary control over natural resources and food production. Deng proposed a much greater pattern of intra-South co-operation (*nannan hezuo*), which he called 'collective self-reliance' (*gebiedehuo jitide zili gengsheng*).

The successful negotiation of Sino-American normalisation was one of the highlights of Zhou's diplomatic career, but the realism which informed his view of the negotiations did not spring from an intuitive understanding of the classical European balance of power, as suggested by Henry Kissinger. In fact, the latter misinterpreted Zhou's position on 'hegemonism'. Zhou's foreign policy was more multidimensional than what is suggested in the exclusive containment

of the Soviet Union, and its primary purpose was not the alignment with the US, but the achievement of united front alignments on the basis of Chinese 'independence and self-reliance'. Ideology was not merely a 'facade'; it was the intellectual source for Zhou's personal 'workstyle'. Zhou's realism was a matter of formal ideological conception which drew on the practical experience of united front politics.

8 Zhou Enlai's Legacy: Towards 'Independent Foreign Policy'

The Chinese Communist Party has made a posthumous reckoning of Zhou's political performance and policies during the late 1960s to mid-1970s. The 27 June 1981 resolution on Party history explicitly criticised Mao's poor political judgement during the Cultural Revolution, but absolved Zhou from any blame. Zhou had ' . . . found himself in an extremely difficult situation throughout the 'cultural revolution' . . . '¹ but he still managed to minimise the 'damage' caused by the lunatic ultra-left and to protect many within and without the Party. The resolution agreed with Deng Xiaoping's earlier assessment in his August 1980 interview with Oriana Fallaci.² Deng then referred to Zhou as his 'elder brother', and he, himself, was popularly thought of as 'the living Zhou Enlai'.

The resolution stresses that once Zhou took charge of the day-to-day operations of the Central Committee in the wake of the 13 September Incident, he attempted to focus anti-Lin Biao criticism on erroneous 'ultra-left trend of thought'. Mao, on the other hand, focused on the political danger posed by the 'right'. The resolution confirms that in 1972 Zhou attempted to sponsor the 'correct proposals' of Party members who had been criticised in 1967 as the perpetrators of the 'February Adverse Current'.³ Zhou reasserted the goals of the 'four modernisations' in the context of the political manoeuvrings of the Fourth National People's Congress, but he became so seriously incapacitated in 1975 that Deng Xiaoping had to take over the operations of the Party Central Committee. As early as 1972 Zhou had been diagnosed as having cancer, and in July 1974, he had suffered a massive heart attack.

In his last series of meetings with world leaders in Beijing on 1973–4, Zhou highlighted 'self-reliance' in China's international relations. In meetings with Third World delegations, he described the prevailing international conditions as 'a great disorder under heaven' (*tianxia daluan*).⁴ Of course such disorder, in Mao's terms, provided the positive conditions for the creation of independent forces in

world politics. The Cultural Revolution line, 'Countries want independence, nations want liberation and peoples, revolution' (*guojia yao duli, minzu yao jiefang, renmin yao geming*), captured the essence of China's own revolutionary experience. In referring to 'the wind sweeping through the tower heralds a rising storm in the mountains' (*shanyu yu lai feng man lou*), Zhou highlighted both the trend towards independence in modern Chinese history and the strategic consolidation of post-colonial Third World political alignments.⁵

In a 11 September 1973 speech welcoming French President Georges Pompidou, Zhou took the opportunity of his guest's remarks concerning 'independence' to explain briefly the reasoning behind 'dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere and never seek hegemony'. He said that China's most basic 'strategy' (*fangzhen*) was 'self-reliance', and he also expressed interest in European unity in relation to the Soviet Union and European independence in relation to the United States.⁶

Even with the leaders of the 'Second World', Zhou was quite candid as to Chinese opposition to both the United States and the Soviet Union. In his welcoming speech to Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau on 11 October 1973, he responded to the Canadian dilemma of 'independence' *vis-à-vis* the United States. Canada's historical dependence on Britain and the US was to be modified in more extensive relations with other countries. Zhou was very direct with his 'old friend', Trudeau, who, despite his reservations, represented one of the most important US allies. Zhou said:

The superpowers in their rivalry for world hegemony jockey for position, try to undermine each other and arbitrarily encroach on the independence and sovereignty of other states. They have great appetites and a long reach . . . Their acrimonious rivalry hardly contributes to the achievement of stability in today's world.⁷

On 21 February 1974 Zhou discussed with Kenneth Kaunda Mao's theory of the three worlds and distinguished between the declining, troubled American superpower and the more hungry, aggressive Soviet superpower.⁸ On 26 February, Zhou welcomed the Algerian President Boumédienne and placed the theme of 'independence' in the context of their countries' efforts to focus the UN General Assembly on the natural resources question.⁹ In welcoming Tanzanian President Nyerere on 24 March, Zhou focused on Nyerere's Arusha Declaration of 1967, stressing national independence and 'self-reliance',¹⁰ and on 6 May, in a speech to the Senegalese Prime Minister, he cited the importance of 'collective self-reliance'.¹¹

In April Deng Xiaoping assumed some of Zhou's duties in terms of the hosting of foreign dignatories. Zhou continued to work from his hospital bed. During his extended stay in hospital, he had had up to 14 operations. He still made it out of hospital to preside over the second plenum of the Tenth Party Central Committee, and subsequently, in January 1975, he gave the keynote address at the Fourth National People's Congress.¹²

Summing up all of his remaining energies, Zhou laboured before the National People's Congress for the last time on 13 January. His speech was a masterful political synthesis of the competing priorities of modernisation and class struggle. The latter became the central thematic axis of the Anti-Lin, Anti-Confucius Campaign.

Zhou once again expounded on 'self-reliance'. The latter precluded 'workstyles' which fostered the extremes of 'servility to things foreign' and 'the doctrine of trailing behind at a snail's pace'. As for an authoritative reading of the principle of 'self-reliance', Zhou cited Mao's instructions:

Rely mainly on our own efforts while making external assistance subsidiary, break down blind faith, go in for industry, agriculture and technical and cultural revolutions independently, do away with slavishness, bury dogmatism, learn from the good experience of other countries conscientiously and be sure to study their bad experience too, so as to draw lessons from it.¹³

According to Zhou, this line provided the means whereby China was able to break 'the imperialist blockade and withstand social-imperialist pressure'. With 'self-reliance', China was not entangled in the 'economic fluctuations' of the capitalist world. Zhou saw the Soviet-American contention for global hegemony as focused on Europe. Zhou also repeated that either war gives rise to revolution or the latter will prevent the former.¹⁴

Zhou summed up China's united front strategy: 'We should ally ourselves with all the forces in the world that can be allied with to combat colonialism, imperialism and above all superpower hegemonism'.¹⁵ Zhou's denunciation of the US and USSR as 'the biggest international oppressors and exploiters today' was accompanied by the standing offer 'to establish or develop relations with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence'. While alluding to the fact that 'fundamental differences' still existed between China and the US, Zhou criticised the Soviets for their failure to honour Kosygin's undertaking to sign an agreement confirming the status quo on the border.¹⁶

The formulations of his report were incorporated into the new state constitution of 17 January. The preamble confirmed the principle of 'self-reliance' in the building of socialism, eschewed any intention of China ever becoming a 'superpower', underscored the importance of implementing the five principles in the relations between states with different social systems and dedicated China to the international united front to 'oppose the hegemonism of the superpowers'.¹⁷

In China, the personal legacy of Zhou Enlai, as a leader, has been stressed in terms of his revolutionary dedication and his 'workstyle'. In these aspects Chinese diplomacy has been inescapably domestic. Zhou was an astute, well-travelled observer, but his own conception of international relations was essentially domestic. The Americans, and surprisingly, even the Soviets, often failed to appreciate the relevance of domestic revolutionary experience to Zhou's diplomacy. Perhaps the reliance on domestic political perspective did pose problems in terms of international communications, but Zhou was able to assess realistically the balance of forces on the basis of domestic 'workstyle' and 'strategies and policies'.

In China, Zhou's relevance to contemporary foreign policy has been repeatedly asserted since the early 1980s. Deng Xiaoping is on record as stating that Zhou and Mao established the basic framework of China's contemporary 'independent foreign policy' (*duli waijiao Zhengce*). Zhou developed foreign policy within the broad outlines of Mao's theories of united front; however, the concrete strategies which today inform China's 'independent foreign policy', originate with his strategy of the five principles of peaceful coexistence and 'seeking common ground while reserving differences'.¹⁸

Contemporary foreign policy expresses 'independence' while furthering the 'open door policy' (*kaifang zhengce*) in an extensive modernisation process which includes much greater latitude for foreign participation in that process. The formal resolution of the inherent tension between 'independence', as a historical lesson in the struggle against imperialism and the 'open door', was conceptually resolved in Zhou Enlai's 'four points', 'first, use; second, criticise; third, improve; and fourth, make it our own' (*yi yong, er pi, san gai, si chuang*).¹⁹ While China will not necessarily follow the 'big powers' in an 'external-oriented road in the form of industry-foreign trade', China intends to make appropriate use of foreign investment and trade in so far as these can be assimilated on the basis of 'equality and mutual benefit'.²⁰ The four points are the distillation of the Zhou-

Mao position of 1948–9, and they reflect the dialectical emphases of Mao's 'On the Ten Major Relationships'.

Zhou's conception of international relations, although 'realistic', was essentially 'revolutionary' in its attempted transformation of the structures of international relations. In this endeavour he stressed the importance of 'self-reliance' to Third World countries. China's contemporary aid programme is still conceptually rooted in the 'eight principles' which Zhou enunciated during his African-Asian tour of 1963–4. The fourth principle by which China was bound not to make any recipient of Chinese aid dependent upon China reflected China's own negative experience of foreign aid. Premier Zhao Ziyang, in 1982, further refined these principles in his four-point formulation on questions relating to China's economic and technological co-operation with other developing countries, namely, 'equality and mutual benefit, stress on practical results, diversity of forms and common progress'. This formulation again featured 'collective self-reliance' in 'South-South co-operation'.²¹

Zhou's 'realism' originated in his ideological understanding of 'independence and self-reliance' which precluded reliance on either the US or the Soviet Union. Zhou in 1949 had warned of the 'cart overturned ahead'. He would not follow in the footsteps of the Guomindang, but he and Mao did try 'leaning to one side',²² and this experience was ultimately judged in terms of its unacceptable costs to China's independence.

Zhou's diplomacy for Sino-US normalisation was also an extension of his strategic focus on independence. The entwining of bilateralism with 'opposition to hegemonism' was premised in the 'dual policy' of traditional united front politics. It was not an intuitive recourse to Metternich's balance of power. Zhou identified with Lenin's 'Brest-Litovsk' tactics. He had discovered realism in making revolution. Normalisation encompassed both the Leninist thesis of imperialism and the CCP's united front tactics. Even with the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué, the US still remained an 'imperialist' power engaged in contention and collaboration with the Soviet Union. 'Opposition to hegemonism' was not synonymous with opposition to the Soviet Union. The five principles of peaceful coexistence as a strategy of international relations presumed a co-operative political multilateralism against the hegemonisms of the two superpowers. Even in his 1973 banquet remarks to French President Pompidou he could not resist asserting: 'Hegemonism and power politics would be consigned to the museum of history by the peoples of the world'.²³

For Zhou, 'self-reliance' was an ideological perspective on imperialism and a practical strategic calculation. Chinese 'independence' would be best served, and more strategic options retained, if China did not rigidly align with either one of the superpowers. It is hardly surprising that the contemporary emphasis on 'seeking the truth from the facts' has served to confirm an approach which would judge the US and USSR on a case-by-case basis in the different areas of regional contention for 'hegemonism', and that 'self-reliance' has underlined the importance of a strict distinction between Sino-Soviet and Sino-American bilateralisms. The implication of a 'China card', of course, was offensive to the Chinese focus on their own independence, hence Zhao Ziyang disparaged 'equi-distant policy' as an unprincipled expression of 'power politics'.²⁴ Zhou Enlai's personal 'realism', as a formal ideological construct, encompassed principle and power, and it is this synthesis which is at the heart of the contemporary 'independent foreign policy'.

Deng Xiaoping, in a 6 May 1982 meeting with Samuel Kanyon Doe, the Liberian Head of State, noted that China had suffered from the hostility of both the US and the USSR, but that the lack of help from the outside had reinforced the importance of 'self-reliance'. He insisted that the open door policy would remain in effect, but that in pursuing the open door China subscribes to 'self-reliance'. Deng summed up:

Thus the primary thing that we've learned from our experience and that we would like to propose to our third-world friends is self-reliance. Of course, that doesn't mean we shouldn't seek outside help, but the main thing is to rely on our own efforts.²⁵

This position precludes not only military alliance with either the USSR or US, but also any systematic trilateral strategic co-operation.

On 1 September 1982 Deng spoke again, this time to an enlarged session of the Politbureau on the subject of 'self-reliance'. Referring to 'self-reliance and independence' as 'our basic stand', he warned:

No foreign country can expect China to be its vassal, nor can it expect China to accept anything harmful to China's interests. We will unswervingly follow a policy of opening to the outside world and actively increase exchanges with foreign countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.²⁶

Zhou's insistence that China would never become a superpower has its corollary in the contemporary protestation that China will

'never play cards'. Despite their continuing hospitality towards Henry Kissinger, the Chinese have yet to accept the 'balance of power system' as an inevitable necessity of the modern state system characterised by a mechanical competition between insecure sovereignties seeking to acquire scarce resources. Zhou believed that 'normalisation' with the US did not preclude political struggle against US 'imperialism' – this was explicit in his strategy of 'seeking common ground while reserving differences' (*qiutong cunyi*). The contemporary 'opposition to hegemony' and 'solidarity' with the Third World is conveyed in a more refined diplomatic language but in it is still grounded in an evolving historiographical integration of the Leninist thesis on imperialism with the Zhou-Mao conception of 'independence and self-reliance'.

The resultant synthesis has, on the formal basis of a 'workstyle' of 'seeking the truth from the facts', emphasised the lessons of the past in such a way as to sanction normal bilateralism and opposition to hegemonism, self-reliance and collective self-reliance against traditional international economic structures, and independence and multilateralism in the struggle against 'power politics' of the two superpowers. The current formulation of 'independence' derives from Zhou's united front position, which realistically assessed the balance of forces while adopting a strategy calling for the transformation of the structures of international politics through the development of multipolarity and multilateralism in opposition to the bipolar struggle of the US and USSR for global hegemony.

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Introduction

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39. Ibid., p. 142.
40. Ibid., p. 195.
41. Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. III, henceforth SWM, III (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967) pp. 179–80.
42. SWZEL, I, p. 228.
43. *The China White Paper*, vol. I (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967).
44. Esherick, *Lost Chance*, op. cit., pp. 315–6.
45. *The China White Paper*, op. cit., p. 115.
46. SWM, III, p. 191.
47. SWZEL, I, pp. 231–44.
48. Kai-yu Hsu, *Chou En-lai*, op. cit., pp. 163–4.
49. SWZEL, I, p. 239.
50. Ibid., p. 288.
51. Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. IV, henceforth SWM, IV (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1969) p. 56.
52. SWZEL, I, p. 286.
53. Ibid., pp. 288–9.
54. Ibid., p. 314.
55. Ibid., p. 368.
56. Ibid., p. 362.

2 Establishing the Foreign Ministry in the Cold War

1. 'Premier Chou Creatively Carried out Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Line in Foreign Affairs' in *We Will Always Remember Premier Zhou Enlai* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977) pp. 37–8.
2. Percy and Lucy Fang, *Zhou Enlai – A Profile*, (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1986) p. 110 (fn 9).
3. Wang Bingnan, 'Huiyi Zhou zongli zai waijiao gongzuozhong jige pianduan' (Recollections of Premier Zhou in foreign affairs work), *Shijie zhishi* (World knowledge), no. 1, 1 January 1979, pp. 8–12. Also refer to Percy and Lucy Fang, ibid., pp. 99–100.
4. See Wang Bingnan's discussion of this bureau, op. cit., as the first foreign policy unit, ch. 2.
5. For Wang Bingnan's career details refer to 'Biographies of CPAFFC Leaders', *Voice of Friendship* (Beijing) no. 3, February 1984, p. 24, and Anne B. Clark and Donald W. Klein, *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese*

Communism, 1921-65. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971) pp. 920-3.

6. Donald Klein, 'The Management of Foreign Affairs in Communist China', in John Lindbeck (ed.) *China: Management of a Revolutionary Society* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971) p. 310.
7. 'Peking's Foreign Relations', US Consulate General, Hong Kong, *Current Background*, (henceforth CB), no. 14, 12 October 1950, p. 1. This report notes that at the time no diplomatic representatives had been exchanged with Albania and Vietnam. A People's Republic of China (PRC) ambassador had taken up his posting in Indonesia, but that country had yet to despatch its ambassador to Beijing. This listing of Ministry and Embassy personnel was later superceded by a revised listing in CB, no. 121, 5 October 1951, pp. 1-5.
8. Michael Yahuda, 'The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China' in Zare Steiner (ed.) *The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World* (London: Times Books, 1982) p. 155.
9. For example, refer to the following report on the allegedly low priority assigned to UN activity in 'Communist Attitudes Toward Chinese Communist Membership in the UN', US State Department, Office of Intelligence and Research (OIR) report no. 6361, 31 July 1953.
10. See for example, 'Considerations Relevant to the Formulation of Conditions for US Recognition of a Communist Government of China', (preliminary version), US State Department, OIR report no. 5009, July 1949.
11. 'Titoism and the Theory of "Colonial" Revolution as Applied to China', US State Department, OIR report no. 4845, 20 February 1949; 'Communist China: Satellite or Junior Partner of the USSR?', Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis report no. 5681-S, January, 1952; 'The Status of Mao Tse-tung as Theoretician and Leader', US State Department, OIR report no. 5101, 1949, p. 11.
12. On the British view of China as a 'fertile field for Titoism' refer to 'Current British Policy Toward Communist China', US State Department, OIR report no. 5111, 15 November 1949, p. 5.
13. 'Points of Stress in Current Sino-Soviet Relations', US State Department, OIR report no. 6225, 1 April 1953, p. 2.
14. 'Internationalism and Nationalism', *Collected Works of Liu Shao-ch'i, 1945-57* (Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1969) pp. 127-8.
15. For example, refer to the article by Zheng Weizhi, Director of the Foreign Ministry's Institute of International Studies, in *Beijing Review*, (henceforth BR), no. 1, January 1985, pp. 16-17, 38. This article originally appeared in *Guoji guanxi yanjiu* (Journal of International Studies), no. 4, 1985. Ma Lie and Wang Ning cite the same 17 April 1949 statement by Zhou in their historiography - Ma Lie and Wang Ning, 'Zhou Enlai tongzhi suochangdao he tixiande xin Zhongguo waijiao fengsu', offprint provided by Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Beijing, c. 1980, p. 2.
16. SWZEL, I, p. 360.
17. SWM, IV, p. 370.
18. Ibid., p. 416.
19. For a summary of these 'wrong' views refer to Hai Fu (ed.) *Wei shenme*

yibiandao? (Why leaning to one side?) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe) May 1951, p. 1.

20. For the text of chapter 7 refer to *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo dui wai guanxi wenjianji* (Collected documents on the foreign affairs of the People's Republic of China), vol. I, 1949–50 (henceforth cited as ZHWGJ, 49–50) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1957) pp. 1–2.
21. British Foreign Office memorandum of 15 August 1949 in US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (henceforth cited as *FRUS* 1949) (Washington DC; GPO, 1974) pp. 57–8.
22. Stuart R. Schram (ed.) *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974) pp. 102–3.
23. US Joint Publications Research Service, *Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought (1949–1968)*, part I (Washington, DC: GPO, 1974) p. 58.
24. Wu Xiuquan, 'Sino-Soviet Relations in the Early 1950s', *BR*, no. 47, 21 November 1983, p. 17.
25. John Gittings, *The World and China 1922–1972* (London: Eyre Methuen, 1974) p. 153.
26. *Ibid.*
27. Wu Xiuquan, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
28. ZHWGJ, I, p. 74.
29. Stuart R. Schram (ed.) *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, *op. cit.*, p. 101.
30. Wu Xiuquan, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
32. Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, *China Under Threat* (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980) p. 45.
33. For the 14 February text see ZHWGJ, 49–50, pp. 81–2.
34. 'The Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements', US State Department, OIR report no. 5544, 23 May 1951, pp. 1–2. The Chinese text is available in ZHWGJ, 49–50, pp. 75–7. American intelligence picked up on the point that 'mutual benefit and equality' had not previously appeared in earlier Soviet treaties. See 'Peiping's View of the Communist Bloc', US State Department, OIR report No. 7392, 3 December 1956, p. 3.
35. Wu Xiuquan, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
36. Text in Norman Graebner, *Cold War Diplomacy* (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1962) p. 161.
37. Peter Calvocoressi (for Royal Institute of International Affairs), *Survey of International Affairs 1949–1950* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954) p. 346.
38. Wu Xiuquan, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
40. See Karunakar Gupta on the conflicting theories on the origins of the Korean conflict, in 'How Did the Korean War Begin', *CQ*, no. 52, October–December, 1972, p. 713. Also refer to Robert Simmons, *Strained Alliance: Peking, P'yongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War* (New York: The Free Press) 1975.
41. ZHWGJ, 49–50, p. 131.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 137.
43. See John Gitting's analysis of this decision in *The World and China, 1922–1972*, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

44. As cited in the analysis of Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, op. cit., p. 55.
45. Phraseology from Zhou's speech of 1 October 1950. See Dick Wilson, *Zhou Enlai: A Biography* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1984) p. 188.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 189.
47. On the devaluation of Zhou's warning by US intelligence see James F. Schnabel, *US Army in the Korean War. Policy and Direction: The First Year* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, US Army, 1972) p. 198.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 201.
49. Robert Ferrell, *Off the Record: Private Papers of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Harper & Row, 1980).
50. 'Sino-Soviet Relations: A Reappraisal', US State Department, OIR report no. 7070, 4 November 1955, p. 4.
51. While US Secretary of State, Acheson, informed the British Ambassador that the US would not recommend to the UN 'a campaign of subversion or guerrilla warfare against the mainland of China', General Omar Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommended 'all practical covert aid to effective Nationalist guerilla forces in China' (see US, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1951*, vol. VII, part 1, (henceforth cited as FRUS, 1951) (Washington, DC: GPO, 1983) pp. 39, 72.
52. Zhou Enlai, *The First Year of People's China* (Bombay: People's Publishing House, c. 1950) pp. 13–14. The Chinese text, *Wei gonggu he fazhan renminde shengli er douzheng* (Struggle to strengthen and develop the people's victory) was published by Xinhuashudian on 10 November 1950.
53. Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, op. cit., p. 53.
54. Calvocoressi, *Survey of International Affairs 1949–50*, op. cit., pp. 351–2.
55. UNSC speech of 28 November 1950 in *China Accuses* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1951) pp. 6–7. The Chinese text is available in *Woguo zai anlihuide zhengyi douzheng* (Our country's just struggle in the Security Council) (Xinhuashishi zongkan) (New China affairs series), no. 81, Renmin chubanshe, 31 December 1950, pp. 3–28.
56. *China Accuses*, op. cit., p. 6.
57. *Ibid.*, pp. 19–20.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 21–2.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
60. FRUS, 1951, p. 1.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 91. Chinese text in *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo dui wai guanxi wenjianji*, vol. 2, 1951–3 (henceforth cited as ZHWGJ, 51–3) (Beijing: Shihjie zhishi chubanshe, 1958) pp. 3–4.
63. FRUS, 1951, pp. 125–6.
64. Zhou's 22 January reply to Panikkar's request for further information on the Chinese position is in SCMP, no. 56, 25 January 1951, pp. 1–2.
65. FRUS, 1951, p. 149.
66. Texts in Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on*

International Affairs, 1951 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954) p. 548 and ZHWGJ, 51–3, p. 8.

67. SCMP, no. 108, 26–9 May 1951, p. 5.

68. SCMP, no. 330, 6 May 1952, p. 5.

69. See the analysis of Chihiro Hosoya, 'Japan, China, the United States, and the United Kingdom', *International Affairs*, vol. 60, no. 2, spring, 1984, pp. 251, 255.

70. As cited by Chihiro Hosoya, *ibid.*, p. 256.

71. FRUS, 1951, p. 552.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 561.

73. John Gittings cites an unnamed Soviet source to the effect that Malik's proposal was a surprise to the Chinese. John Gittings, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

74. SCMP, no. 598, 26 June 1953, p. 2.

75. FRUS, 1951, p. 568.

76. See the analysis of John Gittings, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

77. John Gittings, *op. cit.*, p. 161, and Philip Bridgman, Arthur Cohen and Leonard Jaffe, 'Mao's Road and Sino-Soviet Relations: A View from Washington', CQ, no. 52, October-December 1972, p. 683.

78. Chen Boda, *Renmin ribao* 28 June 1950.

79. John Gittings, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

80. FRUS, 1951, pp. 277–8. For an analysis of the relative importance of Soviet and indigenous factors in the transition from 'economic reconstruction' to 'large-scale capital construction' refer to Ronald C. Keith, 'The Relevance of Border-Region Experience to Nation-Building in China, 1949–52', CQ, no. 78, June 1979, pp. 274–95.

81. Text in CB, no. 134, 5 November 1951, pp. 1–17.

82. CB, no. 134, p. 6.

83. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

84. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

85. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

86. SCMP, no. 106, 22 May 1951, p. 17.

87. CB, no. 134, p. 5.

88. John Gittings, *op. cit.*, pp. 187–8.

89. SCMP, no. 413, 16 December 1952, p. 3.

90. SCMP, no. 518, 22 February 1953, p. 5.

91. SCMP, no. 483, 31 December 1952, p. 16.

92. CB, no. 228, 8 February 1953, p. 4.

93. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

94. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

95. See Dick Wilson, *Zhou Enlai*, *op. cit.*, p. 192 for Zhou's role in Stalin's funeral.

96. Stuart R. Schram (ed.) *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, (New York: Praeger, revised and enlarged, 1969) p. 429.

97. SCMP, no. 542, 30 March 1953, p. 3.

3 Peaceful Coexistence v. Containment at Geneva and Bandung

1. US, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, vol. XVI, The Geneva Conference, henceforth cited as FRUS, 52–4,

(Washington, DC: GPO, 1981) p. 17.

2. FRUS, 52–4, p. 415.
3. SCMP, no. 649, 13 September 1953, pp. 17–19.
4. UN, *Yearbook of the United Nations 1953* (New York: UN Department of Public Information) p. 125.
5. 'The Man Who Witnessed the Birth of the Five Principles', *China Daily*, 29 June 1984, p. 4.
6. Text of Zhou's 31 December remarks in *Zhou Enlai xuanji* (Selected works of Zhou Enlai), vol. 1 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1984) p. 118.
7. FRUS, 52–4, p. 77.
8. François Joyaux, *La Chine et le règlement du premier conflit d'Indochine* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1979) p. 117.
9. Philippe Devillers and Jean Lacouture, *End of a War* (New York: Praeger, 1969) p. 122.
10. François Joyaux, op. cit., pp. 117–18.
11. Text in *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo dui wai guanxi wenjianji* (Collected documents of the foreign relations of the People's Republic of China), vol. 3, 1954–5, henceforth cited as ZHWGJ, 54–5 (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1958) pp. 20–7.
12. ZHWGJ, 54–5, p. 22.
13. FRUS, 52–4, p. 155.
14. Ibid., p. 607.
15. Ibid., pp. 166–7.
16. Ibid., p. 176.
17. Ibid., p. 243.
18. Ibid., p. 232.
19. Ibid., p. 621.
20. Ibid., p. 897.
21. Wang Bingnan, 'Huiyi Zhou zongli zai waijiao gongzuozhong jige pianduan', (Recollections of Premier Zhou in foreign affairs work), *Shijie zhishi*, no. 1, 1 January 1979, pp. 9–10.
22. ZHWGJ, 54–5, p. 34.
23. Ibid., p. 66.
24. In the author's 15 November 1985 interview with Zhang Wenjin, who participated in both the Geneva and Bandung delegations, Zhang emphasised that this concept was not understood to apply to the great powers at Geneva.
25. FRUS, 52–4, p. 689.
26. Ibid., p. 381.
27. Ibid., pp. 382–3.
28. Ibid., p. 383.
29. Ibid., p. 390.
30. Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, *China! Inside the People's Republic* (New York: Bantam Books, 1972) pp. 352–3.
31. See François Joyaux, op. cit., pp. 260–3 for a discussion of extant historiography.
32. In response to this view in Vietnam's so-called 'White Paper' ('The Truth About Vietnam-China Relations Over the Last 30 Years', 1979), the Chinese have cited the account of Hoan Van Hoan, who

attended the Geneva Conference as a member of the delegation from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The latter insists that there was congenial cooperation between the Chinese, Soviet and Vietnamese delegations. See 'Distortion of Facts . . .', BR, NO. 49, 7 December 1979, p. 13.

33. Strobe Talbott (ed.) Intro. by Edward Crankshaw, *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston & Toronto: Little, Brown & Co., 1970) p. 482.
34. François Joyaux, op. cit., pp. 69–70.
35. As discussed in Kuo-kang Shao, 'Zhou Enlai's Diplomacy and the Neutralization of Indo-China, 1954–55', CQ, no. 107, September, 1986, p. 490, fn 13. For further analysis of Khrushchev as a source, refer to Evelyn Colbert, *Southeast Asia in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977) pp. 279–80.
36. FRUS, 52–4, p. 431.
37. Ibid., p. 734.
38. ZHGWJ, 54–5, p. 62.
39. FRUS, 52–4, p. 782.
40. ZHWGJ, 54–5, p. 62.
41. Ibid., p. 12.
42. FRUS, 52–4, p. 820.
43. François Joyaux, op. cit., p. 197.
44. Ibid., p. 188.
45. FRUS, 52–4, p. 946.
46. ZHWGJ, 54–5, p. 64.
47. FRUS, 52–4, pp. 984–5.
48. François Joyaux, op. cit., p. 191.
49. FRUS, 52–4, p. 998.
50. Ibid., p. 1003.
51. ZHGWJ, 54–5, p. 70.
52. FRUS, 52–4, p. 1171.
53. On 14 June Dulles cabled the US Delegation indicating final adjournment was 'in our best interest': FRUS, 52–4, p. 1146.
54. FRUS, 52–4, p. 1214.
55. Ibid., pp. 1233–4, 1240–1.
56. See fn 24.
57. ZHWGJ, 54–5, pp. 113–4.
58. Ibid., p. 111.
59. SCMP, No. 940, 2 December 1954, p. 4.
60. For a discussion of 'li' refer to Ronald C. Keith, 'The Origins and Strategic Implications of China's "Independent Foreign Policy"', *International Journal*, vol. XLI, no. 1, Winter, 1985–6, p. 114.
61. ZHWGJ, 54–5, p. 116.
62. Ibid., pp. 117–18.
63. As cited by Kuo-kang Shao, op. cit., p. 498.
64. See *Renmin ribao* editorial of 28 June 1955 on the five principles in SCMP, no. 1079, 29 June 1955, p. 2.
65. CB, no. 288, 13 August 1954, p. 5.
66. François Joyaux, op. cit., p. 264.
67. Jean Lacoutre, *Ho Chi Minh: A Political Biography* (New York: Random House, 1968) p. 193.

68. From Eden's *Full Circle* as cited in King C. Chen, *Vietnam and China 1938–1954* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969) p. 315.
69. *China! Inside the People's Republic*, pp. 349–50.
70. Wang Bingnan, op. cit., p. 9.
71. CB, no. 296, 28 November 1954, p. 21.
72. The remarks of Zhou and U Nu are in SCMP, no. 946, 10 December 1954, pp. 14–16.
73. SCMP, no. 946, 10 December 1954, p. 16.
74. See the accounts in 'Brilliant Achievement, Outstanding Contribution', in *We Will Always Remember Premier Zhou Enlai* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977) p. 53, and in Percy and Lucy Fang, *Zhou Enlai – A Profile* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1986) p. 107.
75. Report to the NPC Standing Committee in Zhou En-lai, *China and the Asian-African Conference* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1955) p. 32.
76. 'Hong dianxun' (Red news), March 1968, in *Hongweibing ziliao* (Red Guard materials).
77. *Harbin ribao*, as reported in *Calgary Herald* 24 August 1985.
78. 'Brilliant Achievement, Outstanding Contribution', op. cit., p. 53.
79. English and Chinese texts in Zhou Enlai, *China and the Asian-African Conference*, 1st edn (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1955) pp. 9–20 and *Zhou Enlai xuanji* vol. 1 (Beijing, 1984) op cit., pp. 146–57.
80. As explained by Zhang Wenjin in an interview of November 1985.
81. Noble Frankland (ed.) (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs) *Documents on International Affairs 1955* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958) pp. 407–8.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 419.
83. The English discussion of this strategy is in *China and the Asian-African Conference*, op. cit., pp. 21–2, and the Chinese text is in *Zhou Enlai xuanji* vol. II (Hong Kong, 1976) pp. 406–7.
84. See the discussion of the preliminary thinking relating to this strategy in Ma Lie and Wang Ning, 'Zhou Enlai tongzhi suochangdao he tixiande xin Zhongguo waijiao fengsu', offprint provided by Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Beijing, C. 1980 pp. 5–6.
85. *Documents on International Affairs 1955*, op. cit., p. 419.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 417.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 416.
88. See Zhou's 13 May report in *China and the Asian-African Conference*, op. cit., p. 41. For commentary analysis refer to 'The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence – Fundamentals of Modern International Relations', (*Hongqi*, no. 11, 1984) in JPRS, CRF-84-014, 3 August 1984. The translated phraseology in JPRS is 'getting on well with each other at peace', p. 38.
89. As cited in 'Brilliant Achievement, Outstanding Contribution', op. cit., p. 55.
90. Strobe Talbott (ed.) *Khrushchev Remembers*, op. cit., (1974), p. 312.
91. See the extract of Sir John's speech in *Documents on International Affairs 1955*, op. cit., p. 412. Huang Hua discusses the emergence of this problem in 'Looking Back on Bandung', BR, no. 15, 15 April 1985, p. 17.

92. As cited in Evelyn Colbert, op. cit., (note 35), p. 324.
93. Ibid., p. 325, fn 34.
94. Zhou Enlai, *Zhou Enlai xuanji*, vol. II (Hong Kong, 1976) p. 411.
95. Zhou En-lai, op. cit., *China and the Asian-African Conference*, p. 42.
96. Ibid., p. 43.
97. Ibid., p. 55.
98. Ibid., p. 28.
99. Ibid., p. 47.
100. FRUS, 55-7, vol. III, China, 1986, p. 190
101. 'The Chinese Communist Position at the Bandung Conference', US, Department of State, Intelligence Report no. 6909, 20 May 1955, p. 2.

4 'Peaceful Coexistence' and the Sino-Soviet Split

1. Pu shan, one of Zhou's private secretaries, noted in an interview of 14 November 1985 that even given some of the emerging Sino-Soviet differences of the 1950s, Chinese perspective was framed in the assumption that socialist international relations were superior relations of a 'new type' and that 'peaceful coexistence' was not adequate to the exceptional character of such relations.
2. See BR, no. 42, 15 October 1984, p. 19.
3. See Alvin Z. Rubenstein (ed.) *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 72.
4. See R. Judson Mitchell's explanation of the 'correlation of forces' in *Ideology of a Superpower* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982) pp. 11-14. The Chinese prefer to use the phrase, 'balance of forces'.
5. Zhou Enlai, *On the Present International Situation, Chinese Foreign Policy and the Liberation of Taiwan* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1956) pp. 3, 8, 10, 18.
6. Stuart R. Schram (ed.) *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974) p. 191.
7. Ibid., p. 101.
8. Chinese Communist Party, *Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1956) p. 16.
9. Ibid., p. 94.
10. Ibid., p. 131.
11. 'On the Question of the Intellectuals', in Robert Bowie and John K. Fairbank (eds) *Communist China 1955-1959* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971) p. 140. The analysis of Zhou's position here borrows from Ronald C. Keith, 'China's Modernization and the Policy of "Self-Reliance"', *China Report*, vol. XIX, no. 2, March-April 1983, pp. 24-5.
12. See *Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought (1949-1968)*, I, 1974, p. 120 and also Stuart R. Schram (ed.) *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, op. cit., p. 101.
13. Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. V, henceforth cited as SWM, V (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977) p. 291.

14. SWM, V, p. 306.
15. See text in Stuart R. Schram (ed.) *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, op. cit., pp. 84–90. He Luting provides a gloss of this item in ‘In Memory of Chairman Mao’s Talk to the Music Workers’, *Hongqi* (Red Flag), 10 October 1979 in JPRS, no. 74680, 30 November 1979, pp. 118–21.
16. *Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, op. cit., p. 282.
17. For example, see Chou Keng-sheng, ‘The Principle of Peaceful Coexistence from the Viewpoint of International Law’, in Jerome Cohen and Hungdah Chiu (eds) *People’s China and International Law* vol. I (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974) p. 127.
18. As cited in Dick Wilson, *Zhou Enlai: A Biography* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1984) p. 211. See original reference in SWM, V, p. 365.
19. See Imre Nagy, *On Communism* (New York: Praeger, 1957) p. 22. Ambassador He’s role is discussed in Janos Radvanyi, ‘The Hungarian Revolution and the Hundred Flowers Campaign’, CQ, no. 43, July–September 1970, pp. 121–2.
20. Radvanyi, CQ, no. 43, p. 122.
21. Sees Tito’s discussions with John Foster Dulles in FRUS, 55–7, p. 167.
22. See SCMP, no. 1322, 22 June 1956, pp. 28–9.
23. As cited by John Gittings in ‘New Light on Mao’, CQ, no. 60, December 1974, p. 764.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 764.
25. *Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought*, I, op. cit., p. 37.
26. Author’s italics. SWM, V, p. 365.
27. As cited in Dick Wilson, *Zhou Enlai*, op. cit., p. 211.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 212.
29. The SWM, V, edition of this text omits reference to Zhou’s ‘slogans’; however, they are referred to in the Wan Sui text found in translation in *Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought*, I, op. cit., p. 57.
30. The text of the 31 October declaration is found in English translation in Jerome Cohen and Hungdah Chiu, op. cit., pp. 132–5. The Chinese text is in *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo dui wai guanxi wenjianji, 1956–1957*, vol. 4 (The foreign relations of the People’s Republic of China, henceforth cited as ZHWGJ, 56–7) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1958) pp. 150–2.
31. Tito at Pula as cited by Pravda in Paul E. Zinner (ed.), *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956) p. 550.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 555.
33. See Chinese text in ZHWGJ, 56–7, pp. 148–50.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 187.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 176.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 199.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 232–3.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 223–5.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 236.
40. *Ibid.*, pp. 240–1.
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 245–51.

42. Ibid., pp. 387–90.
43. Zhou Enlai, *Zhou Enlai xuanji* (Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, henceforth cited as ZELXJ, II, HK), vol. II (Hong Kong: Yishantushu gongsi, 1976) p. 442.
44. ZELXJ, II, HK, p. 444.
45. Ibid., p. 448.
46. Ibid., p. 450.
47. Ibid., p. 458.
48. Ibid., p. 464.
49. Ibid., p. 465.
50. Zhou's interview with the Japanese radio and press in SCMP, no. 1582, 29 July 1957, p. 23.
51. Zhou Enlai's report on the work of government, CB, no. 463, 2 July 1957, p. 12.
52. SWM, V, p. 420.
53. CB, no. 463, pp. 13–14.
54. Strobe Talbott (ed.) intro. by Edward Crankshaw, *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston & Toronto: Little, Brown & Co., 1970) p. 471.
55. SWM, V, p. 341.
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57. On revisionism as a problem from within the movement see Chang Ching, 'Why Revisionism Must Be Opposed', *Zhengzhi xuexi* (Political study), no. 2, 13 February 1957, in US Consulate General, Hong Kong, *Extracts from China Mainland Magazines*, no. 73, 11 March 1957, p. 13.
58. 'Outline of Views on the Question of Peaceful Transition', in John Gittings, *Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute. A Commentary and Extracts* (New York & Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968) pp. 307–8.
59. Strobe Talbott (ed.) intro. by Edward Crankshaw and Jerrold Schecter, *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston & Toronto: Little, Brown & Co., 1974) pp. 252.
60. Ibid., p. 255.
61. SWZEL, I, p. 313.
62. *Khruschev Remembers*, 1970, p. 467.
63. Apparently, Khrushchev initially believed that Mao was going to take the islands and he was surprised when Mao refrained from doing so. See *Khrushchev Remembers*, 1974. pp. 262–3.
64. Ibid., 1974, p. 254.
65. As cited in Alan J. Day (ed.) (comp. by Peter Jones and Sian Kevill), *China and the Soviet Union 1949–84* (Kessing's International Studies. Harlow, Essex: Longman Group Ltd., 1985) p. 9.
66. For example see Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution*, vol. I (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974) p. 315.
67. Zhou Enlai, 'The Present International Situation and China's Foreign Policy', CB, no. 492, 19 February 1958, p. 2.
68. Ibid., p. 11.
69. Stuart R. Schram (ed.) *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, op. cit., p. 126.
70. Ibid., p. 129.

71. *Khrushchev Remembers*, 1970, op. cit., p. 465; *Khrushchev Remembers*, 1974, op. cit., p. 258.
72. Stuart R. Schram (ed.) *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed*, op. cit., p. 129.
73. John Gittings, *Survey*, op. cit., p. 85.
74. See the analysis in Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc. Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967, rev. & enlarged edn) pp. 324–5.
75. Ibid., p. 330. For the Chinese text of the RMRB editorial and other CCP cadre study materials on the subject of Yugoslav ‘revisionism’ refer to *Geguo gongchandang he gongzuorendang pipan Nangong xiandaixuzhengzhuyi wenxian*, (Documents of the various Communist and Workers’ Parties criticising the Yugoslav Party’s modern revisionism), vol. I (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1958).
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77. Ibid., p. 11.
78. At least this was the interpretation of US intelligence. See US, Department of State, ‘Divisive and Cohesive Elements in the Sino-Soviet Alliance’, Intelligence Report, no. 7800, 15 September 1958, p. 14.
79. *Khrushchev Remembers*, 1974, op. cit., p. 248.
80. John Gittings, *Survey*, op. cit., p. 98.
81. See the analysis of the Chinese perception of this level of threat in Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, *China Under Threat. The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy* (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980) pp. 76–84.
82. Donald Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956–61* (New York: Atheneum, 1967) p. 207; Gurtov and Hwang, *China Under Threat*, op. cit., p. 91.
83. Donald Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict*, op. cit., p. 211.
84. Ibid., p. 214.
85. John Gittings, *Survey*, op. cit., pp. 91–2.
86. *Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought*, I, op. cit., p. 135.
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88. *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo dui wai guanxi wenjianji*, vol. 5, 1958, (henceforth cited as ZHWGJ, 58) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1959) p. 166.
89. ZHWGJ, 58, p. 170.
90. ‘On the Question of Whether Imperialism and All Reactionaries Are Real Tigers’, PR, nos 37, 38, 13 September 1977, p. 7.
91. For a gloss on ‘paper tiger’ refer to ‘Comrade Mao Tse-tung on “Imperialism and All Reactionaries Are Paper Tigers”’, *Renmin ribao*, 31 October 1958, in CB, no. 534, p. 6.
92. PR, nos 37, 38, p. 8.
93. *Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought*, I, op. cit., p. 136.
94. Ibid., pp. 136–7.
95. ZELXJ, II, HK, pp. 494–5, 497.
96. Ibid., p. 497.
97. See Zhou’s report on the work of government in CB, no. 559, 18 April 1958, p. 5.
98. CB, no. 559, p. 26.

99. Gittings, *Survey*, op. cit., p. 107.
100. *Ibid.*, p. 108.
101. *China and the Soviet Union 1949–84*, op. cit., p. 13.
102. *Khrushchev Remembers*, 1974, op. cit., p. 307.
103. *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo dui wai guanxi wenjianji*, vol. 6, 1959 (henceforth cited as ZHWGJ, 59) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1961) p. 201.
104. ZHWGJ, 59, p. 207.
105. *Ibid.*, p. 214.
106. *Khrushchev Remembers*, 1974, op. cit., p. 308.
107. Gittings, *Survey*, op. cit., pp. 130–1, 139–40.
108. Ronald C. Keith (ed.) *Energy, Security and Economic Development in East Asia* (London & Sydney: Croom Helm Ltd, 1986) p. 23.
109. *China and the Soviet Union 1949–84*, op. cit., p. 14.
110. Gittings, *Survey*, op. cit., p. 148.
111. *Ibid.*, p. 146.
112. Zhou Enlai, *Zhou Enlai xuanji*, vol. 2 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1984) pp. 300–1.
113. *Ibid.*, p. 302.
114. Gittings, *Survey*, op. cit., p. 154.
115. *China and the Soviet Union 1949–84*, op. cit., p. 24.
116. *Ibid.*, p. 24. Also see coverage of Zhou's speech in Peter S.H. Tang, *Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Moscow-Tirana-Peking Relations* (Washington: Research Institute on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1962) p. 77.

5 Zhou Enlai, Jawaharlal Nehru and Estranged 'Afro-Asian Unity'

1. India was the third Asian country after Outer Mongolia and Vietnam to recognise the PRC. See the listing in *Renmin shouce 1960* (People's handbook, 1960) (Beijing: Xinhua shudian, 1960) p. 317.
2. Jawaharlal Nehru, *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches 1949–1953*, vol. 2 (Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1954) p. 139.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 177.
5. Jawaharlal Nehru, *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1953–1957*, vol. 3 (Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1958), p. 300.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 307.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 307.
8. For example, see Yaacov Vertzberger, *Misperceptions in Foreign Policy-making: The Sino-Indian Conflict, 1959–1962* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984) p. 211.
9. Jawaharlal Nehru, *Prime Minister Nehru on Sino-Indian Relations*, vol. I, Indian Parliament, part V (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1962) p. 93.

10. Refer, for example, to Escott Reid, *Envoy to Nehru* (Oxford & Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1981) pp. 21–3, 56–7, 64–5. Chester Bowles, the US ambassador to New Delhi, in a written appeal to Dulles of 5 February 1953, noted that it was Nehru's opinion, as well as that of every non-Communist leader in Asia, that the US should adopt a policy which would take as its primary objective the encouragement of a Sino-Soviet rift (US, State Department, 5 February 1955, DOCEX) (The Declassified Documents Reference System) NLE Case no. 77–103, p. 2.
11. Vertzberger, *Misperceptions*, op. cit., p. 210.
12. As cited by Vertzberger, *Misperceptions*, op. cit., p. 227.
13. James Reston in The New York Times, *Report from Red China* (New York: Avon Publishers, 1972) p. 96. During the interview, Zhou referred Reston to Neville Maxwell's famous book, *China's India War*.
14. *Prime Minister Nehru on Sino-Indian Relations*, vol. I, op. cit., p. 118.
15. Ibid., pp. 76–7.
16. Vertzberger, *Misperceptions*, op. cit., p. 68.
17. *Prime Minister Nehru on Sino-Indian Relations*, vol. I, op. cit., p. 92.
18. Subimal Dutt, *With Nehru in the Foreign Office* (Calcutta: Minerva Associates, 1977) p. 87.
19. Ibid., p. 90.
20. Ibid., p. 92.
21. SCMP, no. 912, 20 October 1954, p. 6.
22. Ibid., p. 3.
23. Dutt, *With Nehru*, op. cit., p. 114.
24. Ibid., p. 97.
25. Ibid., p. 103. As a point of later disagreement refer to *Documents on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1960) p. 59.
26. Dutt, *With Nehru*, op. cit., p. 141.
27. R.K. Jain(ed.) *China-South Asian Relations 1947–1980*, vol. I (New Delhi: Radian Publishers, 1981) p. 103.
28. Ibid., p. 110.
29. Allen S. Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975) p. 18.
30. CB, no. 559, 18 April 1959, p. 23.
31. Ibid., p. 23.
32. Ibid., pp. 23–4.
33. Jain (ed.) *Relations*, op. cit., p. 124.
34. 'Revolution in Tibet and Nehru's Philosophy', CB, no. 570, 6 May 1959, p. 11.
35. 'Let Us All Study Nehru's Statement', CB, no. 570, 1 May 1959, p. 1.
36. 'Revolution in Tibet', op. cit., p. 7.
37. Ibid., p. 13.
38. Percy and Lucy Fang, *Zhou Enlai – A Profile*, (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1986) p. 122.
39. Jain (ed.) *Relations*, op. cit., p. 136.
40. *Documents on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question*, op. cit., p. 1.
41. Ibid., p. 12.

42. Ibid., p. 24.
43. Ibid., p. 25.
44. Ibid., pp. 65–6.
45. Ibid., p. 27.
46. Ibid., p. 132.
47. See Dutt's account of the atmospherics and discussions in Dutt, *With Nehru*, op. cit., p. 126.
48. Dutt, *With Nehru*, op. cit., p. 127.
49. Jain (ed.) *Relations*, op. cit., p. 170.
50. Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, *China Under Threat. The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy* (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980) p. 119.
51. Dick Wilson, *Zhou Enlai: A Biography* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1984) p. 224.
52. *Documents on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question*, op. cit., p. 137.
53. Jain (ed.) *Relations*, op. cit., p. 172.
54. Ibid., p. 174.
55. Edgar Snow, *Red China Today*, rev. and updated (New York: Random House, 1970) p. 564.
56. *Documents on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question*, op. cit., p. 58.
57. SCMP, no. 227, 24 March 1960, p. 43.
58. CB, no. 636, 1 October 1960, p. 14.
59. *Prime Minister Nehru on Sino-Indian Relations*, vol. I, op. cit., p. 76.
60. As cited in Gurtov and Hwang, *China Under Threat*, op. cit., p. 122.
61. SCMP, no. 2845, 20 October 1962, p. 25.
62. *Documents on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question*, op. cit., p. 125.
63. SCMP, no. 2848, 24 October 1962, pp. 19–20.
64. CB, no. 698, 13 November 1962, p. 4.
65. Ibid., p. 6.
66. Ibid., p. 3.
67. SCMP, no. 2860, 8 November 1962, p. 38.
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70. Zhou Enlai, *Premier Chou En-lai's Letter to the Leaders of Asian and African Countries on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1974) p. 21.
71. Ibid., p. 29.
72. Jain (ed.) *Relations*, op. cit., p. 237.
73. SCMP, no. 2868, 24 November 1962, pp. 32–3.
74. US Department of State, Memorandum for the President, 21 November 1962, DOCEX, 217C, 1977.
75. SCMP, no. 2865, 20 November 1962, p. 29.
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77. On this 'pacifying' see CB, no. 696, 27 October 1962, p. 15.
78. SCMP, no. 2865, 20 November 1962, pp. 27–8.
79. *Prime Minister Nehru on Sino-Indian Relations*, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 150.

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81. See the text of these proposals in Jain (ed.) *Relations*, op. cit., pp. 247–8.
82. Ibid., p. 252.
83. Ibid., pp. 256–7.
84. SCMP, no. 2909, 24 January 1963, p. 24.
85. Shih Tung-hsiang, 'Rip Off Tito-Clique's "Supra-Bloc" Mask', *Hon-gai*, no. 18, 16 September 1961; CB, no. 282, p. 2.
86. Shih Chien, 'Nehru's Pretense of "Non-Alignment" Can No Long Deceive People', *Shishi shouce* (Current events), no. 22, 21 November 1962 in CB, no. 345, pp. 1–3.
87. CB, no. 696, 27 October 1962, p. 10.
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89. This memorandum only inquired whether any action could be taken to deny the Chinese critical components – Joint Chiefs of Staff to Bundy, 13 July 1964, DOCEX, 193B, 1977.
90. White House, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, memo for the record, Bundy to the President, 15 September 1964, DOCEX, 1978.
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92. Alan Day (ed.) (Comp. by Peter Jones and Sian Kevill), *China and the Soviet Union 1949–84* (Kessing's International Studies. Harlow, Essex: Longman Group Ltd., 1985) p. 46.
93. CB, no. 712, 4 September 1963, p. 1.
94. Ibid., p. 5.
95. 'Peiping Views on "Revolutionary War"', CIA memorandum to Bundy, DOCEX, 116F, 1977, p. 8.
96. SCMP, no. 3036, 4 August 1963, p. 33.
97. SCMP, no. 3062, 14 September 1963, p. 33.
98. SCMP, no. 3121, 12 December 1963, p. 29.
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100. Patrick Seale, as cited in W.A.C. Adie, 'Chou En-lai on Safari', CQ, no. 18, April, June, 1964, p. 177.
101. Zhou Enlai *et al. Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1964) pp. 20, 25.
102. Robert Scalapino's report for the Rand Corporation, 'On the Trail of Chou En-lai in Africa', memorandum RM-4061-PR, April, 1964, p. 1, stressed that Zhou's message in Africa was in fact 'Bandung not Belgrade'.
103. Zhou Enlai's report on his tour is in SCMP, no. 3208, 28 April 1964, p. 28.
104. *Afro-Asian Solidarity*, op. cit., p. 79.
105. Ibid., p. 113.

106. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
107. As cited in Dick Wilson, *Zhou Enlai*, op. cit., p. 230.
108. Percy and Lucy Fang, *Zhou Enlai – A Profile*, op. cit., p. 112.
109. Author's interview with Chen Zhongjing, Beijing, 12 November 1985.
110. *Afro-Asian Solidarity*, op. cit., p. 148.
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112. *Afro-Asian Solidarity*, op. cit., pp. 149–50.
113. *Ibid.*, p. 287.
114. *Ibid.*, p. 355.
115. *Ibid.*, p. 385.
116. SCMP, no. 3204, 17 April, 1964, p. 41.
117. SCMP, no. 3317, 9 October, 1964, p. 25.
118. *Afro-Asian Solidarity*, op. cit., p. 353.
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120. SCMP, no. 3566, 23 October 1965, pp. 26–9.
121. SCMP, no. 3568, 26 October 1965, p. 24.
122. This emphasis is, perhaps, best reflected in Allen S. Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence*, op. cit., *passim*, and Gurto and Hwang, *China Under Threat*, op. cit., pp. 99–154.

6 The 'Revolutionary Diplomatic Line' in the Cultural Revolution

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2. Speech at the reception of Afro-Asian guests, 22 December 1967, US, JPRS, no. 52568, in Columbia University, *Contemporary China Documents Collection*, henceforth cited as CCDC, fiche No. R.600300.05.
3. Deng Xiaoping, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 1975–1982*, henceforth cited as SWDXp, (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), pp. 59, 130, 141, 263. The contemporary policy significance of this phrasology is discussed generally in Ronald C. Keith, “Egalitarianism” and “Seeking the Truth from the Facts” in the People’s Republic of China, *Dalhousie Review*, vol. 63, no. 2, Summer 1983, pp. 325–9.
4. SWDXp, p. 239.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 329–30.
6. Thomas Robinson, ‘Chou Enlai’s Political Style: Comparisons with Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao’, *Asian Survey*, vol. X, no. 12, December 1970, pp. 1101–16. Also see ‘Chou En-lai and the Cultural Revolution’, in Thomas Robinson (ed.), *The Cultural Revolution in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).
7. Deng’s speech to the People’s University, 2 August 1966, CB, no. 819, 10 March 1967, p. 4.
8. See Ishwer Ojha, *Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition. The Diplomacy of Cultural Despair* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2nd edn, 1972) p. 220. Also see Michael Yahuda, *China’s Role in World Affairs* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1978) p. 191.

9. CCP, *Resolution on CPC History 1949–1981* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1981) p. 42.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 45–6.
11. According to interviews with Pu Shan and Chen Chongjing in November 1985, the lack of comment in the decision reflected the fact that there was consistent caution in Mao's foreign policy. Pu Shan did confirm that the debate concerning the 27 June decision covered the issue of 'red diplomatic fighters', but this type of issue was not included in the decision as it affected the sensitivities of other countries.
12. Yahuda, *China's Role in World Affairs*, op. cit., p. 194.
13. For example, refer to the Foreign Ministry note of 1 September 1967, SCMP, no. 4015, 1 September 1967, p. 34.
14. Yahuda, *China's Role in World Affairs*, op. cit., p. 195.
15. Refer to Chen Yi's reassurances at the banquet for the Mauritanian delegation in February 1967, in SCMP, no. 3883, 15 February 1967, p. 20.
16. SCMP, no. 3907, 23 March 1967, p. 31.
17. *Ibid.*
18. SCMP, No. 3907, 17 March 1967, p. 22.
19. For example, see the following Soviet commentary, N. Kapchenko, ‘“The Cultural Revolution” and the Mao Group’s Foreign Policy’, *International Affairs* (Moscow) no. 2, 1968, pp. 14–22. For analysis of Soviet perception refer to A. James Melnick, ‘Soviet Perceptions of the Maoist Cult of Personality’, *Studies in Comparative Communism*, vol. IX, no. 2, Spring/Summer 1976, pp. 129–44; Klaus Mehnert, ‘Mao and Maoism: Some Soviet Views’, *Current Scene*, vol. VIII, no. 15, 1 September 1970, pp. 1–11.
20. CB, no. 785, 30 April 1966, p. 60.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
23. CB, no. 788, 14 May 1966, p. 10.
24. SCMP, no. 3723, 17 June 1966, p. 31.
25. *Ibid.*, 16 June 1966, p. 27.
26. *Ibid.*, 17 June 1966, p. 34.
27. SCMP, no. 3728, 24 June 1966, p. 38.
28. CIA, Intelligence Information Cable, TD:CS-314/11349–66, p. 2. Available in the Declassified Documents Reference System (henceforth DOCEX) (Arlington, Va.: Carrollton Press), 134D, 1978.
29. SCMP, no. 3729, 24 June 1966, p. 24.
30. SCMP, no. 3731, 29 June 1966, p. 31.
31. See Hong Yung Lee, *The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) pp. 31–41.
32. Lowell Dittmer, *Liu Shao-ch'i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974) p. 93.
33. Refer to the text of the 16 points in Edgar Snow, *The Long Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973) pp. 238–49.
34. SCMP, no. 3774, 31 August 1966, p. 7.
35. SCMP, no. 3766, 18 August 1966, p. 5.

36. Zhou's 1 September speech in CB, no. 819, 10 March 1967, p. 17.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
38. *Translations on Communist China: Political & Sociological* (no. 394), US, JPRS, no. 40974, 10 May 1967, p. 1.
38. CB, no. 819, *op. cit.*, pp. 18–20.
40. Zhou's 10 September speech in CB, no. 819, 10 March 1967, p. 32.
41. 10 September speech, CB, no. 819, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
42. Refer to Zhou's 18 October speech at the Worker's Stadium, CB, no. 819, 10 March 1967, p. 65.
43. 10 September speech, CB, no. 819, 10 March 1967, pp. 35–6.
44. 13 September speech, *Ibid.*, pp. 46–7.
45. US, Consulate General, Hong Kong, *Survey of China Mainland Magazines* (henceforth SCMM), no. 635, 2 December 1968, p. 14.
46. *Translations on Communist China*, US, JPRS, no. 40391, 24 March 1967 (in CCDC, R.60400.16).
47. SCMP, no. 3809, 23 October 1966, p. 40.
48. SCMP, no. 3872, 26 January 1967, p. 43.
49. SCMP, no. 3879, 6 February 1966, p. 28.
50. SCMP, no. 3878, 5 February 1967, p. 27.
51. 'Chronology of Events', CB, no. 844, pp. 23–4, CCDC, R. 73900.06.
52. SCMP, no. 3857, 29 December 1966, p. 26.
53. From *Dongfeng zhanbao*, no. 3, 16 February 1967, pp. 5–6, unpublished Harvard Research Centre translation in CCDC, R. 44800.02.
54. Melvin Gurtov, 'The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs During the Cultural Revolution', CQ, no. 40, October–December 1969, pp. 72–3.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
56. SCMP, no. 3899, 23 February 1967, p. 3.
57. Gurtov, 'The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs', *op. cit.*, p. 75.
58. 'A Discussion with Premier Chou En-lai on the Question of Power Seizure', CB, no. 892, 21 October 1969, p. 52.
59. SCMP, no. 4011, 29 August 1967, p. 5.
60. SCMP, no. 3939, 9 April 1967, p. 12.
61. Gurtov, 'The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs', *op. cit.*, p. 83.
62. 'How Vicious Chen Yi Is', SCMP, no. 4007, 23 August 1967, p. 1.
63. Gurtov, 'The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs', *op. cit.*, p. 78.
64. SCMP, no. 4011, 29 August 1967, p. 3.
65. *Translations on Communist China: Political & Sociological* (No. 413), US, JPRS, no. 42070, 3 August 1967, pp. 7–8, CCDC, R.54700.01.
66. SCMP, no. 4003, 26 May 1967, p. 4.
67. CB, no. 841, 26 April 1967, p. 45.
68. SCMP, no. 3982, 14 July 1967, p. 14.
69. 'Yao Dengshan tongzhide baogao' (Comrade Yao Dengshan's report), *Wujou fenglei* (Storms over five continents), 19 May 1967 in *Hongweibing ziliao* (Red Guard resource materials, mfm), vols 13–15, no. 4665.
70. See Lowell Dittmer, 'Chou En-lai and Chinese Politics', in Edward Feit (ed.) *Governments and Leaders: An Approach to Comparative Politics* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978) p. 509.

71. SCMP, no. 4004, 4 June 1967, p. 10.
72. *Waishi fenglei*, (Storms in foreign affairs), 14 July 1967 in *Hongweibing ziliao*, vols 13–15, no. 4394.
73. 'Chen Yi yu lianheguo', (Chen Yi and the UN), *Waishi fenglei*, 14 July 1967, in *Hongweibing ziliao*, vols 13–15, no. 4393.
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77. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
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79. SCMP, no. 4006, 21 August 1967, p. 31.
80. SCMP, no. 3979, 13 July 1967, p. 1.
81. SCMP, no. 4006, 22 August 1967, p. 1.
82. 'Premier Zhou's Magnificent Contributions in the Great Cultural Revolution', *Peking Review*, no. 4, 1977, p. 11.
83. Gurtov, 'The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs', *op. cit.*, p. 86.
84. SCMP, no. 4068, 28 November 1967, p. 15 in CCDC, R.37800.01.
85. CB, no. 844, p. 7, in CCDC, R.73900.02.
86. As reported in *Wenge tongxin* 9 October 1967 in *Communist China Digest*, no. 193, US, JPRS, no. 43903, 8 January 1968, pp. 117–21, in CCDC, R.48000.04.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
88. *Ibid.*, p. 121.
89. SCMP, no. 4065, 24 November 1967, p. 2 in CCDC, R.08200.11.
90. SCMP, no. 4088, 28 December 1967, p. 16.
91. As cited in Gurtov, 'The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs', *op. cit.*, p. 86.
92. SCMP, no. 4041, 13 October 1967, p. 12.
93. SCMP, no. 4085, 21 November 1967, p. 5.
94. Jiang Qing's speech of 18 September, SCMP, no. 4069, 29 November 1967, p. 9.
95. Feng Piao, 'Report on the International Situation', Canton, *Hongse haiyuan*, (Red seamen), 24 January 1968, in CB, no. 850, 3 April 1968, in CCDC, R.20410.01.
96. 'Chairman Mao's Latest Speech', SCMP, no. 4057, 8 November 1967, p. 1.
97. *Ibid.*
98. SCMP, no. 4069, 29 November 1967, pp. 3, 6.
99. CB, no. 611, 22 January 1968, p. 10.
100. SCMP, no. 4088, 29 December 1967, p. 14.
101. SCMP, no. 4078, 12 November 1967, p. 3.
102. *Translations on Communist China*, *op. cit.*, no. 18, US, JPRS, no. 45741, 19 June 1968, pp. 7–8, CCDC, R.10500.07.
103. 'Zhou zongli paoda waibu' (Premier Zhou bombards the Foreign Ministry), *Zhen* (Truth), Hong Kong?, 16 June 1968, in *Zhonggong waijiao gaikuang* (A Survey of the Chinese Communist Foreign Ministry), in Hoover Chinese Collection, Stanford.
104. CB, no. 631, 21 October 1968, p. 3.

105. CB, no. 622, 6 August 1968, p. 3.
106. Allen S. Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975) p. 229.
107. For example, see *Pi Chen zhanbao*, (Criticise Chen struggle magazine), 1 August 1967 in *Hongweibing ziliao*, vols 11–12 no. 3283.
108. SCMP, no. 4060, 15 November 1967, p. 7.
109. SCMP, no. 4076, 8 December 1967, p. 4.

7 Strategy and 'Realism' in Sino-American Normalisation

1. Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston & Toronto: Little, Brown, & Co., 1979) p. 745.
2. Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston & Toronto: Little, Brown, & Co., 1982) pp. 46, 50.
3. As cited in John McCook Roots, *Chou* (New York: Doubleday, 1978) p. 134.
4. Bruce Garvey, *Toronto Daily Star*, 16 July 1971, p. 8.
5. Excerpt from 31 January 1972 interview in *Quotations from Premier Chou En-lai* (New York: Thomas Y. Cromwell Co., 1973) p. 12.
6. Oriana Fallaci, *Interview with History* (Boston: Houghton & Mifflin, 1976) p. 40.
7. Richard Nixon, *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978) p. 554.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 565.
9. Kissinger, *White House Years* op. cit., p. 781.
10. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, op. cit., p. 50.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 49–50, 55.
13. For a gloss on 'badao' as the historical usurpation of the Zhou Emperor's imperium by an 'overlord' refer to Derke Bodde, *China's First Unifier* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1967) p. 10, fn 2. During a series of interviews with professors of international relations at Beijing institutes of international relations, the author was consistently informed that the contemporary use of 'badao' in hegemonism was merely a matter of linguistic convenience rather than an explicit historical allusion. The contemporary content was explicitly related to Lenin's theory of imperialism. The present international political system under such theory is presumed to be qualitatively different from that of past historical epochs. Beijing interviews: *Guojiwenti yanjiuso*, 22 December 1981; *Xiandai guoji guanxi yanjiuso*, Haidianqu, 26 December 1981; *Guoji guanxi xueyuan*, Beida, 24 December 1981.
14. The Chinese text of this interview, together with the text of most of Zhou's important interviews of the early 1970s, is available in *Zhou Enlai jinianji* (Commemorative selections on Zhou Enlai) (Hong Kong: Chishiniandai yuekan, 1977) pp. 440–57.
15. Edgar Snow, *The Long Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973) p. 159.

16. Kissinger, *White House Years*, op. cit., p. 1075.
17. For discussion of this interrelationship see Ronald C. Keith, 'The Origins and Strategic Implications of China's "Independent Foreign Policy"', *International Journal*, vol. XLI, Winter 1985-6, p. 111.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 107-9.
19. CB, no. 882, 16 June 1969, p. 5.
20. For example, western reports were cited as to Moscow's opportuning of Washington to strike a deal on arms control issues and Vietnam in light of the worsening Sino-Soviet dispute. See CB, no. 883, 29 June 1969, p. 19.
21. SCMP, no. 4384, 26 March 1969, p. 30.
22. See Snow, *The Long Revolution*, op. cit., p. 162.
23. The Reston interview is in *The New York Times*, *Report from Red China* (New York: Avon Books, 1972) p. 76.
24. The entire report is translated in CB, no. 880, 9 May 1969, p. 35.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 52.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
27. For a sample of this analysis see RMRB commentary of 28 January 1969 in CB, no. 873, 7 March 1969, pp. 1-4.
28. CB, no. 880, p. 43.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
30. Nixon, *Memoirs*, op. cit., p. 568.
31. SCMP, no. 4426, 29 May 1969, p. 33.
32. SCMP, no. 4459, 22 July 1969, p. 18.
33. SCMP, no. 4460, 23 July 1969, p. 20.
34. For discussion of this theory see NCNA commentary of 23 September 1969 in SCMP, no. 4506, 30 September 1969, p. 31.
35. PRC government statement of 7 October 1969, SCMP, no. 4516, 14 October 1969, pp. 22-3.
36. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, op. cit., p. 690.
37. SCMP, no. 4518, 16 October 1969, p. 39.
38. SCMP, no. 4527, 30 October 1969, p. 21.
39. SCMP, no. 4548, 2 December 1969, p. 21.
40. SCMP, no. 4551, 5 December 1969, p. 28.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
42. *Continue the Revolution, Advance from Victory to Victory* Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1970) pp. 7-8.
43. Ross Terrill, *Mao* (New York: Harper & Row, 1980) p. 360.
44. *The New York Times*, 7 October 1971.
45. Kissinger, *White House Years*, op. cit., p. 1061.
46. Roots, *Chou*, op. cit., p. 168.
47. For analysis of changes in Nixon's position see Fu-mei Chiu Wu, *Richard M. Nixon, Communism and China* (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1978) p. 71.
48. Nixon, *Memoirs*, op. cit., p. 550.
49. Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, *China! Inside the People's Republic* (New York: Bantam Books, 1972) p. 345.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 346.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 347.
52. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, op. cit., p. 693.

53. CCAS, *China!*, op. cit., p. 354.
54. Ibid., p. 356.
55. Ibid., p. 355.
56. Ibid., p. 361.
57. Ibid., p. 364.
58. The New York Times, *Report from Red China*, p. 82.
59. Ibid., p. 88.
60. Ibid., p. 92.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., p. 99.
63. The New York Times, 7 October 1971.
64. Ibid.
65. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, op. cit., p. 47.
66. Nixon confirms that he had requested Kissinger not to return to the US on the day of the UN vote (Nixon, *Memoirs*, op. cit., p. 556).
67. The New York Times, 9 November 1971, pp. 1, 16.
68. Wu, *Nixon, Communism and China*, op. cit., p. 147.
69. SCMP, no. 5011, 10 November 1971, p. 128.
70. Ibid., p. 131.
71. Ibid., p. 133.
72. SCMP, no. 5509, 8 November 1971, p. 50.
73. SCMP, no. 5049, 7 January 1972, p. 209.
74. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, op. cit., pp. 49–50.
75. Ibid., p. 47.
76. SCMP, no. 5015, 17 November 1971, p. 83.
77. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, op. cit., pp. 47, 1063.
78. Lin Biao's political report, CB, no. 880, p. 32.
79. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, op. cit., p. 49.
80. Zhou's report is in *Issues and Studies*, vol. XIII, no. 1, January 1977, pp. 113–19, as well as in King C. Chen (ed.) *China and the Three Worlds* (White Plains: M.E. Sharpe, 1979) pp. 133–42. Its always possible that the original may have been doctored by Taiwan's intelligence services; however, the Taiwan version is, by and large, faithful to the contemporary CCP line.
81. The Taiwan version of the report shows no reference to the standard 'two intermediate zones' in the first pages, but in the body of the text there is reference to 'the first intermediate zone' of Africa, Asia and Latin America and a second zone of Western Europe, Japan, Canada and Oceania, *Issues and Studies*, vol. XIII, no. 1, p. 118 – see Shen Ping-wen's discussion of 'parts' and 'zones' in 'An Analysis of Two Significant Reports Made by Chou En-lai', *Issues and Studies*, vol. XIII, no. 3, March 1977, p. 19.
82. *Issues and Studies*, vol. XIII, no. 1, p. 114.
83. Ibid., p. 117.
84. Ibid., p. 118.
85. For 'On Policy', 25 December 1940, and a Party analysis of its relevance to international affairs, see King C. Chen (ed.) *China and the Three Worlds*, op. cit., pp. 72–84, especially, pp. 77–80.
86. SCMP, no. 5069, 4 February 1972, p. 209.

87. Kissinger, *White House Years*, op. cit., p. 1055.
88. Ibid., pp. 1060–1.
89. Nixon, *Memoirs*, op. cit., p. 561.
90. English text in 'President Nixon's Visit to the People's Republic of China', CB, no. 952, 27 March 1972, p. 14. The Chinese text is in Zhou Enlai, *Zhou Enlai xuanji* (Selected works of Zhou Enlai), vol. II (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1984), pp. 475–6.
91. CB, no. 952, p. 15.
92. Nixon, *Memoirs*, op. cit., p. 565.
93. CB, no. 952, p. 15.
94. Ibid., pp. 24–5.
95. Ibid., pp. 25–6.
96. Nixon, *Memoirs*, op. cit., p. 568.
97. Ibid., p. 555.
98. Kissinger, *White House Years*, op. cit., p. 782.
99. Ibid., p. 783.
100. Ibid., p. 1072; Nixon, *Memoirs*, op. cit., p. 564.
101. English text in CB, no. 952, pp. 37–42; Chinese text in *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo tiaoyueji* (Collected treaties of the PRC), vol. 19, 1972 (Beijing: Renminchuban, 1977) pp. 20–4.
102. Gene T. Hsiao (ed.) *Sino-American Detente and its Policy Implications* (New York: Praeger, 1974) p. 294.
103. John Garver has, in particular, sponsored this interpretation. See *China's Decision for Rapprochement with the United States* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982) pp. 2, 74, and his reply to James Monroe, CQ, no. 88, December 1981, p. 690.
104. Nixon, *Memoirs*, op. cit., p. 567.
105. Arkady Shevchenko, *Breaking with Moscow* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985) p. 201.
106. Enver Hoxha, *Reflections on China* (Toronto: Norman Bethune Institute, 1979), vol. I, p. 686.
107. Ibid., pp. 567, 572, 673, 690.
108. George Ginsburgs, 'Moscow's Reaction to Nixon's Jaunt to Peking', in Hsiao (ed.) *Sino-American Detente*, p. 157.
109. Ibid., p. 165.
110. *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo tiaoyueji*, vol. 19, op. cit., pp. 6–8.
111. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, op. cit., p. 56.
112. Ibid., p. 61.
113. Ibid., p. 343.
114. Zhou's report of March 1973, *Issues and Studies*, vol. XIII, no. 1, January 1977, pp. 122–4.
115. Zhou Enlai's political report, Chinese Communist Party, *The Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Documents)* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1973) p. 5.
116. Ibid., pp. 7–8.
117. Ibid., pp. 18–19.
118. Ibid., p. 23.
119. Ibid., p. 24.
120. Zhou, *Issues and Studies*, vol. XIII, no. 1, January 1977, p. 120.

121. *Tenth National Congress*, op. cit., p. 30.
122. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
123. *Ibid.*, pp. 25–6.
124. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
125. For example, see Yen Jiahua's remarks on debt to the Third Committee of UNCTAD, SCMP, no. 5135, 17 May 1982, pp. 142–4.
126. Bi Jilong, 'China's Position and Propositions on the Drafting of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States', CB, no. 1011, 25 June 1974, pp. 103–6.
127. Wei Pingkuei in US Consulate General, Hong Kong, SCMM, (*Survey of China Mainland Magazines*), nos 767–8, 21 January–4 February 1974, pp. 92–7 especially, p. 93.
128. Ronald C. Keith, 'Origins and Strategic Implications of China's "Independent Foreign Policy"', op. cit., pp. 85–6.

8 Zhou Enlai's Legacy: Towards 'Independent Foreign Policy'

1. Chinese Communist Party, *Resolution on CPC History 1949–81* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1981) p. 40.
2. Deng Xiaoping, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping 1975–1982* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984) pp. 329–30.
3. *Resolution on CPC History*, op. cit., p. 38.
4. For example, refer to Zhou's speeches of 18 November 1973 and 21 February 1974 to visiting South Vietnamese and Zambian leaders in *Dangqianye guoji xingshi 1973.8–1974.5* (The current international situation 1973.8–1974.5) (Hong Kong: Sanlianshudian, 1974) pp. 27, 33. This volume is henceforth cited as DQGJ.
5. For sample references see the 21 February 1974 speech to Kaunda and the 24 March 1974 speech to Nyerere in DQGJ, pp. 33, 46.
6. DQGJ, pp. 7–8.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
12. Percy and Lucy Fang, *Zhou Enlai – A Profile* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1986) pp. 184–6.
13. Zhou Enlai, *Zhengfu gongzuo baogao* (Report on the work of Government), 13 January 1975 (Beijing: Shangwu yinshudian, 1975), Chinese and English texts, p. 21.
14. *Zhengfu gongzuo baogao*, op. cit., p. 25.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
17. Text in *Peking Review*, no. 4, 24 January 1975, p. 13.
18. Part of the analysis in this chapter regarding the contemporary requirements of this policy was already developed in my article, 'The Origins

and Strategic Implications of China's "Independent Foreign Policy", *International Journal*, vol. XLI, winter, 1985-6, pp. 95-128.

19. These 'four points' were originally brought to my attention during a May 1979 discussion in Beijing with members of China's National Council for the Promotion of International Trade.
20. Ma Hong of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences discusses this 'external-oriented road' in his analysis of the world economic situation and the prospects for Sino-Japanese economic co-operation in *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong, 7 November 1983) p. 1.
21. See Han Nianlong, 'Five Principles Guide China's Diplomacy', *Beijing Review*, no. 31, 30 July 1984, p. 18 and Li Ke, 'China's Aid to Foreign Countries', *Beijing Review*, no. 36, 5 September 1983, pp. 16-17.
22. The Director of the Foreign Ministry's Institute of International Relations has argued that 'independence' has remained as a 'cardinal principle' ever since 1949, and that 'leaning to one side' did not mean giving up China's own initiative. Zheng Weizhi, 'Independence is the Basic Canon', *Beijing Review*, no. 1, 7 January 1985, pp. 16-17, 38.
23. DQGJ, p. 7.
24. Ronald C. Keith, 'The Origins and Strategic Implications of China's "Independent Foreign Policy"', op. cit., pp. 101, 103.
25. SWDXP, p. 384.
26. SWDXP, p. 396.

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Selected Glossary

Asians fighting Asians	<i>Yazhouren da Yazhouren</i> 亚洲人打亚洲人
attitude of realism	<i>xianshizhuyi taidu</i> 现实主义态度
big-country chauvinism	<i>daguoshawenzhuyi</i> 大国外交主义
building a new kitchen	<i>ling qi lucao</i> 另起炉灶
Central Foreign Affairs Bureau	<i>zhongyang waishizu</i> 中央外事组
collective peace	<i>jiti heping</i> 集体和平
collective self-reliance	<i>gebiedehuo jitide zili gengsheng</i> 个别的或集体的自力更生
Committee for Cultural Exchange	<i>dui wai wenhua lianjie weiyuanhui</i> 对外文化联结委员会
Committee on Foreign Economic Relations	<i>dui wai jingji weiyuanhui</i> 对外经济委员会
Countries want independence, nations want liberation and peoples, revolution	<i>guojia yao duli, minzu yao jiefang, renmin yao geming</i> 国家要独立 民族要解放 人民要革命
dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere and never seek hegemony	<i>shen wa dong, guang ji liang, bu chengba</i> 深挖洞 广积粮 不称霸
diplomatic methods	<i>waijiao shouduan</i> 外交手段
diplomatic norms	<i>waijiao zhunze</i> 外交准则
dirty war	<i>angzang zhanzheng</i> 肮脏战争
divide and rule	<i>fen er zhizhi</i> 分而治之
dogmatism	<i>jiaotiaozhuyi</i> 教条主义
dual leadership	<i>shuangchong lingdao</i> 双重领导

east wind prevails over the west wind	<i>dongfeng yadao xifeng</i> 东风压倒西风
economic reconstruction	<i>jingji huifu</i> 经济恢复
Eisenhowerism	<i>Aisenhaoweierzhuyi</i> 艾森豪威尔主义
empiricism	<i>jingyanzhuyi</i> 经验主义
equality and mutual aid	<i>pingdeng huzhu</i> 平等互助
equality and mutual benefit	<i>pingdeng huli</i> 平等互利
essential; secondary	<i>ben; mo</i> 本末
first, use; second, criticise; third, improve; fourth, make it our own	<i>yi yong, er pi, san gai, si chuang</i> 一用二批三改四创
Foreign Affairs General Office	<i>waishi bangongshi</i> 外事办公室
Foreign Affairs Publications Bureau	<i>waijiao chubanju</i> 外交出版局
foreign affairs system	<i>waishi xitong</i> 外事系统
fraternal unity and friendly co-operation of the socialist countries, headed by the Soviet Union	<i>yi sulian wei shoude shehuizhuyi geguode qinmi tuanjie he youhao hezuo</i> 从苏联为首的社会主义各国的 亲蜜团结和友好合作
forward and offensive line	<i>jingong luxian</i> 进攻路线
gentleman scholar	<i>junzi</i> 君子
get busy with the five things	<i>wuqin</i> 五勤
golden mean	<i>zhongyong</i> 中庸
great disorder under heaven	<i>tianxia daluan</i> 天下大乱
great zone of peace	<i>guangda heping qu</i> 广大和平区

guiding leadership	<i>zhidao</i> 指 导
hegemonism	<i>baquanzhuyi</i> 霸 权 主 义
in all its manifestations	<i>zai yiqie biaoxianzhong</i> 在 一 切 表 现 中
independent foreign policy	<i>duli waijiao zhengce</i> 独 立 外 交 政 策
infantile disorder on the left	<i>zuopai youzhibing</i> 左 派 幼 稚 痘
large-scale capital construction	<i>daguimode jiben jianshe</i> 大 规 模 的 基 本 建 设
leaded doll	<i>budao weng</i> 不 倒 翁
leaning to one side	<i>yibiandao</i> 一 边 倒
like the two wings of a bird	<i>ru niaozhi liangyi</i> 如 鸟 之 两 翼
liquidationism	<i>quxiaozhuyi</i> 取 销 主 义
mistakes of principle	<i>yuanzexing cuowu</i> 原 则 性 错 误
no cease-fire, no talks and no peaceful solution	<i>buting huo, butanpan ye buheping jiejue</i> 不 停 火 不 谈 判 也 不 和 平 解 决
open door policy	<i>kaifang zhengce</i> 开 放 政 策
Overseas Chinese Commission	<i>Huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui</i> 华 侨 事 务 委 员 会
people's diplomacy	<i>renmin waijiao</i> 人 民 外 交
policy of combining large, medium and small	<i>dazhongxiao xiangjiehede fangzhen</i> 大 中 小 相 结 合 的 方 针
policy of propagandising our Party	<i>xuanchuan wodangde zhengce</i> 宣 传 我 党 的 政 策
pragmatism	<i>shiyongzhuyi</i> 实 用 主 义

red diplomatic fighters	<i>hongse waijiao zhanshi</i> 红色外交战士
revolution cannot be exported	<i>geming shi buneng shuchude</i> 革命是不能输出的
rising storm in the mountains	<i>shanyu yu lai feng man lou</i> 山雨欲来风满楼
scheme of cease-fire first and talk later	<i>xian tingzhan hou tanpande guiji</i> 先停战后谈判的诡计
seeking common ground while reserving differences	<i>qiutong cunyi</i> 求同存异
seeking the truth from the facts	<i>shishi qiu shi</i> 实事求是
self-reliance	<i>zili gengsheng</i> 自力更生
sinification of Marxism-Leninism	<i>Zhongguohuade Makesi-Lieningzhuyi</i> 中国化的马克思列宁主义
South-South co-operation	<i>nannan hezuo</i> 南南合作
special responsibilities	<i>teshude zeren</i> 特殊的责任
standard for taking action	<i>xingdong zhunze</i> 行动准则
strategically despise the enemy while taking full account of him tactically	<i>zhanlüeshang miaoshi diren zhanshushang</i> <i>zhongshi diren</i> 战略上藐视敌人 战术上重视敌人
strategies and policies	<i>fangzhen zhengce</i> 方针政策
strategy of peaceful settlement of the Xi'an Incident	<i>heping jiejue Xi'an shijiande fangzhen</i> 和平解决西安事变的方针
strive to seek common ground	<i>nuli xunzhao gongtong dian</i> 努力寻找共同点
study	<i>xuexi</i> 学习

suzerainty	<i>zongzhuquan</i> 宗主权
three bigs and one deep	<i>sanda, yishen</i> 三大一深
three peacefuls and two entires	<i>sanhe, liangquan</i> 三和两全
three surrenders and one elimination	<i>sanxiang, yimie</i> 三降一灭
two great camps	<i>liang da zhenying</i> 两 大 阵 营
uniting with all the forces that can be united with	<i>tuanjie yiqie keyi tuanjiede liiliang</i> 团结一切可以团结的力量
various kinds of new troops and military personnel as well as various kinds of weapons and ammunition	<i>gezhong xinde budui he junshi renyuan yiji gezhong wuqi he danyao</i> 各种新的部队和军事人员 以及各种武器和弹药
way of the hegemon; way of the king	<i>badao; wangdao</i> 霸道 王道
workstyle	<i>gongzuo zuofeng</i> 工作 作风

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